Performance Tracker 2026: Policing and crime

Unlike many of the services we look at in Public Services Performance Tracker, policing in England and Wales was generally improving when the Starmer government took office in July 2024 – albeit from a low base. Officer numbers had increased sharply under the police uplift programme, launched by the Johnson government. Charges and other positive resolutions to crimes were rising. Most types of crime were falling or flat.

But there were still some major challenges. Certain serious violent offences had risen sharply from around 2014, including knife-enabled crime, with attempted murder and serious assaults recorded by the police both around 50% higher in 2023/24 than in 2009/10,^{*, 190} Office for National Statistics, ‘Crime in England and Wales: year ending March 2026’, July 2026.  when Labour were last in office. Alongside an increase in domestic abuse and sexual offences reported to the police, this has contributed to police demand becoming increasingly complex. The police inspectorate has also identified serious failings in crime investigation and in responding to the public, ¹⁹¹ His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Services, ’State of Policing: The Annual Assessment of Policing in England and Wales 2023’, July 2024, https://hmicfrs.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/publication-html/state-of-policing-the-annual-assessment-of-policing-in-england-and-wales-2023  which may be contributing to widespread perceptions that crime is rising. ¹⁹² Office for National Statistics, ‘Crime in England and Wales: year ending March 2026’, July 2026.  

Public trust and confidence in the police have fallen substantially. ¹⁹³ Office for National Statistics, ‘Perception and experience of police and criminal justice system, England and Wales’ (Year ending March 2026), 2026.  There have been repeated incidents of serious misconduct and grave failings on racism, sexism and other prejudices, including those revealed in Baroness Casey’s review of the Metropolitan Police. ¹⁹⁴ Casey L, Baroness Casey Review: Final report: An independent review into the standards of behaviour and internal culture of the Metropolitan Police Service, Metropolitan Police, 2023, www.met.police.uk/SysSiteAssets/media/downloads/met/about-us/baroness-casey-review/update-march-2023/baroness-casey-review-march-2023a. pdf  These cast a long shadow on public trust. At the same time, under half of the public said their local police force was doing a good or excellent job in 2023/24. ¹⁹⁵ Office for National Statistics, ’Perception and experience of police and criminal justice system, England and Wales‘, year ending March 2026’, July 2026.

Against this backdrop, the Starmer government set clear, well-chosen objectives and successfully galvanised action to follow through on them. The milestone of having 13,000 more police officers and police community support officers (PCSOs) in neighbourhood roles by the end of this parliament is not a good metric for the overall success of the safer streets mission, as it does not measure outcomes. But neighbourhood policing was a good choice to focus on and should drive some improvements in police performance. The ambition to halve both knife crime and violence against women and girls (VAWG) within 10 years similarly sets a clear direction on priorities, and real progress has already been made on the knife crime goal. Both of these objectives require involvement from many services, not just policing, and the strength of partnership working is likely to be key to their success.

The Starmer government published a clear and coherent proposal for police reform in its white paper in January 2026 and also revamped the police performance framework. ¹⁹⁶ Home Office, From Local to National: A new model for policing, CP 1489, GOV.UK, 2026, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/69779267276692606c013862/260125_White_Paper.pdf  These changes have successfully provided a sense of direction and a positive vision for policing. However, they are potentially in conflict both with the Burnham government’s emphasis on local leadership and devolution, and with some goals in other criminal justice services. For example, the emphasis in the new police performance framework on using charges, rather than out-of-court resolutions, for VAWG offences is likely to put more pressure on overstretched magistrates’ courts. 

The case for some of the proposed structural reforms – particularly regional police force mergers – is much weaker than others. But even so, the Burnham government should seek to retain and build on many aspects of these reforms, while aligning them with its broader priorities for public service and state reform. It must also address persistent failings in police conduct and investigations, if policing is to deliver a high quality service to the public.

Many of the reforms in policing are at relatively early stages, making it challenging to assess progress in the past year. This chapter therefore takes a more qualitative approach to determine whether the changes proposed are likely to further the government’s objectives, as well as to assess some of the downsides or trade-offs they may face.

_{* Police-recorded crime is affected by changes in reporting and police recording practices, particularly changes to crime recording practices and rules from 2014 and in 2019. However, the impact of these changes on very serious crimes, such as serious knife-enabled assaults, is relatively small, so they are still a useful measure of trends. See Davies T and Farrell G, ‘Knife crime has increased in England and Wales over the last decade – here’s how the next government can prevent it’, The Conversation, 19 June 2024, retrieved 28 September 2026, https://theconversation.com/knife-crime-has-increased-in-england-and-wales-over-the-last-decade-hereshow-the-next-government-can-prevent-it-230905}

The government is currently ahead of its target on neighbourhood policing

Starmer made neighbourhood policing the backbone of his safer streets mission, pledging 13,000 more police officers and PCSOs in neighbourhood roles by the end of this parliament – a 76% increase compared to March 2025.^* Neighbourhood policing teams are the visible front line of policing, patrolling communities, holding police surgeries and engaging with residents, community groups and schools.

The number of police officers and PCSOs in neighbourhood roles is an ‘input’ measure, rather than an outcome, which made it a poor choice for monitoring whether the government was actually achieving its mission of making streets safer. But neighbourhood policing was a good area to focus on that should improve performance and, despite some risk of perverse incentives, officers in neighbourhood roles was the most reasonable target to track progress, given the limited outcome metrics available.

Visible policing is an important driver of public trust and confidence, ²⁰² Yesberg J, Brunton-Smith I, Bradford B and others, ‘Police visbility, trust in police fairness, and collective efficacy: A multilevel Structural Equation Model‘, European Journal of Criminology, 2021, vol. 20, no. 2, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/14773708211035306 ^{, 203} College of Policing, ‘The effectiveness of visible police patrol’, College of Policing, 1 July 2021, retrieved 5 October 2026, www.college.police.uk/research/what-works-policing-reduce-crime/visible-police-patrol  and neighbourhood teams provide crucial intelligence and community connections, which support everything from local investigations to counterterrorism. Neighbourhood policing also takes a proactive, preventative approach, aiming to improve community safety by tackling the underlying causes of crime. ²⁰⁴ Higgins A and Hales G, ’Police Effectiveness in a Changing World’, The Police Foundation, February 2017, www.police-foundation.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/changing_world_paper_4.pdf  Neighbourhoods was one of the areas of policing that saw the biggest cuts in officer numbers over the 2010s ²⁰⁵ House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts, Financial pressures undermining confidence in the police: Fiftieth report of session 2017-19 (HC 970), The Stationery Office, 2018, https://committees.parliament.uk/committee/127/public-accounts-committee/news/98222/financial-pressures-undermining-confidence-in-the-police  – despite the police inspectorate warning back in 2014 that “forces’ ability to prevent crime and reduce demand will be seriously undermined if their neighbourhood teams are materially eroded”. ²⁰⁶ His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Services, ’Policing in Austerity: Meeting that Challenge’, July 2014, retrieved 5 October 2026, https://assets-hmicfrs.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/uploads/policing-in-austerity-meeting-the-challenge.pdf

The thing that drives confidence in policing is place-based problem solving… the police being seen to work most effectively with others in a place to focus on the problems that matter to that place. – Interviewee 

Moving away from a target based on headline officer numbers, created by the Johnson government as part of the police uplift programme, was also a positive step. The target created perverse incentives for forces to fill back-office roles with officers and to unnecessarily upgrade PCSOs to more expensive warranted officers.^**

The Starmer government substantially exceeded its first-year target for neighbourhood officers, with an increase of more than 3,800 against a target of 3,000. Almost 3,500 of these are warranted officers, while just over 300 are PCSOs. Around 500 are still in training, but destined for neighbourhood roles. Even discounting those who are in training, however, this is almost a 20% increase in the number of officers in neighbourhood roles in a single year. The increase has principally been achieved by redeploying officers into neighbourhood roles, rather than additional recruitment; the total number of officers has actually fallen by around 600 since March 2025 (566 warranted officers and 55 PCSOs). 

_{* Special constables – volunteers who act as police officers on a part-time basis – were also included in the original pledge but are not being tracked as progress against the 13,000 target.}

_{** Warranted officers are full police officers who have completed the police training programme and have powers to arrest people.}

Redeployment in this way is not necessarily a bad thing, but there are limits to how far forces will be able to take this approach. By definition, it means removing officers from other teams and functions, which will become progressively harder to do as these teams shrink. Taken too far, it risks undermining other core functions of policing, such as responding to emergencies, safeguarding vulnerable people and intelligence gathering and analysis.

This is especially true given other government workforce commitments. These include creating specialist rape and sexual offence teams in every force, the deadline for which the Burnham government has just brought forward 18 months to December 2027. ²⁰⁹ Home Office, PM accelerates roll out of police rape and sexual offence teams, GOV.UK, 2026, www.gov.uk/government/news/pm-accelerates-roll-out-of-police-rape-and-sexual-offence-teams  This is also a positive step, but may make it harder for forces to find spare capacity that they can redeploy towards neighbourhood policing. So too will serious weaknesses in investigative teams and the significant threats to public order seen over recent summers, from both riots and organised crime.

We found a strong link between neighbourhood policing and overall organisational performance. Higher-performing forces used additional investment from the [Neighbourhood Policing Guarantee] to strengthen neighbourhood teams and protect them from routine abstractions. Their leaders took a long-term approach. They prioritised visibility, worked with communities and problem-solved, even if this created short-term pressures elsewhere… This helped reduce future demand. – HM Chief Inspector ²¹⁰ His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Services, ’State of Policing: The Annual Assessment of Policing in England and Wales 2025-26’, September 2026, https://hmicfrs.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/publication-html/state-of-policing-the-annual-assessment-of-policing-in-england-and-wales-2025-26

Officers are classified according to their primary job function, but the statistics do not differentiate between those who spend 100% of their time in a neighbourhood role versus those who spend just 55% in one. This may make the target vulnerable to ‘gaming’, via abstraction (when officers are temporarily assigned to other duties) or part-time redeployments. This is particularly a risk if police forces continue to rely on their existing pool of officers, and given major protests and public disorder incidents in recent years, which often require temporary redeployments of officers to handle. 

One means of mitigating this would be to focus on PCSOs over warranted officers. PCSOs have more limited powers than warranted officers and so are harder to redeploy, and they are also cheaper to employ, so the same budget can hire more of them. But allowing headline officer numbers to fall substantially may be politically difficult. While good progress on the 13,000 officer goal has been made so far, therefore, it may still prove challenging to meet the final target while funding remains largely flat in real terms for the rest of the spending review period (up to 2028/29).

The focus on neighbourhoods may be contributing to falls in local crime

There are signs that the increase in neighbourhood officers and a focus on local crime may be having a positive effect on crime. While most crime types have been in sustained decline since the 1990s, low-level theft incidents rose sharply from 2022/23 to 2024/25, with recorded shoplifting up 55% and estimated theft from the person (such as pickpocketing or snatch theft) almost doubling in two years.^{*, 212} Office for National Statistics, ‘Crime in England and Wales: year ending March 2026’, July 2026.  But, in the past year, these have dropped significantly. More serious forms of theft, including domestic burglary (13%) and theft of vehicles (31%), have also fallen sharply.

These drops are unlikely to be entirely attributable to policing. Changes in the international market for second-hand phones, ²¹⁷ Institute for Government interviews, 2026. ^{, 218} Quinn L and Clare J, ‘The influence of changing reward of electronic consumer goods on burglary and theft offences in Western market-based countries in the years prior to and during the crime drop’, Crime Science, Vol 10(18), 2021, retrieved 5 October 2026, https://link.springer.com/article/10.1186/s40163-021-00153-w  investments in security by supermarkets ²¹⁹ Braakmann N and Croft Wednesday, ‘Crime Prevention Through Private Actors: Evidence From a Policy Change at a Large UK Supermarket Chain’, Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, Vol 88(3), pp.426–40, 2025, retrieved 5 October 2026, https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/obes.70020?msockid=2ac1c22b16146db5282ed5e617fe6c50  and other shops, and even weather patterns ²²⁰ Clutter J E, Peterson S, Henderson S and Haberman C P, ‘Understanding the impact of weather and potentially criminogenic places on street robbery’, Crime Science, Vol 13(42), 2024, retrieved 5 October 2026, https://link.springer.com/article/10.1186/s40163-024-00243-5  can cause substantial variation in crime levels. However, the fact that a wide range of local crime types seem to have been affected does suggest greater police presence may be playing a role.

_{* Shoplifting figures are police-recorded crime while data on estimated theft from the person is from the Crime Survey for England and Wales.}

Targeted action on knife crime appears to be delivering results, with a notable drop in serious offences

Knife crime was another key focus of the Starmer government’s safer streets mission, which aimed to halve knife crime within a decade. While this is a long-term goal, interviewees suggested that the knife crime target has successfully galvanised action and is shaping police activity. ²²² Institute for Government interviews, 2026.  Within a few months of taking office, in October 2024, the Starmer government set up the Knife-Enabled Robbery Taskforce, with a focus on targeting hyper-local ‘hotspots’ known to have high levels of knife-enabled robbery. Policing has since expanded on this approach, using ‘problem-solving policing’ to target tightly defined areas and the specific types and drivers of knife crime in each.^*

This appears to be having results, as there was a 10% drop in serious offences involving a knife from 2023/24 to 2025/26. This has been driven by large drops in knife-enabled robbery (down 14%) and serious violent assaults, including murder and manslaughter (together down 11%). By contrast, knife-enabled rape and sexual assault have risen noticeably in the past two years (up 17%), but this is from a very low base and changes in police reporting and recording are likely to have had a significant influence on the data; the proportion of all rape and sexual offences that are knife enabled has remained steady.

_{* Problem-solving policing involves identifying a specific problem, analysing its root causes or the conditions that enable it, developing a tailored response to address it and then assessing the impact. See College of Policing, ‘Problem-solving policing’, first published 19 October 2022, retrieved 28 September 2026, www.college.police.uk/guidance/problem-solving-policing.}

As with neighbourhood crime, we cannot conclusively attribute these improvements to policing activity. One interviewee highlighted that robbery offences, which have accounted for most of the fall in knife-enabled offences, are particularly sensitive to any changes in the international market for second-hand phones, which may not be easily visible from the data or police intelligence. ²³⁵ Institute for Government interviews, 2026.  Nonetheless, the widespread decline across most types of knife-enabled crime is a good sign, and should allow time for longer-term preventative action on knife crime to have an effect. Knife-enabled robbery also fell further in the seven areas targeted by the Knife-Enabled Robbery Taskforce (falling 15% from June 2024 to October 2025)^* than it did nationally (10%), which similarly suggests policing tactics are having a positive effect.

In April 2026, the Starmer government published its knife crime action plan. ²³⁶ Home Office, Protecting Lives, Building Hope: A plan to halve knife crime, GOV.UK, 2026, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/69ef69f3606c20d41216344e/FINAL_E03563431_CP_1539_Protecting_Lives_Web_Accessible.pdf  This was after considerable delay – almost two years after entering government. This suggests that while the knife crime mission has successfully been prioritised within policing and the Home Office, it has been less effective at driving cross-departmental work. 

The plan is generally strong, but it is not clear that the investment promised meets the scale of the challenge, particularly in relation to early intervention. The Starmer government pledged £130m in total for knife crime prevention programmes in 2026/27, including £66m for serious violence reduction work by Violence Reduction Units and the new multi-agency Young Futures Panels pilots, and £26m for targeted policing activity in knife-crime hotspots. This is roughly equal in real terms to the £100m committed to serious violence by the Johnson government in 2019/20 (nearly £130m in today’s prices), although the funding streams are not directly comparable. ²³⁷ Home Office, Police funding for England and Wales 2015 to 2027, GOV.UK, 2026, https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/police-funding-for-england-and-wales-2015-to-2027/police-funding-for-england-and-wales-2015-to-2027 ^{, 238} Jones S, ’Crimes of Violence’, Hansard, Statement UIN 9389, 12 June 2026, retrieved 5 October 2026, https://questions-statements.parliament.uk/written-questions/detail/2026-06-12/9389/

Some other funding is not specific to knife crime, but linked to broader support for children and families. For example, the Better Futures Fund promises £500m over 10 years to support up to 200,000 children, young people and families, but this aims to improve school attainment and youth employment as well as reducing youth offending. ²³⁹ Home Office, Protecting Lives, Building Hope: A plan to halve knife crime, GOV.UK, 2026, www.gov.uk/government/publications/protecting-lives-building-hope-a-plan-to-halve-knife-crime/protecting-lives-building-hope-a-plan-to-halve-knife-cr…  This integrated approach is welcome, given how interconnected many of these problems are, but it makes it hard to assess how funding for violence prevention compares to previous years. 

The action plan is explicitly grounded in longer-term prevention as well as short-term disruption and enforcement by police, and makes good use of the evidence on what works to reduce knife crime. This includes early intervention, ranging from investing in youth work and including healthy relationships education in schools, to improving mental health support in schools and colleges, along with reforming children’s social care and improving safeguarding through the Families First Partnership. The plan also includes diversion from formal criminal justice processes for children where appropriate, and ‘whole family’ approaches to children who are at risk of involvement in knife crime. ²⁴⁰ Ibid  A longer-term funding settlement for youth justice services is also very positive, as knife crime prevention and early intervention work often runs on annual contracts, making it hard to retain staff and sustain high-quality services. ²⁴¹ Institute for Government interviews, 2026.

Where the action plan is notably much weaker is on interventions for adults who are already involved in knife crime. The plan acknowledges that knife crime is largely driven by adults, with three-quarters of knife crime offenders thought to be aged 18 or over and almost 65% of victims of knife crime who needed hospital treatment aged 25 or over in 2024–25. ²⁴² Home Office, Protecting Lives, Building Hope: A plan to halve knife crime, GOV.UK, 2026, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/69ef69f3606c20d41216344e/FINAL_E03563431_CP_1539_Protecting_Lives_Web_Accessible.pdf  It also highlights the role of multiple disadvantage – the combination of multiple problems such as substance misuse, mental health problems and homelessness – in driving knife crime. But the section in the plan on breaking the cycle of knife crime focuses on reforms to youth justice and generic support for adults, such as offending behaviour programmes and incentivised substance-free living wings in prisons. These may be valuable, but they are likely to achieve relatively little in reducing knife crime among adults.

The critical test of the action plan will inevitably be whether it can be effectively implemented and build on the early successes in bringing down knife crime. Hotspot policing – targeted, visible patrolling of very small areas with high levels of crime ²⁴³ The College of Policing, ‘Hot spots policing’, 19 October 2022, retrieved 5 October 2026, https://www.college.police.uk/guidance/hot-spots-policing  – does not have a sustained impact on crime once police presence reduces or stops, ²⁴⁴ Kochel TR, O’Guinn BJ, Nouri S and others, ’Impact of hot spots patrol treatment duration on gun violence and disorder: a randomized controlled trial’, Policing: A Journal of Policing and Practice, 2026, vol. 20, https://academic.oup.com/policing/article/doi/10.1093/police/paaf069/8443284  although it may have a longer-term effect if it is combined with problem-solving policing. ²⁴⁵ College of Policing, ’Hot spots policing’, College of Policing, 19 October 2022, retrieved 5 October 2026, www.college.police.uk/guidance/hot-spots-policing  Delivering effective prevention requires substantial and sustained investment, much of it outside of policing such as substance misuse services, victim support, housing and other services that support those facing multiple disadvantage. With intense demand on public finances, adequately resourcing this will pose a major challenge for the Burnham government at the next spending review.

The plan’s focus on early support and protecting children who are vulnerable to exploitation and serious violence is particularly encouraging. The real test, however, will be delivery. Short term funding and time limited pilots cannot undo years of instability in young people’s lives. Prevention must be backed by sustained, long term investment if it is to make a lasting difference.  – Ben Kinsella Trust ²⁴⁶ Green P, ’Government halving knife crime: Ambition must be matched by delivery’, Ben Kinsella Trust, 2026, retrieved 5 October 2026, https://benkinsella.org.uk/knife-crime-strategy-ambition-must-be-matched-by-delivery

_{* This compares knife-enabled robbery offences in the 12 months to June 2024 to those in the 12 months to October 2025.}

It is not yet clear what progress has been made on halving violence against women and girls

Tackling violence against women and girls (VAWG) is both slower and harder to track. These offences commonly happen in private, domestic settings and are much less likely to be reported to the police, or to lead to prosecutions and convictions. They also 
involve a wider section of the population as both victims and perpetrators than knife crime, and in a broader range of places. These factors make it harder to achieve results through short-term disruption and enforcement activity. Preventative interventions, such as healthy relationships education in schools and family-based interventions to reduce domestic abuse, ²⁷⁴ Home Office, What works to reduce violence against women and girls: a summary of the evidence, GOV.UK, 2026, www.gov.uk/government/publications/freedom-from-violence-and-abuse-a-cross-government-strategy/what-works-to-reduce-violence-against-women-and-girls-…  can take many years to be effective. 

Interviewees suggested that the goal of halving VAWG is focusing attention and activity, but that relatively little progress has been made so far because of the complexity of the problem and the time it takes to tackle it. ²⁷⁵ Institute for Government interviews, 2026.  

The Starmer government published its VAWG strategy and action plan in December 2025, ²⁷⁶ Home Office, Freedom from Violence and Abuse: A cross-government strategy to build a safer society for women and girls: Volume 1: Strategy, GOV.UK, 2025, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/697c7e14043a4ade0f7b503f/31.260_VAWG_01_Strategy_Slip_FINAL_v5_290126_WEB.pdf ^{, 277} Home Office, Freedom from Violence and Abuse: A cross-government strategy to build a safer society for women and girls: Volume 2: Action plan, GOV.UK, 2025, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/697c7e21aacd0dc9777b502a/31.260_VAWG_02_Action_Plan_Slip_FINAL_v3_WEB_290126.pdf  which victim and survivor organisations generally welcomed. Positively, the strategy takes a preventative approach with a strong focus on perpetrators – aiming to prevent both first offending and reoffending. 

Like the knife crime action plan, the VAWG action plan is closely linked to the evidence on what works. ²⁷⁸ Home Office, What works to reduce violence against women and girls: a summary of the evidence, GOV.UK, 2026, www.gov.uk/government/publications/freedom-from-violence-and-abuse-a-cross-government-strategy/what-works-to-reduce-violence-against-women-and-girls-…  Much of this activity is outside policing. For instance, one of the priorities is wrap-around family support, including expanded early help, multi-agency child protection teams and tools such as family group decision making that will be delivered through the Families First Partnership in children’s social care. This broad approach is crucial to deliver the major transformation necessary to meet the ambition of halving VAWG.

Within policing, the National Centre for Violence Against Women and Girls and Public Protection was set up in April 2025, as a joint initiative between the National Police Chiefs’ Council and the College of Policing, and funded by the Home Office. Dedicated rape and sexual offences teams in every police force have also been promised – a commitment originally made under the Starmer government and since brought forward 18 months by Burnham. ²⁷⁹ Home Office, PM accelerates roll out of police rape and sexual offence teams, GOV.UK, 2026, www.gov.uk/government/news/pm-accelerates-roll-out-of-police-rape-and-sexual-offence-teams

Assessing the scale of investment promised is hard, because there is no publicly available baseline to compare it to and, as with the knife crime action plan, the VAWG action plan includes funding for several programmes that are much broader than VAWG alone. The Families First Partnership, for example, commits £2.4bn over three years, which is a substantial increase in spending on preventative children’s services. But while there is evidence that these kinds of interventions can reduce domestic abuse, ²⁸⁰ Home Office, What works to reduce violence against women and girls: a summary of the evidence, GOV.UK, 2026, www.gov.uk/government/publications/freedom-from-violence-and-abuse-a-cross-government-strategy/what-works-to-reduce-violence-against-women-and-girls-…  it is not the main purpose of the funding.

Last year’s Public Services Performance Tracker examined recent trends in VAWG offences. There is currently no up-to-date data available on trends in domestic abuse or sexual offences, due to changes and delays in data processing for the Crime Survey for England and Wales. ²⁸¹ Office for National Statistics, ’Crime in England and Wales, year ending March 2026’, July 2026.  This means it is not currently possible to see if any of these changes are affecting VAWG victimisation rates. However, as alluded to earlier, tackling VAWG is likely to be a much longer and slower process than reducing knife crime, so it would be surprising for any changes to be having an impact yet.

The Burnham government should build on the clear vision for police reform set out under Starmer

A number of major reforms to policing were announced under the Starmer government, including a major shake-up of police oversight with the abolition of police and crime commissioners. ²⁸² Home Office, Police and crime commissioners to be scrapped, GOV.UK, 2025, www.gov.uk/government/news/police-and-crime-commissioners-to-be-scrapped  The police reform white paper was subsequently published in January 2026 – several months later than the originally planned spring 2025. ²⁸³ Home Office, Home Secretary announces major policing reforms, GOV.UK, 2024, www.gov.uk/government/news/home-secretary-announces-major-policing-reforms  It set out a clear, coherent vision for policing and a theory of change for how the proposals will address the problems the government has identified in policing, although some elements are in tension with devolving more power to local areas.

The biggest change proposed was major structural reform:

• creating a new National Police Service to hold various national responsibilities
• merging existing police forces into fewer, larger ones
• setting up ‘local policing areas’ to deliver local policing, likely to be similar to 
  existing basic command units (BCUs). 

So far, relatively little progress has been made on implementing these structural reforms or setting up the National Police Service. An independent review into police structures, set up in March 2026, has yet to report its findings. 

There are strong arguments in favour of structural reform, particularly setting up a National Police Service. There is currently no co-ordinating body providing national strategic direction for policing. An empowered centre is also intended to facilitate stronger national leadership and co-ordination on professional standards, best practice and vetting, which would be valuable and should help improve public trust and confidence in the police.

Equally, bringing together national and regional responsibilities on counterterror policing and serious and organised crime into a single body should allow smoother coordination and intelligence sharing. These are currently split across individual police forces (such as the Metropolitan Police running counterterror policing), regional bodies such as the Regional Organised Crime Units (ROCUs) and the National Crime Agency. As these functions are merged nationally, it will be crucial to maintain connections to local and regional policing, so that intelligence can be gathered and shared and regional patterns or threats can be identified. ²⁸⁴ Institute for Government interviews, 2026.

The argument for establishing the [National Police Service] is strong. Policing lacks a single organisation that has the authority and responsibility to make and implement decisions across the system. As a result, decision-making can be too slow, forces take differing approaches without proper justification and capabilities are often dispersed across multiple organisations. – His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Services ²⁸⁵ His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Services, ’State of Policing: The Annual Assessment of Policing in England and Wales 2025-26’, September 2026, https://hmicfrs.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/publication-html/state-of-policing-the-annual-assessment-of-policing-in-england-and-wales-2025-26

Redrawing police force boundaries also makes sense. Interviewees widely considered the existing 43-force structure to be outdated ²⁸⁶ Institute for Government interviews, 2026.  and boundaries frequently do not align with other services such as integrated care boards in the NHS, probation delivery units or mayoral strategic authorities. Police forces vary dramatically in size, in terms of geography, population and workforce, and many forces already collaborate on key areas such as custody suites, back-office functions and forensics. But substantially reducing the number of forces also holds some serious potential pitfalls. 

There is no reason to keep this structure unless you believe you can’t do change. – Interviewee

Would we design the 43-force structure now? No, of course not. – Interviewee 

The government should realign local forces with strategic authorities on a one-to-one basis

Figuring out the right locus for different policing activities is hard. Too large an area, and there is a risk of losing local connection and accountability, and the ability to target specific problems in different areas. Too small, and it becomes harder to develop specialist skills and functions, and people and intelligence can fall through the gaps and patterns can be missed. 

Shortly after the police reform white paper was published, the home secretary set up an independent review of police structures, led by former Metropolitan Police Commissioner Lord Bernard Hogan-Howe. This is a sensible exercise when it comes to deciding which responsibilities will sit at the different tiers. But deciding the size and shape of forces is a more fundamental question that the prime minister and home secretary should not delegate to a review. Instead, they should commit to aligning police forces to strategic authorities on a one-to-one basis, as they are set up. 

The government’s recent cabinet statement, ‘Rewiring the state’, declared an intention of aligning police force boundaries with strategic authorities. ²⁸⁷ Cabinet Office, ‘Rewiring the state – cabinet statement’, GOV.UK, 31 July 2026, retrieved 29 September 2026, www.gov.uk/government/publications/rewiring-the-state-cabinet-statement  This is very welcome, as misaligned boundaries can cause major headaches for service delivery and worsen barriers to partnerships and place-based working. However, the statement left open the possibility of having multiple strategic authorities within a single force. The government should avoid this, and instead have one force for each authority.

A one-to-one model provides far clearer lines of accountability and governance structures. Inherent to devolving power is accepting that different areas will make different choices. For example, one mayor may favour a ‘prosecution first’ approach to crime, focused on driving up charges, while another may want to pursue a more diversionary, problem-solving approach. If both areas are served by a single force, these are likely to be very difficult for the chief constable to balance. 

There are inevitably downsides to aligning police forces to individual strategic authorities. Some existing and proposed strategic authorities, such as Hull and East Yorkshire, or Cornwall, are smaller than the police forces currently serving them and alignment would mean shrinking or breaking up existing forces. But even so, this is likely to be preferable to the alternative. Merging Humberside and Lincolnshire police forces to cover both Hull and East Yorkshire and Greater Lincolnshire strategic authorities would risk one area or the other being neglected or the chief constable being pulled in different directions by different mayors.

Equally, mayors (and other elected leaders, in areas without a mayor) are likely to be held responsible by their electorate for police performance in their area. It is important for democratic legitimacy and accountability, therefore, that they have the right levers available to them to address it. This should include the power to sack chief constables.

This one-to-one alignment would mean keeping a much larger number of forces than the 10–15 widely expected after the police reform white paper, likely around 3035. ²⁸⁸ Sandford D and Mackintosh T, ’Massive overhaul of England and Wales policing announced’, BBC, 26 January 2026, retrieved 5 October 2026, www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cp37lryxq4eo ^{, 289} Institute for Government interviews, 2026.  But even 15 forces would mean moving to a much larger geographic footprint, which would risk disconnecting forces from local communities and, crucially, local priorities and accountability. While the white paper argues that local policing areas will provide this local connection, strategic direction, operational management and culture will still largely come from the force, which will also continue to provide many core policing functions such as public order and major crime investigations.

The main operational advantage of larger forces would be supporting greater specialism in serious offences, particularly homicide and rape and serious sexual offences. Because some small forces typically have relatively few of these offences reported, they do not have the opportunity or capacity to develop a mature specialism in responding to and investigating these crimes. These specialist teams are valuable. In 2019, the Metropolitan Police disbanded its central Sapphire team, dedicated to sexual and child abuse offences, in favour of generalist teams within each basic command unit. Performance suffered as a result: it diluted the specialist skillset in investigating rape and serious sexual offences, and the loss of the prestigious central team also encouraged experienced specialist detectives to leave the force or seek other roles.’ It diluted the specialist skillset in investigating rape and serious sexual offences, and the loss of the prestigious central team also encouraged experienced specialist detectives to leave the force or seek other roles. ²⁹⁰ Casey L, Baroness Casey Review: Final report: An independent review into the standards of behaviour and internal culture of the Metropolitan Police Service, Metropolitan Police, 2023, www.met.police.uk/SysSiteAssets/media/downloads/met/about-us/baroness-casey-review/update-march-2023/baroness-casey-review-march-2023a.pdf

But regional forces would not necessarily solve this problem. Nor are they the only option. Many forces already have specialist joint units working across force boundaries, on areas ranging from protective services and firearms (Thames Valley Police with Hampshire and the Isle of Wight Constabulary) ²⁹¹ Thames Valley Police, ‘Departments and teams’ (no date), retrieved 5 October 2026, www.thamesvalley.police.uk/police-forces/thames-valley-police/areas/au/about-us/our-people/departments-and-teams  to custody, criminal justice and analytics (Norfolk and Suffolk constabularies) ²⁹² Suffolk Police and Crime Commissioner, ‘Collaboration agreements’ (no date), retrieved 5 October 2026, https://suffolk-pcc.gov.uk/key-info/partnerships-and-collaboration/collaboration-agreements  and major crime investigations (Avon and Somerset Police with Wiltshire Police), ²⁹³ Avon and Somerset Police, ‘Collaboration with other police forces’ (no date), retrieved 5 October 2026, www.avonandsomerset.police.uk/about/collaboration-with-other-police-forces  among others. 

The advantage of joint units over larger forces is that individual units can be set up in line with local needs and priorities, and then scrutinised and held accountable for their performance by the relevant mayors or policing boards for their constituent forces – and ultimately, via local and mayoral elections, by the communities they serve. Because these joint units would likely be limited to a few specific areas of policing, such as homicide and serious sexual offences, they do not pose the same problems for local accountability as merging whole forces. Equally, where local leaders do not believe they are delivering effective results or value for money, they can challenge police chiefs on that and ask them to justify the joint approach, potentially recommending withdrawing from joint arrangements if they believe it is not working well.

The central justification in the police reform white paper for substantially reducing the number of forces is efficiency. ²⁹⁴ Home Office, From Local to National: A new model for policing, CP 1489, GOV.UK, 2026, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/69779267276692606c013862/260125_White_Paper.pdf  It argues that consolidating back-office functions, ranging from human resources (HR) and payroll to forensics and data analysis, will reduce duplication and save money, particularly for smaller forces. 

Having 43 police force headquarters each providing their own support functions to local policing is ineffective and inefficient. We are wasting money by procuring technology and equipment 43 different ways. – Police reform white paper ²⁹⁵ Home Office, From Local to National: A new model for policing, CP 1489, GOV.UK, 2026, p. 40, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/69779267276692606c013862/260125_White_Paper.pdf

But these potential benefits are quite uncertain, particularly in terms of cashable savings. These kinds of mergers do not always unlock the savings envisaged, and several forces already collaborate on support functions such as HR and finance systems, digital evidence software and other systems, ²⁹⁶ O’Halloran J, ’How to ensure back-office collaboration brings benefits rather than problems’, Policing Insight, 10 August 2020, retrieved 5 October 2026, https://policinginsight.com/feature/opinion/how-to-ensure-back-office-collaboration-brings-benefits-rather-than-problems  meaning additional gains may be small. Where there are opportunities for large savings, these seem more likely to be delivered nationally via the new National Police Service – such as by the centralised procurement of police vehicles and IT systems.

Equally, there can be significant downsides to moving support functions such as admin, procurement and analytics further from the front line. Common complaints about centralised procurement in prisons and centralised contact centres in criminal courts illustrate this clearly, such as the complex bureaucracy to acquire basic goods, and delays and frustrations contacting courts for simple admin tasks. ²⁹⁷ Institute for Government interviews, 2026.  

There will always be trade-offs with any structural reform. But one-to-one alignment with strategic authorities offers the best option for providing direct democratic accountability for policing and the right balance of localism and efficiency. The three tier structure proposed for policing aligns well with Burnham’s broader vision for the state, with enhanced roles for local and strategic authorities and a slimmer, more focused national state. The home secretary should therefore continue to pursue the reforms outlined in the police reform white paper, but in a way that reflects the new overarching agenda on public service reform.

The revised police performance process has more teeth and provides stronger Home Office oversight

Policing has been struggling with poor performance for years, with the inspectorate criticising forces for “fail[ing] to get the basics right” as far back as 2022. ²⁹⁸ His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Services, ’State of Policing: The Annual Assessment of Policing in England and Wales 2022’, June 2023, https://hmicfrs.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/publication-html/state-of-policing-the-annual-assessment-of-policing-in-england-and-wales-2022  The quality of crime investigations, safeguarding vulnerable people and responding to the public (such as answering 999 calls and attending incidents) have been particular weaknesses, ²⁹⁹ His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Services, ’State of Policing: The Annual Assessment of Policing in England and Wales 2024-25’, September 2025, https://hmicfrs.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/publication-html/state-of-policing-the-annual-assessment-of-policing-in-england-and-wales-2024-25  and may have contributed to substantial declines in confidence in police performance.

While the most recent annual assessment highlights some improvements in how forces respond to the public and safeguard vulnerable people, there are still few forces that perform well in these areas. On investigation, performance is still poor, with none of the 13 forces inspected so far under the new inspection regime graded as ‘outstanding’ or ‘good’. ³⁰⁰ His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Services, ’State of Policing: The Annual Assessment of Policing in England and Wales 2025-26’, September 2026, https://hmicfrs.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/publication-html/state-of-policing-the-annual-assessment-of-policing-in-england-and-wales-2025-26  It is especially concerning that there has been no improvement as officers hired through the police uplift programme have become more experienced. Public confidence has improved slightly, but remains low, with more people saying that they have not very much or no confidence in their local police to tackle crime (48%) than that they have a fair amount or a lot of confidence (43%) in the three months to September 2026.

This is more than an issue of individual case quality. We found wider weaknesses in governance, understanding of demand and workforce planning, training and supervision. Forces often didn’t have a clear enough understanding of crime related demand or the skills and capacity they need to manage it. Investigators were overwhelmed by their workloads. – HM Chief Inspector ³⁰⁵ His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Services, ’State of Policing: The Annual Assessment of Policing in England and Wales 2025-26’, September 2026, https://hmicfrs.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/publication-html/state-of-policing-the-annual-assessment-of-policing-in-england-and-wales-2025-26

In this context, renewed attention on police performance management and oversight is very welcome. The Home Office has developed a new performance framework, ³⁰⁶ Home Office, Police performance framework: first iteration, GOV.UK, 2026, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/69779436276692606c013867/Police_Performance_Framework_-_First_Iteration-v3.pdf  based on substantial consultation with stakeholders, that sets out the key metrics on which policing should be assessed. This forms the basis for the new performance process, which involves placing police forces in one of four levels. 

These levels will be based on traditional inspections by the police inspectorate, combined with performance data collected by the Home Office. Levels will be assigned by the new Policing Performance Monitoring Group, chaired by the inspectorate and including the Home Office and other key policing bodies such as the National Police Chiefs’ Council, the College of Policing, the Independent Office for Police Conduct and the Association of Police and Crime Commissioners. ³⁰⁷ His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services, ‘Policing Performance System: how we monitor and improve police performance’ (no date), retrieved 5 October 2026, https://hmicfrs.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/about-us/what-we-do/policing-performance-system ^{, 308} The College of Policing, ‘About the policing performance system’, 28 April 2026, retrieved 5 October 2026, www.college.police.uk/guidance/performance-support-toolkit/policing-performance-system  However, the Chief Inspector will make the final decision on a force’s level. This process is intended to be more transparent and collaborative, and allow for earlier identification of potential problems than the previous inspection regime.

The introduction of the level two ‘early warning’ tier and associated support offer is one of the most significant changes, and is intended to prevent escalation and stop declining performance. Forces will have access to additional support from partners across policing, such as the College of Policing, which is being strengthened to support this work. ³¹⁶ Home Office, Police performance framework: first iteration, GOV.UK, 2026, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/69779436276692606c013867/Police_Performance_Framework_-_First_Iteration-v3.pdf  The inspectorate is also gaining stronger powers, including the chief inspector being able to issue ‘directions’ to forces in response to serious causes of concern. Forces may also be subject to intervention by the home secretary, such as sending in ‘turnaround teams’ from other forces, if they persistently fail to improve or refuse to engage with support.

The home secretary will also regain the power to sack chief constables.^{*, 317} Home Office, Police performance framework: first iteration, GOV.UK, 2026, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/69779436276692606c013867/Police_Performance_Framework_-_First_Iteration-v3.pdf  The overall thrust of the reforms shifts oversight and priority setting sharply towards the Home Office and away from local elected leaders and mayors. 

Several interviewees agreed that the new process has “more teeth” and should make it possible to respond earlier and more effectively when forces are performing poorly. ³¹⁸ Institute for Government interviews, 2026.  But this is largely reliant on two assumptions:

1. There is enough capacity and capability in the wider policing system to provide effective support for forces that are struggling.
2. Oversight and ‘grip’ from the Home Office will be more effective at holding forces to account and improving performance than local scrutiny by police and crime commissioners and mayors.

The first of these is subject to serious question. Out of 13 forces that have been inspected so far in the 2025–27 round, just two each have received a ‘good’ rating for safeguarding people at risk of harm and responding to the public, and none has received an ‘outstanding’ rating. ³¹⁹ Police Leadership Commission, Professionalism and performance – police leadership for the future, College of Policing, 2026, https://assets.college.police.uk/s3fs-public/2026-07/Police-Leadership-Commission-Report_0.pdf?VersionId=QrU0hT1OG0svd8gkF0D039kKLfTL9a7T&v=1783337316  On investigating crime, where performance problems are most widespread, none has received a rating above ‘adequate’. In the previous round, only two out of all 43 forces received a ‘good’ rating on investigation. Moreover, the inspectorate and the police leadership commission have both highlighted poor leadership as one of the major barriers to improving police performance. ³²⁰ Police Leadership Commission, Professionalism and performance – police leadership for the future, College of Policing, 2026, https://assets.college.police.uk/s3fs-public/2026-07/Police-Leadership-Commission-Report_0.pdf?VersionId=QrU0hT1OG0svd8gkF0D039kKLfTL9a7T&v=1783337316 ^{, 321} His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Services, ’State of Policing: The Annual Assessment of Policing in England and Wales 2025-26’, September 2026, https://hmicfrs.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/publication-html/state-of-policing-the-annual-assessment-of-policing-in-england-and-wales-2025-26

Support will not only come from other forces: the College of Policing will also draw on the existing evidence base and national policing organisations such as the National Centre for Violence Against Women and Girls and Public Protection, and the Centre for Police Productivity. ³²² Institute for Government interviews, 2026.  But even so, in this context of widespread performance problems, it may be hard to provide enough support, and enough high-quality leaders, to help all the forces that are in need of them and drive meaningful performance improvements.

_{* This responsibility used to sit with the home secretary but passed to police and crime commissioners when they were introduced in 2012.}

We have… identified systemic causes for concern about the consistency, capability and culture of leadership across the service. Put simply, leadership in policing is not consistently of a high enough standard to provide confidence and trust in the attainment of the service which the public deserves.  – Police Leadership Commission ³⁴⁴ Police Leadership Commission, Professionalism and performance – police leadership for the future, College of Policing, 2026, https://assets.college.police.uk/s3fs-public/2026-07/Police-Leadership-Commission-Report_0.pdf?VersionId=QrU0hT1OG0svd8gkF0D039kKLfTL9a7T&v=1783337316

The view that more Home Office involvement in performance oversight will lead to better police performance is easier to justify. While inspectorate ratings carry significant weight, they are necessarily relatively infrequent and so cannot provide such timely monitoring as Home Office data can. The inspectorate does conduct inspections on an ongoing basis, which can allow major concerns to be flagged, but this is less intensive and granular than the new system. ³⁴⁵ Institute for Government interviews, 2026.  The Home Office will also have a wider range of powers to compel forces to make changes. 

But there are risks here too. Police and crime commissioners and mayors have a more rounded picture of crime prevention and response in their area than the Home Office can have. Shifting oversight to central government could encourage forces to focus much more on visible policing metrics and neglect broader partnership working, which is easier to spot at a local level. This may weaken prevention and problem-solving efforts, undermining performance over the longer term. 

Close monitoring by the Home Office on central government priorities, and the use of these metrics to decide inspection tiers, are also likely to mean local priorities hold less sway with police forces. This risks accountability to mayors or local policing boards becoming mere lip service, while senior officers focus much more on Home Office imposed metrics. Moving the power to sack chief constables from police and crime commissioners to the home secretary only amplifies this risk.

The new performance framework leaves relatively little space for local direction and priorities

The other key element of the new performance process is the performance framework itself. This sets out a large number of performance metrics, which will be monitored and inform the grading of forces. It includes 26 headline metrics that focus on key aspects of policing and the home secretary’s priorities, as well as dozens of ‘monitoring’ metrics that will be used to help contextualise and understand the headline metrics and mitigate against perverse incentives. ³⁴⁶ Home Office, Police performance framework: first iteration, GOV.UK, 2026, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/69779436276692606c013867/Police_Performance_Framework_-_First_Iteration-v3.pdf  There are currently two metrics with specific targets (on answering 999 calls and attending serious ‘grade 1’ incidents*), while the others set ambitions on the direction of travel.

Setting performance metrics for any service is difficult and complex, and this is especially true for a service with as wide a remit as policing. The metrics in the framework are generally well chosen and provide helpful information on police performance. The choice of targets is particularly positive. Targets are most effective at driving performance where they establish minimum standards, there are not too many of them and they are less vulnerable to gaming. ³⁴⁷ Davies N, Atkins G and Sodhi S, Using targets to improve public services, Institute for Government, 2021, www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/targets-public-services.pdf  Response times are harder to game and it is reasonable to expect a consistent minimum standard across the country, making them good options for targets.

However, there may be too many headline performance metrics. Metrics need to capture the breadth of policing work, but there is a limit to how much police forces can focus on at any one time. If forces can choose to focus on some specific metrics over others, and have that reflected in their assessment by the inspectorate, the number of metrics should not be a problem. The process should be flexible enough that a force can say, for example, that they have chosen to focus on driving up charge volumes rather than charging offences more quickly, or that they are prioritising VAWG over knife crime based on their local priorities, and for their performance to be assessed accordingly. Without this flexibility, the sheer number of metrics in the national framework will make it extremely hard for mayors, police and crime commissioners and policing boards to meaningfully shape the priorities of their local force.

It’s going to make it really difficult for local chiefs to balance their priorities for the force with [more than] 50 national metrics – Interviewee 

Some of the metrics may also not be the right ones. Of particular note here is the focus on charges, rather than all positive outcomes such as out-of-court resolutions, for offences involving VAWG. For some of these offences, such as serious sexual offences or prolonged stalking, an out-of-court resolution would clearly be inappropriate. But there are some out-of-court programmes for domestic abuse, such as Project CARA, which have a strong evidence base and may be more effective than charging at reducing VAWG. ³⁴⁸ University of Birmingham, ‘Evaluation of the CARA (Cautioning and Relationship Abuse) service’ (no date), retrieved 5 October 2026, www.birmingham.ac.uk/research/centres-institutes/crime-justice-and-policing/research/evaluation-of-the-cara-service  Targeting charges is also likely to put additional pressure on magistrates’ courts, which are already struggling to cope with demand, risking worse delays in resolving offences.

The metrics are also tightly focused on policing work, rather than engagement and collaborative working with partners. Especially in conjunction with the number of metrics being tracked and a greater role for the Home Office in overseeing forces, rather than local leaders, this may encourage a more insular and narrow approach to policing that hampers long-term preventative work.

In future, the framework will also incorporate the new National Strategic Policing Priorities, which will be issued by the home secretary. ³⁴⁹ Home Office, From Local to National: A new model for policing, CP 1489, GOV.UK, 2026, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/69779267276692606c013862/260125_White_Paper.pdf  These will replace the current Strategic Policing Requirement in setting out national threats and required national policing capabilities. They will also be broader, establishing key strategic priorities – such as tackling VAWG and knife crime – that the government wants all forces to focus on. Unlike the existing Strategic Policing Requirement, which forces only need to have “due regard” to, they “must comply” with the National Strategic Policing Priorities. ³⁵⁰ Home Office, From Local to National: A new model for policing, CP 1489, GOV.UK, 2026, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/69779267276692606c013862/260125_White_Paper.pdf

This is much stronger language and again shifts decisions on strategic direction for forces away from local areas and towards the Home Office. The National Strategic Policing Priorities explicitly aim to “unite policing around a single vision for improvement and reduce unacceptable variation in standards”. ³⁵¹ Home Office, From Local to National: A new model for policing, CP 1489, GOV.UK, 2026, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/69779267276692606c013862/260125_White_Paper.pdf  But if devolution in public services is to be meaningful, it must allow for variation in standards and different visions for improvement and what good looks like. 

In the face of prolonged performance problems in policing and a commonly expressed view that police and crime commissioners have not been effective at holding forces to account, ³⁵² Home Office, ‘Police and crime commissioners to be scrapped’, press release, 13 November 2025, retrieved 5 October 2026, www.gov.uk/government/news/police-and-crime-commissioners-to-be-scrapped ^{, 353} Institute for Government interviews, 2026.  it makes sense that the government wants a firmer central grip on police performance and priorities. But this must be carefully balanced with the Burnham government’s commitment to empowering local areas and “devolution by default”. 

Given the state of policing currently and the nascent – at best – state of many strategic authorities, it may make sense to take a more centralised approach to police performance and priorities in the short to medium term. But even so, the government must resist the urge to monitor or prioritise too many things at a national level, particularly within the National Strategic Policing Priorities. Prioritising some things necessarily means deprioritising others, and forces must have enough capacity in reserve to respond to locally set goals as well. 

_{* These are the most urgent emergencies, such as where there is a danger to life, use or immediate threat of the use of violence, a serious crime in progress, etc. See Lincolnshire Police, ‘When to call the police’ (no date), retrieved 5 October 2026, www.lincs.police.uk/police-forces/lincolnshire-police/areas/about-us/about-us/contact/when-to-call-the-police.}

Better co-ordination seems to have improved the response to widespread violent disorder

Improving the police response to serious disorder was not an explicit goal when the Starmer government was elected, but it very quickly became one in response to racially aggravated riots in July and August 2024. ³⁵⁴ BBC News, ‘Why are there riots in the UK?’, 7 August 2024, updated 9 August 2024, retrieved 5 October 2026, www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/ckg55we5n3xo  Two interviewees highlighted maintaining public order as one of the central challenges for policing over the past two years, in contrast to years before 2024. ³⁵⁵ Institute for Government interviews, 2026.  The expectation among many policing stakeholders is that managing public order is likely to be an ongoing challenge for policing, including disruptive protests as well as violent disorder. Highly disruptive, threatening incidents with masked protesters in Dover and Portsmouth in September 2026 have once again brought this to the fore. 

During the crisis of 2024, there was significant criticism that the police response was inadequate and forces were too slow to grasp the scale of the challenge. A major problem was how widespread the unrest was. One of the key policing tools to manage public disorder is mutual aid, which allows forces to share specialist officers, particularly officers with public order public safety (POPS) training: riot police. 

Regional POPS mobilisation plans allow neighbouring forces to share the burden of responding to disorder. But when many forces are dealing with unrest at the same time, this system becomes hard to sustain. Ultimately, a national mobilisation of POPS officers was needed to restore order in August 2024. ³⁵⁶ His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services, An inspection of the police response to the public disorder in July and August 2024: Tranche 1, His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services, 2024, retrieved 5 October 2026, https://hmicfrs.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/publication html/police-response-to-public-disorder-in-july-and-august-2024-tranche-1  The police inspectorate judged that this plan should have been activated earlier, which would have restored order more quickly. ³⁵⁷ Ibid.

The police service must be able to anticipate serious violence and disorder.  And it needs to enhance its plans at force, regional and national levels, so it  can mobilise resources to multiple seats of disorder quickly and efficiently.  –  His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Services ³⁵⁸ Ibid.

The inspectorate found that failures in intelligence sharing and analysis meant that the police underestimated the likelihood of disorder in 2024, given previous episodes of unrest over 2023 and 2024 and evidence of escalating tensions, such as at the ‘Uniting the Kingdom’ rally. ³⁵⁹ His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services, An inspection of the police response to the public disorder in July and August 2024: Tranche 2, His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services, 2025, retrieved 5 October 2026, https://hmicfrs.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/publication html/police-response-to-public-disorder-in-july-and-august-2024-tranche-2  It was also critical of the lack of channels for gathering, analysing and sharing intelligence around disorder in real time, which made operational decision making much harder. While the National Police Coordination Centre has an intelligence analysis and sharing function, the inspectorate found it lacked the “capability and capacity” for this real-time sharing. ³⁶⁰ Ibid.

In response to these problems identified in 2024, the Starmer government significantly strengthened national co-ordination and intelligence-sharing across forces around violent groups and public disorder. ³⁶¹ Institute for Government interviews, 2026.  One interviewee said this had created a “much more dynamic engine room” than had existed before, enabling much better central co-ordination and faster mobilisation. They suggested that this meant the response to disorder in 2025 – albeit on a smaller scale – was much faster and more effective than in 2024. ³⁶² Institute for Government interviews, 2026.

The police reform white paper sets out further ambitions to build on this progress. It commits the government to appointing a senior national co-ordinator for public order policing, and strengthening the National Police Coordination Centre with an additional £2.75m of funding, particularly focused on data and intelligence. ³⁶³ Home Office, From Local to National: A new model for policing, CP 1489, GOV.UK, 2026, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/69779267276692606c013862/260125_White_Paper.pdf  These changes should allow for a better-organised and informed response to major public disorder. Once the National Police Service is up and running, it will absorb the National Police Coordination Centre, and should enable further resilience and flexibility in responding to major disorder incidents. 

But the centre will still be largely reliant on local forces assessing and sharing intelligence about potential disorder effectively. As the recent failure of Kent police to identify intelligence about planned far-right protests shows, this is not always reliable. ³⁶⁴ Dodd V, Quinn B and Syal R, ‘Far-right port protests: police told to improve intelligence gathering’, The Guardian, 8 September 2026, retrieved 5 October 2026, www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2026/sep/08/far-right-port-protests-police-intelligence-gathering-dover-portsmouth  A key focus throughout the police reform programme should be ensuring there are effective communication channels for intelligence all the way from front-line neighbourhood teams in local policing areas to forces and the National Police Service.

Even with better intelligence sharing, there will still be an onus on ministers, particularly the prime minister and home secretary, to take a visible public stand to combat violent public disorder. To date, Burnham and Mahmood (and their immediate predecessors) have failed to do this in an effective or timely manner. 

Conclusion

As with other criminal justice services, policing continues to face serious and enduring performance problems. The past two years have not seen consistent improvements, with poor crime investigation and safeguarding continuing to be major concerns. However, the Starmer government made good progress on its key objectives and was on track to meet its goals on neighbourhood policing and knife crime, although there is still a long way to go on both. It also produced a roadmap for reform and revamped the performance management process, with a clear theory of change for how these will drive further performance improvements. Crucially, there are early signs this progress may be increasing public confidence in policing.

The Starmer government set ambitious targets and picked good priorities to focus on. Meeting these would be a huge achievement – one for which the Burnham administration should continue to strive. On knife crime and violence against women and girls, this will require sustained investment in preventative measures, ranging from early years parenting support to effective rehabilitative programmes for perpetrators and dedicated support for victims and survivors. 

The government should also ensure that local and strategic authorities have the freedom to bring together different pots of funding on violence prevention, drugs and alcohol, family support and more, to deliver the most effective interventions for their communities. This should be rooted in the support that individuals and families need, rather than siloed across different services. Success in halving knife crime and violence against women and girls will require a tremendous effort across a wide range of services and government departments, including particular investment in youth services, mental health and early family support.

On police reform, the government should press ahead with the thrust of the white paper published under Starmer. But it must ensure the reforms further its overarching agenda on public services and state reform by aligning police forces and strategic authorities on a one-to-one basis. Equally, it should apply the new performance management process flexibly, to allow space for communities to pursue their own priorities around public safety and crime. This should ensure the right balance between central oversight and local leadership.

Recommendations

• Implement the police performance framework flexibly, allowing mayors, police and crime commissioners and policing authorities (once established) to set their own priority metrics and provide meaningful strategic direction for forces.
• Commit to aligning police force boundaries to strategic authorities on a one-to-one basis, even where this means splitting up existing forces.
• Ensure mayors, police and crime commissioners and policing authorities (once established) keep the power to sack the chief constable of their force.
• Maintain the focus on neighbourhood policing and targeting knife crime hotspots.