Performance Tracker 2025: Schools

Labour inherited a schools system still recovering from the pandemic. Between 2020 and 2022, schools underwent the biggest disruption since the Second World War, with closures lasting months, amounting to thousands of hours of lost learning, and exams and other functions severely disrupted.

Research conducted since, including by the Institute for Government, shows that educational inequalities across English schools opened up at an alarming rate over this period, with some gaps growing to their widest in a decade. Disadvantaged pupils and those with special educational needs faced among the greatest setbacks. In this context, Labour’s ambition to close the gaps in outcomes for these groups – a central plank of its ‘opportunity mission’ – represents a major test.

The special educational needs and disabilities (SEND) system is a source of particular concern. At the time of publication, some children and young people with special educational needs are missing out on support altogether, while soaring costs are putting local authorities’ own financial sustainability at risk. The government is expected to publish a new SEND strategy in 2026. ³⁸⁸ Department for Education, ‘Letter from the Secretary of State for Education to the Education Select Committee’, letter, 22 October 2025, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/68f8da406a52e8a2726dc2a3/DfE_SoS_letter_to_the_ESC_22102025.pdf

Falling pupil numbers across England present both a challenge and an opportunity. Schools receive most of their funding on a per-pupil basis, so unfilled classrooms can put further pressure on already stretched budgets. But, if managed well, lower demand could free up resources for that desperately needed SEND provision. Given the fragmented local governance of the school system, effective management of capacity will likely require strategic direction by ministers.

Tackling teacher shortages is another government priority but its current plan is unfocused. Even if it met its initial pledge to recruit 6,500 new teachers, it is unclear whether this would in fact meet demand.

Unfortunately for the government, what is clear is that balancing these pressures will be extremely difficult within the budget Labour has set for the coming parliament. This report breaks down the scale of the challenge, looking at: pupil numbers; the SEND and financial pressures facing the education system; staffing; and the performance of schools.^*

_{* This report covers schools in England serving pupils aged 5 to 16. It covers state-funded mainstream schools, including local authority-maintained schools and academies, unless stated otherwise. The Methodology is available to view at the bottom of this page (PDF).}

Pupil numbers

Pupil numbers are falling fastest in London and coastal areas

A surge in births in the late 2000s and early 2010s pushed pupil numbers^* to a peak of 7.0 million in 2023–24.^{**, 389} Department for Education, ‘National pupil projections’, 17 July 2025, https://explore-education-statistics.service.gov.uk/find-statistics/national-pupil-projections/2025  Now, as that recent ‘baby-boom’ cohort begins to exit the school system, pupil numbers are falling: 2024–25 marked the first annual decline since 2010–11, with 47,200 fewer pupils in the schools system. And the decline is expected to accelerate, with 412,200 (or 6%) fewer pupils forecast by 2029–30 than in 2023–24, leaving an estimated 6.6 million at the end of the decade. ³⁹⁰ Ibid.

As the population bulge moves through the system, primary schools have inevitably been the first to experience declines. Numbers peaked at 3.8 million in 2018–19, and have since fallen by 102,100, or 3%, to 3.7 million in 2024–25. ³⁹¹ Ibid.  That drop is equivalent to the pupil population of about 390 primary schools. The decline is lagged in secondary schools, where pupil numbers appear to have peaked in 2023–24. ³⁹² Ibid.

_{* Throughout this report, if analysis uses national pupil projections to create a consistent forward-looking time series, as it does here, we have excluded children aged 4 at the beginning of the school year from our scope because there are no pupil projections for this age group. This means most pupils in Reception are not covered. In all other analysis, unless stated otherwise, we look at pupils aged 4 to 15 at the start of the school year.
** This chapter refers to both academic school years and financial years. We refer to school years as 20XX–YY, and financial years as 20XX/YY.}

An apparent^* post-pandemic rise in home education may also be contributing to falling pupil numbers. In 2021–22, when the Department for Education (DfE) first published this data, 116,300 children, or 16 in every 1,000 of compulsory school age,^** were home-educated. ⁴⁰⁰ Department for Education, ‘Elective home education, autumn term 2024/25’, 12 December 2024, https://explore-education-statistics.service.gov.uk/find-statistics/elective-home-education/2024-25-autumn-term; Office for National Statistics, ‘Estimates of the Population for the UK, England, Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland’, 26 September 2025, www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationandmigration/populationestimates/datasets/populationestimatesforukenglandandwalesscotlandandnor…  In 2023–24, that had risen to 153,300, or 20 in every 1,000. ⁴⁰¹ Ibid.

London’s classrooms are emptying nearly two times faster than any other region’s. Since 2018–19, its primary schools have lost 8.1% of their pupils – a drop of 55,200, or around 2,060 classes. ⁴⁰² Department for Education, ‘Schools, pupils and their characteristics’, 5 June 2025, https://explore-education-statistics.service.gov.uk/find-statistics/school-pupils-and-their-characteristics/2024-25  This accounts for a third of the national decline (36%). Inner London has seen the steepest fall, with enrolment down 12.2% compared to 5.9% in Outer London.^{***, 403} Ibid.  In Westminster, the most affected local authority, pupil numbers fell by nearly a quarter (24.4%) over these six years. ⁴⁰⁴ Ibid.  Think tank and media reports have attributed this to a growing number of young families being priced out of the capital, ⁴⁰⁵ Burn-Murdoch J, ‘London’s Parasitical Housing Market Is Driving Away Young Families’, Financial Times, 21 April 2023, retrieved 24 October 2025, www.ft.com/content/d6bc22ed-d6d8-464b-b706-b4d478c6baf1; Tabbush J, ‘Is Inner London Becoming a “Child-Free Area”?’, blog, Centre for London, 7 November 2022, retrieved 24 October 2025, https://centreforlondon.org/blog/london-child-free  and to London’s especially sharp drop in birth rates. ⁴⁰⁶ McCurdy C, Ageing in the Fast and Slow Lane: Examining Geographic Gaps in Ageing, Resolution Foundation, 8 January 2025, www.resolutionfoundation.org/publications/ageing-in-the-fast-and-slow-lane

_{* Increases are likely in part a reflection of improvements in data quality. The Department for Education first collected data only a few years ago, and data reporting only became mandatory in autumn 2024.
** The denominator used here and in the following sentence is the number of children who were aged 4 to 15 in England in the middle of the calendar year that the relevant academic year starts in (i.e. mid-2021 for 2021–22), according to ONS’s mid-2011 to mid-2024 population estimates. This does not line up exactly with the definition of compulsory school age.
*** Calculated using local authority-level data, as regional-level data is not split into Inner and Outer London. In both 2018–19 and 2024–25, Inner and Outer London pupil numbers sum to the regional figure for London.}

This trend in London is not part of a wider urban one. In fact, in other parts of the country, primary schools closer to city or town centres have seen their numbers hold most steady. It is the smallest and most rural settlements that have experienced the sharpest declines outside of London, losing 6.9% of their primary school pupils.^{*, 409} Department for Education, ‘Schools, pupils and their characteristics’, 5 June 2025, https://explore-educationstatistics.service.gov.uk/find-statistics/school-pupils-and-their-characteristics/2024-25  By contrast, numbers fell by only 3.5% in the most urban areas (2.4% if London is excluded). ⁴¹⁰ Ibid.

_{* See M1 in the Methodology, found at the bottom of this page (PDF), for further details of this calculation.}

Coastal schools^* are also shrinking particularly quickly, losing 4.7% of their pupils since 2018–19, compared to a drop of 3.4% in non-coastal primaries. Coastal areas face a complex set of economic and demographic challenges, including an outflow of younger people and an influx of retirees, ⁴¹² Barton C, Cromarty H, Garratt K and Ward M, The Future of Coastal Communities, House of Commons Library, 5 September 2022, https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CDP-2022-0153/CDP-2022-0153.pdf  which would naturally result in falling school admissions.

_{* We define a coastal school as one located less than 6km from the nearest bit of coast, in a coastal local authority. With thanks to FFT Education Datalab for its data, which allowed us to run this analysis. 1.4% of schools in our data (or 1.3% of the pupils aged 4 to 15 in our data in 2024–25) were not defined as coastal or non-coastal in the coastal data. See M2 in the Methodology for further detail.}

In secondary schools, the picture is a little different. Pupil numbers remain higher than in 2018–19 in every region, reflecting the continued presence of much of the recent ‘baby-boom’ cohort. But, in 2024–25 pupil numbers did start to fall in the North East, London, the South West, and Yorkshire and the Humber. ⁴¹⁵ Department for Education, ‘Schools, pupils and their characteristics’, 5 June 2025, https://explore-educationstatistics.service.gov.uk/find-statistics/school-pupils-and-their-characteristics/2024-25  London again saw the sharpest drop, at 0.8%, followed closely by the North East, where enrolment fell by 0.7%. ⁴¹⁶ Ibid.

As national numbers begin to fall, we are likely to see geographic patterns mirror those already playing out in primary schools, with London, rural and coastal areas affected more acutely than others.

The introduction of VAT on private schools has not yet noticeably increased state pupil numbers

In January 2025, the government introduced the standard 20% VAT rate on private school fees, ending their long-standing exemption. The policy is forecast to raise an average of £1.6 billion a year (cash terms) between 2025/26 and 2029/30. ⁴²¹ HM Revenue & Customs, Private school fees – VAT measure, 15 November 2024, retrieved 24 October 2025, www.gov.uk/government/publications/vat-on-private-school-fees/applying-vat-to-private-school-fees  Some private schools have fully or partially absorbed the additional costs, while others increased their fees in line with the tax rise. ⁴²² Seely A and Roberts N, VAT on Private School Fees, House of Commons Library, 25 July 2025, https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP-10125/CBP-10125.pdf

In January 2025, there were 573,000 pupils^* enrolled in private schools across England, 11,000 or 1.9% fewer than there were a year earlier. ⁴²³ Department for Education, ‘Schools, pupils and their characteristics’, 5 June 2025, https://explore-educationstatistics.service.gov.uk/find-statistics/school-pupils-and-their-characteristics/2024-25  Some have attributed this drop to pupils leaving the sector as a result of the VAT-associated fee rises. ⁴²⁴ For example: McGough K and Agerholm H, ‘Private school pupil numbers drop by 11,000’, BBC News, 5 June 2025, www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/c2lk2p7wpr4o; Eccles L and D’Urso J, ‘Private school exodus of 13,000 far exceeds ministers’ predictions’, The Times, 17 May 2025, www.thetimes.com/uk/education/article/private-school-exodus-of-13000-dwarfs-ministers-predictions-sm6pf5qv5; Harding E, ‘Private school pupil numbers dip by 11,000 after VAT hike – but Labour STILL claims controversial tax isn’t causing exodus’, Daily Mail, 5 June 2025, www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-14784229/Private-school-pupil-11000-VAT-Labour-exodus.html  But that is unlikely to be the whole picture.

Interpreting the impact of the VAT change based solely on year-on-year changes is complicated by the broader, ongoing decline in pupil numbers nationally. A more useful measure is the share of pupils attending private schools, which removes the effect of population change. As the black line below shows, that share fell by 0.1 percentage points (ppts) over the last year, reaching 6.4% in 2024–25. This is a modest drop by historical standards, ranking only fourth out of the nine yearly changes observed. And the proportion of children in private schools has not hit an all-time low: it was 0.05ppts lower in 2020–21.

_{* Full-time equivalent number of pupils of any age.}

While the immediate impact of the VAT rise appears limited, the full effects may take several years to materialise and it is, by and large, too early to tell what they will be. Rather than causing parents to pull children out of private schools midstream – in say, the second or third of five academic years – the tax may primarily deter would-be new entrants to the sector. This would spread the impact over time, as the final pre-VAT cohorts progress through the system. Early signs are consistent with this theory: as the figure shows, the largest declines last year were among 4-, 11-, and 12-year-olds – the first two of which being the groups most likely to be starting at new schools.

The government estimates that the introduction of VAT will ultimately reduce private school numbers by around 37,000, or 6%, with the vast majority (35,000) expected to enrol in state schools instead. ⁴³¹ HM Revenue & Customs, Private school fees – VAT measure, 15 November 2024, retrieved 24 October 2025, www.gov.uk/government/publications/vat-on-private-school-fees/applying-vat-to-private-school-fees  However, this is unlikely to materially offset the wider decline in state school pupil numbers. Under the latest government estimates, state schools are expected to see a net loss of 447,600 pupils^* between 2023–24 and 2029–30. ⁴³² Department for Education, ‘National pupil projections’, 17 July 2025, https://explore-education-statistics.service.gov.uk/find-statistics/national-pupil-projections/2025

The policy is also unlikely to offset many local declines, as areas where state school numbers are falling fastest do not generally have more pupils enrolled in independent schools.^** London is an exception.^*** With 10.3% of its pupils attending independent schools in 2023–24, compared to 6.5% nationally, ⁴³³ Department for Education, ‘Schools, pupils and their characteristics’, 5 June 2025, https://explore-education-statistics.service.gov.uk/find-statistics/school-pupils-and-their-characteristics/2024-25  its faster declines in pupil numbers may be cushioned slightly more by the VAT rise than other regions’, potentially narrowing regional disparities in falling rolls.

Assuming the same proportion of independent school pupils move into the state sector in every area, around 8,900 additional pupils could enter London’s state schools over the long term – a gross increase of 0.7% on 2023–24 numbers.^**** That would likely make only a small difference overall, however. London state schools’ intake of four-year-olds fell by an average 1.9% a year between 2018–19 and 2023–24, suggesting the VAT-related inflow would offset less than half a year’s typical decline.^*****

_{* Full-time equivalent number of pupils of any age, attending any state-funded school.
** See M3 in the Methodology for regression details.
*** See M3 in the Methodology for regression details.
**** Assuming children who would have enrolled in London’s independent schools enrol in London state schools instead, rather than state schools in other parts of the country.
***** Trends in the number of 4 year-olds are used only to illustrate the scale of demographic decline in the longer term, rather than the likely age distribution of pupils who shift from private to state schools.}

Primary school capacity is not falling with demand, putting pressure on finances

The supply of state school places has not yet adjusted to falling demand. Instead, England had 53,700 or 1.1% more state-funded mainstream primary school places in 2023–24^* than in 2018–19, despite losing 80,000 pupils.^{**, 434} Department for Education, ‘School capacity, academic year 2023/24’, 27 March 2025, https://explore-education-statistics.service.gov.uk/find-statistics/school-capacity/2023-24  As a result, the number of unfilled primary places has increased steadily since 2020–21 after a decade of relative stability. ⁴³⁵ Ibid.; Department for Education, ‘Schools, pupils and their characteristics’, 5 June 2025, https://explore-education-statistics.service.gov.uk/find-statistics/school-pupils-and-their-characteristics/2024-25  Almost one in eight were unfilled in 2023–24, the equivalent of 22,900 empty primary school classrooms across England. This is the highest number and proportion since records began in 2009–10. ⁴³⁶ Department for Education, ‘School capacity, academic year 2023/24’, 27 March 2025, https://explore-education-statistics.service.gov.uk/find-statistics/school-capacity/2023-24

_{* The latest available data.
** This figure covers pupils attending state-funded mainstream primary schools upwards to align it with the capacity figures.}

Empty classrooms can quickly take a toll on school finances. Because funding is largely determined on a per-pupil basis, falling rolls leave many schools maintaining the same buildings – and often employing the same number of staff – on smaller budgets, putting them under financial strain. There is a clear link between spare capacity and financial fragility in local authority-maintained primary schools.^* When a given local authority sees a 1ppt increase in unfilled primary school places, the share of maintained primary schools that have negative financial reserves^** climbs by 1.1ppts. Growth in unfilled places accounts for an estimated 2.7ppts – almost two fifths – of the increase in the occurrence of debt among local authority-maintained primary schools, from 7.9% in 2018–19 to 14.7% in 2023–24. ⁴³⁸ Department for Education, ‘LA and school expenditure, financial year’, 12 December 2024, https://explore-education-statistics.service.gov.uk/find-statistics/la-and-school-expenditure/2023-24

_{* Local authority-maintained schools are those run by the council. Financial data on academies – state-funded schools that operate independently of local authority oversight – is less transparent, so we have not conducted the same analysis for those schools.
** Normally referred to as debt. See M4 in the Methodology for regression details.}

Financial pressures are being felt in primary academies as well: in 2023–24, England’s largest primary-only trust^* recorded an in-year operating deficit of £2.1 million (roughly 1.6% of that year’s income),^** causing it to dip into reserves. ⁴⁵³ Dyson J, ‘Primary-only Trust Raids Reserves as Pupil Numbers Dip’, Schools Week, 26 January 2025, retrieved 24 October 2025, https://schoolsweek.co.uk/primary-only-trust-raids-reserves-as-pupil-numbers-dip  In early 2025, a different trust received £1m (cash terms) to wind down operations after its only secondary school was transferred out of its control due to performance concerns. ⁴⁵⁴ Dyson J, ‘Closing Academy Trust Exposes “Vulnerability” of Primary Schools’, Schools Week, 19 January 2024, https://schoolsweek.co.uk/closing-academy-trust-exposes-vulnerability-of-primary-schools; Dyson J, ‘Primary-only Trust Raids Reserves as Pupil Numbers Dip’, Schools Week, 26 January 2025, retrieved 24 October 2025, https://schoolsweek.co.uk/primary-only-trust-raids-reserves-as-pupil-numbers-dip  Without it, the trust said, the group was “unsustainable”.^{***, 455} Dyson J, ‘Primary-only Trust Raids Reserves as Pupil Numbers Dip’, Schools Week, 26 January 2025, retrieved 24 October 2025, https://schoolsweek.co.uk/primary-only-trust-raids-reserves-as-pupil-numbers-dip/  Micon Metcalfe, a government adviser on school finances, has recognised this issue, stating that more trusts may have to pool funding and staff “to deliver education where pupil numbers are declining”. ⁴⁵⁶ Ibid.

The mismatch between primary school demand and capacity is expected to widen in the short term, with DfE projections suggesting that by 2026–27 primary enrolment will have fallen by a further 164,400. ^{****, 457} Department for Education, ‘National pupil projections’, 17 July 2025, https://explore-education-statistics.service.gov.uk/find-statistics/national-pupil-projections/2025  This makes plans by local authority areas to add 18,900 permanent primary places (net) between now and then surprising.^{*****, 458} Department for Education, ‘School capacity, academic year 2023/24’, 27 March 2025, https://explore-education-statistics.service.gov.uk/find-statistics/school-capacity/2023-24  Indeed, just over a third are planning net expansions (34%) while just 8% are cutting back. ⁴⁵⁹ Ibid.

Additional primary school places are still sometimes required. Not all areas have falling rolls, and classrooms cannot simply be redistributed around the country. In Central Bedfordshire, for example, primary enrolment rose by 7.8% between 2018–19 and 2023–24;^{******, 460} Department for Education, ‘Schools, pupils and their characteristics’, 5 June 2025, https://explore-education-statistics.service.gov.uk/find-statistics/school-pupils-and-their-characteristics/2024-25  primary school capacity grew by 5.8% over the same period. ⁴⁶¹ Department for Education, ‘School capacity, academic year 2023/24’, 27 March 2025, https://explore-education-statistics.service.gov.uk/find-statistics/school-capacity/2023-24

However, the system is much less responsive to declines in demand than to increases. Reducing capacity^******* typically requires school closures, or the repurposing of site buildings – decisions that can be politically contentious and are often unpopular with the affected group. According to an interviewee for this paper, many areas and schools facing declines have reduced intakes to try to keep operations efficient, without removing physical classroom space. ⁴⁶² Institute for Government interview.

As a result, by summer 2024, cuts to capacity were planned in only one of the 25 local authorities where primary pupil numbers^******** have fallen fastest since 2018–19. ⁴⁶³ Department for Education, ‘School capacity, academic year 2023/24’, 27 March 2025, https://explore-education-statistics.service.gov.uk/find-statistics/school-capacity/2023-24; Department for Education, ‘Schools, pupils and their characteristics’, 5 June 2025, https://explore-education-statistics.service.gov.uk/find-statistics/school-pupils-and-their-characteristics/2024-25  In Camden – where primary rolls have dropped by 15% – no reductions were planned, despite 17% of their primary places sitting empty in 2023–24. ⁴⁶⁴ Ibid.  Westminster, Southwark and Lambeth, which have experienced similarly sharp declines in pupil numbers, also had no capacity cuts planned at that time, but have since taken action. At the end of 2024–25, for example, Southwark closed two primary schools ⁴⁶⁵ Gregory R, ‘Fall in school rolls forces closure of two schools’, BBC News, 20 June 2025, retrieved 29 October 2025, www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/ckg3ndpm5kmo  and five Westminster primaries merged into two. ⁴⁶⁶ Lynch B, ‘Primary schools to merge as pupil numbers fall’, BBC News, 30 June 2025, retrieved 29 October 2025, www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cp8my7jrrjpo  However, with data on capacity plans and unfilled places available only up to 2023–24, the full scale and impact of these more recent changes remain unclear.

_{* Academy trusts are not-for-profit companies that run academies.
** The deficit figure is in cash terms and is calculated using free reserves, as is done by DfE. Income has been measured using income from restricted general funds – a proxy for the inflow from the general annual grant and high-needs funding.
*** This not to say that secondary schools are without financial pressures.
**** This figure covers pupils of all ages attending state-funded primaries, to bring it closer in line with the scope of
the places planned data.
***** According to DfE, this only includes projects “with a high degree of certainty of going ahead, usually where funding has been committed”. And it does not include changes to school capacity “planned through DfE programmes such as centrally funded Free Schools”. This applies throughout the section, whenever we talk about planned capacity.
****** This figure covers pupils attending state-funded mainstream primary schools from Reception to Year 11, to align it with the capacity figures.
******* In this section, ‘capacity’ refers to net capacity, a physical measure of available places, for local authority-maintained schools. For academies, capacity figures come from their funding agreements, which usually reflect the last net capacity assessment carried out before conversion. Sometimes published admissions numbers (PANs – the number of pupils a school intends to admit to each year group) are used as measures of capacity; here we refer to those as intakes. PANs are typically published separately by individual local authorities, making them a difficult measure to work with.
******** Those aged 4–15 in state-funded mainstream primary schools.}

Academies are less sensitive to local declines in pupil numbers than local authority-maintained schools.^* When an area sees state-school enrolment fall by 1ppt, its local authority-maintained schools tend to cut their available places by 0.8ppts. Academies in the area, however, show no consistent response, and may even increase their capacity (though the estimate is imprecise).

_{* Controlling for number of pupils on roll in each school type, and year fixed effects. Analysis covers mainstream schools only. See M5 in the Methodology for regression results and methodological details.}

Academies may simply be more popular on average than council-run schools, meaning local falls in demand naturally hit the latter harder. Alternatively, academies may be less responsive to demographic changes, keeping places open even when they are no longer needed. This can leave council-run schools to absorb the impact of falling rolls by reducing capacity, helping to keep local spending on school places broadly aligned with per-pupil funding.

The fragmented governance of the system, with oversight of an area’s schools split between local authorities and academy trusts, is a key barrier to managing school places effectively. ⁴⁷⁹ Department for Education, Children’s Wellbeing and Schools Bill: Policy Summary, 19 March 2025, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/67dd2b17a18f580c277f7887/CWS_Bill_Policy Summary notes_as_amended_in_the_House_of Commons.pdf  Although local authorities have a statutory duty to manage school places locally, there are currently no general duties on schools and local authorities to co-operate regarding these functions. ⁴⁸⁰ Department for Education, Children’s Wellbeing and Schools Bill: Policy Summary, 19 March 2025, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/67dd2b17a18f580c277f7887/CWS_Bill_Policy_Summary_notes_as_amended_in_the_House_of_Commons.pdf  For example, a local authority cannot direct an academy to reduce its intake, cut its capacity, or to close. While some councils and schools work well together to meet local need, their interests do not always align and there are currently limited mechanisms to resolve disputes. In 2024, leaked documents revealed that some Catholic schools in London were being encouraged to academise by their diocese to protect themselves from potential local authority closure orders. ⁴⁸¹ Dyson J, ‘Academise so LAs can’t close you, diocese tells schools’, Schools Week, 9 February 2024, retrieved 24 October 2025, https://schoolsweek.co.uk/academise-so-las-cant-close-you-diocese-tells-schools

The challenge for government is to ensure that primary (and eventually secondary) school places are reduced in a managed and strategic way. The Children’s Wellbeing and Schools Bill, now before parliament, seeks to support this by placing new duties on state schools and local authorities to co-operate on place planning. ⁴⁸² UK Parliament, ‘Children’s Wellbeing and Schools Bill’, Session 2024–26, 18 September 2025, retrieved 24 October 2025, https://bills.parliament.uk/bills/3909  Currently, local authorities can only object when a school or trust proposes to decrease a published admissions number (PAN, the number of pupils it intends to admit to each year group). The bill would extend this right to also cover cases where a PAN is increased or left unchanged, giving councils balanced powers to address both shortages and surpluses of school places and helping the system adjust to falling rolls. ⁴⁸³ Department for Education, Children’s Wellbeing and Schools Bill: Policy Summary, 19 March 2025, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/67dd2b17a18f580c277f7887/CWS_Bill_Policy_Summary notes_as_amended_in_the_House_of Commons.pdf

The bill would also empower a local authority to set a school’s PAN if its objection to the proposed level were upheld, introducing a much-needed mechanism to resolve place-planning disputes. ⁴⁸⁴ UK Parliament, ‘Children’s Wellbeing and Schools Bill’, Session 2024–26, 18 September 2025, retrieved 24 October 2025, https://bills.parliament.uk/bills/3909  At present, with councils unable to influence academies’ capacity, they may have to close their own schools even when that runs counter to local need. However, there are concerns – particularly in the academy sector – that this measure could give councils too much power over school admissions. ⁴⁸⁵ Institute for Government interviews; Weale S, Adams R and Walker P, ‘Who is criticising Labour’s new education bill – and why?’, The Guardian, 29 January 2025, www.theguardian.com/education/2025/jan/29/who-is-criticising-labours-new-education-bill-and-why  For example, where school closures are necessary, a council might prioritise keeping its own school open even when this would not best serve local pupils. But in the absence of a neutral commissioning body, some risk of distortion in the supply of school places is inevitable – as the current system shows only too well.

Special educational needs and financial pressures

The rising number of education, health and care plans is causing a capacity crisis in state special schools

The number of pupils^* with an EHCP (or its predecessor) has more than doubled over the last nine years, rising from 236,800 in 2016 to 482,600 in 2025. ⁴⁸⁷ Department for Education, ‘Special Educational Needs in England’, 12 June 2025, https://explore-education-statistics.service.gov.uk/find-statistics/special-educational-needs-in-england/2024-25  This growth shows little sign of slowing: in the last year alone, numbers rose by 11.1%. ⁴⁸⁸ Ibid.  Today, 5.3% of pupils have an EHCP – equivalent to more than one pupil in each class nationwide. ⁴⁸⁹ Ibid.  In 2016 the figure was just 2.8%, and had been stable for several years. ⁴⁹⁰ Ibid.

_{* Data on pupils with EHCPs only covers children and young people in education – state-funded primary schools, state-funded secondary schools, state-funded special schools, non-maintained special schools, state-funded alternative provision and independent schools. Some of these pupils will be under the age of 5, or over the age of 15. Data is split in this way because the state funds children with EHCPs, even when their education is in the independent sector.}

Much of the rise in EHCPs can be accounted for by three categories of need: autistic spectrum disorder (ASD); speech, language and communication needs; and social, emotional and mental health needs (which includes ADHD). ASD has remained the most common primary need since 2016. But today, 149,200 pupils with ASD have an EHCP – 34% of all plans – up from 57,500 (26%) in 2016.^{*, 498} Ibid.

Several factors are likely to be behind this growth. One is improved awareness and diagnosis. For example, while the number of boys with ASD receiving SEN provision has doubled since 2016 (+126%), it has quadrupled among girls (+335%), suggesting improved identification in a historically underdiagnosed group. ⁴⁹⁹ Department for Education, ‘Special Educational Needs in England’, 12 June 2025, https://explore-education-statistics.service.gov.uk/find-statistics/special-educational-needs-in-england/2024-25; Sibieta L and Snape D, Spending on Special Educational Needs in England: Something Has to Change, Institute for Fiscal Studies, 10 December 2024, https://ifs.org.uk/publications/spending-special-educational-needs-england-something-has-change

But the increase in EHCPs also likely reflects greater prevalence of need. For example, the pandemic appears to have triggered a global surge in mental health difficulties among children and young people. ⁵⁰⁰ World Health Organization, ‘COVID-19 Pandemic Triggers 25% Increase in Prevalence of Anxiety and Depression Worldwide’, 2 March 2022, www.who.int/news/item/02-03-2022-covid-19-pandemic-triggers-25-increase-in-prevalence-of-anxiety-and-depression-worldwide  Similarly, the increase in speech and language needs has been linked to reduced early-life interaction among ‘lockdown babies’. ⁵⁰¹ Adams R, ‘School starters born during pandemic lack communication skills, Ofsted says’, The Guardian, 8 October 2024, retrieved 24 October 2025, www.theguardian.com/education/2024/oct/08/school-starters-pandemic-lack-communication-skills-ofsted  And long waiting lists for children’s mental health care ⁵⁰² Children’s Commissioner for England, ‘Press notice: Children’s Commissioner calls for urgent action to tackle waiting times and inequality in mental health care for children’, 18 May 2025, retrieved 24 October 2025, www.childrenscommissioner.gov.uk/news-and-blogs/press-notice-childrens-commissioner-calls-for-urgent-action-to-tackle-waiting-times-and-inequality-in…  and cuts to services like children’s centres mean schools are increasingly relied on to provide support. ⁵⁰³ Institute for Government interviews.  Efforts to identify and address needs before they escalate appear to be limited – as the National Audit Office (NAO) has pointed out:

“There is currently no system, process or funding to encourage [earlier identification of needs], nor an assessment of the extent to which this would be value for money”. ⁵⁰⁴ Comptroller and Auditor General, Support for Children and Young People with Special Educational Needs, Session 2024–25, HC 299, National Audit Office, 24 October 2024, www.nao.org.uk/reports/support-for-children-and-young-people-with-special-educational-needs

_{* Data on type of need is not available for independent schools or general hospital schools, so unlike the figures for total EHCPs, those school types are not covered.}

EHCPs are, however, just an output – not a pure measure of demand. The Education Policy Institute has found that the school a child attends has more influence on whether they are identified as having SEN and receive support than any other factor, ⁵¹⁵ Hutchinson J, Reader M and Akhal A, Education in England: Annual Report 2020, Education Policy Institute, August 2020, https://epi.org.uk/publications-and-research/education-in-england-annual-report-2020  indicating that access to EHCPs often depends more on local practice than on the child’s needs. In some areas, for instance, EHCPs may be less common simply because securing additional support for pupils is more difficult. As local authorities recently told the Education Committee:

“Decisions not to issue an EHCP or to offer less support than is needed are often driven by limited resources, capacity constraints, or a lack of authority to compel other services into action.” ⁵¹⁶ House of Commons Education Committee, Solving the SEND Crisis (HC 492), The Stationery Office, 18 September 2025, p.17, https://committees.parliament.uk/publications/49536/documents/265373/default

But equally, EHCPs may be relatively scarce because some schools are particularly good at supporting children without additional resources. For example, Aylsham High School in Norwich reportedly meets many pupils’ needs through high-quality ordinarily available support, reducing the need for statutory plans. ⁵¹⁷ Ibid.

These variations in practice have contributed to the striking differences in access to EHCPs across England: ⁵¹⁸ Department for Education and Department of Health and Social Care, SEND Review: Right Support, Right Place, Right Time, 29 March 2022, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/624178c68fa8f5277c0168e7/SEND_review_right_support_right_place_right_time_accessible.pdf  in 2023–24, some 7.6% of pupils in Tower Hamlets had EHCPs, compared to just 2.9% in Nottinghamshire. ⁵¹⁹ Department for Education, ‘Special Educational Needs in England’, 12 June 2025, https://explore-education-statistics.service.gov.uk/find-statistics/special-educational-needs-in-england/2024-25

The rise in EHCPs, then, does not just reflect increasing levels (and identification) of need. It also demonstrates waning confidence in schools’ ability to meet that need without statutory support. ⁵²⁰ Department for Education and Department of Health and Social Care, SEND Review: Right Support, Right Place, Right Time, 29 March 2022, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/624178c68fa8f5277c0168e7/SEND_review_right_support_right_place_right_time_accessible.pdf  Since 2016, the proportion of children with identified SEN who have an EHCP has risen from 19% to 27%. ⁵²¹ Department for Education, ‘Special Educational Needs in England’, 12 June 2025, https://explore-education-statistics.service.gov.uk/find-statistics/special-educational-needs-in-england/2024-25  At heart, this reflects a growing gap between what core SEND provision is seen to offer and what families or schools believe is required.

Schools’ financial incentives are also likely to have played a role, as has been noted by the Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS). Mainstream schools can only access top-up funding when a pupil’s additional support costs more than £6,000, and in practice, often only if the pupil has an EHCP. ⁵²² Sibieta L and Snape D, Spending on Special Educational Needs in England: Something Has to Change, Institute for Fiscal Studies, 10 December 2024, https://ifs.org.uk/publications/spending-special-educational-needs-england-something-has-change  That threshold, set in 2014, has never been uprated, meaning it is surpassed by children with less and less severe needs. As a result, schools may be incentivised to seek EHCPs where they once might not have.

While many children with an EHCP can (in theory) be well-supported in mainstream schools, others require more specialised support – typically in special schools. The sharp rise in EHCPs has put particular pressure on state special schools, which teach a disproportionate share of pupils with plans (43% compared to only 1% of pupils overall, in 2015–16). ⁵²³ Department for Education, ‘Special Educational Needs in England’, 12 June 2025, https://explore-education-statistics.service.gov.uk/find-statistics/special-educational-needs-in-england/2024-25; Department for Education, ‘National pupil projections’, 17 July 2025, https://explore-education-statistics.service.gov.uk/find-statistics/national-pupil-projections/2025  While enrolment in state-funded mainstream schools has risen by 14% since 2010–11 and 8% since 2015–16, enrolment in state special schools rose by 90% and 65% over the respective time periods. ⁵²⁴ Department for Education, ‘National pupil projections’, 17 July 2025, https://explore-education-statistics.service.gov.uk/find-statistics/national-pupil-projections/2025

Rising demand for state special school provision has outstripped supply, and around two thirds are now operating over capacity. ⁵³⁴ Department for Education, ‘School capacity, academic year 2023/24’, 27 March 2025, https://explore-education-statistics.service.gov.uk/find-statistics/school-capacity/2023-24  In 2023–24, pupil numbers exceeded state special school places by 4%, equating to 25 pupils for every 24 places across England. ⁵³⁵ Ibid.  In the East Riding of Yorkshire, the most oversubscribed local authority, there were nearly three pupils for every two places. ⁵³⁶ Ibid.  At the other end of the spectrum, nearly a quarter (22%) of the places in Wokingham appear to be sitting empty.^{*, 537} Ibid.

For pupils in overcrowded special schools, this can mean unmet personal care needs, inaccessible breakout spaces and a lack of subject-specific classrooms. ⁵³⁸ Peirson-Hagger E, ‘SEND and special school provision: the capacity crisis’, Tes, 14 March 2025, retrieved 24 October 2025, www.tes.com/magazine/analysis/specialist-sector/send-and-special-school-provision-the-capacity-crisis  But insufficient capacity also means children may miss out on attending a state special school entirely. ⁵³⁹ Comptroller and Auditor General, Support for Children and Young People with Special Educational Needs, Session 2024–25, HC 299, National Audit Office, 24 October 2024, www.nao.org.uk/reports/support-for-children-and-young-people-with-special-educational-needs  The share of pupils with EHCPs attending state special schools fell from 43% in 2015–16 to 34% in 2024–25. ⁵⁴⁰ Department for Education, ‘Special Educational Needs in England’, 12 June 2025, https://explore-education-statistics.service.gov.uk/find-statistics/special-educational-needs-in-england/2024-25  Meanwhile, mainstream and independent provision has become more common, now catering for 56% and 9% of pupils with EHCPs respectively, compared to 49% and 7% in 2015–16. ⁵⁴¹ Ibid.  The NAO concluded that insufficient capacity in state special schools could be a factor behind these shifts. ⁵⁴² Comptroller and Auditor General, Support for Children and Young People with Special Educational Needs, Session 2024–25, HC 299, National Audit Office, 24 October 2024, www.nao.org.uk/reports/support-for-children-and-young-people-with-special-educational-needs

_{* There are two local authorities recorded as having higher rates of unfilled special school places than Wokingham in 2023–24: Windsor and Maidenhead and Bury. These two entries have known data quality issues. DfE is not aware of any problem with Wokingham’s data, but warned via personal communication with the Institute for Government that data collection for special school capacity is new and there will be issues that it is not yet aware of.}

This can result in both poor outcomes and poor value for money. According to Ofsted, many pupils wait for specialist provision in placements that cannot meet their needs, often for extended periods. ⁵⁵¹ Ofsted, The Annual Report of His Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Education, Children’s Services and Skills 2022/23, 23 November 2023, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/655f2551c39e5a001392e4ca/31587_Ofsted_Annual_Report_2022-23_WEB.pdf  The shift to mainstream provision, without better resourcing, has likely strained those schools’ ability to support pupils with SEN, perhaps increasing parents’ preference for specialist settings. ⁵⁵² Sibieta L and Snape D, Spending on Special Educational Needs in England: Something Has to Change, Institute for Fiscal Studies, 10 December 2024, https://ifs.org.uk/publications/spending-special-educational-needs-england-something-has-change; Department for Education and Department of Health and Social Care, SEND Review: Right Support, Right Place, Right Time, CP 624, The Stationery Office, 29 March 2022, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/624178c68fa8f5277c0168e7/SEND_review_right_support_right_place_right_time_accessible.pdf  And the shift to independent provision is very expensive (discussed below).

The government will set out its policy position on reforming the SEND system in a white paper expected in 2026. It has already committed to “improving inclusivity and expertise in mainstream schools”, ⁵⁵³ Department for Education, Written Evidence Submitted by the Department for Education (SEN0887), https://committees.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/137777/pdf/  which includes investing £740m^* to increase mainstream capacity for specialist provision in 2025/26 and running a ‘test and learn’ programme on models of inclusive mainstream practice. ⁵⁵⁴ Department for Education, ‘£740 million allocated for 10,000 new places for pupils with SEND’, press release, 27 March 2025, www.gov.uk/government/news/740-million-allocated-for-10000-new-places-for-pupils-with-send; Department for Education, Consolidated Annual Report and Accounts, 17 July 2025, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/687794132bad77c3dae4dc67/DfE_consolidated_annual_report_and_accounts_2024_to_2025__web-optimised_versi…

But these efforts to rebalance provision could be obstructed by limited data. The NAO reported in late 2024 that DfE is not confident about how much capacity is needed, or in which settings, to meet future needs. ⁵⁵⁵ Comptroller and Auditor General, Support for Children and Young People with Special Educational Needs, Session 2024–25, HC 299, National Audit Office, 24 October 2024, www.nao.org.uk/reports/support-for-children-and-young-people-with-special-educational-needs  Nor does it yet have a good understanding of how outcomes differ for children with similar needs across different settings. ⁵⁵⁶ Ibid.  Meanwhile, the House of Commons Education Committee has highlighted that DfE lacks an official definition of ‘inclusive mainstream’ education, leaving the wider sector uncertain about what this should look like in practice. ⁵⁵⁷ House of Commons Education Committee, Solving the SEND Crisis (HC 492), The Stationery Office, 18 September 2025, https://committees.parliament.uk/publications/49536/documents/265373/default  This leaves reform efforts vulnerable to poor targeting and unintended consequences.

_{* Cash terms, capital funding.}

Spending on special educational needs is outpacing funding

High-needs funding, or the funding dedicated to meeting special educational needs and alternative provision,^* has risen sharply over the last decade in response to the burgeoning number of EHCPs. Between 2012/13 and 2025/26, it has grown by two thirds (66%) in real terms, from £6.7bn to £11.1bn, accounting for a third of the overall increase in school funding over that period.^{**, 558} Figures provided by the Department for Education, see the Methodology for more information; Department for Education, ‘School funding statistics’, 30 January 2025, https://explore-education-statistics.service.gov.uk/find-statistics/school-funding-statistics/2024-25; HM Treasury, Autumn Budget 2024, HC 295, The Stationery Office, 2024, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/6722120210b0d582ee8c48c0/Autumn_Budget_2024 print_.pdf  We project that high-needs funding will hit £12.9bn in 2028/29, up 93% on 2012/13.^***

_{* Education outside a school setting, arranged by local authorities or schools, often to prevent exclusions or help pupils re-engage with learning.
** Cash figures are given in 2025/26 prices. Figures only cover high-needs funding and schools funding for pupils
aged 5 to 16.
*** DfE has not yet set high-needs funding allocations beyond 2025/26. See M6 in the Methodology for details on how the forecast figures were calculated.}

Despite these uplifts, there is less money per pupil in need. In 2015/16, there was around £29,000 available per EHCP in 2025/26 prices (figures cover a wider group of people than others in this section).^* That has since nearly halved in real terms, to £14,700 in 2024/25. As the IFS has noted, some of this drop is due to the expansion of EHCPs to over-18s in 2018, who tend to receive a lower level of funding per pupil than younger children. ⁵⁶⁶ Sibieta L and Snape D, Spending on Special Educational Needs in England: Something Has to Change, Institute for Fiscal Studies, 10 December 2024, https://ifs.org.uk/publications/spending-special-educational-needs-england-something-has-change  But even among school-age pupils, per-EHCP funding has fallen by more than £5,000 since 2015/16.^{**, 567} Ibid.

What money remains for each pupil is being spent in costlier ways. Between 2015–16 and 2024–25, the number of pupils with EHCPs in independent schools more than doubled, from 17,300 to 42,200, which was faster than the overall growth in numbers with EHCPs. These settings now educate 9% of school-age pupils with EHCPs, ⁵⁶⁸ Department for Education, ‘Special Educational Needs in England’, 12 June 2025, https://explore-education-statistics.service.gov.uk/find-statistics/special-educational-needs-in-england/2024-25  and each place costs an estimated £65,500 on average, compared to £25,500 in state special schools.^{***, 569} Comptroller and Auditor General, Support for Children and Young People with Special Educational Needs, Session 2024–25, HC 299, National Audit Office, 24 October 2024, www.nao.org.uk/reports/support-for-children-and-young-people-with-special-educational-needs

While in some cases the higher costs reflect genuinely specialist provision, witnesses to a recent Education Committee inquiry voiced concerns that some independent providers are capitalising on shortages in state special schools, reportedly making profits of up to 25%. ⁵⁷⁰ House of Commons Education Committee, Solving the SEND Crisis (HC 492), The Stationery Office, 18 September 2025, https://committees.parliament.uk/publications/49536/documents/265373/default  As the committee writes, “this raises serious questions about value for money” ⁵⁷¹ Ibid., p.139.  – questions the current system is ill-equipped to answer. With no clear definition of the goals of high-needs funding, it is very difficult to judge whether budgets are being spent effectively. ⁵⁷² Institute for Government interviews; Sibieta L and Snape D, ‘England’s SEND crisis: costs, challenges and the case for reform’, Institute for Fiscal Studies, 12 September 2025, https://ifs.org.uk/articles/englands-send-crisis-costs-challenges-and-case-reform

_{* Unlike other EHCP and high-needs funding figures in this chapter, these figures cover children and young people aged 0 to 25 as comparable figures for high-needs spending on school-age pupils could not be computed with the data available from DfE. Funding covers more than provision for pupils with EHCPs, but the figures are illustrative of how funding is being eaten up by demand. 
** This is likely to be an underestimate of the drop, as the funding figures only cover pupils aged 5 to 16, but the EHCP numbers cover all school-age pupils, who may also be in nursery or sixth form.
*** Adjusted to 2025/26 prices.}

Local authorities’ statutory duties with regard to EHCPs limit their ability to adjust spending in response to funding pressures. As a result, spending on high needs in England has outstripped available funding in every year since 2016/17, and by a generally increasing margin. By 2023/24, each EHCP was on average costing £1,000 more than the funding it attracted, leaving 70% of local authorities with cumulative deficits in their schools budgets.^{*, 582} Department for Education, ‘LA and school expenditure’, 12 December 2024, https://explore-education-statistics.service.gov.uk/find-statistics/la-and-school-expenditure/2023-24  That deficit totalled £1.9bn in 2023/24 (2025/26 prices), or 5.8% of that year’s funding – up from just 1.9% (£611m) in 2019/20, on the eve of the pandemic. ⁵⁸³ Ibid.

By law, local authorities must ensure their overall spending does not exceed their income in any given financial year. ⁵⁸⁴ Local Government Finance Act 1988, Section 114, available at: www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1988/41/section/114 (accessed: 24 October 2025)  But as high-needs deficits have mounted, this rule has become unworkable. In response, the government in 2020/21 created a ‘statutory override’ – an accounting technicality to keep SEND deficits off councils’ books (discussed further in the local government chapter). ⁵⁸⁵ The Local Authorities (Capital Finance and Accounting) (England) (Amendment) (No. 2) Regulations 2022, available at: www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2022/1328/pdfs/uksiem_20221328_en.pdf (accessed: 24 October 2025)

This is clearly not a sustainable solution, merely masking the problem on paper while councils’ finances continue to deteriorate. The government has said it will announce next steps on addressing SEND deficits in the Local Government Finance Settlement later this year.

_{* See M7 in the Methodology for details of these calculations.}

The largest deficits occur in areas that are less deprived and rely more on independent provision

By 2023/24, local authorities had each racked up substantially different deficits in their schools budgets. At one end of the spectrum, Bournemouth, Christchurch and Poole recorded a cumulative deficit of £62.5m,^* equivalent to 58.4% of that year’s schools budget. ⁵⁸⁶ Department for Education, ‘LA and school expenditure’, 12 December 2024, https://explore-education-statistics.service.gov.uk/find-statistics/la-and-school-expenditure/2023-24  At the other, Southend-on-Sea held a 19.4%, or £12.4m,^** surplus. ⁵⁸⁷ Ibid.

_{* In 2025/26 prices.
** In 2025/26 prices.}

Part of this extraordinary local variation can be traced to how high-needs funding is carved up. Central government sets allocations using the National Funding Formula, which distributes a quarter of high-needs funding based on councils’ spending in 2017/18. ⁵⁸⁸ Department for Education, ‘National funding formula for schools and high needs’, 14 September 2017, retrieved 24 October 2025, www.gov.uk/government/publications/national-funding-formula-for-schools-and-high-needs  As the IFS notes, this hardwires “some fairly arbitrary differences in council funding that have arisen over time”, ultimately meaning allocations take too little account of current need. ⁵⁸⁹ Sibieta L and Snape D, Spending on Special Educational Needs in England: Something Has to Change, Institute for Fiscal Studies, 10 December 2024, https://ifs.org.uk/publications/spending-special-educational-needs-england-something-has-change  This leaves some councils facing far deeper deficits in their schools budgets than others, and has prompted the Education Committee to call for a “comprehensive review” of the formula. ⁵⁹⁰ House of Commons Education Committee, Solving the SEND Crisis (HC 492), The Stationery Office, 18 September 2025, https://committees.parliament.uk/publications/49536/documents/265373/default

Differences in how local SEND systems operate, including how many pupils receive an EHCP, how often independent provision is used to support those pupils, and how affluent the area is, can amplify these pressures.^*

Perhaps surprisingly, less deprived areas have higher average deficits.^** In 2023/24, the most deprived fifth of local authority areas had cumulative deficits in their schools budgets equal to 1.4% of the schools funding that year; for the least deprived fifth, that was 12.3%.

_{* See M8 in the Methodology for details.
** See M8 in the Methodology for details.} 

This cannot be explained by higher activity: less deprived areas do not issue more EHCPs on average.^* Nor can it be explained entirely by placement type, although the least deprived fifth of local authorities do place more children with EHCPs in expensive independent provision (8.5% compared to 5.6% in the most deprived fifth).^** Even after controlling for both factors, the least deprived fifth of areas still had schools budget deficits that were, on average, 8.1ppts larger than those in the most deprived fifth, in 2023/24.^***

One plausible alternative explanation is that parents in more affluent areas are better equipped to advocate for their children’s needs – securing more resource-intensive support and, in turn, driving up per-EHCP spending. Indeed, recent research from the Sutton Trust found that better-off families can more easily access the SEND system, right up to being more likely to secure a special school place for their child. ⁶⁰³ O’Regan C and Latham K, Double Disadvantage? Uncovering Inequalities in Access to Support within the SEND System, Sutton Trust, 16 October 2025, retrieved 24 October 2025, www.suttontrust.com/our-research/double-disadvantage  It is also possible that the funding formula assumes a greater link between disadvantage and demand for SEND services than actually exists. ⁶⁰⁴ Institute for Government interview.

While deprivation shapes spending pressures, local authorities’ reliance on independent SEND provision is still a key driver of deficits. The extent of that reliance varies sharply across England: in 2023–24, none of the children or young people with EHCPs in Hackney or Peterborough were in independent settings, but in Surrey 14.1% were. ⁶⁰⁵ Department for Education, ‘Education, health and care plans’, 26 June 2025, https://explore-education-statistics.service.gov.uk/find-statistics/education-health-and-care-plans/2025  Each additional percentage point of children with EHCPs enrolled in independent provision was linked to having a 1.2ppt larger schools deficit in 2023/24,^**** after accounting for deprivation and EHCP prevalence.

_{* See M8 in the Methodology for regression results.
** See M8 in the Methodology for regression results.
*** See M8 in the Methodology for regression results.
**** The cumulative deficit as a proportion of 2023/24 schools funding. See M8 in the Methodology for regression results.}

Per-pupil funding has increased, but settlements appear less generous once cost pressures are accounted for

These SEND pressures sit within a wider funding picture. Under the Conservative-led governments, overall per-pupil funding^* remained broadly flat in real terms from 2010/11 until 2015/16, before falling sharply to a low of £7,400 in 2017/18,^** some £250 less than at the start of the decade. ⁶⁰⁶ Department for Education, ‘School funding statistics’, 30 January 2025, https://explore-education-statistics.service.gov.uk/find-statistics/school-funding-statistics/2024-25  During the pandemic, however, per-pupil funding quickly rose to a new high of around £7,800, and stayed around this level before rising again in both 2023/24 and 2024/25. ⁶⁰⁷ Ibid.  Over the final six years of Conservative government allocations, per-pupil funding rose by 8.7% in real terms, reaching £8,100 in 2024/25. ⁶⁰⁸ Ibid.  However, due to earlier cuts, that figure only represents a 6.3% real-terms increase on 2010/11 levels. ⁶⁰⁹ Ibid.

When Labour came into power in 2024, it used its first autumn budget to confirm an additional £2.3bn (cash terms) for core schools funding for 2025/26 compared to 2024/25.^{***, 610} HM Treasury, Autumn Budget 2024, HC 295, The Stationery Office, 2024, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/6722120210b0d582ee8c48c0/Autumn_Budget_2024_print_.pdf  While this was a smaller increase than many other departments received, the 0.2% drop in pupil numbers^**** over this period meant 2025/26 per-pupil funding was 3.6% higher in real-terms than the year before. ⁶¹¹ Department for Education, ‘School funding statistics’, 30 January 2025, https://explore-education-statistics.service.gov.uk/find-statistics/school-funding-statistics/2024-25  This was the second-largest annual increase since 2010/11, behind only the pandemic hike in 2020/21. ⁶¹² Ibid.

Labour’s 2025 spending review set the course for continued, though slowing, real-terms growth over the rest of the parliament. ⁶¹³ Ibid.  Per-pupil funding is expected to reach £8,800 in 2028/29 (in 2025/26 prices), representing a 7.7% (or £600) real-terms increase on its inheritance in 2024/25, but only a 1.0% increase on 2027/28. ⁶¹⁴ Ibid.

_{* Funding figures within this section only cover pupils aged 5 to 16, and include compensation to schools for increased employer pension contributions. The trends we describe here would be different if further education were included.
** 2025/26 prices.
*** It also announced a £615m additional teacher pay grant in May 2025, which we have included in the 2025/26 baseline of our analysis.
**** Pupils aged 4 to 15 at the start of the academic year, taken from DfE’s ‘School funding’ statistics.}

But funding will be much tighter than those top-line figures suggest. The government also used the 2025 spending review to commit to spend £410m (in cash terms) per year by 2028/29 on expanding free school meals to every child in families that claim Universal Credit. ⁶²⁷ HM Treasury, Spending Review 2025, CP 1336, The Stationery Office, June 2025, www.gov.uk/government/topical-events/spending-review-2025  This policy initiative, as well as anticipated above-inflation staff pay rises, will both eat into the 4.0% real-terms rise in per-pupil funding between 2025/26 and 2028/29, leaving just a 3.4% increase.^*

Much of recent per-pupil funding increases have also been absorbed by the SEND system, with 28.8% of additional funding in 2025/26 going to high-needs budgets. ⁶²⁸ Figures provided by the Department for Education.  As a result, the gap between per-pupil funding and per-mainstream-pupil funding^** has widened since 2020/21. Some local authorities are introducing pressures beyond what the figure above shows, by making additional diversions of money from mainstream budgets to their high-needs budgets – in some cases, taking per-pupil funding below ‘guaranteed’ minimums set by DfE. ⁶²⁹ Whittaker F, ‘DfE lets councils skirt minimum funding rules to prop up SEND’, Schools Week, 11 October 2024, retrieved 24 October 2025, https://schoolsweek.co.uk/dfe-lets-councils-skirt-minimum-funding-rules-to-prop-up-send

Looking ahead, upcoming SEND reforms are likely to further deplete available funding. In the spending review, the government earmarked £760m for these reforms – an amount that is currently included in per-pupil funding figures. ⁶³⁰ HM Treasury, Spending Review 2025, CP 1336, The Stationery Office, June 2025, www.gov.uk/government/topical-events/spending-review-2025  And DfE has said that more funding will be redirected to these reforms following the publication of the schools white paper next year. ⁶³¹ Whittaker F, ‘Spending review 2025: What’s in it for schools?’, Schools Week, 11 June 2025, retrieved 24 October 2025, https://schoolsweek.co.uk/spending-review-2025-whats-in-it-for-schools  Assuming the gap between per-pupil funding and per-mainstream-pupil funding continues to widen at the same rate it has in recent years, as the figure does,^*** mainstream pupils are set to receive a 4.1% real-terms increase over the course of this parliament, compared to 7.7% for pupils overall.

According to the IFS, the combined effect of these pressures means that per-pupil funding will “at best” stagnate between 2025/26 and 2028/29. ⁶³² Sibieta L, ‘What the Spending Review Really Means for Schools’, Institute for Fiscal Studies, 12 June 2025, https://ifs.org.uk/articles/what-spending-review-really-means-schools

To fend off these cost pressures, schools are expected to find savings through improved productivity and smarter spending. ⁶³³ HM Treasury, ‘Departmental Efficiency Plans’, 11 June 2025, www.gov.uk/government/publications/departmental-efficiency-delivery-plans/departmental-efficiency-plans#department-for-education  DfE published an ‘efficiency plan’ alongside the spending review, ⁶³⁴ Ibid.  supposedly detailing where this extra money could be found. But its proposals are vague and there is a risk that, in practice, they may function as little more than a cover for cuts.

_{* See M9 in the Methodology for details of this estimate’s calculation.
** Estimated from figures provided by DfE – this is likely to be an overestimate. See M9 in the Methodology for details.
*** See M9 in the Methodology for details.}

Staffing

Recruitment to initial teacher training courses remains poor, although it has improved over the past year

To qualify as a teacher in England, most trainees complete the postgraduate initial teacher training programme (PGITT). ⁶³⁵ Department for Education, ‘Initial teacher training census’, 5 December 2024, https://explore-education-statistics.service.gov.uk/find-statistics/initial-teacher-training-census/2024-25  In 2024–25, some 23,100 people started PGITT, a 8% rise on the 21,400 who entered in 2023–24. ⁶³⁶ Ibid.

This marks the first increase since the pandemic, and a partial reversal of a worrying trend: between 2020–21 and 2023–24, the number of PGITT entrants fell by over a third (38%), or 13,000 people. ⁶³⁷ Ibid.  Even so, trainee numbers remain more than 10,000 below what they were four years ago. ⁶³⁸ Ibid.

The government sets annual PGITT recruitment targets to ensure that the teacher workforce can meet future demand. This is of particular concern in secondary schools, where pupil numbers are expected to stay relatively stable for a few more years, maintaining pressure on the workforce. In 2024–25, only 69% of the overall target was met, including 62% of the secondary target and 88% of the primary target. ⁶⁴⁵ Ibid.  This left programmes short by 9,150 secondary trainees and 1,100 primary trainees. ⁶⁴⁶ Ibid.

Still, this represents a modest improvement on the previous year. In 2023–24, the series low, only 60% of the overall target was met, reaching as little as 48% of the secondary target, but 94% of the primary target. ⁶⁴⁷ Ibid.

New teachers are leaving earlier

The proportion of qualified teachers leaving the state-funded sector fell sharply during the pandemic, likely reflecting the reduced mobility in the wider labour market. The yearly exit rate dropped to 7.2% in 2019–20, down from between 9.3% and 10.6% in the preceding decade. ⁶⁴⁸ Department for Education, ‘School workforce in England’, 5 June 2025, https://explore-education-statistics.service.gov.uk/find-statistics/school-workforce-in-england/2024  It has now largely returned to pre-pandemic levels, with one in every 11 qualified teachers leaving in 2023–24 (9.0%), representing a loss of 40,800 full-time equivalent teachers. ⁶⁴⁹ Ibid.

Early career retention, meanwhile, has steadily worsened. As the figure below shows, five-year retention rates have worsened in recent cohorts. While 67.6% of teachers who qualified in 2019 remain in the classroom, 68.3% of the 2011–2015 starters, and 73.5% of the 2006–2010 starters, were still teaching five years after they qualified. ⁶⁵⁰ Ibid.  A similar decline can be seen at the 10-year mark.

Poor retention among early-career teachers was a central theme in submissions to the Education Select Committee’s 2024 inquiry on recruitment, training and retention. ⁶⁷⁴ House of Commons Education Committee, Teacher Recruitment, Training and Retention (HC 119), The Stationery Office, 8 May 2024, https://committees.parliament.uk/publications/44798/documents/222606/default  The committee identified a number of contributing pressures, including uncompetitive wages, limited flexible working arrangements, escalating workloads – often the result of shortfalls in other public services like mental health and social care – and worsening pupil behaviour. ⁶⁷⁵ Ibid.

The government’s plan to tackle teacher shortages lacks clarity and evidence

In its 2024/25 annual report, DfE described the shortage of high-quality teachers in schools and colleges as a ‘major issue’, identifying it as one of the most critical challenges to departmental objectives, alongside cost pressures from the SEND system. ⁶⁷⁶ Department for Education, Consolidated Annual Report and Accounts, 17 July 2025, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/687794132bad77c3dae4dc67/DfE_consolidated_annual_report_and_accounts_2024_to_2025__web-optimised_versi…

Labour entered government with a pledge to “recruit 6,500 new expert teachers in key subjects” by the end of the parliament. ⁶⁷⁷ Labour Party, Change: Labour Party Manifesto 2024, 2024, p.75, https://labour.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/Labour-Party-manifesto-2024.pdf  But in February 2025, DfE rated its delivery confidence as a ‘significant challenge’ out of concern it would not have enough funding to use its best-evidenced – and often more expensive – recruitment initiatives, such as bursaries. ⁶⁷⁸ Comptroller and Auditor General, Teacher Workforce: Secondary and Further Education, Session 2024–25, HC 854, National Audit Office, 30 April 2025, www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/teacher-workforce-secondary-and-further-education.pdf  The pledge has since been revised, with the government confirming in July 2025 that the 6,500 teachers would not all be ‘new’; ⁶⁷⁹ Chantler-Hicks L, ‘The Shapeshifting 6,500 Teachers Pledge’, Schools Week, 4 July 2025, retrieved 24 October 2025, https://schoolsweek.co.uk/the-shapeshifting-6500-teachers-pledge  but instead that it would target overall workforce growth, including through improved retention.

Questions also remain about whether DfE will focus on expert teachers or shortage subjects, as initially stated. ⁶⁸⁰ Ibid.  And it has yet to confirm how the target will be split across settings (although it has ruled primary schools out of scope). Amid ongoing uncertainty, the Public Accounts Committee warned that the government lacks a coherent plan to boost teacher numbers. ⁶⁸¹ House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts, Increasing teacher numbers: Secondary and further education: Thirty-Eighth Report of Session 2024–25 (HC 825), The Stationery Office, 9 July 2025, https://committees.parliament.uk/publications/48695/documents/255438/default; Comptroller and Auditor General, Teacher Workforce: Secondary and Further Education, Session 2024–25, HC 854, National Audit Office, 30 April 2025, www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/teacher-workforce-secondary-and-further-education.pdf  DfE has since promised a full delivery plan by December 2025, which will include the definition of the pledge and details of how progress will be measured. ⁶⁸² HM Treasury, Treasury Minutes, CP 1404, The Stationery Office, 2025, p.21, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/68cd779ba1e4472207995df6/E03449792_CP_1404_Treasury_Minutes_Accessible.pdf

While clarity from DfE is welcome, it is unclear how far the pledge would go towards addressing teacher shortages even if it were well-defined and delivered in full. In May 2025, the NAO concluded that it was “not clear if, or how, [it] relates to known and forecast shortages across different settings”. ⁶⁸³ Comptroller and Auditor General, Teacher Workforce: Secondary and Further Education, Session 2024–25, HC 854, National Audit Office, 30 April 2025, www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/teacher-workforce-secondary-and-further-education.pdf

For example, DfE estimates that to meet demand, the system needs 1,600 additional secondary school teachers between 2023–24 and 2027–28, and between 8,400 and 12,400 additional college teachers by 2028–29. ⁶⁸⁴ Ibid.  That is well above the 6,500 target. ⁶⁸⁵ Ibid.  And as the National Foundation for Educational Research has highlighted, in 2024–25 the government missed its secondary school target for entrants into PGITT by 9,150 – in other words, by more than the pledge target itself. ⁶⁸⁶ National Foundation for Educational Research, Written Evidence Submitted by the National Foundation for Educational Research (ITN0006), May 2025, https://committees.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/141293/pdf

And these teacher demand forecasts and recruitment targets are themselves questionable, leaving limited clarity over how many more teachers are actually needed. DfE’s estimates for further education are generated using a model in which two thirds of the assumptions have limited or no underlying evidence. ⁶⁸⁷ House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts, Increasing teacher numbers: Secondary and further education: Thirty-Eighth Report of Session 2024–25 (HC 825), The Stationery Office, 9 July 2025, https://committees.parliament.uk/publications/48695/documents/255438/default  Its forecasting model for the school workforce, which underpins its teacher trainee recruitment targets, assumes that current teacher numbers meet existing demand, ⁶⁸⁸ Comptroller and Auditor General, Teacher Workforce: Secondary and Further Education, Session 2024–25, HC 854, National Audit Office, 30 April 2025, www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/teacher-workforce-secondary-and-further-education.pdf  despite ongoing vacancies and use of temporary cover suggesting this is not the case. ⁶⁸⁹ Department for Education, ‘School workforce in England’, 5 June 2025, https://explore-education-statistics.service.gov.uk/find-statistics/school-workforce-in-england/2024  The schools model also fails to fully account for ongoing shortfalls in initial teacher training. ⁶⁹⁰ Comptroller and Auditor General, Teacher Workforce: Secondary and Further Education, Session 2024–25, HC 854, National Audit Office, 30 April 2025, www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/teacher-workforce-secondary-and-further-education.pdf

If the government is to win what already seems to be something of an uphill battle on teacher recruitment and retainment it must, at a minimum, draw more effectively on evidence to inform its targets and approach.

School performance

Labour inherited a schools system struggling to recover from the pandemic 

The Labour government’s long-term opportunity mission aims to break the link between a child’s background and their future success. ⁶⁹¹ Labour Party, Mission Driven Government: Breaking Down the Barriers to Opportunity, 2023, https://labour.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/Mission-breaking-down-barriers.pdf  Its key milestone is for 75% of five-year-olds in England to reach a good level of development^* by 2028. ⁶⁹² Prime Minister’s Office, 10 Downing Street, Plan for Change, The Stationery Office, 5 December 2024, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/6751af4719e0c816d18d1df3/Plan_for_Change.pdf  In schools, progress on the mission will be judged by attainment at the end of secondary school, though it remains unclear exactly which metric will be used. ⁶⁹³ Prime Minister’s Office, 10 Downing Street, ‘Break Down Barriers to Opportunity’, 2024, www.gov.uk/missions/opportunity

Given that pupil performance has largely declined since the pandemic, the government faces a steeper climb than it might have beforehand. In 2023–24, around two thirds (67.7%) of five-year-olds reached a good level of development, down from 71.8% in 2018–19 (though these figures are not strictly comparable as the assessment criteria changed from 2021). ⁶⁹⁴ Department for Education, ‘Early Years Foundation Stage Profile Results’, 28 November 2024, https://explore-education-statistics.service.gov.uk/find-statistics/early-years-foundation-stage-profile-results/2023-24  Surveys of school leaders and teachers also suggest that fewer pupils are ‘school ready’ when starting Reception than were before the pandemic. ⁶⁹⁵ Tracey L, Bowyer-Crane C and Bonetti S and others, The Impact of the Covid-19 Pandemic on Children’s Socio-Emotional Wellbeing and Attainment During the Reception Year, Education Endowment Foundation, May 2022, https://educationendowmentfoundation.org.uk/projects-and-evaluation/projects/the-impact-of-the-covid-19-pandemic-on-childrens-socioemotional-well-bei…; Weale S, ‘Some children starting school “unable to climb staircase”, finds England and Wales teacher survey’, The Guardian, 30 January 2025, retrieved 24 October 2025, www.theguardian.com/education/2025/jan/30/some-children-starting-school-unable-to-climb-staircase-finds-england-and-wales-teacher-survey; Montacute R and Holt-White E, Views on the Ground from Parents, Providers and Teachers, The Sutton Trust, August 2021, www.suttontrust.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/Views-on-the-ground-from-parents-providers-and-teachers.pdf  To reach 75%, the government says between 40,000 and 45,000 extra children will need to meet that standard every year until 2028. ⁶⁹⁶ Prime Minister’s Office, 10 Downing Street, Plan for Change, The Stationery Office, 5 December 2024, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/6751af4719e0c816d18d1df3/Plan_for_Change.pdf

_{* To achieve a good level of development, children must be performing at the expected level across 12 early learning goals covering communication, motor skills, social and emotional development, maths and literacy.}

Primary school attainment has also slipped since the pandemic.^* The proportion of pupils meeting the expected standard in Key Stage 2 (KS2) reading, writing and maths fell from 65% to 61% between 2019 and 2025, driven by steep drops in maths and writing results. ⁷⁰⁸ Department for Education, ‘Key Stage 2 attainment’, 11 September 2025, https://explore-education-statistics.service.gov.uk/find-statistics/key-stage-2-attainment/2024-25

_{* We do not cover Key Stage 2 progress as this data was not released in 2024 or 2025 due to interruptions from Covid.}

At secondary level, Key Stage 4 (KS4) attainment and progress have held steady, but that is largely by design. Meaningful changes in the distribution of GCSE grades awarded to pupils only happen if the exams regulator is satisfied that one cohort is performing notably better or worse than another. ⁷⁰⁹ Ofqual, ‘National Reference Test annual statement 2024’, GOV.UK, 22 August 2024, www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-national-reference-test-in-2024/national-reference-test-annual-statement-2024  As a result, KS4 attainment – the proportion of pupils achieving at least a grade 4 in their English and maths GCSEs – was 65% in both 2019 and 2025. ⁷¹⁰ Department for Education, ‘Key Stage 4 performance’, 16 October 2025, https://explore-education-statistics.service.gov.uk/find-statistics/key-stage-4-performance/2024-25  And KS4 ‘progress scores’ – a measure of the progress that pupils make between KS2 and KS4 relative to pupils with similar KS2 results – are close to 0 by definition at a national level.^*

The National Reference Test, taken every year by a representative sample of 16-year-olds, provides a clearer view of changes in national KS4 performance over time. Results show that between 2017 and 2025, there was no statistically significant change in performance in English or maths at most of the grade boundaries measured in the test. ⁷¹¹ Burge B and Benson L, ‘National Reference Test Results Digest 2025’, Ofqual, 21 August 2025, www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-national-reference-test-in-2025/national-reference-test-results-digest-2025-accessible

_{* When averaged across the whole of England, the difference between pupils’ KS4 attainment and the KS4 attainment of pupils who performed similarly at KS2 is 0. It is -0.03 for the years where data was published between 2019 and 2025 because progress scores are calculated for pupils in special schools, even though those pupils’ KS4 attainment is not included in the calculation of other pupils’ progress scores.}

The government also faces growing inequalities in performance, which may affect its ability to deliver on its opportunity mission. Over the pandemic, London saw smaller declines – or even improvements – across all measures of performance where comparison is possible.^* Its KS2 results fell slightly less than elsewhere, ⁷¹² Department for Education, ‘Key Stage 2 attainment’, 11 September 2025, https://explore-education-statistics.service.gov.uk/find-statistics/key-stage-2-attainment/2024-25  and its KS4 attainment and KS4 progress improved while it decreased in other regions. ⁷¹³ Department for Education, ‘Key Stage 4 performance’, 16 October 2025, https://explore-education-statistics.service.gov.uk/find-statistics/key-stage-4-performance/2024-25  As a result, the gap between London and England as a whole has grown since the pandemic – in KS4 attainment, for example, from 4 to 6ppts. ⁷¹⁴ Ibid.

Similarly, the gap in performance between disadvantaged and non-disadvantaged children – where disadvantage is roughly measured as eligibility for free school meals – widened considerably following the pandemic.^** Pupils from disadvantaged households tended to be less well-equipped for learning at home, with poorer access to digital devices, less support from parents and fewer quiet spaces to study. ⁷¹⁵ Howard E, Khan A and Lockyer C, Learning during the pandemic: review of research from England, GOV.UK, 21 July 2021, www.gov.uk/government/publications/learning-during-the-pandemic/learning-during-the-pandemic-review-of-research-from-england  As a result, when assessments resumed after the pandemic, the KS2 attainment gap widened to levels last seen in 2012. ⁷¹⁶ Department for Education, ‘Key Stage 2 attainment’, 11 September 2025, https://explore-education-statistics.service.gov.uk/find-statistics/key-stage-2-attainment/2024-25

While it has since started reverting to pre-pandemic levels, in 2025 the gap was still bigger than a decade earlier. At KS4, the attainment gap declined slightly in 2024 and again in 2025 but is still greater than it was in 2012. ⁷¹⁷ Department for Education, ‘Key Stage 4 performance’, 16 October 2025, https://explore-education-statistics.service.gov.uk/find-statistics/key-stage-4-performance/2024-25  This too is ominous for the opportunity mission. Addressing such disadvantage gaps will be critical to its delivery given it includes an explicit focus on disadvantaged children. ⁷¹⁸ Prime Minister’s Office, 10 Downing Street, ‘Break Down Barriers to Opportunity’, 2024, www.gov.uk/missions/opportunity

_{* Data on the proportion of children achieving a good level of development is not comparable between 2018–19 and 2023–24.
** DfE changed the definition of free school meal eligibility in 2018, which impacted disadvantage statistics for the first time in 2024. The DfE reported that this had “minimal impact on … disadvantage breakdowns” in 2024 and 2025, and as such, we have treated statistics concerning disadvantage as continuous between 2019 and 2025.}

The government must also frame its mission carefully to avoid unintended consequences. As a recent Institute for Government report argues, if it directs its efforts primarily towards groups already close to the developmental or attainment benchmarks, it risks widening inequalities that then persist throughout children’s education – by in effect abandoning the very worst performing in the pursuit of an easier target. Instead, by pairing short-term action to meet targets with sustained investment in the children most at risk of poor educational outcomes, the government could achieve lasting benefits, bringing it closer to its ultimate goal of closing the opportunity gap.

Absences and suspensions are increasingly common, especially among those already most at risk of poor outcomes

For the opportunity mission to be a success, the pupils most at risk of poor outcomes will need to attend school regularly and learn in safe, supportive environments. But disadvantaged children and children with SEN – two groups the opportunity mission intends to focus on ⁷²⁹ Prime Minister’s Office, 10 Downing Street, ‘Break Down Barriers to Opportunity’, 2024, www.gov.uk/missions/opportunity  – are disproportionately likely to miss school through absence or suspension. The pandemic was particularly disruptive for these children, exposing inequalities in home learning environments and cutting off access to support services. ⁷³⁰ Ofsted, ‘Children and young people with SEND disproportionately affected by pandemic’, GOV.UK, 16 June 2021, www.gov.uk/government/news/children-and-young-people-with-send-disproportionately-affected-by-pandemic; Howard E, Khan A and Lockyer C, Learning during the pandemic: review of research from England, GOV. UK, 21 July 2021, www.gov.uk/government/publications/learning-during-the-pandemic/learning-during-the-pandemic-review-of-research-from-england  These setbacks widened existing gaps, and current trajectories suggest they will continue to do so.

In the wake of the pandemic, absences reached heights not seen since at least the 2006–07 academic year. ⁷³¹ Department for Education, ‘Pupil absence in schools in England: Academic Year 2023/24’, 20 March 2025, https://explore-education-statistics.service.gov.uk/find-statistics/pupil-absence-in-schools-in-england/2023-24  While they are now gradually declining, they remain well above pre-pandemic levels. In 2023–24, primary school pupils missed an average of 5.5% of sessions,^* up from 4.0% in 2018–19. ⁷³² Ibid.  In secondary schools, absences are still three fifths higher than they were pre-pandemic: 8.9% compared to 5.5%. ⁷³³ Ibid.

Several factors are likely to be behind this trend. Since the pandemic, more parents have come to see school attendance as optional, having seen classrooms close for prolonged periods during lockdowns. ⁷³⁴ Burtonshaw S and Dorrell E, Listening to, and learning from, parents in the attendance crisis, Public First, 15 September 2023, www.publicfirst.co.uk/public-first-research-finds-parental-support-for-fulltime-schooling-has-collapsed.html  Rising mental ill-health and unmet special educational needs are also contributing, with children and their parents feeling unsupported by school. ⁷³⁵ Macmillan L and Anders J, ‘Rising school absence: what do we know and what can we do?’, blog, University College London, 16 January 2024, retrieved 24 October 2025, https://blogs.ucl.ac.uk/ioe/2024/01/16/rising-school-absence-what-do-we-know-and-what-can-we-do  And increasing poverty may mean more families struggle to afford school transport, spare uniforms and trips. ⁷³⁶ House of Commons Education Committee, Persistent absence and support for disadvantaged pupils (HC 970), The Stationery Office, 27 September 2023, https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm5803/cmselect/cmeduc/970/ report.html

For children with EHCPs, the trend in absences is even more concerning.^** In 2023–24, the average primary-aged pupil with an EHCP missed fully a tenth of lessons, up from 7.0% in 2018–19. ⁷³⁷ Department for Education, ‘Pupil absence in schools in England: Academic Year 2023/24’, 20 March 2025, https://explore-education-statistics.service.gov.uk/find-statistics/pupil-absence-in-schools-in-england/2023-24  In secondary schools, it jumped even more dramatically, from 8.6% to 15.8%, an 84% increase. ⁷³⁸ Ibid.

_{* A session of absence is half a day of school that a pupil misses as a result of authorised or unauthorised absence.
** Absences have also surged among pupils who receive SEN support (the tier of support below an EHCP). Moreover, the absence gap between those pupils and pupils with no identified SEN has grown in both primary and secondary schools.}

Looking at a local authority level brings this trend into even sharper relief. In 2023–24, the best-performing tenth of local authority areas had absence rates among secondary EHCP pupils of 10.5%, higher than the worst-performing tenth five years earlier. ⁷⁴⁷ Ibid.  Now, in the worst-affected areas, absences stand at 19.5%, the equivalent of missing a full day of secondary school every week. ⁷⁴⁸ Ibid.

Absences among children with no identified SEN have increased by little in comparison. As a result, those with EHCPs are now twice as likely to be absent from primary or secondary school as peers without SEN. ⁷⁴⁹ Ibid.  That disparity was much smaller before the pandemic: less than half the current size in secondary schools, and around two thirds (65%) in primary schools. ⁷⁵⁰ Ibid.  Recent Institute for Government research finds a similar trend among disadvantaged children, confirming that their attendance has fallen further behind their better-off peers’.

When pupils do attend school, there is some evidence that they are behaving more poorly on average than they were before the pandemic. Teachers and leaders report encountering more frequent and severe instances of pupil misbehaviour, with many attributing this rise to poor socialisation skills following pandemic restrictions, a lack of deterrents and pupils’ poor mental health. ⁷⁵¹ NASUWT, Behaviour in Schools, NASUWT, September 2023, www.nasuwt.org.uk/static/357990da-90f7-4ca4-b63fc3f781c4d851/Behaviour-in-Schools-Full-Report-2023.pdf  This is also reflected in suspensions, which have increased in every year since the pandemic, in every school type.^{*, 752} Department for Education, ‘Suspensions and permanent exclusions in England, academic year 2023/24’, 10 July 2025, https://explore-education-statistics.service.gov.uk/find-statistics/suspensions-and-permanent-exclusions-in-england/2023-24  This has been most marked in secondary schools, with an average of 22.6 suspensions per 100 pupils in 2023–24, more than double the highest rate seen pre-pandemic and equivalent to five in every class. ⁷⁵³ Ibid.

Exclusions, which prevent pupils from returning to their schools and are typically reserved for the most serious incidents, have also increased year-on-year since 2020/21.^{**, 754} Ibid.

_{* A rise in suspensions may solely reflect worsening pupil behaviour, and/or it could signal a leadership push to enforce stricter behavioural standards – common, for example, after taking over a struggling school. The national scale and persistence of recent increases in suspensions suggest that worsening pupil behaviour is the main cause. As one interviewee pointed out, a three-year, system-wide behavioural reset seems unlikely.
** Given their long-lasting consequences, exclusions are less likely than suspensions to be used as a general behavioural signal by leadership.}

Suspensions have increased most sharply among pupils living in the poorest areas. In 2023–24, they were 10 times more common among pupils living in the most deprived areas than among those in the least deprived areas, at a rate of 30.2 versus 3.5 per 100. ⁷⁵⁷ Ibid.  While this disparity has existed since the data series began in 2015–16, it again widened dramatically after the pandemic, with the gap growing nearly eight times in size since 2018–19. ⁷⁵⁸ Ibid.

Absences and suspensions in school are closely linked to academic performance ⁷⁶² Sims S, Briefing note: School absences and pupil achievement, University College London, April 2020, https://repec-cepeo.ucl.ac.uk/cepeob/cepeobn1.pdf; Department for Education, The Impact of School Absence on Lifetime Earnings, Department for Education, March 2025, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/67d2cf8f4702aacd2251cbae/The_impact_of_school_absence_on_lifetime_earnings.pdf; Dräger J, Klein M and Sosu E, ‘The long-term consequences of early school absences for educational attainment and labour market outcomes’, British Educational Research Journal, 2024, vol. 50, no. 4, pp. 1636–54; Department for Education, The link between attendance and attainment in an assessment year, March 2025, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/67c96d7dd0fba2f1334cf2ed/The_link_between_attendance_and_attainment_in_an_assessment_year_-_March_2025…  and longer term outcomes such as labour market returns. ⁷⁶³ Dräger J, Klein M and Sosu E, ‘The long-term consequences of early school absences for educational attainment and labour market outcomes’, British Educational Research Journal, 2024, vol. 50, no. 4, pp. 1636–54.  Two interviewees pointed to attendance among pupils with identified SEN as a key indicator of how well the SEND system is working. ⁷⁶⁴ Institute for Government interviews.  High attendance signals that pupils feel safe, supported and able to learn. If current absence and suspension gaps persist or widen, disparities in outcomes are likely to follow suit, putting the opportunity mission in jeopardy.

As noted, Labour plans to publish a white paper covering SEND reforms in 2026, aiming to make the system work better for those it serves. But the approach risks being disjointed, given that it comes after key funding decisions in the spending review and at a different time to announcements about the statutory override. The government will need to pivot to a far more joined-up approach on tackling these structural issues if the opportunity mission is to succeed.