Three ways to improve the Grenfell Tower Inquiry's chances of delivering lasting change

We expect a lot from public inquiries. They should establish a truthful narrative of what went wrong and provide answers to help those who have suffered. They also aim to identify who was responsible for failures. Most crucially – although sometimes underplayed – they need to propose changes that would prevent a similar tragedy from happening again. Grenfell is no exception.

Over the past 30 years inquiries have found mixed success in turning their recommendations into lasting change. The inquiry which followed the Piper Alpha disaster led to the wholesale transformation of safety in the offshore oil and gas industry within a matter of years. But there are inquiries like Leveson – on the culture, practices and ethics of the British press – where it is not entirely clear whether anything has changed for the better. Worst of all, mistakes are sometimes repeated despite an inquiry or inquest recommending ways to fix a problem – with the Grenfell inquiry’s first report noting how the fire brigade had failed to learn important lessons from the Lakanal House fire in 2009.

The second phase of the Grenfell Tower Inquiry must address a set of issues that are complex even by the standards of public inquiries. There are technical questions about the testing, certification and installation of the cladding which caused the fire to grow out of control, and into the underlying regimes of building safety and inspection. There are also wider questions of governance and accountability that touch on decisions made at every level of government.

The inquiry will learn a great deal. It is vital that these lessons are translated into lasting change. As the second phase gets underway, there are three ways it can make that happen.

The inquiry must be clear about who is responsible for implementing its recommendations

Good recommendations are unlikely to be implemented if it is not clear who is responsible for their implementation. The phase one report contained both clear recommendations – often it was the London Fire Brigade which took responsibility – but others which were worryingly vague. Without clarity on this point, nobody is likely to seize the job of implementing change.

Lord Cullen’s 2001 report into the fatal train crash at Ladbroke Grove is an example to follow. An organisation is pinpointed to implement each of the Cullen’s 74 recommendations, with the report also suggesting a reasonable timeframe for carrying out the changes.

The inquiry must establish clear lines of accountability for implementation

The transition from inquiry to implementation has rarely been seamless. Many chairs – and judges in particular – have treated the end of the inquiry as the end of the process, rather than the start; but the chair of an inquiry also has the power to ensure that those responsible for implementing the recommendations are held accountable. There are good reasons why chairs cannot always oversee implementation themselves, but they can designate another individual or body to carry out ongoing scrutiny of the implementation.

The very first recommendation of Sir Robert Francis’ report into the failings at the Mid Staffordshire NHS Trust did just this, placing responsibility for oversight squarely in the hands of the House of Commons Health Select Committee.

The committee went on to work closely with the Department of Health, tracking the progress made in implementing the report’s other 289 recommendations over the following months and years. Other inquiries have taken a similar approach: PACAC looked into the lessons that needed to be learned from the Chilcot Inquiry, and the Home Affairs committee did a ten-year follow-up on the Macpherson Report. This sort of scrutiny should be the norm for every inquiry.

The second phase of the Grenfell Tower Inquiry will produce many recommendations on building safety and decision-making in local government – and it would be wise to direct the House of Commons select committee on housing and communities to hold the government accountable for putting these recommendations into practice.

The inquiry should work with officials and ministers ahead of time to get buy-in

Even with well-targeted recommendations and a clear line of accountability, changing anything in government is difficult without ministers being fully on board. Inquiries can sometimes be introspective affairs. They lock themselves away for months before emerging with a report that is hundreds or thousands of pages long and expecting it to be entirely accepted by default. This is not a realistic approach.

The Grenfell Tower Inquiry has the respect of government, and the sooner it shares its findings with government the greater its chances of delivering lasting change. The inquiry should its work with ministers and officials as part of an ongoing process of engagement. By sharing its recommendations, and securing ministerial backing, it will be better placed to ensure that the failures of the Grenfell tragedy are not repeated.