Reform the Foreign Office – and devise a foreign policy 

It is rare to read a parliamentary report – let alone one from a committee chaired by a member of the governing party – which is so scathing about government failures and devastating in its view of what that means for the UK’s reputation in the world. The Foreign Affairs Committee’s report Missing in Action blames ministers – Dominic Raab as foreign secretary – and the government’s lack of strategy or thought for the UK’s presence in Afghanistan above all. But the committee, led by Conservative MP Tom Tugendhat, heaps blame on the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, beginning with Sir Philip Barton, its permanent secretary, as well as on military intelligence and on the failure of diplomacy with Washington.  

The chance of the Taliban’s victory should have been anticipated 18 months earlier, the possible need for an evacuation foreseen and plans made with careful thought about who of the Afghans who had supported the UK would be eligible. “It might be convenient to blame FCDO officials or military intelligence for these failures, but ministers should have been driving this policy”, it says. When a rapid evacuation became inescapable, both Raab and Barton were on holiday marking “a fundamental lack of seriousness, grip or leadership”. There was no clear line of command; the evacuation was chaotic including the handling of desperate petitions from Afghans seeking rescue. Junior staff and the ambassador did the best they could.  

The Foreign Affairs Committee's report is credible and its recommendations carry force

The FCDO says it does not accept all the points and will now respond. But the committee’s report is all too credible, not least through many other accounts given to the Institute for Government, and its recommendations have great force. In particular, we agree that:  

• The FCDO is too often defensive; it should commit itself to transparency in response to queries from Parliament or public.
• Departments must work together better in a crisis; here, three departments did not.  
• The Joint Security Committee should review how the National Security Council operates in a crisis.
• The government should urgently clarify its intentions for Afghanistan and the region. What those should be is a political decision; the committee argues not only that the UK has a moral obligation to support the Afghans who helped it, but that the exit badly damaged the UK’s standing in the region and with any countries which might count on its support. To offset China’s interests in the region and to begin – perhaps – to regain the trust of allies, it should make clear its commitment to Afghanistan. It needs to clarify whether its desire to isolate the Taliban means that it will withhold development aid (a “valid” potential policy, the committee says, but one with consequences for Afghans and the region).  

Ministers are responsible for the lack of a clear foreign policy

Barton’s response to these points (and he has spent hours in front of committees already) will show whether he can lead the FCDO away from this disaster, or, as some are now suggesting, should acknowledge that he cannot.  

But the committee is entirely right that the greater problem and responsibility is with ministers. The lack of a clear foreign policy, of foresight, of consistency, and a tendency to believe that the best will happen, lends itself too easily to what the committee has rightly called in this case “a disaster”.