The Covid Inquiry shows the importance of ministerial leadership during crises

Some of the lessons from the Module Two report are inevitably specific to those individuals and their circumstances: Boris Johnson’s “oscillation”, Matt Hancock’s “truthfulness and reliability” and Dominic Cummings’ “toxic” workplace. These are all part of the historical record rather than an ongoing failure in government, but current ministers should ensure they still learn the lessons from the inquiry.

Ministers need to set clear objectives – matched by clear decisions  

During crises, lots of different public bodies need to work together. Covid is an extreme example, cutting across all of government business. But even in more localised crises, like flooding or a terrorist attack, various organisations – from emergency services to local authorities to central government departments – need to cooperate.  

This can be difficult without clear overarching objectives, which ministers need to set. Throughout the pandemic, the government was not clear what its objectives were: protecting the NHS, minimising the spread of infection and supporting the economy were all important aspects of the response, but without a clear steer from the prime minister, it was difficult for the system to know what to prioritise. Ministers will have many different aspects to consider – expert advice, public opinion, their own political preferences – but they need to set the parameters for the wider system to act.  

Having done so, ministers need to make the decisions on how they want different parts of the system to achieve those objectives. As the inquiry’s report shows, and as Matt Hancock told the Institute, “in a pandemic, no decision is a decision”: in waiting for more certainty about infection numbers before locking down, ministers effectively allowed the virus to spread further. Decision making in government is difficult at the best of times, but in a crisis where information is hard to come by and often changes, deciding what to do next can be especially hard. Nonetheless, it is a fundamental part of a minister’s role.  

Ministers need to communicate clearly  

Having made their decisions and set the parameters for the rest of the system, ministers then need to communicate these – to the government, parliament and the public.

Sometimes, as we saw during the pandemic, that means drawing on experts – Chris Whitty and Patrick Vallance became household names due to their regular appearances alongside ministers at government press conferences. Amber Rudd also told the Institute how, as home secretary, she worked with experts from the National Cyber Security Centre to explain what the government was doing to counter the WannaCry cyber-attack in 2017.  

As well as choosing the right messenger, ministers need to make sure the message itself is clear. The inquiry’s report showed how the government’s messaging changed over the course of the pandemic and sometimes led to confusion and uncertainty over what rules applied (this was also the case for the devolved governments). In a long-running crisis like the pandemic circumstances will inevitably change, and so messages will too, but ministers need to ensure they communicate this clearly to all their different audiences.  

More than ever, ministers must lead from the front

It's hard to disagree with the inquiry’s finding that “when it comes to workplace culture, the tone is set at the top”. A minister's behaviour sets the expectation for how constructive and collaborative their teams will be and how open they are to a plurality of opinions. However, the inquiry argued that the “toxic and chaotic culture” at the centre of the UK government – with evidence of offensive, sexualised and misogynistic language used by senior advisers, and tolerated by the prime minister – materially harmed the range of perspectives brought into, and the quality of, decision making during its pandemic response.

Ministers also have a duty of care towards their team, with a responsibility to role model positive coping strategies during intensely stressful periods. During the 2006 transatlantic aircraft plot, a thwarted ‘liquid bomb’ attack, David Rowlands – then the permanent secretary at the Department for Transport – told his secretary of state Douglas Alexander they should both head home in the evening because:  

“this crisis is going to last several days, and we are not going to make better decisions if we are exhausted. You and I need to model to the department that, actually, it’s OK to have appropriate levels of cover but to look after the team."

Preparation is key – and the IfG can help

It’s impossible for ministers to plan for everything – but good preparation can pave the way for a more successful response. Amber Rudd reflected that whilst ministers might worry about whether “spending an afternoon pretending there's a terrorist attack and some remote part of Scotland” is a good use of their time, when the situation hits they will be “very grateful” for the practice. Operation Pegasus – a government-wide pandemic preparedness exercise that took place from September to November 2025 – was a good example of this, but its success will have largely stood (or fallen) based on how comprehensively ministers took part in it.  

For those with less time on their hands, the IfG has designed a bespoke workshop for ministers to reflect on the roles they would play in a crisis and how, to the best of their abilities, they can prepare themselves for when the unexpected happens.