European Parliamentary Committees of Inquiry

Governments around the world conduct investigations into matters of public concern and state failure in different ways and through various institutional mechanisms, depending on local legal and political traditions. The UK, and other countries including Australia and New Zealand, use independent public inquiries. Others, like South Africa, India and Israel, use judicial inquiries or judicial commissions of inquiry. ‘Truth and reconciliation commissions’ are also a tool used in post-conflict contexts.  

But in many European countries, parliamentary committees of inquiry (PCIs) are the main mechanism for investigating these matters. 

How are PCIs different from the UK inquiry model?  

In several European states, the parliament can initiate PCIs, and in so doing conduct original research, interview participants and form recommendations. The topics they deal with range widely under the broad umbrella of ‘public interest’. In Poland, for instance, a PCI has been investigating the use of Pegasus spyware by the previous government, while the Bundestag has investigated both corporate fraud relating to car emissions and spying scandals involving the BND (Germany’s secret intelligence service) and the American CIA.  

This goes a step beyond the role of the UK parliament. In the UK, select committee inquiries are more exploratory than investigative, with both Commons and Lords committee inquiries looking primarily into issues relating to government performance, with a different mandate, and fewer powers and responsibilities than for an independent public inquiry (such as those into the covid pandemic or Grenfell fire).  

Currently, the UK parliament has no role in public inquiries beyond select committees responding to recommendations or sometimes launching their own ad hoc inquiries to investigate issues that have arisen from public inquiries. For example, the ongoing parliamentary inquiry into Grenfell and building safety, by the Housing, Communities and Local Government Committee, is examining the government response to the national Grenfell inquiry’s recommendations as well as looking at building and fire safety more broadly.  

While a recent House of Lords report on reform to UK public inquiry processes has called for a greater role for parliament in overseeing the implementation of recommendations made by national public inquiries, this would still be a different function to that of other European parliaments. 

What is the legal basis for European parliamentary committees of inquiry?

Many ‘committees of inquiry’ in European nations are established by parliaments, with their legal basis often enshrined in nations’ constitutions, and their scope usually defined obliquely as matters of ‘public interest’. A comparative survey of committees of inquiry across EU member states found only Estonia’s legal basis for setting up PCIs resides outside its constitution, in its Riigikogu Rules of Procedure. This differs from the UK where public inquiries are established by government and conducted by an independent body.  

How do European parliamentary committees of inquiry work?

In some bicameral parliaments, PCIs may include representatives from both chambers, such as in Italy and Spain. In others such as Austria, Germany, Poland and Slovenia, only the lower chamber can establish PCIs. The procedures and means of investigation are broadly similar to those of UK public inquiries: PCIs have powers to request information from government, public and private bodies, and call for evidence. Likewise, the subjects of inquiry are often similar to those of UK public inquiries, including examples of state failure, maladministration and corruption.  

However the extent of parliamentary powers varies a great deal between European nations. In Italy, PCIs have the same powers and limitations as courts. In France, appearance before a PCI is mandatory if summoned. This is comparable to the power to compel in UK statutory inquiries, though in France fines and even imprisonment can be used if witnesses fail to attend evidence sessions without proper exceptions granted. Similar sanctions are in place in Belgium, Germany, Latvia and Portugal if witnesses fail to provide information or give false evidence. In contrast, attendance is voluntary in Finland.

In all nations surveyed by the European Parliament on their use of PCIs, findings ‘do not have direct legally binding or enforceable consequences’, but they often achieve a high degree of visibility and political prominence and are seen as useful tools for spearheading change.

How often are they used?

The frequency of PCIs varies across European parliaments. Some initiate at least one each session, others rarely; for example in the Danish Folketing, representatives have powers to set up PCIs but have not done so since 1993. Instead, Danish commissions of inquiry are formed by the minister of justice using the 1999 Commission of Inquiry Act, in much the same way as inquiries are established by ministers in the UK government under the Inquiries Act 2005.

Could the UK parliament play a greater role?  

The UK parliament plays only a limited role in public inquiries. While select committees sometimes review the implementation of inquiry recommendations, there is no consistent or formal system of parliamentary oversight – nor any mechanism or resources for parliament to run inquiries itself. Committees can call witnesses, but non-compliance carries no legal or financial sanctions.

Under the Inquiries Act 2005, inquiries are established by government ministers, who set them up, appoint chairs, define terms of reference, and – even if never used—hold the power to close them early. Most European countries with PCIs embed their rules and criteria in their constitutions. In the UK, parliament would have to amend standing orders to create ad hoc committees of inquiry, with a majority supporting a substantive motion. Practically, government backing would be important to avoid public confusion in an already low-trust area.

Select committees could take on limited roles, such as scoping inquiries or reviewing terms of reference. The decision to launch an inquiry by parliament can become politically fraught, as seen in Latvia, where parliamentary inquiries established by the opposition have been perceived of as motivated by political gain rather than for lesson-learning.  

A recent House of Lords inquiry recommended giving committees more responsibilities  in monitoring the implementation of inquiry recommendations. Yet with record numbers of public inquiries currently underway, and with MPs already facing a demanding work schedule – where it can be difficult already to fill vacancies in existing select committees – it is unlikely that MPs could dedicate sufficient time to chairing these inquiries without a significant expansion in resources. This is a similar argument for why departmental select committees, which are responsible for conducting post-legislative scrutiny, rarely conduct it despite its value when it’s done well. 

The European model of PCIs offers advantages, empowering elected representatives to hold the government and public bodies to account for state failure and arguably providing greater and more immediate democratic oversight.  However, expanding parliament’s role in the UK without a significant expansion of support for MPs, is unlikely to deliver improvements in the inquiry process – to be faster, cheaper and more effective. Real improvement depends on reconsidering not just who conducts inquiries but how they are established, scoped, and followed through.