Whitehall Monitor 2026: Part 1 - The government

Mission-driven government

Missions promised to change both the ‘what’ and the ‘how’ of government

Mission-led government describes both the five policy priorities of this government and how it hopes to change the state to achieve them. The five missions themselves were set out back in February 2023 by Keir Starmer, as leader of the opposition – with Labour pitching them as “the pillars of the next Labour government” ¹⁴² 1 Mason C and Whannel K, ‘Keir Starmer unveils Labour’s five missions for the country’, BBC News, 23 February 2023, www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-64739371 www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-64739371  in the long run-up to the 2024 general election. Those missions are:

• Kick-start economic growth
• Build an NHS fit for the future
• Safer streets
• Break down the barriers to opportunity
• Make Britain a clean energy superpower.

Then, five months after the election, as prime minister Starmer announced the Plan for Change in December 2024, which set out milestones under each mission. His speech reaffirmed the missions as the guiding force of this government and the pact he believes the Labour Party made with the electorate: “These missions are our mandate.” ¹⁴³ Prime Minister’s Office, 10 Downing Street, Plan for Change: Milestones for mission-led government, GOV.UK, 5 December 2024, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/6751af4719e0c816d18d1df3/Plan_for_Change.pdf  He also believes missions are the route to state reform: “we must change the way government serves this country. That is what Mission-led government will do.” ¹⁴⁴ Cabinet Office, ‘Prime Minister appoints Sir Chris Wormald as new Cabinet Secretary and Head of the Civil Service’, op. cit.

The theory of ‘mission-led government’ draws on various intellectual influences, ¹⁴⁵ Gurumurthy R, Owen J, Burns A and Norris E, Mission-driven government, Nesta and Institute for Government, 15 July 2024, www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/publication/mission-driven-approach-government ^{, 146} Mazzucato M, Mission Economy: A Moonshot Guide to Changing Capitalism, Penguin, 27 January 2022  and while there are lots of theories about what changes missions can bring about in terms of the way the state works, there is little consensus on how missions might be pursued.

The start of December 2024 saw a drumbeat of government announcements on the ‘how’ of missions. On 2 December 2024 Sir Chris Wormald was appointed as cabinet secretary and tasked with “nothing less than the complete rewiring of the British state”. ¹⁴⁷ Cabinet Office, ‘Prime Minister appoints Sir Chris Wormald as new Cabinet Secretary and Head of the Civil Service’, op. cit  Later that same week the Plan for Change described how the government wanted Whitehall to work differently, including applying longer term thinking, making better use of technology, breaking down silos both within government and with the public, and building a culture of continuous improvement.

Starmer’s growing frustration with the civil service was already evident and, in a move that deeply damaged the hitherto improving relationship between ministers and civil servants, he described too many people in Whitehall as being “too comfortable in the tepid bath of managed decline”. ¹⁴⁸ Starmer K, ‘PM speech on Plan for Change: 5 December 2025’ op. cit  Pat McFadden, then the chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, gave another speech a few days later setting out his vision for a state that worked more like a start-up – and tried to repair some of the relationship damage by praising “hard working and diligent civil servants”. ¹⁴⁹ McFadden P, ‘Reform of the state has to deliver for people’, speech at UCL East, GOV.UK, 9 December 2024, www.gov.uk/government/speeches/reform-of-the-state-has-to-deliver-for-the-people  Three days later the chancellor Rachel Reeves added her own voice, saying that “by totally rewiring how the government spends money we will be able to deliver our Plan for Change”. ¹⁵⁰ HM Treasury, ‘Chancellor: Every pound spent will deliver plan for change’, press release, 12 December 2024, www.gov.uk/government/news/chancellor-every-pound-spent-will-deliver-plan-for-change

In last year’s Whitehall Monitor we said that 2025 would be a “make or break” year for missions, and set out some tests for ‘mission-driven government’:

• a clear institutional framework for the missions
• reforms to the spending review process
• and a sustained focus on reform over the long term.

A year on, it is hard to say any of these have been met in 2025.

The government is only now putting in place foundations for mission-led working

The first of those tests – a clear institutional framework for the missions – failed most obviously. For more than a year it was unclear which minister was responsible in the centre for driving the missions and managing the trade-offs between them. Indeed, it was not until later in 2025 that the governance around missions improved, with the appointment of Darren Jones as both chief secretary to the prime minister and chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster.

In November 2025 he was appointed as the chair of two new cabinet committees, on public services and domestic and border security, and he received a standing invitation to the small and senior ‘growth and living standards’ committee. ¹⁵¹ Cabinet Office, ‘List of Cabinet Committees and their membership’, Guidance, 19 November 2025, www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-cabinet-committees-system-and-list-of-cabinet-committees/list-of-cabinet-committees-and-their-membership  Together these committees cover off the government’s five missions, and give Jones some standing to force trade-offs and drive coherence between them. The mission delivery unit in the Cabinet Office was disbanded in September and re-established under Jones as a joint Number 10 and Cabinet Office team. Not only does it now have a clear ministerial owner, Jones’s recent description of it as empowering, supporting, and holding departments to account while focusing on a small number of top priorities was a welcome articulation of the new delivery unit’s role. ¹⁵² House of Commons, Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee oral evidence, ‘The work of the Cabinet Office’, 16 December 2025, https://committees.parliament.uk/event/25586/formal-meeting-oral-evidence-session/

But other problems with the institutional framework continue. It is good that the government has recognised that mission boards – the inter-ministerial groups chaired by the lead secretary of state for each mission – were not serving the delivery role that had been originally envisaged for them. ¹⁵³ Ibid.  But their new role, and how the mission boards, delivery unit and new cabinet committees will relate to each other remains unclear. Nevertheless, this is a good start. The prime minister and chief secretary should give these new foundations time and sustained attention to prove they can work.

On our second test of reforms to the spending review process, the government had very mixed performance. From zero-based reviews of existing policy that assessed their value for money, through to greater certainty for capital spending through longer-term budgets, the 2025 spending review saw much-needed improvements to the process, many of which the Institute for Government had previously recommended. ¹⁵⁴ Bartrum O, Paxton B and Clyne R, How to run the next multi-year spending review, Institute for Government, July 2024, www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/sites/default/files/2024-07/how-to-run-spending-review.pdf  On the specific – and mission-critical – test of a spending review that created a joined up approach to budgeting and greater collaboration, however, the government failed.

Darren Jones told parliament in December 2025 that as part of that year’s spending review, the mission boards had submitted joint mission bids, and that settlement letters for departments (which set out the funding given to them in a spending review, and are not publicly available) confirmed funding that was allocated for the mission.But funding was ultimately still allocated on a departmental basis. And indeed Jones was quite clear that this process was not a rewiring: “Has it fundamentally changed the constitutional principles or the set-up of the government? No.” ¹⁵⁵ House of Commons, Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee oral evidence, ‘The work of the Cabinet Office’, op. cit

It is perhaps understandable that the government did not turn mission boards into department-like structures with spending powers and parliamentary accountability in their first year in power. But it was never a binary question of such radical change or the status quo. The government failed to use the flexibility available in the existing processes to break down departmental silos and incentivise collaboration as it could have done. The 2025 spending review included very few shared budgets or outcomes, and showed little evidence of cross-departmental working.*

Early clarity of ambition for mission-led government has collapsed

Our third test – a sustained focus on reform over the longer term – has been failed not only in scale, but in nature. There has been no shortage on rhetoric over the need to “rewire” ¹⁵⁶ Cabinet Office, ‘Prime Minister appoints Sir Chris Wormald as new Cabinet Secretary and Head of the Civil Service’, op. cit  the state (December 2024), for it to operate at “max power” ¹⁵⁷ Starmer K, ‘PM remarks on the fundamental reform of the British state’, op. cit  (April 2025) and to be “modernised” (June 2025). ¹⁵⁸ HM Treasury, ‘Spending Review 2025 document’, Policy paper, 11 June 2025, www.gov.uk/government/publications/spending-review-2025-document  But that has not translated into organisation-wide outcomes.

Most importantly, the government has not clearly articulated or stuck with a plan for what that reform should be. Instead, radically different ideas of what reform of the state actually means – to different ministers in the government and over time – have been swept under the all-encompassing carpet of ‘mission-led government’.

Labour’s manifesto set out three core attributes of a mission-led government – it would be more joined up, it would push power out to communities, and it would harness new technology. ¹⁵⁹ Labour, Change, The Labour Party, 13 June 2024, labour.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/Labour-Party-manifesto-2024.pdf  These are laudable but broad, ill-defined and long-term aims. Progress on them is patchy at best.

Breaking down the silos between departments was not accompanied by a plan for how to do so, and the spending review reinforced departmental boundaries.

There has been progress on pushing power out to communities through English Devolution (notwithstanding the government’s recent poor decision to delay four mayoral elections till 2028), ¹⁶⁰ Paun A, Fright M, Shaw H and Issac M, ‘The government’s decision to delay mayoral elections cannot be justified on democratic or fairness grounds’, blog, 05 December 2025, https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/comment/governments-decision-delay-mayoral-elections  and the Test, Learn and Grow pilots, which have seen much closer working between central and local government. But the broad concept has been used to argue for a similarly broad range of ideas – from a new digital centre of government (which would “catalyse a wholesale reshaping of the public sector” ¹⁶¹ Department for Science, Innovation and Technology and Government Digital Service, A blueprint for modern digital government, Department for Science, Innovation and Technology, 21 January 2025, www.gov.uk/government/publications/a-blueprint-for-modern-digital-government/  alongside local government), to the abolition of NHS England (“tearing down the walls of Whitehall”), ¹⁶² Starmer K, ‘PM remarks on the fundamental reform of the British state’, op. cit  to ‘mission hubs’ in Manchester and Aberdeen (getting civil servants to “leave their desks behind and work on the ground with communities”). ¹⁶³ Cabinet Office, ‘Frontline workers and local communities to play a crucial role in delivery of Government missions’, Press release, 16 June 2025, http://www.gov.uk/government/news/frontline-workers-and-local-communities-to-play-crucial-role-in-delivery-of-government-missions

And on harnessing new technology, this has been set up as both the answer for a state that should both operate more like a start-up (“how do we make this better by next Friday”) ¹⁶⁴ Cabinet Office, ‘Pat McFadden vows to make the state “more like a start up” as he deploys reform teams across country’, Press release, 9 December 2024, www.gov.uk/government/news/pat-mcfadden-vows-to-make-the-state-more-like-a-start-up-as-he-deploys-reform-teams-across-country  and one that should find £45 billion in savings. ¹⁶⁵ Department for Science, Innovation and Technology and others, ‘Archaic tech sees public sector miss £45 billion annual savings’, Press release, 19 January 2025, www.gov.uk/government/news/archaic-tech-sees-public-sector-miss-45-billion-annual-savings

Institute for Government research into public service performance earlier this year described how a lack of preparation in opposition as to how the missions would work in practice resulted in “little evidence of cross-departmental working or a coherent approach to public services reform”. ¹⁶⁶ Davies N and Haile D, Public services performance tracker 2025: Cross-service analysis, Institute for Government, November 2025, www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/publication/performance-tracker-2025/summary  So it is perhaps not a surprise that same problem is now being seen elsewhere, in civil service and wider state reform.

The government has also developed wholly new concepts for what mission-led government means over the past year. There was an increasing focus over 2025 on a ‘productive and agile state’, which one government description says means: reducing bureaucracy through AI and technology; reforming arms-length bodies; “streamlining approval processes”; and a focus on civil service performance. ¹⁶⁷ House of Lords, Hansard, ‘Government Departments: Bureaucracy’, PQ HL7878, 2 June 2025, https://questions-statements.parliament.uk/written-questions/detail/2025-06-02/HL7878/  Another defines it as a state that is “resilient, innovative, and equipped to meet today’s challenges and tomorrow’s opportunities”. ¹⁶⁸ A Modern Civil Service, ‘Government Risk Profession – Being more productive and agile through better risk management’, blog, GOV.UK, 17 July 2025, https://moderncivilservice.blog.gov.uk/2025/07/17/government-risk-profession-being-more-productive-and-agile-through-better-risk-management/  The Places for Growth initiative, to relocate civil servants outside of London, also badges itself as part of the efforts to create a productive and agile state, ¹⁶⁹ Cabinet Office, Places for Growth, GOV.UK, 27 October 2025, www.gov.uk/government/collections/places-for-growth  and the abolition of NHS England to take on the “cottage industry of checkers and blockers” came in a speech titled “Fundamental reform of the British state”. ¹⁷⁰ Starmer K, ‘PM remarks on the fundamental reforms of the British state: 13 March 2025’ op. cit  This was also the speech where cutting back office costs to shift money to the front line was first promoted – echoed again by McFadden in April, ¹⁷¹ Cabinet Office, ‘Government-branded merchandise and away days banned’, Press release, 6 April 2025 www.gov.uk/government/news/government-branded-merchandise-and-away-days-banned  and by Reeves in the June spending review. ¹⁷² HM Treasury, ‘Spending Review 2025 document’, op. cit  Most recently, Darren Jones put delivery – and the speed of it – at the heart of rewiring: “I want to encourage more delivery experience, more innovation, more private sector expertise, because the current system doesn’t move quickly enough, this is the rewiring that the prime minister is talking about.” ¹⁷³ House of Commons, Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee oral evidence, ‘The work of the Cabinet Office’, op. cit

It would take a great deal of effort to make these shifting phrases and slogans, proposals and strategies into a coherent plan. They are, in some areas at least, fostering new ways of working in parts of government. But the lack of consistent language, and the absence of a clear plan, means that ‘mission-driven government’ can mean almost anything to anyone. This may make for good press releases but does little for setting priorities.

As the government’s own evidence to the Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee (PACAC) set out, the positive changes that mission-led government has resulted in are often “against the grain of existing structures and processes”. ¹⁷⁴ House of Commons Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee, ‘Written Evidence Submitted by HM Government (MIG0027)’, published 3 September 2025, committees.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/144308/pdf/  In 2026 the government needs to do far more to set out what it will be doing to change those structures and processes – and then to execute it.

_{*  See the chapter Departmental spending and efficiencies.}

Ministers and Number 10

Ethical standards have driven an unusually high number of political resignations

Since the 2024 general election, Keir Starmer has had to manage 11 ministerial resignations, the second highest of any recent prime minister at this stage of their tenure.

Of those, five were due to retirement, personal or health issues (two whips, Lord Cryer and Lord Moraes, two DESNZ* ministers of state, Baroness Curran and Lord Hunt, and Baroness Gustaffson as minister of state for investment). However, the other six caused some political headaches for the prime minister. Two ministers stepped down over policy disagreement with the government, deciding to resign rather than abide by collective responsibility: Anneliese Dodds resigned as development minister in February 2025 in protest over cuts to the international aid budget; Vicky Foxcroft resigned as junior whip in June 2025 over cuts to personal independence payments in the welfare reform bill.

The other four were all tied to ethical standards, and allegations that the minister in question had failed to meet the “highest possible standards of proper conduct” expected of them by the ministerial code. ¹⁸¹ Magnus L, ‘Letter from the Independent Adviser to the Prime Minister’, Independent Adviser on Ministerial Standards, 5 September 2025. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/68bac57c536d629f9c82ab4b/Letter_from_the_Independent_Adviser_to_the_Prime_Minister.pdf

No.10 has been at pains to say the number in part reflects that the government is holding its ministers to a higher standard than its predecessors, and that the prime minister is rightly ensuring ethical investigations are taken seriously. Louise Haigh, then transport secretary, was the first to resign from Starmer’s government in November 2024 after it emerged that she misled the police and was issued a conditional discharge by magistrates before she became an MP. Since then, the (former) economic secretary to the Treasury Tulip Siddiq, health minister Andrew Gwynne, homelessness minister Rushanara Ali, and deputy prime minister Angela Rayner have all resigned over standards.

The departure of Rayner was the toughest test of the new ethics regime. She referred herself to the independent adviser for investigation after it emerged that she failed to pay sufficient stamp duty on her property in Hove. Rayner resigned after the investigation concluded that she had failed to meet the highest possible standards of conduct and therefore breached the code. ¹⁸² Magnus L, ‘Letter from the Independent Adviser to the Prime Minister’, Independent Adviser on Ministerial Standards, 5 September 2025. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/68bac57c536d629f9c82ab4b/Letter_from_the_Independent_Adviser_to_the_Prime_Minister.pdf

Taken together, however, this was not a good look given that in opposition the Labour Party was relentlessly critical of the Conservative government’s record on ministerial standards. Labour’s 2024 general election manifesto pledged to restore the public’s trust in government by holding public servants to the highest possible standards and by establishing a new Ethics and Integrity Commission (EIC) to oversee and convene ethics in public life – announced at the IfG in a keynote speech by Rayner. ¹⁸³ Labour, Serving the country, The Labour Party, 13 June 2024, https://labour.org.uk/change/serving-the-country/

The EIC replaces the Committee on Standards in Public Life (CSPL) and officially launched on 13 October 2025. It is chaired by Doug Chalmers, chair of the CSPL until it was wrapped into the EIC. Starmer's ministerial code, published in November 2024, also strengthened the powers of the prime minister’s independent adviser on ministerial standards, a post currently held by Sir Laurie Magnus. ¹⁸⁴ Baker F, McAlary P, Savur S, Durrant T, ‘Kier Starmer’s ministerial code’, Institute for Government, 6 November 2024, accessed 5 December 2025, www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/explainer/keir-starmer-ministerial-code

There is some merit to No.10’s claims that these resignations reflect positively on the robustness of the new ethics structures, and the government’s commitment to them, but they have unquestionably been disruptive. None more so than Rayner’s, whose resignation saw Starmer lose a trusted deputy and an effective secretary of state, and also precipitated a large-scale cabinet reshuffle and the election of a new deputy leader.

And Downing Street itself has not dodged this cycle of forced resignations and reshuffles. There has also been an unusually high rate of turnover among the prime minister’s special advisers. Within months of the general election, chief of staff Sue Gray resigned and was replaced with Morgan McSweeney, and by the end of September 2025, four more senior advisers had left Starmer’s team. These were Paul Ovenden, director of political strategy, and three senior communication advisers: Matthew Doyle (March 2025), James Lyons and Steph Driver.

Questions of ethical standards have also not been limited to ministers. In September 2025, the UK ambassador to the US, Peter Mandelson, was sacked for links to the convicted paedophile Jeffrey Epstein. ¹⁸⁵ BBC News, ‘Starmer aide resigns after explicit texts about Abbott surface’, BBC News, 15 September 2025, accessed 5 December 2025, www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/ckgy79yr74do”www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/ ckgy79yr74do ^{, 186} Mason R, ‘Keir Starmer sacks Peter Mandelson over Jeffrey Epstein ties’, The Guardian, 11 September 2025, accessed 5 December 2025, www.theguardian.com/politics/2025/sep/11/keir-starmer-sacks-peter-mandelson-over-jeffrey-epstein-revelations

Starmer’s ‘delivery reset’ brought some clarity but was quickly overshadowed by more disruptive personnel changes

Starmer announced a “delivery reset” ¹⁹² Brown F, ‘Sir Keir Starmer reshuffles his Downing Street team’, Sky News, 1 September 2025, https://news.sky.com/story/sir-keir-starmer-reshuffles-his-downing-street-team-13422929  in the first week of September 2025. All reporting had suggested there would be a minor change of some junior ministerial posts and indeed, initially just three ministers changed roles: Darren Jones into No.10, James Murray promoted from within the Treasury to take over his role as chief secretary, and Dan Tomlinson from the backbenches to backfill Murray’s role. ¹⁹³ Prime Minister’s Office, 10 Downing Street, Prime Minister appoints Chief Secretary and Chief Economic Advisor: 1 September 2025, GOV.UK, 1 September 2025, accessed 5 December 2025, www.gov.uk/government/news/prime-minister-appoints-chief-secretary-and-chief-economic-advisor-1-september-2025

The most significant of these was Jones’s appointment into a newly created role as chief secretary to the prime minister. The exact parameters of the role are yet to be worked out, but it looks similar to that of ‘first secretary’ the Institute called for in our Commission on the Centre of Government, ¹⁹⁴ Urban J, Clyne R, Thomas A, Power with purpose: Final report on the Commission on the Centre of Government, op. cit  and is a welcome development. Jones was also appointed later that same week to chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster in the Cabinet Office. While holding both roles undoubtedly increases Jones’s structural power at the centre of government, the Cabinet Office role brings with it significant policy responsibilities, from public appointments to national security. ¹⁹⁵ Cabinet Office, ‘List of Ministerial Responsibilities’, 20 august 2024, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/government-ministers-and-responsibilities/list-of-ministerial-responsibilities-html#cabinet-office  If the additional portfolio is not to dilute his role as chief secretary to the prime minister he will need to delegate strongly and effectively.

Alongside these ministerial moves were changes to the prime minister’s team in No.10. Starmer’s principal private secretary, Nin Pandit, was replaced by senior Treasury official Dan York-Smith. The prime minister also brought in Minouche Shafik, economist and former permanent secretary at the Department for International Development, as a senior economic advisor. These changes reflected a reported desire for more economic heft in Downing Street. ¹⁹⁶ Fleming S and Parker G, ‘Keir Starmer names Minouche Shafik as top economic adviser’ Financial Times, 29 August 2025, www.ft.com/content/7739bc75-b2dd-4109-bf07-2cba18c6eb04

In addition to economic know-how, this initial ‘delivery reset’ also appeared to be an attempt from the prime minister to give his immediate team more power to drive forward his objectives – and perhaps, to strengthen its position with regards to the Treasury.

However, what was planned as a minor reset focused at the centre soon turned into a far wider-reaching reshuffle, precipitated by the departure of Angela Rayner as deputy prime minister as described above. Combined with the high rate of turnover within No.10, September proved a far more disruptive month than the prime minister would have hoped for.

Starmer’s first reshuffle was the largest in decades

That September reshuffle ended with over half of all ministers either leaving government or changing roles. Of the 27 ministers attending cabinet, 13 moved roles or left government altogether, making it the highest cabinet turnover in any prime minister’s first reshuffle since at least 1979. There were many moves outside cabinet too – only David Cameron’s 2012 reshuffle (carried out over two years into his tenure) involved more ministers.

The scale of change means that the trend of short ministerial tenures seen since the 2016 Brexit referendum continues to be an issue under this government. The post of home secretary is indicative. At the last reshuffle Shabana Mahmood became the 10th home secretary in the past 10 years. That is more home secretaries than served in the preceding 20 years.

This much ministerial churn will inevitably hinder government effectiveness and capacity to deliver in the short term. Many ministers will only just have been getting to grips with their new briefs when they were moved. The same is true for civil servants who will have to adapt to new personalities, new ways of working, and potentially new policy priorities with the reshuffle. And this is not just about the names at the top of the organisations but across the workforce: this is most stark in the Department for Business and Trade, where every single minister left the department during the reshuffle.

This disruption will be particularly acute where individual ministers who were personally pushing forward good, if limited, reforms have been reshuffled – Georgia Gould’s absence will be felt in public sector innovation, and Darren Jones’s in continuing much-needed reforms to the spending review process. Angela Rayner, too, had spearheaded a high-profile and wide ranging portfolio of changes, including local government reorganisation and the workers’ rights bill, before her departure.

Several secretaries of state responsible for flagship policies were also moved. David Lammy for example took up the dual briefs of deputy prime minister and secretary of state for justice, just as his new department introduced major sentencing reforms initiated by Shabana Mahmood – who takes on the high-profile immigration and asylum brief. ¹⁹⁹ Rowland C, ‘The government is taking the right approach to sentencing reform’, September 2025, www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/comment/government-sentencing-bill

Starmer, of course, chose not to reshuffle the chancellor of the exchequer, Rachel Reeves, nor the defence secretary, John Healey – responsible for the economic stability and national security elements of Starmer’s ‘strong foundations’ for the country. ²⁰⁰ Labour, Strong foundations, The Labour Party, 13 June 2024, https://labour.org.uk/change/strong-foundations/  There was also relative continuity for the secretaries of state heading up missions, with just one of the five (Yvette Cooper, Home Office) leaving their role, although Shabana Mahmood coming in from MoJ will have already been involved in the safer streets mission she now heads up. Indeed, while there was a lot of movement of roles across the cabinet as a whole, only four ministers actually left cabinet, and only four were brought in. Most of the faces in Stamer’s current cabinet are therefore familiar, but many of them moved to new roles, leading to extensive change across government.

Over a third of ministers were elected for the first time in 2024

Starting work as a minister can be daunting – doing so while still getting to grips with being an MP for the first time will only add to this pressure. This is the case for a large number of the ministers appointed since the 2024 election. Of the 93 ministers in the House of Commons, 32 are now from the 2024 intake, making them the largest group in government.

This number is in part a reflection of the fact that 231 of Labour’s 411 MPs returned at the general election were new to the job. Within that group, Starmer seems to have prioritised loyalty and those who gained some experience in parliamentary roles since being elected; of the new ministers from the 2024 intake appointed at the September 2025 reshuffle, 16 had spent time as parliamentary private secretaries (PPS) to a minister, while a further 10 also had some committee experience.

Amid reports of backbench disquiet around government engagement on its legislative programme, Starmer also used the reshuffle to increase the total number of MPs on the payroll vote, either as ministers in the Commons (+2), or as PPSs (+23). Indeed, there are now a record number of PPSs, with the current 55 topping the previous high of 52 in 2022 under Rishi Sunak. Those new roles were used to reward loyalty: of the 126 MPs who threatened rebellion on the welfare bill in June only one made it onto the payroll as a PPS.

The size of that rebellion points to widespread discontent among many backbenchers. Rewarding loyalty with an expanded payroll vote is not enough in itself to ensure good relations between government and Labour MPs. The new ministerial team – in particular the new leader of the House of Commons, Alan Cambell, and chief whip Jonathan Reynolds – have work to do rebuilding links and trust between the front and backbenches, along with the expanded set of PPSs.

It remains to be seen if the government’s move to reward loyalty will encourage independent-minded backbenchers to believe that is their route to ministerial roles or whether those that feel firmly ‘outside the tent’ may be more willing to cause trouble for those still inside government. The latter may become more likely if polling for Labour remains low, and MPs fear losing their seats.

_{*  A list of departmental initialisms is found at the end of this report.}

Permanent secretaries

Permanent secretary churn means more disruption for departments

Since the general election in 2024, there have been 12 changes to head of department permanent secretaries* – meaning that more than half of all departments are now under new leadership. A reshuffle of this scale after a change of government is not unusual; in the six months following the 2010 general election, nine out of 16 department heads had changed. ²⁰⁵ Riddell P and Haddon C, Transitions: Lessons Learned, Institute for Government, 10 November 2011, www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/Transitions%20Lessons%20Learned.pdf  But this does not mean so many changes won’t affect departments. New permanent secretaries will need to get to grips with their briefs and build connections with their secretaries of state.

This means five departments now have both a secretary of state appointed in September 2025 and a permanent secretary appointed after July 2024 (Foreign Office; Justice; Environment, Food and Rural Affairs; Science, Innovation and Technology; and Home Office – although here, Shabana Mahmood and Antonia Romeo reunite, having worked together in MoJ earlier in the year).

DSIT, with new faces in four of its five ministerial roles as well as a new permanent secretary in Emran Mian, faces a particularly daunting task in establishing itself across Whitehall as the new ‘digital centre of government’.**

Even in the missions’ lead departments, where ministerial stability has been largely ensured, permanent secretaries have been moved. Three of the five (Home Office, DESNEZ, and Health) have changed their head of department. Nevertheless, there has been some continuity. At DESNZ, Clive Maxwell stepped up from second permanent secretary; at the MoJ, while David Lammy and Jo Farrar are each new to the secretary of state and permanent secretary roles respectively, neither is new to the justice brief; Lammy served as shadow lord chancellor from 2020 to 2021 ²⁰⁶ UK Parliament, ‘Mr David Lammy’, House of Commons, no date, https://members.parliament.uk/member/206/career  and Farrar as second permanent secretary at the MoJ from 2021 to 2023. ²⁰⁷ UK Government, ‘Dr Jo Farrar CB OBE’, GOV.UK, no date, www.gov.uk/government/people/jo-farrar

All the same, the year’s moves speak to an unwelcome tendency of Starmer – or those close to him – for chopping and changing roles at the centre of government. Successive governments have overvalued the impact that individuals can make at the centre of government, and tried to mask underlying structural issues with personnel changes. Starmer risks repeating this mistake.

Now that the government’s senior leaders on both the political and civil service sides are set, Starmer must back his team and work with them. He is not the first prime minister to address the deep, structural problems at the centre of government with surface level personnel moves, but he should attempt to be the last: the Institute for Government has set out proposals in our Commission on the Centre of Government to fundamentally restructure, and strengthen, the centre – which include creating a new ‘Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet’, and aligning the Treasury and the rest of the centre behind a shared strategy. ²⁰⁸ Urban J, Clyne R, Thomas A, Power with purpose: Final report on the Commission on the Centre of Government, op. cit  This would serve the prime minister far more than a merry-go-round of his top team.

More permanent secretaries have experience working outside of central government

Ministers have agency in the appointment process of permanent secretaries. While it is the prime minister who has the final say on who gets picked for the role, ministers can adjust job descriptions and offer views on potential candidates. As such, appointing new permanent secretaries provides a chance to shape the leadership of the civil service. The most recent appointments seem to indicate – although from a small sample – that a smattering of external experience is becoming a more valuable trait for permanent secretaries, and one which potential candidates may be more actively seeking out in their careers.

Of the eight permanent secretaries newly appointed since the general election, four bring experience from outside the civil service. Olly Robbins joined the FCDO having spent time at Goldman Sachs and the advisory firm Hakluyt, while Samantha Jones came to DHSC from renewable energy firm Xlinks, following a career in the NHS and health sector. Emran Mian (DSIT) and Paul Kissack (Defra) served as leaders of the think tanks Social Market Foundation and Joseph Rowntree Foundation respectively. Kissack also has international experience, having held senior positions in New Zealand’s Ministry for Children. Also bringing outside experience is the recently appointed National Armaments Director Rupert Pearce***, whose extensive private sector background includes four years as the CEO of communications firm Inmarsat.

This is not a private sector or external takeover of the civil service. All head of department permanent secretaries have extensive civil service experience, and half of them have prior experience at least at director general level within their current department. Right at the top the cabinet secretary, Chris Wormald, holds the most civil service senior experience, having assumed his first director general position in 2006, and his first permanent secretary role in 2012 – and most permanent secretaries continue to have no recent senior experience outside the public sector.

The is perhaps unsurprising – proven capability and understanding of a system as complex as the civil service is clearly an asset in top positions within it. However, the increase in outside experience, while small, is notable – more top civil servants have sought outside experience before returning, and bringing with them fresh ideas and novel ways of working.

_{*  The term ‘permanent secretary’ refers to the most senior grade of civil servant (SCS4), not to a particular role. Our analysis here focuses only on head of department permanent secretaries, that is, the most senior officials within each department as well as the devolved administrations. The description can also apply to others, such as the national statistician and chief medical officer. For more, see Haddon C, Grama T, Howes D, ‘Permanent secretaries’, Institute for Government, 19 November 2025, www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/explainer/permanent-secretaries}

_{**  See the chapter Digital Transformation.}

_{*** The National Armaments Director is a permanent secretary grade senior civil servant (SCS 4) but is not a head of department.}

Special advisers

The total number of special advisers is similar to previous years

The release of the annual report on special advisers in July 2025 revealed the size, shape and pay of this cohort as of March 2025, before Starmer’s first reshuffle in September 2025.*^{, 213} Cabinet Office, ‘Annual Report on Special Advisers 2025’, 17 July 2025, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/6878dc8e0263c35f52e4dd64/2025-07-14-_Annual_Report_on_Special_Advisers_2025_FINAL.docx__1___3_.pdf

As of March 2025, Labour had appointed 130 special advisers across government since the 2024 general election, a total similar to that of recent prime ministers. Initially, the government appointed just 116 special advisers, but since the election a steady flow of advisers have joined, with the number in No.10 itself growing from 36 in December 2024 to 42 by March 2025.

Some of this appears to be a desire from Keir Starmer to bring in more expertise and heft to the centre of government. Several recent appointments, such as the founder of Portland Communications Tim Allan, are senior figures with a great deal of experience that will be in the highest pay band of special advisers.

Special adviser unhappiness around pay continues

A major grievance among current advisers has been around pay and conditions – with reports in the autumn of 2024 that some had joined a union over such work-related disputes. ²¹⁴ Adu A, ‘Labour special advisers join union over concerns about pay’, The Guardian, 10 September 2024, www.theguardian.com/politics/article/2024/sep/10/labour-special-advisers-join-union-over-concerns-about-pay  The latest data release shows a slight uptick in pay but this has been smaller at the lowest pay bands, and overall adviser pay remains well below 2010 levels in real terms. ²¹⁵ Cabinet Office, Special adviser data releases: numbers and costs, July 2025, GOV.UK, 17 July 2025, accessed 5 December 2025, www.gov.uk/government/publications/special-adviser-data-releases-numbers-and-costs-july-2025/special-adviser-data-releases-numbers-and-costs-july-202…

The distribution of advisers across grades remains similar to recent years, although there are now almost no special advisers on the lowest pay band PB1. This is likely because some will have been appointed to more senior pay bands to counteract lower real-term salaries. The Cabinet Office launched a review of special adviser pay shortly after Labour took office in September 2024, ²¹⁶ Adu A, ‘Labour special advisers join union over concerns about pay’, The Guardian, 10 September 2024, www.theguardian.com/politics/article/2024/sep/10/labour-special-advisers-join-union-over-concerns-about-pay  but has yet to report its findings.

_{*  A special adviser’s appointment automatically ends when their minister leaves government or moves role, though they may be reappointed to another role in government. It will only become clear after the next data release in summer 2026 how the special advisers cohort has changed after the September reshuffle.}