The vetting system needs to survive the Mandelson test

In his evidence to the Foreign Affairs Committee, Olly Robbins expressed concerns about the hasty changes the government was making to the system for vetting to suspend the ability of departmental officials to overrule UK Security Vetting (UKSV) recommendations. ⁴ https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/2026-04-21/debates/7B876C7E-8D3F-4445-B018-04B2B8A98F59/PeterMandelsonGovernmentAppointment#contribution-889588…  Darren Jones, the chief secretary to the prime minister, had declared the ability of the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) to be the final decision maker, and go against a recommendation from UKSV, as “unacceptable”.

The day before, Robbins’s concerns were echoed by former PACAC chair Sir Bernard Jenkin, who warned of a potential chilling effect on the vetting system, one which would make it less effective.  

The FCDO and No.10 should have agreed in advance on how the Mandelson vetting would work  

Olly Robbins had to make the Mandelson decision within 10 days of taking over at FCDO. He did so in an atmosphere of “constant” pressurising for a decision from No.10 – and although he maintained he resisted that pressure, he was painfully aware of how committed No.10 already were to its appointment; that to the outside world – including the incoming Trump administration – it was done and dusted “without caveats”, and that the PM had already brushed aside slightly ambiguous recommendations on process from his outgoing cabinet secretary.  

Although No.10 conceded that Mandelson would go through vetting, it is not clear that the PM was briefed on how that worked. It is possible to imagine a world in which the FCDO explained how the process worked for normal ambassadorial appointments, who the ultimate decision maker was, what the options were if there was an adverse recommendation from UKSV, and then asked the PM if he was content to apply that process to the very abnormal appointment of Mandelson. The prime minister might have said that in this case he wanted to be the ultimate decision maker – and asked Mandelson, as a condition of his appointment, to waive the right to confidentiality that applies to other appointees going through the process.  

An exceptional appointment needed an exceptional process

Most of the subsequent problems arise from trying to bend a standard process, which works pretty well for 99.99% of cases, to fit the Mandelson appointment. That was unusual on two levels: first because of the extent to which the government publicly committed to the appointment before any  clearances were in place and second because of what Robbins euphemistically termed Mandelson’s “interesting” life. The numbers of red flags already highlighted in the due diligence report would have already scuppered most normal appointments.  

The system treated Mandelson as just another FCDO employee, rather than someone who needed to go through a political appointment process. That had probably worked well for the previous political appointee to the FCDO, when David Cameron parachuted his former chief of staff Ed Llewellyn in as ambassador to France – and Llewellyn has now effectively resumed his former diplomatic service career. But whatever Mandelson was, he was not like any other FCDO employee – and the process should have reflected that. 

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Political appointees need a different process to officials

The government could – and should – have waited for the outcome of Sir Adrian Fulford’s review into vetting before making rushed changes. That should look at is whether political appointments to official jobs should be subject to different processes than when career civil servants or diplomats are appointed. In those cases, which are likely to get far more political attention, there should be more transparency and different rules on confidentiality, and it may make sense for officials to make a recommendation to ministers but for ministers – including the prime minister – to be the final decision-taker. If officials’ recommendations are overruled, there might be provision – as with ministerial directions – for officials to notify the chair of the Intelligence and Security Committee.  

If that different process had been in place, we would have known for sure whether the PM would indeed have abandoned the Mandelson appointment – or be unable to shift the blame for proceeding now; Olly Robbins would not be accused of leaving the PM in the dark and would be continuing with his civil service career. We would also still have intact a system for protecting national security that has failed to cope with as outlandish a case as Peter Mandelson’s. 

Hindsight makes it easier to see how this could have been handled better in the past. But the right lessons need to be learned to improve the system for the future.