After Boris Johnson’s “disaster” remark, here’s how to judge devolution

Of the three big problems that will confront Boris Johnson next year – the economy, Brexit and Scottish calls for independence – the last is a contender to be the most troublesome. The prime minister’s reported remarks to a virtual meeting of Conservative MPs that devolution had “been a disaster north of the border” have made it more so. The prospect of Scottish independence hangs there in the national imagination, somewhere between a theoretical notion that will never come to pass and a real possibility coming fast down the tracks.

There are many forces causing the surge in support for Scottish independence, which has been steadily over 50% in polls this autumn. Dislike of Brexit and along with that, Boris Johnson, is certainly one. Coronavirus is a second; while the death rate in Scotland does not appear markedly different, Nicola Sturgeon, the Scottish National Party leader, has given a more consistent message. It is easier for her to do so than it is for Johnson; it is not her government making the big decisions on economic support, purchase of vaccines and testing and tracing systems. But all the same, she has outclassed Johnson comprehensively in communications and in winning public trust during the pandemic.

Johnson should make a strong case for what the union does best as a single country

Johnson would do better to start from a recognition that devolution has been popular in Scotland, Wales and indeed in Northern Ireland, for all the complexities of power-sharing there. It has respected a sense of national identity and pride and people’s preference in many cases to be governed close to home. That is not the same thing as fostering separatism – the thrust of his “disaster” remark.

He could then make a better case for a cooler assessment of the devolved administrations’ two decades of government. In both Scotland and Wales, the record of public services in health and education leaves a lot for their voters to desire. Some figures here – and figures about the money that the Barnett formula transfers to them from England – would be better than the gibes which Johnson is prone to launch in their direction. He could make a strong case for the things that the union can best do as a single country. Defence and cyber security, where he has just announced a big new slug of money, is an obvious one (and many of the jobs are likely to go to Scotland). So is combatting climate change; again, many of the jobs may go to places that have a lot of manufacturing (and so more emissions to combat), as in Wales and Scotland. So, too, is management of the economy and extensive capital investment, supported by the UK’s ability to borrow. Sturgeon has never answered well how she envisages an independent Scotland raising its own money – for example, in combatting a crisis such as coronavirus. It is to her political advantage that so many people in Scotland apparently think she is responsible for the furlough support in Scotland, rather than the UK government overall.

It is awkward for Johnson to use the pandemic as an argument for the strengths of a united country because his handling of it has been so uneven – and has so much strained relations with the devolved administrations. But it ought to be one of his strongest arguments. The vaccines his government has bought will be used across the whole of the UK. 

Real concessions of power and money may be required to keep the union together

It may be too late for these arguments to get as much traction as they might have done, handled with aplomb and sensitivity. Only an attempt at that sensitivity now will show whether Johnson can regain ground. If not, in his bid to keep the union together, he might have to look at changes which he might think even more of a “disaster” such as more formal federalism, more tax raising powers, possibly representation in a reformed House of Lords. But if it becomes a choice between that and an unstoppable movement for Scottish independence, he would be well advised to consider it before too late.

Above all, he needs to resolve Brexit and relations with the European Union in a way which addresses voters’ concerns as much as possible. The Brexit vote was the moment that the drive for a second Scottish independence referendum reignited. The problems that Johnson’s proposed exit present for Northern Ireland – to be impeded in connections to the rest of the UK, if there is not to be a border of checks to the south – remain unresolved. A movement towards reunification of the island of Ireland could prove even harder for him to counter than that for Scottish independence, even if at the moment it is quieter and slower in building support. He needs to produce an answer that avoids chaos and disruption at borders and with supply chains. It may be too late to repair the political damage done but he could work harder to set out the opportunities he believes Brexit does offer; Scottish fishermen have found the prospect of freedom from the Common Fisheries Policy powerfully attractive but, crucially, fishing rights will be part of any deal that does get done and those terms are yet to be set.

Johnson’s stated goal of keeping the union together may require real concessions, of power topped up with money. But words and tone have played a surprisingly large part in the deterioration of relations between the devolved capitals and Westminster. He should start by trying harder to pick the right one.