Carney, Canada and the EU: What could it mean for the UK/EU reset?
Fresh EU thinking on Canada may not give the UK more post-Brexit options.
Jill Rutter looks at what a new relationship between Canada and the EU could mean for the UK.
On Thursday, Mark Carney, Canada’s prime minister, received a standing ovation after his speech to the European Parliament. The build up had seen much speculation about a new and closer relationship between Canada and the EU, with the possibility of some new status being invented – whether “associate membership” or a “unique allowance”, to Fabian Zuleeg, the head of the Commission’s favourite think tank, the European Policy Centre, floating the possibility that “Canada should become an EU member state in all but name” – a sort of reverse BRINO. 16 Zuleeg, F, 'Canada should become an EU state in all but name. Here’s how to make that a reality', The Guardian, 14 September 2026, retrieved 17 September 2026, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2026/sep/14/canada-eu-member-state-uk-japan-mark-carney Then realism hits, with Carney suggesting that first the 10 member states yet to ratify the 2017 trade deal (CETA) should do so – and others pointing out that politics in France and Italy would suggest that is unlikely to happen any time soon.
Ursula von der Leyen seems willing to be more inventive for Canada
Commission President Ursula von der Leyen seems to see political advantage of getting closer to Canada, using her state of the Union speech to highlight shared values. The EU sees common cause with Canada on standing up to Donald Trump on trade and on territorial expansionism and, unlike the UK, Canada was offered a price it was prepared to pay to participate in the first round of the EU’s Security Action for Europe programme last year.
Von der Leyen has laid out a series of further areas for EU-Canada deepening. 17 von der Leyen, U, '2026 State of the Union Address', 16 September 2026, retrieved 17 September 2026, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/ov/SPEECH_26_1868 “We will move from CETA to an Alliance for the Future to create a common prosperity and economic security space. We will work on intelligent manufacturing. We will create a tech alliance. We will integrate defence industrial bases. We will make the Arctic a flagship joint project. We will work on energy, critical minerals and batteries. On AI, quantum, cyber and economic security.” Carney on Thursday laid out more areas for potential cooperation – participation in EU programmes, promoting movement of young people across the Atlantic, creating an integrated market in financial services and Canada helping the EU achieve security in critical minerals and energy. 18 Smith, A, et al, 'Canada becoming EU ‘associate member’ would be positive move, Carney says', 17 December 2026, retrieved 17 September 2026, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/live/cx3051ye5j0nt What was notable was the warmth with which Carney’s speech was received – and his stress on the broad support in Canada for closer ties with the EU.
What is absolutely unclear is what any of this means in practice. Does it mean more chats in cooperation councils? Or does it mean enhancing Canadian trade access to the EU (and vice versa), and, if so, then on what terms? In particular, does it guarantee Canada exemption from any restrictions the Made in Europe programme may impose on third countries? Does it create any expectation of alignment with EU rules? Does Canada get any say? And does it come with a price tag? None of those irksome details appeared in von der Leyen’s speech, and Zuleeg in his piece reverted to the usual EU language about a balance of rights and obligations. There is clearly plenty of of work to be done to turn the friendly words into a concrete proposition.
Meanwhile, the UK is making slow progress on its own reset
A shiny new relationship with the Canadians – if it materialises and gets through member states, the European parliament, and EU legalese, and Trump threats – does not mean that there will necessarily be a new and welcoming berth for a resetting UK. The UK already has a much deeper (and ratified) Free Trade Agreement with the EU than Canada has – and where the Canadians have things the UK would like (the repeatedly asked for mutual recognition of conformity assessment, for instance), 19 European Commission, 'CETA - Protocol on Conformity Assessment', retrieved 17 September 2026, https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/single-market-compliance-space/notified-bodies/ceta-protocol the EU has refused to concede since the UK is seen as a bigger competitive threat.
The change of prime minister and most of the ministers involved in the reset has slowed down progress and it now looks like the UK-EU follow up to the May 2025 summit will take place after the scheduled EU-Canada summit. It’s not clear that Andy Burnham’s government takes a very different view to Starmer’s, nor is it clear that the forward path, still hemmed in by the 2024 manifesto’s red lines, will change very much either. The main UK concern, beyond the negotiations set off last May, will be on minimising the threat to UK industry from the EU’s putative Made in Europe programme.
It is welcome that the EU is at last showing a bit of institutional imagination
Even if it does not yield instant benefits for the UK, it is good news that one part of the EU at least is showing that it can think more widely about options for new configurations – thinking that goes beyond the constrained approach that characterised the EU’s stance in the Brexit negotiations. Geopolitical tensions with Russia, China and the US are forcing a fresh look at possible options, with von der Leyen also floating the possibility of a European Security Council that could include the UK.
But the extent to which the UK wants to avail itself of any new options will depend on the state of the debate back home. On the same day as Ursula von der Leyen was laying out some of her future vision, two leading Conservative shadow cabinet ministers were doubling down on their opposition to the government’s limited reset with the EU. That lack of domestic consensus will limit the amount of time and effort the EU is likely to put into renegotiating its trading relationship – which is working quite well for the EU as it is – with the UK. 20 Policy Exchange UK, 'Britain and the EU: after the Reset', 16 September 2026, retrieved 17 September 2026, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-qa498-4P8Y The risk for the UK is that the EU spends more time and effort working out its exciting new relationship with Canada than going back over the leftovers from Brexit with the UK.
- Topic
- Brexit
- Keywords
- Defence and security Trade
- Country (international)
- European Union
- Publisher
- Institute for Government