The Patel v Rutnam clash shows the limits of the cabinet secretary’s power

Sir Mark Sedwill, as cabinet secretary, head of the civil service and national security adviser, holds three of the most important jobs in government. The past week’s meltdown in the Home Office, however, shows the limits of his power.

Performance management of permanent secretaries is always hard

Most permanent secretaries – including, until Saturday, Sir Philip Rutnam – report to Sedwill as head of the civil service. In some respects this is a standard managerial relationship.

Sedwill signs off annual objectives for his top team (which the IfG has criticised as muddled and inconsistent in the past, and which are now based around single departmental plans, the documents approved by secretaries of state which set out government objectives for each department). Sedwill will talk to them about their performance, looking to evidence of achievement and taking in views from their secretary of state and lead non-executive director. With the support of other senior colleagues he can decide who should be rewarded with a bonus. And if he, having consulted with ministers, judges it to be necessary then he can oversee a process that might lead to a permanent secretary’s exit or re-assignment – though matters rarely get that far.

But the most critical relationship for any permanent secretary is how he or she gets on with the minister. Arguably a permanent secretary is not doing their job if they don’t have the confidence of their secretary of state. But how should that be judged? And how can the head of the civil service work out whether criticisms from a secretary of state are valid points about the competence of an official, or loaded rejections of a civil servant speaking truth to power? Until now, this system has been based on largely informal conversations between top officials and ministers.

There is also a long standing question of how permanent secretaries can be held accountable for the advice they have given ministers – or not given. How should they be judged on giving bad advice – or arguing against a bad policy favoured by a minister? What about being held accountable for problems in delivery of the minister’s priorities – which might be sensible projects, or frankly unachievable?

Patel v Rutnam: a clash of personalities and a lack of clarity over accountability 

Rutnam’s exit shone a light onto these unresolved questions. Perhaps the working relationship was never going to survive a clash of personalities and styles – and the immense pressure of the work to be delivered by the Home Office this year was almost certainly a central factor.

But the clash has shown the limits of the cabinet secretary’s ability to resolve disputes – particularly when the allegations are about ministers’ behaviour. In his resignation speech, Rutnam cited both a pattern of bullying behaviour against staff by the home secretary (strongly denied by Patel) and briefing against him in the media that, he said, had made his job untenable.

At the same time, as supporters of Patel point out, the Home Office and Rutnam himself expected to be criticised by the forthcoming inquiry into how the immigration status of the Windrush generation was handled. That brings the debate back to senior official accountability.

We may be reaching the limits of the civil service’s ability to smooth things over

In some respects it is remarkable that permanent secretaries and senior ministers get on as well as they do, and that the system has endured for so long. That is because permanent secretaries have generally proved adept at understanding what their ministers want – and delivering it for them. As IfG research shows, the problem is often that senior civil servants say "yes" too often and shy away from saying “no, minister” for fear of jeopardising their relationship.

Where problems emerge it has previously been in the interests of all to resolve the issue quietly with the permanent secretary moving on with a pay-off, a peerage or simply another job. Ministers and officials have tended to want to avoid a confrontation which might lead to uncomfortable truths being revealed. And the individual in turn will not want his or her competence questioned, or to pursue lengthy litigation which might hinder them in finding other positions.

However, Rutnam’s exit shattered conventions. The result may be that in future relationship breakdowns, others seek formal redress instead of agreeing to smooth things over. 

Several questions arise from the wreckage of the Patel-Rutnam relationship. Asking the cabinet secretary to advise on bullying allegations against a minister has proved convenient for successive prime ministers, but puts everyone in a difficult position. The victims and those accused of such behaviour would both benefit from a more transparent system of investigation.   

Second, greater clarity of their roles and responsibilities, with accountabilities made explicit on both sides, might have helped both Rutnam and Patel to know where they stood.

The question of the accountability of permanent secretaries is a live one, made more so by recent developments. If senior civil servants start to look to a more formal employment relationship with the government, the consequence may well be that the government looks to more formal accounting of their responsibilities, achievements and mistakes.