One year on: the impact of Donald Trump on British politics and policy

Donald Trump has learned from a first term in the White House characterised by personnel churn and a dependence on Republican old faithfuls rather than MAGA true believers. Instead, Trump 2.0 has both a relatively stable team and a plan of action which – through industrial scale use of executive orders – he has rapidly deployed. Indeed executive action on the international front now includes the forceable capture and removal of the president of Venezuela without any reference to congress. 

As well as having to respond to and cope with Trump’s actions on the world stage, the US government’s breakneck first year on the domestic front has also provided a palpable contrast with the criticism of Keir Starmer and his team for a rather directionless first year in office. Likewise, on communication, where the president’s style remains unchanged – with panellists at our recent event all stressing the way in which Trump made the news weather and dominated coverage through his Truth Social posts – this is in contrast with the struggles of the Starmer government to develop and deliver a coherent story about what it is trying to do.

But, a year on, how has Trump affected the UK on the eight areas we identified, and where have other impacts been felt? 

1. Spending priorities

The first issue identified was the impact on spending. Trump has indeed forced NATO members to up their commitment to defence, the UK included. But the impact on last June’s spending review was less than it might have been as ministers upped their defence commitment to 2.5% simply by further cutting overseas aid, now reduced to 0.3% of GDP against the supposedly legal binding obligation of 0.7%. That decision, combined with Trump’s own savaging of USAID, means a dramatic reduction in flows to poorer countries. But the UK has also signed up to further hikes in defence spending to reach the new target of 3.5% of GDP, storing up potential problems for spending reviews to come. 

2. Trade policy

Trump loves tariffs. That was the verdict in January 2025, and a year on it remains the case. The rules-based world trading system has come under unprecedented assault from the Trump administration, and after April’s “Liberation Day” most governments rushed to cut deals with the US, with Keir Starmer leading the pack. The UK managed to insulate itself from much of the worst impact of Trump’s tariffs (and deals more generally mean they have had much less of an impact on the world economy than forecasters such as the IMF originally feared – and more on the US economy where “affordability” has become a big stick for Democrats). 

But the trade environment remains fraught. A couple of weeks ago the UK caved to US threats on pharmaceutical tariffs – with potential big cost implications for the NHS – and the US has suspended the tech deal, unveiled during Trump’s “unprecedented” state visit, to gain better access to the UK market for agricultural goods and remove the digital services tax. But the Trump tariff policy may come apart if the US supreme court strikes down his reliance on “national emergency” powers to by-pass congress.

3. EU reset 

Keir Starmer has spent the year refusing to choose between the US and the EU, pursuing his reset while also trying to rebuild relations with China. It is far from clear that he will be able to sustain this through 2026, not least if he manages to land a deal on agricultural standards with the EU. That could bring direct conflict with the US if it continues to press for better access for US agricultural produce, but an emergent theme over the last year is the sheer visceral contempt the Trump administration seems to harbour for many European governments, its willingness to lend support to their political opponents on the right, and its loathing for the EU – all laid bare in the recent National Security Strategy. The UK’s rapprochement with the EU now takes place against the backdrop of a US which seems willingly to take many of its cues from the Kremlin rather than European democracies. 

4. Regulation

The regulatory choice is yet to be forced, but this could be a big issue in 2026 as the US uses trade policy as a weapon to promote the interests of the US tech and food sectors. And as the US willingness to renege on the tech deal shows, the Trump administration does not feel any particular need to stick to commitments with a perceived weaker partner.

5. Immigration

The Trump administration has cracked down on illegal immigration (and on long-term US residents). In doing so, the US president may have moved the Overton window of what is deemed possible in terms of mass deportation.  All of Europe is moving in any case to a harder line on irregular migration, looking at reformulating the European Convention on Human Rights (to stave off those who want to withdraw) and considering options dismissed as unacceptable just a couple of years ago. The tactics of US ICE have yet to be replicated in Europe - indeed they led to some governments warning their citizens about tough border enforcement, even before the US tightened its rules on visa waivers.  

6. Net zero and climate change

One of Trump’s first acts was to withdraw from the Paris climate agreement (again). While other countries did not follow, the COP30 in Brazil did not attract many world leaders and 35 years of UK climate consensus is under strain – with the Conservatives rowing back on the net zero target they had put into law. Notable backtracking across Europe could also impact the UK, such as on any attempts to resist pushing back the ICE car ban from 2030. But energy secretary Ed Miliband did well in both the spending round and the budget, and the government is holding pretty firm on its net zero commitments for now. 

7. Government efficiency

Elon Musk and DOGE’s slash and burn approach to government activity were leapt on by Nigel Farage’s Reform party, with its mini-DOGEs established to look for cuts (though they do not seem to have found many) in the councils it now runs. Other parties are also searching for savings, with the government planning to appoint efficiency “czars” for each department and the Conservatives relying on big but vague civil service cuts to make its numbers add up. However, after making a great deal of noises at the start of the year, Elon Musk and his team seem to be a model of how not to reduce spending. 

8. Politicisation of public service

One area where Trump has proceeded apace is with the dismantling of departments he does not like (even getting round the need for Congressional authority, dismissing civil servants and targeting specific individuals who have got in the way of his agenda). This will represent a big diminution of US state capacity. But that has not deterred Reform from going public with ambitions to reduce the role of non-partisan officials.

Watch our event on the Trump challenge

The Trump effect: what did we miss? 

It was inevitable that Trump would dominate politics in 2025, but the extent was not clear. He has been ubiquitous in foreign affairs, seeing himself as a “peacemaker” but always through the lens of narrow US transactional advantage (particularly on critical minerals) and with an eye on promoting the financial interests of Trump inc. He has repeatedly demonstrated his penchant for strongman regimes and his intense dislike of the Ukrainian president, and chosen to be most hostile toward US’s traditional closest allies in Canada and Europe. Kicking off 2026 with direct intervention in Venezuela, taking their president to the US and committing to run the country shows how happy he is to ape strongman tactics – and the that the “Trump corollary” to the Monroe doctrine is not just words in a theoretical strategy. 

He has been willing to take on Democrat leaders he does not like in their backyards under the most feeble of pretences. He has taken a hammer to many of the sources of US strength and soft power – its leading universities, its research base and its ability to act as a magnet for global talent. But he is also failing to deliver the better living standards he promised and has started to alienate some of his erstwhile biggest supporters. Even his very effective chief-of-staff has gone public, by accident or design, with some of her concerns. 

Keir Starmer can congratulate himself for having managed to keep the wheels on the US-UK relationship, but at the cost of a focus on foreign rather than domestic policy that may ultimately cost him his premiership. There is also no evidence that that task will become any easier as Trump settles into his second year.