The Burnham government needs a new strategy for the Union

Introduction

Having taken office as prime minister, Andy Burnham has a full in-tray and many pressing immediate challenges, but he should not neglect the state of his relationship and that of his wider government with the devolved governments. His approach and early actions will define these key relationships and will set the tone that the rest of Whitehall follows when engaging with Edinburgh, Cardiff and Belfast.

By taking early action to create a stronger culture and institutional structures for joint working between the governments, the new prime minister can help to ‘future-proof’ devolution and the Union against several headwinds: pressures from nationalism in Scotland and Wales, potential government formation challenges and instability following the 2027 elections in Northern Ireland, and the fragmentation of the party system in England.

Burnham should build on Starmer’s partial reset of relations with the devolved nations

In July 2024, the Institute for Government set out four recommendations for how Sir Keir Starmer, as prime minister, should make a reality of his manifesto promise of a relationship “reset” with the devolved governments, as part of a “new strategy for the Union”, namely that he should:

• send an early signal of his commitment to improving relations  
• treat the devolved governments as partners rather than rivals  
• respect and protect the autonomy of the devolved institutions  
• consider and respond to reasoned proposals for further devolution.  

Under Starmer, progress on this agenda was a partial success. ⁶ This section of the paper is based in large part on off-the-record interviews with participants in and close observers of the UK-devolved relationship from all parts of the UK.  Starmer undertook an early tour of the UK to meet the leaders of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. His government moved away from the deliberately confrontational approach adopted under the Conservatives (sometimes dubbed ‘muscular unionism’) and held more frequent and constructive meetings between UK ministers and officials and devolved counterparts. The Starmer government also showed increased flexibility about allowing the devolved nations to go their own way on policy, within the confines of the United Kingdom Internal Market Act 2020, mostly avoiding legislating in devolved areas without consent.

However, not all has gone to plan. The new Council of the Nations and Regions has struggled to find a purpose – despite being presented as a high-profile summit between the prime minister and devolved leaders from across the UK. Some other ‘interministerial groups’ have met only sporadically. The period before the Scottish and Welsh elections this year, as attention shifted to electoral competition, saw a deterioration of relations. The leaking of a Whitehall memorandum advising government departments to be more assertive in projecting the power of the UK government, rather than taking an “overly deferential” approach to the devolved governments, did not help this. And Labour has opted not to repeal powers that enable UK ministers to spend money directly in the devolved nations, and has occasionally used these powers in ways that have caused irritation in Edinburgh and Cardiff.

In addition, Edinburgh, Cardiff and Belfast have expressed frustration about the lack of meaningful engagement on crucial initiatives that affect devolved functions, such as the UK–EU reset negotiations and the UK–US trade agreement. And the Labour government has shown little interest in engaging in the debate around further devolution to Wales or Scotland, despite the devolved governments (including the former Welsh Labour administration in Cardiff) having set out solid arguments for this.

From the perspective of the UK government, however, many of these criticisms are exaggerated and/or reflect an unrealistic expectation of what a relationship ‘reset’ could plausibly deliver. Disagreement between governments is inevitable, and intergovernmental communication will not always produce consensus, but may simply end in an agreement to disagree. Given Westminster holds more of the power than the devolved nations, this outcome is likely to be frustrating from a devolved perspective.

Furthermore, the Scottish and Welsh governments are perceived to take a more “expansive” view of what devolution entails than Whitehall does, which leads to disagreement, for instance over whether UK ministers should set policy and allocate resources across the UK, including on largely devolved functions such as local economic growth.  

Burnham therefore inherits a somewhat improved relationship with the devolved nations, but one in which there are continuing tensions between Westminster and the devolved capitals. In addition, Burnham takes office with an even more complex political landscape to negotiate, with – for the first time ever – nationalist first ministers in each of Holyrood, Cardiff Bay and Stormont. Burnham has entered office setting high expectations that he will deliver a major transfer of power away from Whitehall. But his focus lies clearly on strengthening the role of English mayoralties, with no equivalent offer laid out for the devolved nations.  

The prime minister should send an early signal of a new approach to devolution

The tone on devolution is set from the top and the devolved nations should not be an afterthought for the new prime minister. Like several of his predecessors, Burnham has taken the sensible step of scheduling one-to-one meetings with the first ministers of Scotland and Wales in his first few days, in Glasgow on the afternoon of 23 July 2026. He should follow this up with an early visit to Belfast to meet the first and deputy first ministers of Northern Ireland. These meetings send a signal of respect and willingness to listen to devolved concerns, but should be the start of a genuine dialogue with the devolved leaders, rather than one-off photo opportunities.

Burnham should also move quickly to invite all of the first ministers to Downing Street (or perhaps his new Manchester-based No. 10 North) for a multilateral summit meeting to consider the overall state of intergovernmental relations and to explore opportunities for cooperation. If the plan is to reconvene the Council of the Nations and Regions – also including England’s mayors – then Whitehall, the devolved bodies and the UK Mayors Group should jointly agree the agenda. But given that this body failed to find a purpose in its first two years, the more important step will be to convene the four-nation ‘IGR Council’ – the body that brings together the prime minister and devolved leaders to consider the overall operation of devolution and other strategic issues – and to commit to a schedule of meetings of this body at least twice a year.

In parallel, the prime minister – together with first secretary of state, Louise Haigh, and secretary of state for housing, communities and local government, Angela Rayner – should agree a schedule for meetings of the Mayoral Council for England. This body should meet regularly, perhaps even quarterly, with meetings in different parts of England, and with the purpose of: identifying how government and the mayors can work together to improve economic and other outcomes; and considering the case for further mayoral powers, which mayors can now ask for under the statutory ‘right to request’ process.

Burnham’s plan to rewire Whitehall should extend to how it deals with the devolved nations

With the introduction of a new intergovernmental relations framework in 2022, the UK and devolved governments have a more transparent architecture for engagement, with interministerial groups across more than a dozen policy areas bringing UK and devolved ministers together. Since 2024, there has been an improvement in the tempo and tone of meetings but the effectiveness of this system has remained variable, with meetings of some interministerial groups being held irregularly or not at all, depending on individual ministerial choices.

Just as he intends to lay down the law to Whitehall when it comes to getting behind English devolution, Burnham should also instruct all departments to make full and proper use of the existing machinery for intergovernmental relations, and to engage with devolved counterparts in a spirit of greater openness, sharing information and engaging early on in the policy process, for instance when legislation is being planned that will touch on devolved functions. While the political context is not simple, Burnham does have a window of opportunity ahead of the 2029 general election – a period in which there are no national elections in Scotland and Wales – to rewire the centre of government to ensure intergovernmental relations become part of the everyday business of government.

Structural solutions can only go so far, and even with a move to No. 10 North, further cultural shifts are required in the civil service. As we have called for previously, ministers should prioritise further investment in the ‘devolution capability’ of Whitehall and encourage greater interchange of staff between the UK and devolved governments – shifting to an expectation that to apply for a senior civil service role, candidates should have worked outside of Westminster in their career.

As minister for intergovernmental relations and European relations, Hamish Falconer will play an important role and should set out a clear plan for: how he intends to use his role to reinvigorate how Whitehall engages with the devolved capitals; and how he will work with the lead devolved ministers for constitutional affairs and intergovernmental relations to support the development of new four-nation ways of working. Given his twin responsibilities for intergovernmental relations within the UK and for UK–EU relations, he will play a particularly important role in ensuring that devolved views are taken into account in negotiations with Brussels.

The Burnham government should build a genuine partnership with Edinburgh, Cardiff and Belfast where interests align

The purpose of intergovernmental relations, consultation and engagement is in part to show respect for the democratically elected institutions in the three devolved capitals. But a neglect of Scottish, Welsh and Northern Irish perspectives would also miss the chance for Burnham to develop a new partnership with the devolved nations that could help him achieve core aspects of his agenda, where better outcomes will depend on co-ordination between devolved and reserved powers.  

It would be naïve to expect the devolved governments to simply row in behind a Burnham-led agenda: both genuine and manufactured points of disagreement will continue to arise. And a central function of the intergovernmental relations system is to provide mechanisms through which the four governments can air and manage their differences, strengthen mutual understanding of differing perspectives and formally resolve disputes via a transparent process, when compromise cannot be reached.

However, there is a fair amount of underlying agreement between the four governments on some of the most pressing issues facing the UK. And on many of these issues, the relevant policy levers are divided between central and devolved governments, so better outcomes will depend on the ability of the governments to co-ordinate their actions.

This applies to:

• the prime minister’s headline commitment to deliver balanced and inclusive economic growth (“in every postcode”)
• his apparent belief that the state needs to play a stronger guiding role in achieving regeneration and reindustrialisation
• the focus on tackling specific complex social challenges such as health-related economic inactivity
• the ambitious green energy mission
• the desire for a closer relationship with Europe
• even the need for greater defence investment.

Naturally, Burnham will not always agree with counterparts from the Scottish National Party (SNP), Plaid Cymru, Sinn Féin and the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) on policy direction, but there is enough broad agreement over the future direction to mean there is an opportunity for genuine four-nation co-operation to achieve shared goals.

Westminster should protect and strengthen the devolution settlements

Parliamentary sovereignty means that Westminster has the ability to legislate on all matters throughout the UK. In practice, this should happen rarely and governments should abide by the Sewel convention – ensuring the UK parliament does not normally legislate on devolved matters without consent. Regrettably, no visible progress has been made on Labour’s manifesto commitment to agree a new memorandum of understanding setting out how Westminster and Whitehall will operate the ‘legislative consent’ process, to avoid the scenario where the constitutional protections that the Sewel convention offers are overridden.  

Nonetheless, since entering office, the Labour government has upheld the Sewel convention with a few very partial exceptions. For example, a policing bill was passed without Senedd consent in the last days of the 2024–26 parliamentary session, when the Welsh government itself favoured consent but had been defeated by opposition parties, who themselves objected to the legislation for very different reasons. There was also a case where the Northern Ireland executive was itself unable to reach agreement on whether to give consent to a UK bill, so Westminster proceeded to enact the legislation.

There are still improvements to be made. The Scottish government has criticised Whitehall’s lack of understanding of deadlines in the Scottish parliament and the challenge of securing consent in the context of minority government. From the UK government perspective, there has been a concerted effort to secure consent on bills that require them. And in some instances, devolved legislatures have sent contradictory signals as to why consent has been denied, including being perceived to withhold consent for political reasons rather than on the substance of the bill.  

Burnham should make a new effort to secure four-nation agreement on this important aspect of the territorial constitution. As part of this, as we have previously argued, there should be stronger commitments to early sharing of draft legislation with devolved governments, and reform of parliamentary procedure to ensure that devolved concerns and issues are given greater prominence during the legislative scrutiny process. In addition, ministers should lay a ‘devolution statement’ before parliament alongside any bill, setting out the impact in devolved policy areas and explaining how and whether consent has been sought from the devolved governments.  

Similar principles apply to UK government spending. Under the United Kingdom Internal Market Act 2020 – passed under then prime minister, Boris Johnson, despite strong opposition in all three devolved capitals – UK ministers were granted new ‘financial assistance powers’ to allocate funds across the UK in a broad range of policy areas, including economic development, infrastructure, culture and educational activities. In our view, it would be in line with Burnham’s commitment to devolution to repeal these powers and to simply fund the devolved governments to take appropriate action in these policy areas. However, if repeal is not on the table, then the Burnham government should commit itself to use these powers only where there is a demonstrable added value that UK government action can offer. It should also develop stronger guidance for how to avoid duplication or overlap with devolved government programmes.   

The government should be open to reasoned proposals for further devolution

As a champion for devolution, Burnham has raised expectations for a major transfer of power from Whitehall, but his commitments so far promise more power for the regions in England, without any corresponding offer for the devolved nations.  

Following the recent devolution Act, there is a new statutory basis for English mayors to request new devolved powers and to receive a clear response from UK ministers. The Starmer government made clear that existing powers for English mayors were “the floor not the ceiling” for devolution in England. But there is no equivalent mechanism by which Edinburgh, Cardiff and Belfast can request reforms to their devolution settlements. This has meant that Whitehall can – and often does – simply ignore reasoned propositions emanating from the devolved nations, such as the call for justice and rail devolution to Wales, Scottish calls for greater power over energy and taxation or the proposals of the independent commission on the constitutional future of Wales.  

Whitehall may be unpersuaded by such proposals, and indeed there may be legitimate reasons why Westminster should retain these powers, but Burnham and his key ministers should engage seriously with reasoned and evidence-based cases for reform if these are brought forward. In his speech at the People’s History Museum in Manchester at the end of June, Burnham argued that, alongside devolution to England’s cities and mayors, he favoured devolution “deeper down” within Scotland and Wales, implying decentralisation of power from Edinburgh and Cardiff to smaller units within those nations. This suggestion, and its potential implication that Westminster might seek to bypass the devolved capitals, ruffled some feathers in Edinburgh and Cardiff, with Scottish first minister, John Swinney, accusing Burnham of a “lack of knowledge” about Scotland.  

In fairness to Burnham, his claim that “the people of Dundee and Bangor feel just as distant from Holyrood and the Senedd as they do from Westminster” is hardly an absurd one. There is a good case to be made that national devolution has led to a centralisation of power in Edinburgh and Cardiff, at the expense of further-flung regions. Indeed, John Swinney himself is committed to some form of devolution, in particular to the Glasgow City Region, although the Scottish government is opposed to the mayoral model that has taken root in England.  

Devolution ‘deeper down’ should not be imposed from Westminster. Local government reform and regional growth policy are devolved matters for Scotland and Wales to decide on themselves. However, as in other areas mentioned above, there is an opportunity for the UK and devolved governments to work together to create, empower and fund regional bodies in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland – building on past precedent of city and regional growth deals, which represent rare examples of joint policy initiatives between the governments.

Burnham has an opportunity to strengthen the Union for the long term

As part of his future strategy for the Union, Burnham should also consider questions such as:

• how the nations and regions could be represented in a reformed House of Lords
• how the funding system for devolution should be brought up to date
• what protections for devolved autonomy should be put onto the statute
• in what – if any – circumstances Scotland and Wales would be entitled to hold a referendum on independence. ⁸ In Northern Ireland, the rules for when a border poll on the reunification of Ireland should be held are laid out in the Northern Ireland Act 1998.

These are complex questions and the new prime minister should not rush into major commitments to constitutional reform. Nonetheless, not least to head off accusations that he is focused on England to the exclusion of other parts of the UK, Burnham should signal an openness to debate on how to rewire not just the state but also the Union itself, especially where these are questions that people across all the nations of the UK are raising.