Andy Burnham has opened the door to EU membership
It is far from clear that there is a path to a clear consensus on Europe.
The prime minister’s plan to set out long-term options for the UK’s future relationship with the EU marks a big break with Keir Starmer, argues Jill Rutter, but does not mean the prime minister will find it easy to build consensus.
Foreign affairs only surfaced at the end of Andy Burnham’s (long speech) to the Labour conference. A short passage on Ukraine, some mentions of national security, and then the PM pull an EU rabbit from the hat.
Since taking office, the prime minister has been talking up his ten-year plan. While all indications were that it would be domestic in scope, Burnham has now made clear that it had to also embrace future relationship options with EU, - with the clear implication that he did not seethe sort of piecemeal dynamic alignment Rachel Reeves and Keir Starmer appeared to seek as a stable place to land.
Burnham goes back to the Barnier staircase
When pressed on what the options might be, Burnham was notably conservative. He mentioned former chancellor George Osborne’s proposal the UK could form a customs union with the EU. He nodded at the Liberal Democrats’ desire to join the Single Market. And he acknowledged that becoming a full member state again could be on the table.
Burnham’s options have one notable thing in common – they are existing options, and ones that the EU has said in the past could be on offer to the UK, as long as it was prepared to take on the obligations in order to enjoy the rights they bring. He notably steered clear of Theresa May’s language of “bespoke” deals, Johnsonian cakeism, the Starmer/Reeves promise of a “better Brexit” or Carney “associationism” (though he later flirted with that in follow-up interviews). He also did not toy with Tony Blair’s fantasy EU, which the former PM launched unhelpfully in the run-up to the conference, where the prospect of the UK rejoining galvanises member states to reform into a “Europe of Nation States”, failing to note that while the UK used to chalk up successes on individual dossiers or opt-outs the history of our membership showed a Canute like inability to prevent the rest of the EU making good on their political project of “ever closer union”.
This may change, but it is better to spend time looking at options that the EU may be prepared to put on the table. UK politicians wasted a lot of time after the referendum agonising about options to satisfy UK political needs without thinking whether an EU, reeling from the Leave decision of a big member state, would be prepared to offer them.
Burnham’s immigration framing was an attempt to pass the Makerfield test
Keir Starmer’s manifesto commitment to improve Boris Johnson’s “botched deal” was based largely on the economic impacts for farmers and food exporters, touring musicians, and qualified professionals (and he only succeeded in making any progress with the EU on the first).
Burnham, on the other hand, accepted that business had been hurt by Brexit – but ventured onto Farage/Reform territory by claiming that Brexit had caused the UK to have less control over our borders than when we were a member state. He may have a point aboutthe levels of cooperation on small boats, but he definitely does noon legal migration.
He argues that EU citizens who moved to the UK were more likely to be temporary than those who came more recently. It is true that Brexit sparked an exodus which has made net migration from the EU negative in recent years – but millions of EU citizens claimed settled or pre-settled status (far more than the initial three million estimate). The so-called “Boriswave” was a direct result of a decision to liberalise immigration by the Johnson government.
Where he may be right is that UK is unlikely to see the same inflows even with free movement as it did in the period up to 2016 – unless new member states are added. The Migration Advisory Committee noted that convergence of economies meant the UK was already becoming less of a draw when we voted to leave. Even so, contorting the argument to try to make the return of free movement pass the Makerfield test looks like a failing tactic.
Burnham has brought rejoin back into the mainstream
In the post-2016 years, it looked as though the campaign for a second referendum was a barrier to a soft Brexit – the intermediate options of customs union or single market union membership could never garner majority support while reversing the referendum decision was still a possibility.
But by wanting to reopen a debate about options, Burnham is now signalling a path that could lead to rejoin. The problems with the mid-way options of rule-taking that made them a lot of people’s third preference still exist. So the options may boil down to accepting something close to the status quo, but with more cooperation on defence and security and hoping the EU invites the UK inside the tent for initiatives like Made in Europe, or deciding to reapply and, ultimately, go back to full membership on whatever terms can be negotiated.
- Keywords
- Foreign affairs
- Country (international)
- European Union
- Political party
- Labour
- Administration
- Burnham government
- Publisher
- Institute for Government