Resourcing is key for the Covid inquiry's recommendations to make a difference
Targeted investments could have big payoffs and ensure the UK is better prepared for the next major crisis.
It is never a given that a public inquiry will publish findings in advance of the final report – and the publication of the Covid inquiry's findings gives the government an opportunity to act now, say Rosa Hodgkin and Emma Norris
The Covid inquiry report is clear about how poorly the UK was prepared for the Covid-19 pandemic, echoing many of the problems our research found around joining up across departments, coordinating with devolved governments and ensuring effective assurance and scrutiny. Although it was surprising that it did not discuss the resilience of key services, a topic that might have been expected to be central to this module, this might feature more in the future module on health systems.
In some cases, the report recommends action in areas where the previous UK government had already made reforms. These include improving the data available for preparedness and crisis response – through the National Situation Centre – with more expert challenge and a longer timeframe for risks to materialise, and establishing ministerial and official level cabinet committees, including the reintroduction of a resilience sub-committee of the National Security Council. But there is still more that could be done in some areas, for example in further extending the timeframe for risk identification.
Lessons from the pandemic should not become Cabinet Office tick box exercises
The proposals to publish regular reports on UK and devolved nations’ resilience and for an independent advisory body for preparedness and response would help to improve scrutiny, which was very limited ahead of the pandemic. As would regular ‘red teaming’ and publishing the results of pandemic exercises. But it is important that exercises and reporting do not end up being seen as another Cabinet Office tick box exercise and that lessons identified are acted on.
That did not consistently happen in the lead up to 2020. Neither the lessons from Exercise Cygnus (flu, 2016) about the inadequacy of the UK’s pandemic preparedness and the lack of capacity in healthcare, or those from Exercise Alice (MERS, 2016) about the need for clarity about self isolation versus quarantine and the issues with PPE stocks, appeared to have been acted on. Our research suggested that better assurance from an independent body could help incentivise departments to act on the results of exercises, but the role of the centre of government is also critical.
The Cabinet Office will need more resources to lead on "whole-system" crises
One of the most eye-catching proposals from the report is that the Cabinet Office takes the lead on ‘whole-system’ crises rather than them being assigned to a lead department. It also emphasises, correctly, that the Cabinet Office needs to monitor departments and escalate issues where necessary. This is important. Ahead of the pandemic, departments often failed to prepare for risks where they were not the lead department – such as the lack of planning by the Department for Education and the Treasury for pandemic school closures and economic support. The lack of assurance that preparedness activities were taking place was a striking part of the evidence in module one.
The previous administration separated out preparedness and emergency response functions to stop officials constantly being pulled onto crises. But ahead of the pandemic the Cabinet Office struggled to monitor departments’ preparedness effectively, without also being asked to lead on specific risks. Performing that assurance role well and leading on risks at the same time is a big task and would require careful planning, more resources and the right capability.
Resourcing is a key question for many of the reforms proposed. So will adequate resources be allocated across the system to implement these reforms in the context of a very tight fiscal situation and services in crisis? As the report recognises, allocating scarce resources to risks that may not occur is a difficult and fundamentally political decision. However, some targeted investments, such as R&D in key risk areas and more capacity to check departments’ preparedness actions, could have big payoffs and ensure the UK is better prepared for the next major crisis.
The government has the opportunity to act before waiting for the inquiry's final report
One of the most striking things about the module one report is not the content but its existence at all. It is never a given that a public inquiry will publish findings in advance of the final report. The inquiry itself can now put pressure on government to act and, like the Manchester Arena Inquiry, the inquiry secretariat could choose to monitor recommendations and provide public updates on the state of implementation. At the very least, the decision to publish the first set of findings a year in advance of a final report provides an opportunity for the government to act now – to take on recommendations and ensure the country is better prepared for a future pandemic.
- Keywords
- Public inquiries
- Political party
- Labour Conservative
- Department
- Cabinet Office HM Treasury Department for Education
- Public figures
- Baroness Hallett
- Publisher
- Institute for Government