Working to make government more effective

Comment

Public inquiry reform must be targeted at the right problems

Government reforms to public inquiries need to address the role played by ministers.

Prof Sam Eljamel protest outside Holyrood by affected patients, protesting over "dithering" on the delay to the public inquiry into the affair.
A protest outside Holyrood by affected patients, protesting over "dithering" on the delay to the Eljamel Inquiry.

Inquiries are becoming longer, costing more and often failing to achieve meaningful change, but as Rebecca McKee and Jack Pannell – the authors of a new IfG report on public inquiries – argue, reforms must go further than the introduction of time limits and set budgets

The UK’s system of public inquiries is no longer fit for purpose

The government’s announcement of seven new inquiries this year means a record 27 are currently underway, and many have been running for years.

Costs are spiralling too. Since 2005, completed inquiries have cost over £730m. The Covid-19 Inquiry alone has already spent £192m and will soon surpass the record £200m spent on the Saville Inquiry. In 2023–24, inquiries cost taxpayers £130m and there are further costs to the government and other public bodies, including the £100m the government has spent engaging with the Covid-19 Inquiry. These costs reflect a lack of preparedness and defensiveness from government departments and public bodies, which increase costs to themselves as well as inquiries. But duplication between inquiries, such as the infected blood and Penrose inquiries and the UK and Scottish Covid Inquiries, is also a factor.

Despite the numerous inquiries that have been carried out, the lessons identified often fail to translate into meaningful, lasting change. As a result, organisations find themselves repeating the same mistakes, leading to avoidable disasters. Those impacted wait years for answers, and political impetus for reform can wane.

How can the government ensure inquiries are set up to succeed?

Early decisions can set inquiries off on the wrong path. Our report sets out the underlying drivers that are leading to unsatisfactory inquiries, and makes a series of recommendations for reforms .

Read the report
Exterior signs outsider the enquiry venue on the first day that former Prime Minister Boris Johnson attended the UK Covid-19 Enquiry on 6th December 2023

Inquiries are criticised but ministers also need to take responsibility 

Inquiries themselves are often – and fairly – criticised for being overly legalistic, too adversarial and poorly designed to achieve policy change. While there are some examples of interesting innovation, such as engaging with vulnerable witnesses (Muckamore Abbey Inquiry), digital engagement (Leveson Inquiry), and phased reporting (Manchester Arena Bomb Inquiry), inconsistent and limited systematic knowledge sharing between inquiries limits opportunities to learn about what works well and how decisions are made

But government ministers also need to take responsibility for their part in what is going wrong. They choose whether to establish an inquiry, set its scope and powers, and appoint the chair. These early decisions shape much of what follows. In establishing an inquiry ministers have an opportunity to clearly set out the purpose on the inquiry, be that policy change, lesson learning, reconciliation and truth telling, or a longer forensic inquiry. These aims are not always compatible, and navigating the trade-offs between them is essential. Yet the difficult conversations about scope and priorities are often avoided by ministers, who instead promise inquiries will “leave no stone unturned” or “get to the truth” and end up setting unrealistic expectations.

Ministers should be clear about the trade-offs and how they will take key decisions. Will they appoint the chair and wider inquiry team first and take their input? How and when will they involve survivors and bereaved in these decisions? Avoiding these hard choices leads to sprawling terms of reference, unfocused inquiries, and mismatched expectations between government and victims. Inquiries are often left to find their own way, resulting in lengthy, adversarial and complex processes that struggle to deliver timely recommendations or answers for those directly affected. 

Ministers need better support to make informed decisions about how an inquiry should be set up

Recent announcements, such as the grooming gangs inquiry’s three-year deadline and £65m budget, sound decisive. But deadlines often slip – the Post Office Inquiry was meant to report in 2022 but remains ongoing – and delays are in part due to the government and other organisations not being ready to respond to the inquiry. Setting timelines and budgets, without tackling the underlying problems, is simply a sticking plaster.

Reform should start with ministers. The decision to establish an inquiry is political, and ministers need better guidance to make informed choices. The Cabinet Manual should be updated to provide clear advice on scope, purpose, and chair selection. The Cabinet Office Inquiry Team should then take a proactive role in gathering evidence, sharing lessons, and engaging experts. And the government should set out a framework for inquiries, creating a decision point where ministers weigh trade-offs and choose the most appropriate model.

There is a broad consensus among those impacted by and working on inquiries that the status quo is untenable. Reform is necessary, and it is entirely possible.

Topic
Ministers
Publisher
Institute for Government

Related content