Government's Covid-19 decision making hindered by lack of strategy and planning

The government’s initial response to the Covid-19 crisis was hampered by the absence of a long-term strategy, lack of clarity about who was responsible for what and its poor use of evidence, according to a new Institute for Government report.

Decision making in a crisis: first responses to the Covid-19 pandemic examines decisions made in three areas: economic support, Covid-19 testing, and the lockdown.

The report highlights the chancellor’s economic support measures as an example of policy based on clear objectives and developed after working closely with scheme users.

But when making decisions on lockdown, the report finds, ministers relied too much on an illusion that “following the science” would provide the answers. Waiting for certainty from SAGE, itself struggling to get timely data, deferred decisions on lockdown.

And in making his commitment to hit 100,000 tests a day, the health secretary did not give enough thought to what the target – set without input from local public health officials, the diagnostics industry or the testing co-ordinator – was intended to achieve and how. This meant the target became a distraction from equally important matters like making it easier for NHS staff to access testing.

The report also identifies how:

• The government needed to be clearer about the role of science advice and its limitations, particularly in the early stages of the crisis when it looked to its scientists to generate policy, not just advise on it
• Government decisions were influenced too much by concerns over NHS capacity rather than by controlling the spread of the virus
• Senior officials distanced themselves from the decision to reach 100,000 tests a day, and it was unclear who was responsible for different aspects of the testing regime, which made it difficult to assign responsibility for remedying gaps and failures
• The government did not think about some of the most important aspects of how it would implement its policies until after it had announced them, leaving many public services, in particular schools and the police, playing catch up.

The report recommends that the government should:

• Be clearer about the extent to which it wants SAGE to incorporate social and economic concerns into its advice
• Clearly identify the responsibilities of different departments and agencies where those responsibilities overlap
• Use rapid consultation to build support for policies and avoid the need for U-turns
• Use scientific advice to inform rather than determine policy
• Develop its strategy before setting targets that will be hard to resile from.

Sarah Nickson, researcher at the Institute for Government, said:

“Poor decision making is not an inevitable consequence of a crisis. But in a fast-moving situation, there may be little time or opportunity to fix early mistakes. That means that consulting fast and considering implementation at the outset are all the more crucial.”

Alex Thomas, programme director at the Institute for Government, said:

“The best decisions are made when the government knows not just what it wants to do, but why it wants to do it. At times, during its early response to the pandemic, the government lacked a wider sense of strategy. Greater focus on ‘why’ it was taking decisions – ultimately to save lives – would have led to better outcomes all round.”

Notes to editors

1. The Institute for Government is an independent think tank that works to make government more effective.
2. For more information, including data to reproduce any charts, please contact press@instituteforgovernment.org.uk / 0785 031 3791.