Fixing public services: The criminal justice system

The criminal justice system is failing to cope with demand. In the police service, capacity and experience that were lost during the 2010s have been partially rebuilt, and some first steps to do the same have been made in the criminal courts. But this is a slow process that requires sustained investment.

Repeated restructures and staff cuts in probation from the late 2000s to mid-2010s ¹⁰⁸ Ford M, ‘Trends in criminal justice spending, staffing and populations’, UK Justice Policy Review Focus, 2017, no. 2, pp. 1–11.  have left the service with high caseloads, few experienced practitioners and struggling either to meet offenders’ needs or to manage risk. In prisons, policy changes and challenges in courts and probation have led to a spiralling population, which the estate can no longer accommodate, requiring emergency measures. Worse, any substantial improvement in performance for policing or the courts would only deepen the crisis for prisons.*

The police are not resolving crimes and have lost the confidence of the public

Police effectiveness has fallen over the past decade

Only a small proportion of crimes recorded by the police result in a positive outcome – a charge, an out-of-court disposal or a diversionary resolution. Before a slight rise in 2023, both the total number of positive outcomes and the rate of reported crimes solved had fallen for a decade. The police inspectorate, His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Services (HMICFRS), has criticised police forces for the low proportion of crimes that they are solving and for their decisions to close investigations without exhausting available lines of enquiry. ¹⁰⁹ HM Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Services, Police Performance: Getting a grip, July 2023, https://assets-hmicfrs.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/uploads/peel-spotlight-report-police-performance.pdf  Less than 10% of victim-based offences in 2023 resulted in a successful outcome – down from 20% in 2015. ¹¹⁰ Home Office, ‘Police recorded crime and outcomes open data tables’, Outcomes open data, year ending December 2023, GOV.UK, 25 April 2024, www.gov.uk/government/statistics/police-recorded-crime-open-data-tables

Cuts to officer and staff numbers during the 2010s were key drivers of these problems. From 2009/10 to 2017/18, police officer numbers fell from 144,000 to 122,000, with knock-on effects on crimes solved. But since 2014/15, the number of charges per officer has also been falling. This is due partly to the increasingly complex and serious crime mix recorded by police from 2014, and partly to falling officer productivity due to key skills shortages, including around digital forensics.

Since 2019, productivity has been further reduced by the police uplift programme. While the uplift programme successfully increased officer numbers, which reached 147,000 in 2022/23, it takes time for new officers to become effective, and training and overseeing new recruits has imposed a significant burden on more experienced officers. As new officers become more experienced, we would expect productivity to increase – and recent improvements in solve rates suggest this is occurring. The number of charges has risen substantially in the past two years, up 18% from 2021 to 2023, and is now close to 2019/20 levels – although still well below 2010 levels. Retaining these officers will be crucial to maintaining productivity. 

^{*This chapter covers England and Wales, which have a shared policing and legal system.} 

Poor performance has contributed to falling public confidence and trust in the police

Positive outcomes are important for public trust and confidence, which have fallen to new lows in recent years. ¹¹⁵ Redgrave H, ‘The confidence question’, Crest Advisory, 4 August 2022, www.crestadvisory.com/post/the-confidence-question-faith-in-the-police-is-falling-why  The problem is particularly acute for some forces, such as the Metropolitan Police, but has been felt across England and Wales. Trust and confidence are related, but distinct: confidence is about effectiveness and how well the public think the police are performing their role, while trust is about fairness, equal treatment and upholding standards. ¹¹⁶ Brown R and Hobbs A, Trust in the Police, UK Parliament, Post note 693, 2023, https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/POST-PN-0693/POST-PN-0693.pdf

Confidence tends to correspond closely to crime attendance or response rates, positive outcome rates and police visibility. Declining officer numbers, charge rates and police visibility since 2010 have caused confidence to drop, as people have lost faith in the police’s ability to investigate and deter crime. In July 2024, YouGov found only 40% of people had at least a ‘fair amount of confidence’ in the police to deal with crime in their local area – and 16% had no confidence at all. ¹¹⁷ YouGov, ‘How much confidence Brits have in police to deal with crime’; full question, ‘Generally speaking, how much confidence do you have in the police to deal with crime in your local area?’, retrieved 8 July 2024, https://yougov.co.uk/topics/politics/trackers/how-much-confidence-brits-have-in-police-to-deal-with-crime  As recently as 2020/21, these figures were 53% and 9% respectively. Similarly, in 2023, less than half of people thought their local police were doing a good or excellent job (49%), compared with 56% in 2019/20. ¹¹⁸ Office for National Statistics, ‘Crime Survey for England and Wales (CSEW) estimates of personal and household crime, anti-social behaviour, and public perceptions, by police force area, year ending December 2023’, 2024, retrieved 8 July 2024, www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/crimeandjustice/adhocs/1994crimesurveyforenglandandwalescsewestimatesofpersonalandhouseholdcrimeantisocia… and ONS, ‘Crime in England and Wales: annual supplementary tables’, year ending March 2020, retrieved 8 July 2024, www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/crimeandjustice/datasets/crimeinenglandandwalesannualsupplementarytables  This continuing fall in public confidence shows that recent increases in police officer numbers and a slight rise in the charge rate have not yet translated into improved public confidence. 

Trust is more closely related to views on fairness and trustworthiness than effectiveness. ¹²⁴ Brown R and Hobbs A, Trust in the Police, UK Parliament, Post note 693, 2023, https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/POST-PN-0693/POST-PN-0693.pdf  This has been profoundly damaged by a series of major scandals, hitting the Metropolitan Police hardest but also affecting several other forces. In 2023, an Ipsos poll found less than half of people would describe their local police as trustworthy (48%), down from 56% in 2022. ¹²⁵ Ipsos, ‘The future of policing’, 15 November 2023, www.ipsos.com/en-uk/understanding-society/futurepolicing  Trust varies significantly across groups: nationally, people from minority ethnic groups are less likely than others to trust the police, and in London, women have less trust in the police than men (the reverse is true elsewhere). ¹²⁶ Pickering S, Dorussen H, Hansen ME and others, ‘London, you have a problem with women: trust towards the police in England’, Policing and Society, 2024, https://repository.essex.ac.uk/38226/1/20240418_Policing%26Society_Pickering%20et%20al.pdf

These declines in trust and confidence have serious implications for policing. The police are reliant on positive community relationships, intelligence and co-operation for the reporting and investigation of crime. ¹²⁷ College of Policing, ‘Engagement and communication’, 23 October 2013, retrieved 16 June 2024, www.college.police.uk/app/engagement-and-communication  Certain offence types, such as sexual offences, domestic abuse and all forms of exploitation, are likely to be particularly affected. Low levels of trust and confidence may therefore pose a challenge for the new government’s mission to halve violence against women and girls within 10 years.

Workforce shortages and growing inefficiency mean criminal courts still cannot meet demand, despite rising capacity

Backlogs in criminal courts are growing

On 26 June 2024, the Ministry of Justice announced a potential data quality issue affecting criminal court statistics. ¹²⁸ Ministry of Justice, ‘Accredited official statistics announcement: criminal court statistics quarterly: January to March 2024’, 4 July 2024, retrieved 4 July 2024, www.gov.uk/government/statistics/announcements/criminal-court-statistics-quarterly-january-to-march-2024#full-publication-update-history  The scale of this issue is currently unknown. Findings should therefore be interpreted with caution and numbers may be subject to change.

Backlogs in magistrates and crown courts are large and growing, with courts operating less efficiently and failing to keep pace with demand. After initially good progress in clearing outstanding cases that built up during the pandemic, the backlog in magistrates’ courts began rising again in the second half of 2023. The sharp uptick at the end of that year suggests this may be driven by hearing delays due to the lack of space in prisons, which is unlikely to be resolved soon. 

The situation is much worse in the crown court, where the case backlog is now at its highest level ever, at 67,573 cases, more than three quarters (78%) higher than on the eve of the pandemic. When taking into account the greater complexity of cases in the backlog, it is equivalent to around 95,000 cases – roughly equal to the total number of cases dealt with in the crown court in 2023. 

The growing backlog is not principally due to rising demand. While crown court case receipts have now returned to 2019 levels, they fell more than 25% from 2010 to 2019. The reason the backlog has grown is because processing capacity in the crown court has fallen. 

Capacity has declined for several reasons. During the 2010s, police officer numbers and charges fell substantially, requiring less capacity in the courts. The number of sitting days was reduced, magistrate and judge numbers fell and courtrooms were closed. Criminal legal aid funding was also cut sharply, leading many barristers and solicitors to move away from criminal practice. ¹³⁸ Hoddinott S, Davies N, Fright M, Nye P and Richards G, Performance Tracker 2023, ‘Criminal courts’, Institute for Government, 2023, www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/publication/performance-tracker-2023  The number of barristers receiving at least 80% of their income from criminal work fell 6% from 2017 to 2021. ¹³⁹ Institute for Government analysis of data provided by the Bar Council.  These changes meant that the backlog in both courts had already begun to grow in 2019, and when the pandemic hit, the system came under immense pressure. The 2022 barristers’ strike in response to pay recommendations not being fully implemented exacerbated this, but even once the strike and pandemic were no longer delaying cases, quarterly receipts have continued to outpace disposals.

The courts system is running less efficiently than before the pandemic 

From 2021, Conservative governments attempted to ramp up capacity again, with some success. Removing the cap on the number of sitting days funded and successfully recruiting new judges ¹⁴⁰ Institute for Government interview.  have led to a large increase in sitting days, which are now at their highest level since 2016 and 23% higher than in 2019. ¹⁴¹ HM Courts and Tribunals Service, ‘HMCTS management information – March 2024’, ‘Ad-hoc management information release on Crown Court sitting days’, 9 May 2024, retrieved 8 July 2024, www.gov.uk/government/statistical-data-sets/hmcts-management-information-march-2024  Several nightingale courts, introduced during the pandemic, continue to provide additional physical court capacity. However, it is proving harder to replace lost legal advocates, particularly for certain serious offence types such as rape and serious sexual assault. ¹⁴² Institute for Government interview.  Rate increases for legal aid work in 2022 and 2023 fell far short of cuts over previous years, ¹⁴³ Bellamy C, Independent Review of Criminal Legal Aid, Criminal Bar Association, 2021.  and pay remains low relative to other areas of legal practice. ¹⁴⁴ Institute for Government interview.

There are not enough lawyers to meet demand and this means the court system runs less efficiently. In 2023, 5% of all scheduled trials in the crown court were rescheduled on the day due to the unavailability of legal professionals (1,436 trials in total). ¹⁴⁵ Ministry of Justice, ‘Criminal courts statistics quarterly: October to December 2023’, 2024, retrieved 8 July 2024, www.gov.uk/government/statistics/criminal-court-statistics-quarterly-october-to-december-2023/ and ‘Trial effectiveness at the criminal courts tool’, 2023, retrieved 8 July 2024, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/6578456c0467eb000d55f5a7/trials_tool.xlsx/preview  That compares to 0.3% (71 trials total) in 2019. ¹⁴⁶ Ministry of Justice, ‘Criminal courts statistics quarterly: October to December 2023’, 2024, retrieved 8 July 2024, www.gov.uk/government/statistics/criminal-court-statistics-quarterly-october-to-december-2023 and ‘Trial effectiveness at the criminal courts tool’, 2023, retrieved 8 July 2024, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/6578456c0467eb000d55f5a7/trials_tool.xlsx/preview  The total proportion of ineffective trials – trials rearranged on the day they were due to take place – has gone up sharply and now makes up more than a quarter of all crown court trials (27%), up from 16% in 2019. The ineffective rate has also risen in the magistrates’ courts and is now at its highest level since 2005 (22%). Ineffective trials waste time and make courts less productive.

The number of hours spent in hearings per sitting day is a good measure of court productivity. In the crown court, this was 3.15 hours in 2023; while a slight rise on 2022, this was still lower than any year before the pandemic. The practical impact of this is that the 23% increase in sitting days since 2019 only translates to a 7% increase in hours spent in hearings. 

Backlogs are causing substantial delays, worsening the quality of justice

The size of the backlog means cases are waiting months or years to be heard. Trials being rearranged worsens this, because limited advocate and judge availability makes it extremely difficult to reschedule them. Such delays have serious consequences.

They create long periods of uncertainty for victims, defendants and their families, preventing them from moving on after an offence. Victims are more likely to withdraw from the process the longer cases are delayed, particularly for serious or sensitive offences. In the last quarter of 2023, victim withdrawal was responsible for 19% of non-convictions post-charge in rape cases and 48% of domestic abuse-flagged cases. ¹⁵² Crown Prosecution Service, ‘CPS data summary quarter 3 2023–2024’, 18 April 2024, retrieved 17 June 2024, www.cps.gov.uk/publication/cps-data-summary-quarter-3-2023-2024  Some defendants face years on remand without having been convicted of any crime; ¹⁵³ House of Commons Justice Committee, The role of adult custodial remand in the criminal justice system: Seventh report of session 2022–23 (HC 264), The Stationery Office, 2023, https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm5803/cmselect/cmjust/264/report.html  more than a third (38%) of defendants held on remand will later be acquitted or given a non-custodial sentence. ¹⁵⁴ Ministry of Justice, ‘Criminal Justice System statistics quarterly, December 2023’, ‘Remand tool’, 16 May 2024, retrieved 8 July 2024, www.gov.uk/government/statistics/criminal-justice-system-statistics-quarterly-december-2023

There are also negative effects for the broader criminal justice system. Very long delays undermine public trust in the system and may increase reoffending. ¹⁵⁵ Abramovaite J, Bandyopadhyay S, Bhattacharya S and Cowen N, ‘Classical deterrence theory revisited: an empirical analysis of police force areas in England and Wales’, European Journal of Criminology, 2023, vol. 20, no. 5, pp. 1663–80, https://doi.org/10.1177/14773708211072415  The large remand population – currently 19% of all prisoners – places heightened pressure on the prison system. ¹⁵⁶ Ministry of Justice, ‘Offender Management Statistics quarterly, October – December 2023’, ‘Prison population 2024’, 25 April 2024, retrieved 8 July 2024, www.gov.uk/government/statistics/offender-management-statistics-quarterly-october-to-december-2023  Delays can also be self-defeating: the recent rise in defendants failing to attend their court hearings may be due in part to long waiting periods between being instructed to appear in court and the actual hearing date. This results in wasted time for the court and additional burdens on the police in locating and remanding defendants to custody.

Prisons could exceed safe capacity within weeks

Prisons are full and the situation is set to get much worse

The prison system has a severe capacity crisis. Prison expansion efforts have failed to keep pace with growing demand, especially in the male estate, and the Sunak government implemented a range of emergency measures to stay within useable capacity. 

Following an initial drop during the pandemic, since early 2021 the number of prisoners has been climbing sharply. This rise is a combination of the long-term trend for longer sentences, as well as dramatically larger remand and recall populations,* up 84% and 72% respectively since 2018/19. These, in turn, reflect challenges elsewhere in the system: the large court backlog and struggling probation service, as well as legislative changes increasing the use of probation supervision.

Efforts to increase capacity to keep up with this rising demand have fallen short. In 2021, the Johnson government pledged to build 20,000 new prison places by the mid-2020s. So far, about 5,600 have been delivered, and a further 4,400 are expected by December 2025. ¹⁶⁰ Ministry of Justice, ‘Written evidence submitted by the Ministry of Justice’, Parliament, October 2023, https://committees.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/126249/pdf  This falls far short of the projected prison population, which is estimated to increase by 12,000 by then. Planning appeals and construction difficulties have been the major reason for these delays, and have dogged successive governments’ attempts to increase capacity. A lack of capital investment has also hindered efforts, with more than 2,700 (gross) spaces lost to dilapidation since 2019. ¹⁶¹ Argar E, Letter to Sir Robert Neill, Parliament, 1 May 2024, https://committees.parliament.uk/publications/44647/documents/221863/default  The capacity crunch exacerbates this, as non-essential maintenance has been paused to maximise capacity. 

Staff levels also contribute to capacity constraints. The staffing situation in prisons has improved substantially, with joiners up and leavers down in the past year. At a national level, the prison estate is now fully staffed for the first time in years. But the total number of operational officers is still below the 2009/10 figure, despite a larger prison population and a more serious mix of offenders. Recruitment has been patchy across the country, leaving some prisons still seriously understaffed and reliant on short-term deployments of staff from other prisons. More staff would be required to increase capacity swiftly; for instance, through rapid deployment cells – Portakabin- style modular cells that are quick to set up. Staff are also less experienced than they were. More than half of officers have less than five years’ experience, compared with just 22% in 2010, while the number with more than 10 years’ experience has fallen sharply. New recruits are also increasingly young, in their teens and early 20s, which has raised concerns about potential criminal exploitation of staff by prisoners. ¹⁶² Institute for Government interviews.

Overcrowding makes it harder to maintain a functioning regime inside prisons, and often hinders access to purposeful activity such as work and education. While the number of accredited programmes started and completed by prisoners has risen since last year, both remain lower than before the pandemic. This comes on top of a dramatic decline before the pandemic. Reduced access to education can itself exacerbate capacity pressures if prisoners are unable to complete the courses they need to improve their chances of parole. 

^{*People on remand are awaiting trial or sentencing. The recall population refers to those who have been recalled to prison for a breach of their licence conditions, after having been released on parole.} 

Overcrowding also lowers morale for both prisoners and staff and makes outbreaks of violence and unrest more likely. Assaults on prisoners, although still below their pre- pandemic peak, have risen sharply since 2021, while assaults on staff have returned to around peak levels. The degree of overcrowding, narrow operating margin* and lack of flexibility in moving prisoners also increase the risk of a major riot, as the recent disorder at HMP Parc in Wales suggests. 

^{* The operating margin – the difference between the maximum operational capacity and the useable operational capacity required to place prisoners in the right cells according to sex, security category and other factors – has been reduced, from 2,000 before the pandemic to just 1,350 now. See MoJ, ‘Prison population figures: 2020’ and ‘Prison population figures: 2024’.} 

Further emergency measures to reduce the prison population will be necessary but come with major drawbacks

In response to the crisis in prisons, the Sunak government introduced several emergency measures, including releasing prisoners up to 70 days early, delaying hearings in the magistrates’ courts and using police cells as overflow prison capacity. Prison overcrowding has also influenced sentencing decisions, ¹⁷⁴ Davis W, Lord Justice, ‘The application of sentencing principles during a period when the prison population is very high – statement from the chairman of the Sentencing Council’, Sentencing Council, 20 March 2023, www.sentencingcouncil.org.uk/news/item/the-application-of-sentencing-principles-during-a-period-when-the-prison-population-is-very-high-statement-fro…  and the National Police Chiefs’ Council advised police forces to consider reducing arrests due to pressure on prison capacity. ¹⁷⁵ Miller H, ‘Police urged to consider making fewer arrests’, BBC, 22 May 2024, www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cv2274gdk10o  So far, the impact of these emergency measures has been insufficient. Further crisis measures are likely to be necessary over the summer. ¹⁷⁶ Rowland C, ‘The crisis in prisons’, Institute for Government, 3 July 2024, www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/publication/crisis-prisons

However, these measures have serious downsides. They all impair fair and equitable justice, and risk undermining public confidence in the justice system. If prison capacity influences the length and type of sentence, people do not receive equivalent sentences for equivalent crimes. Early release has been implemented very rapidly, which has negatively affected preparation for release. ¹⁷⁷ Institute for Government interviews.  Prisoners are more likely to be released without accommodation and with limited support, often leading to rapid reoffending and recall to prison. ¹⁷⁸ Hymas C, ‘Up to half of prisoners released early recalled within days at some jails’, The Telegraph, 30 May 2024, www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2024/05/30/up-to-half-of-prisoners-released-early-recalled  And victims who are entitled to be notified of an offender’s release – mostly domestic abuse victims – may be informed after the fact or not at all. ¹⁷⁹ Boffey D, ‘Domestic abuse survivors “put in danger by early prison release of prisoners”’, The Guardian, 8 May 2024, www.theguardian.com/society/article/2024/may/08/survivors-endangered-by-early-prison-release-of-domestic-abusers-without-notice-adviser-says

There are also public protection risks. Early release decisions are made centrally by His Majesty’s Prison and Probation Service (HMPPS), according to set criteria. Neither prison governors nor probation practitioners have a veto if they believe a prisoner poses an unacceptable risk if released, although they can raise an objection. ¹⁸⁰ Institute for Government interview.  Equally, delaying remand hearings means defendants will be released on police bail, due to time limits on police custody. ¹⁸¹ Casciani D and Mason C, ‘Court cases delayed after pressure on prison places’, BBC, 15 May 2024, www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-69014154  There is a lack of transparency as to what risk assessment processes are governing these decisions, or who is accountable for them. 

The prison crisis is the most immediate criminal justice challenge facing the new government, and it requires swift and decisive action to remedy it, even if none of the options is palatable. While short-term measures will be necessary to mitigate the immediate crisis, it has been driven by long-term policy trends, which the government will also need to address if it is to get away from stop-gap measures and find a sustainable solution.

The probation service is overstretched and cannot adequately manage caseloads or risk

The vacancy rate is rising and staff lack experience

Probation is often the forgotten service within the criminal justice system, but it plays a vital role in resettling and rehabilitating offenders, supporting court decision making and contributing to public protection. However, it is currently facing a range of deep-seated challenges, including unmanageable caseloads, high vacancy rates and inadequate risk assessment processes. The service currently lacks a clear sense of its purpose and role within the justice system, exacerbated by repeated restructuring and changes in focus within the past 10 years and an inexperienced workforce that is struggling to cope.

Probation performance has been poor for some time. In 2014/15, the coalition government replaced the 31 regional probation trusts with a partially outsourced system, divided into private sector-led community rehabilitation companies (CRCs) to oversee low- to medium-risk offenders and the National Probation Service, which supervised high-risk offenders. Poor performance in many CRCs, much of which stemmed from a poor initial contracting process, led the service to be reunified under public sector management in 2021, run nationally within HMPPS. ¹⁸² Davies N and Johal R, Reunification of Probation Services, Institute for Government, 2022, www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/publication/reunification-probation-services  But performance has worsened since reunification. When CRC caseloads and staff were brought into the national service, it became clear there was a severe staffing shortfall and particularly a lack of qualified probation officers, with CRCs instead relying heavily on unqualified probation services officers.*

Recruitment of trainee probation officers has boosted numbers in post in recent years, but dropout rates are high and rising. Among those who started their training course in 2020/21 or 2021/22, around 20% of trainees did not complete the course. This compares to 13% for the 2017/18 class. The leaving rate for qualified probation officers has also risen, hitting 8% in March 2024 compared with 5% in March 2018. ¹⁸³ Ministry of Justice and His Majesty’s Prison and Probation Service, ‘HM Prison and Probation Service workforce quarterly: March 2024’, Table 10b.  The combination of high workloads and responsibility with low pay is a driver of poor retention; probation officers in 2022/23 earned 22% less on average in real terms than in 2010/11, and less than either prison or police rank-and-file officers. ¹⁸⁴ Office for National Statistics, Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings 2023, ‘Earnings and hours worked, occupation by four-digit SOC: ASHE Table 14’, 1 November 2023.  

^{* Probation services officers and probation officers are collectively referred to as probation practitioners. Trainees work as probation services officers during their training, so some probation services officers are working towards their professional probation officer qualification.} 

The increase in staff numbers needed to improve performance since reunification means the workforce is increasingly short of the required staffing level, with a 25% vacancy rate in Q4 2023, compared with 10% in Q4 2020. There is still a lack of experienced staff, with only 10% of probation officers having spent 10 years or more in probation (compared with 25% in prisons). Caseloads have reduced since reunification, but remain very high, particularly for junior probation services officers: 53% are holding more than 50 cases (down from 72% within CRCs). ¹⁸⁷ HM Inspectorate of Probation, Annual Report 2022/2023, 2023, www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmiprobation/wp-content/uploads/sites/5/2023/09/2022-2023-HMIP-Probation-Annual-Report-v1.0.pdf

Probation performance is declining

The high vacancy rate and large caseloads result in poor-quality supervision. In 2022/23, His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Probation (HMIP) rated nearly half of the 31 probation delivery units as ‘inadequate’, while only one was ‘good’ and none was ‘outstanding’. ¹⁸⁸ HM Inspectorate of Probation, Annual Report 2022/2023, 2023, www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmiprobation/wp-content/uploads/sites/5/2023/09/2022-2023-HMIP-Probation-Annual-Report-v1.0.pdf  This reflects failures across probation activities, from supporting offenders to desist from offending to adequately assessing risk of harm. HMIP highlighted that performance across all categories of need had deteriorated since reunification. The most successfully met need was around accommodation, but this was still only delivered to a high enough standard in 43% of cases. 

This poor performance has knock-on effects on the rest of the criminal justice system. Probation supervises community sentences for adults, and these have declined sharply, falling from 12% of all sentences passed in 2012 to 6% in 2023. This has been attributed in large part to judges and magistrates losing confidence in the quality of supervision and support from probation. ¹⁹⁹ National Audit Office, ‘National Audit Office – written evidence (JCS0039)’, UK Parliament, July 2023, https://committees.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/122239/pdf

The growing number of recalls to custody for people on probation suggests that probation is struggling to work effectively with offenders or manage risk in the community. Recalls have risen 26% since 2021 – even though the number of people on post-release supervision has fallen 5% over the same period. We do not know what proportion of people on post-release supervision have been recalled because this data is not published, but the ratio of recalls to parolees is now almost 1:2, up from around 3:10 in 2016.

If rising recalls represented a genuine increase in risk levels or poor rehabilitation, this would not be a bad thing. But the bulk of this increase comes from those serving short sentences, rather than more serious offenders, and most recalls do not involve a charge for a further offence: only 27% in 2023. These suggest that high recalls may be a product of probation’s failure to meet the needs of those on licence, as well as changing probation practice. HMIP’s annual report highlighted that non-compliance with licence conditions in the cohort it reviewed was driven chiefly by homelessness and/or substance misuse, often arising from prison leavers not being able to access appropriate support in the community. ²⁰⁰ HM Inspectorate of Probation, Annual Report 2022/2023, 2023, www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmiprobation/wp-content/uploads/sites/5/2023/09/2022-2023-HMIP-Probation-Annual-Report-v1.0.pdf

High caseloads mean practitioners do not have time to develop meaningful relationships with those they supervise – possibly only having 10 minutes a week for each of their cases ²⁰¹ Transform Justice, ‘Ep32: Does probation push people back into prison?’, podcast, 5 April 2024.  – so they may be more willing to recall them to prison. HMIP has been highly critical of case supervision and risk assessment processes in the probation service, with just three out of the 31 probation delivery units managing adequate risk assessment in at least half their cases. ²⁰² HM Inspectorate of Probation, Annual Report 2022/2023, 2023, www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmiprobation/wp-content/uploads/sites/5/2023/09/2022-2023-HMIP-Probation-Annual-Report-v1.0.pdf  Without the capacity or experience to assess risk appropriately, and with ineffective management supervision, many probation practitioners appear to be taking a very risk-averse approach, using relatively minor breaches as a reason for recall. High-profile failures of probation supervision, such as Jordan McSweeney’s murder of Zara Aleena in 2022, encourage this approach. ²⁰³ Institute for Government interviews, 2024.

However, heavy reliance on the use of recall has serious downsides. It disrupts accommodation, employment and family relationships for those recalled to prison, leads to poorer relationships between probation practitioners and those they supervise ²⁰⁴ Grehan K, ‘Recalls in crisis: what needs to change?’, Revolving Doors, 26 April 2024, https://revolving-doors.org.uk/recalls-in-crisis-what-needs-to-change ^{, 205} JUSTICE, A Parole System Fit for Purpose, 2022, https://files.justice.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/22164155/JUSTICE-A-Parole-System-fit-for-Purpose-20-Jan-2022.pdf  and places a heavy demand on prison capacity – 14% of current prisoners are there on recall post-release. It is also unlikely to reduce reoffending, as short recall periods of 14 or 28 days offer no opportunity for rehabilitative activities in prison and only result in more acute needs when the person is re-released. 

High recall rates lay bare a cultural struggle at the heart of probation: What is the purpose of the service? Is it principally to provide support and rehabilitation, or punishment and risk management? The original role of the probation officer was to ‘advise, assist and befriend’, but policy changes since the 1990s have increased the focus on public protection and risk management. ²⁰⁶ Justice Committee, ‘The role of the probation service’, UK Parliament, 2010, retrieved 8 July 2024, https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmjust/519/51905.htm  Repeated restructures and changes in practice have muddled the clarity of purpose and identity of probation as a service, ²⁰⁷ Annison H, Burke L, Carr N and others, ‘Making good? A study of how senior penal policy makers narrate policy reversal’, The British Journal of Criminology, 2024, vol. 64, no. 3, pp. 726–43, https://academic.oup.com/bjc/article/64/3/726/7334304#447226828  particularly the recent integration of probation and the prison system as one service in HMPPS, run nationally with limited local connections. HMIP emphasises the importance of strong supportive relationships between practitioners and those under supervision to effective rehabilitation. ²⁰⁸ HM Inspectorate of Probation, ‘Supervision skills’, 2020, retrieved 8 July 2024, www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmiprobation/research/the-evidence-base-probation/models-and-principles/supervision-skills

But these have increasingly been lost under high caseloads and a more punitive approach, which damages trust and discourages honesty from those being supervised. Improving performance in probation is likely to require not only addressing high vacancy rates and staff inexperience, but also setting out clearly the role and purpose of the service.