The UK government needs to decide how to manage its post-Brexit relationship with the EU

Committees. Deadlines. Review points. The new UK-EU Trade and Cooperation Agreement is stuffed full of them. But there is one other thing that it – and its sister document the Northern Ireland Protocol – have many of: elephant traps.

Ten days ago the EU blundered into one of them – and set off repercussions on both sides of the Irish Sea and across the channel. When someone, somewhere, decided that all potential leakages of EU-produced vaccines into third countries needed to be stopped, they concluded that a loophole through Northern Ireland had to be blocked off to ensure no deliveries to Great Britain. Cue the rash proposal to invoke article 16 to safeguard the Single Market against the “societal threat” that Pfizer might divert some its vials to Belfast.

Most people would have put money on the UK, determined to assert its new found independence, being the first party to the agreement to blunder. But while the UK was lucky that the EU was the first to shoot itself in the foot, the warning shot was loud and clear.

Managing the TCA is a game of multi-dimensional chess

It is not just the outstanding decisions, deadlines and review points in the TCA itself that the UK government needs to prepare for – though it does. Many of these may be technical – but individual  decisions shape the overall relationship. That can be seen in outsiders’ incomprehension – from the disbelief of seafood exporters in Newlyn that the UK failed to negotiate easy access for unprocessed shellfish, to Sir Elton John’s horror that work permit free travel for young musicians is not part of the deal. Neither of these were because of the “incompetence” of individual negotiators: they came from the prime minister’s unwavering focus on a sovereignty first Brexit, without regard to the potential collateral damage. All future decisions will need to take account of the political context.

They will also need to look west and north. Any decision by the UK government to diverge from the bank of EU regulations on goods that it has transferred into UK law will deepen the border in the Irish Sea as Northern Ireland is committed to stay aligned with EU rules. The depth of the border is already causing big problems, with the potential further to destabilise Northern Ireland’s constitutional settlement. The UK government needs to tread carefully.

Ditto with Scotland. The Scots have legislated to continue aligning with EU rules – so UK government divergence has potential repercussions for the UK internal market. Both the Scots and Welsh are already outraged by what they see as the assault on their devolved powers in last year’s Internal Market Act. It is still not clear whether or how the UK government proposes to engage them either in the management of the TCA or give them a say in the development of future UK government regulatory policy.

Brussels is watching for UK transgressions and whether to trigger dispute processes

But it is not just the internal angles that need managing. The EU thinks the TCA has robust protections against the UK undercutting their companies. Their reassurance is through the complex level playing field provisions in the agreement, and the EU representation in London – already the subject of a seemingly pointless arm wrestle with the UK over status – will be watching like a hawk for any suggestion the UK is stealing a march. Back in Brussels they will need to decide whether and when to trigger any of the dispute processes – with potential escalation to “rebalancing”, also known as reducing access. So the prime minister’s achievement of tariff-free trade is not guaranteed.

Where the EU draws the line is one of the great unknowns in the agreement. In normal FTAs, dispute resolution mechanisms are rarely used. It could be that the UK-EU FTA joins that club. But the Swiss, whose agreements with the EU, albeit with better access, look quite like the UK’s, and who are the other geographically proximate high income economy, complain that their relationship is a never ending negotiation. That is a fate the UK will want to avoid.

The UK’s new EU relationship needs to be coordinated from the centre of government     

The UK needs to invest in relationship management now, as our new report sets out. That can only come from the centre. It looks as though that task will fall to Lord Frost’s new Brexit and International Policy Unit in No.10 – but they also need to establish links to the people managing the Northern Ireland protocol and the economic and trade policy secretariats in the Cabinet Office, as well as the Constitution Group there. There will also need to be a new Cabinet Committee to sign off decisions – and the UK needs to nominate its chair of the Partnership Council. According to Michael Gove, the prime minister is still working on that one.

The UK government may think this is all too much for a not too special relationship. But the quickest way to normalise the relationship, and avoid the elephant traps of the future, is to invest now in ways to manage it well.