The questions to ask Dominic Cummings

The lifecycle of set-piece committee appearances is well established. The date of a hearing is announced. Journalists, think tanks and other government-watchers begin a drum-beat of anticipation leading up to the big day. And then the star turn parries questions, does his or her best not to make news and the event is written off.

Dominic Cummings’ appearance at the joint health and science committee tomorrow promises to be different. He is on the offensive. In long Twitter-thread teasers, he set out his accusations of an inadequate government machine, a failing civil service and a prime minister absent from or overwhelmed by the pandemic. The committee interrogation is for Cummings an opportunity to pursue his agenda. His tweets show he will accuse the government of pursuing a policy of deliberate Covid-19 herd immunity in the early months and of failing to learn from early mistakes. But his real agenda may be revenge for his sacking by the prime minister, a new chance to air his derision for elements of the civil service – and to show that his ideas still matter. His standing never recovered from his lockdown trip to Barnard Castle which became an international joke and target of scorn.

But a select committee inquiry needs to set its own terms, focus on uncovering new information and identify how to improve the decisions and operation of the government.

The 10 questions that MPs should ask Dominic Cummings

1. Unpick his contradictory claims that the UK should have both locked down earlier and could have avoided lockdowns entirely. Cummings makes the startling claim that with the right preparations and people in charge then the UK would “probably have avoided lockdown 1”. But he also says that he argued for faster lockdowns. How does he reconcile this, when the virus was present in the UK in January 2020 and the best early response to the outbreak would have presumably involved a swift and comprehensive lockdown?

2. Probe into the role of economic projections in decisions about lockdown. How did ministers assess what turned out to be a false trade-off between lockdowns and keeping the economy open, and what role did the chancellor play?

3. Focus on lockdown decisions from October to November 2020 more than February to March 2020. The initial lockdown decisions are already well discussed and it is now clear that UK government planning was inadequate, even accounting for lack of knowledge about the nature of the virus. More important is to understand why the second lockdown decision was taken so late. On what basis did the prime minister reject the advice of SAGE to implement a lockdown in September? When was the Kent variant identified and when was the prime minister told? These decisions were the full responsibility of the prime minister, and Cummings was his principal adviser.

4. Demand specific examples about organisational failures. Clearly there were structural problems about how the Cabinet Office, the Department of Health and Social Care (DHSC), the Department for Education and parts of the rest of government responded. It was easy at his last committee hearing for Cummings to criticise the “smoking ruin” of DHSC. But what specifically went wrong? How did the different parts of the healthcare system, in particular DHSE, the NHS and Public Health England interact? What was the government’s plan when it brought in “tsars” to lead on protective equipment, vaccines and test and trace, and why was the vaccines taskforce successful when test and trace was not?

5. Ask where ministers felt let down by poor advice. A key, contested area for the future inquiry will be the advice on which ministers based their decisions. We know already that scientific advisers say they regret not advising on earlier lockdown in March. On other areas – border closures, mask-wearing – the initial advice seems to have been wrong. How well advised were ministers? Are there other areas where advice was lacking, or have ministers tried to make scapegoats of scientists?

6. Find out how modelling and data informed decisions. Cummings will criticise poor data in the civil service – and he is right to do so. But we already know this. The questions to ask are about how the prime minister took decisions in the absence of good data. How far did modelling inform the prime minister’s decisions, and how was that modelling represented to him? When did he see the early Imperial College modelling and how long did it take him to reach a decision based on it? Did the Joint Biosecurity Centre, set up in May 2020, play a useful part?

7. Probe Cummings’ No10 role. When things go wrong it suits everybody involved to keep responsibilities fuzzy. Defining what Cummings’ role was will also be important for the credibility and accuracy of his evidence. The committee should try to establish who reported to Cummings. What specific projects was he working on? What did the prime minister hold him accountable for? Was he spread too thinly? Why was he unable or unwilling to rectify the problems he identifies; what – specifically – were the obstacles to doing that? Given the authority he had why was he not able, for example, to overcome procurement barriers in relation to mass testing? Did he have a formal agreement with Boris Johnson about access and decision-making? Did he expect civil servants to take informal direction from him?

8. Ask about how the government could have been more transparent while protecting reasonable private debates and classified material. Cummings has said that he will answer the committee’s questions for as long as they want him to. What is his view of government transparency and why has he changed his mind about co-operation with select committees? Why did he not see earlier that, as he now puts it, “secrecy contributed greatly to the catastrophe”? If he was arguing for more openness on such vital matters, is he familiar with government whistleblowing procedures and why did he not speak out at the time? Cummings’ appearance itself will have consequences. He will not be concerned about embarrassing the government – quite the reverse – but his evidence will cast a shadow. He should be asked about the responsibility of former advisers and civil servants to speak out after they leave office. Is he concerned about damaging future relationships between ministers and special advisers? The committee will also need to ask about who briefed the media in advance on crucial public health announcements, and why somebody retrospectively edited his blog to add references to coronaviruses – and what the value was in doing so.

9. Press him on government communications. There will inevitably be a focus on the role of the infamous trip to Barnard Castle in undermining public trust in the government and adherence to rules. But more widely, Cummings was regarded as a master in crafting electoral messages in a government which, during his time in office, did not communicate about the pandemic clearly or consistently. What went wrong?

10. Tee up evidence sessions with other committees. As the prime minister’s most senior adviser, Cummings will have been involved to some extent with all the major decisions up to November 2020. Questions from MPs should set up opportunities for other select committees to ask about, for example, the exams fiasco, Cummings’ role in procurement contracts and his approach to civil service reform.

The committee should ask Cummings why government polling has improved since his departure

The committee has a responsibility to drill down on Cummings’ more outlandish claims. He was at the heart of a government that presided over often chaotic management of the crisis, with one of the highest death tolls in the world. He now says the UK could have avoided any lockdowns at all if only competent people were in charge. The committee should press Cummings to say what exactly he would have done and why he did not do it. Before they conclude, MPs might also ask him why the government’s stability, perceived competence and its polling ratings have risen since his departure last November.