The Ethics and Integrity Commission is right to review the ombuds landscape

The UK’s ombuds landscape matters for both public service improvement and individual redress, but it needs an overhaul. The Ombudsman Association lists 53 members – which include ombuds schemes as well as complaint handlers, dispute resolution charities and others – covering different services and jurisdictions. ¹⁶ Ombudsman Association, ‘Find an ombudsman’, Ombudsman Association, no date, accessed 18 August 2026, www.ombudsmanassociation.org/find-ombudsman  Among public sector schemes alone, there is significant variation in powers and remits across and within the four nations of the UK. This makes seeking redress more arduous than it needs to be for individual complainants while also hampering institutional learning and service improvement.

At the IfG we have repeatedly made the case for an overhaul of the ombuds landscape, so the decision by the Ethics and Integrity Commission to review this area is welcome. ¹⁷ Ethics and Integrity Commission, ‘Ombudsman Review’, Ethics and Integrity Commission, no date, accessed 3 September 2026, https://eic.independent-commission.uk/our-remit/reviews/ombudsman-review/  The review created an opportunity to highlight the key areas for reform: mapping and clarifying the confusing landscape of ombuds and other redress bodies; making better use of ombuds to spot early warning signs; and overhauling outdated structures. 

Our written evidence to the review goes into more depth on what we think needs to change, and can be read via the button above (PDF).

The ombuds system is fragmented, outdated and inaccessible

The current ombuds landscape is complex and inconsistent. Within England alone, several schemes cover different public services (for example, there are separate ombuds for complaints related to health, housing and social care). This system is at odds with Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, which each have a single integrated public services ombuds. Citizens who have already been failed by a public body’s internal complaints process must then navigate this fragmented landscape.

The fragmentation partly reflects the outdated statutory basis of ombuds. The Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman (PHSO) was established under legislation dating back to 1967. Its powers and access routes still reflect an older model of public administration, blocking modernisation of the system and limiting its potential to play a bigger role in identifying systemic failures, rather than simply responding to individual complaints.

There are several important opportunities for reform:

1.    Mapping and clarifying the ombuds landscape

A comprehensive mapping of the ombuds landscape is needed to identify areas of overlap and duplication. This should also clarify the relationship between ombuds and related bodies such as compliant handlers, inquiries, commissioners, guardians and regulators. A clearer picture of the redress landscape would, in turn, enable consistent policy decisions to be made about the remits of each. 

2.    Improving data sharing and triage

Improving data sharing between ombuds schemes would facilitate a single, integrated online portal that could direct complainants to the relevant body for their issue, building on a triage role the PHSO is already taking on to some extent. For those pursuing a specific complaint through the system, data sharing could also improve the integration between ombuds schemes and the rest of the administrative justice and redress landscape – which may in fact be more of a concern in practice.

Better data sharing would also improve ombuds’ ability to spot thematic risks as they emerge across different geographies and services.

3.    Using ombuds to do more

Ombuds are uniquely placed to build a system-wide view of a particular service, based on the complaints they receive. By expanding their remits beyond complaint resolution to include systemic issues, there is scope for ombuds to proactively use these complaints to identify emerging risks and inform the relevant services before a systemic failing occurs.

Ombuds could also go further and engage in shared-initiative investigations agreed between the ombuds and government or parliament. This might reduce the need for lengthy and costly public inquiries by responding to concerns earlier and ensuring recommendations are both more likely to be adopted and also subject to ongoing oversight.

4.    Overhauling outdated structures

Several structures should be reformed to modernise ombuds. For example, complaints to the PHSO about government departments still need to be referred to the ombudsman through an MP, even though NHS complaints can be made directly. This ‘MP filter’ should be removed to ensure equality of access to the ombudsman. 

Public service ombuds in England and Scotland should be granted own-initiative powers to conduct investigations without requiring a prior complaint (as their Welsh and Northern Irish counterparts already have). These powers might be used to facilitate shared-initiative investigations in the first instance, as described above. Beyond that, their usefulness in addressing systemic issues, where a broad failing cannot be articulated by a single complaint, should be weighed against the risk of external pressure on when and how they are used.

But barriers must be overcome if reforms are to succeed

The PHSO’s strategy for 2026-31 sets out how it intends to modernise its work. The strategy commits to a shift towards systemic and preventative impact, ¹⁸ Parliamentary and Health Services Ombudsman, Our strategy 2026 to 2031, PHSO, April 2026, www.ombudsman.org.uk/sites/default/files/our_strategy_2026_to_2031.pdf, p. 3  and to using complaints data, user experience and wider evidence to generate insight that can be shared with others. It also highlights the potential of AI-enabled tools, better data systems and dashboards, and deeper partnerships with other organisations – including responsible data sharing. ¹⁹ Ibid, p. 11   

Any shift towards more system-level investigations will need to be balanced against ombuds’ important original function of addressing individual complaints. Prioritisation will clearly be necessary to manage demand, but any method of weighing individual complaints handling against systemic investigations (like the PHSO’s Public Value Model) ²⁰ Parliamentary and Health Services Ombudsman, ‘Delivering impact from our casework’, PHSO, no date, accessed 5 August 2026, www.ombudsman.org.uk/about-us/corporate-information/our-strategy-2025-2026/objective-three-delivering-impact-our-casework  should be transparent and publicly accessible. 

Nonetheless, the overall direction of travel is welcome. But reform cannot be left to individual ombuds alone. A more systemic role for ombuds will require clarity about how they work with departments, regulators, inquiries and Parliament. It will also force decisions about powers, data-sharing, public communication and the relationship between individual redress and wider public service improvement.

These changes will require sustained focus at the centre of government – particularly where legislation is needed. Broad system improvement may be best driven by the Cabinet Office, given the cross-cutting nature of the ombuds landscape, with the Ministry of Justice leading on the integration of ombuds with the administrative justice system. But however it is configured, a clear and sustained locus of policy leadership in this area is essential.

The opportunity to make it easier for citizens to secure redress while enabling ombuds to contribute more effectively to public service improvement is clear. The challenge now is turning this strong case for reform into action.