'5 Days in May': Inside the Coalition Negotiations

What happened inside Coalition negotiations between the Liberal Democrats and Labour in May 2010?

‘5 Days in May’: Inside the Coalition Negotiations

On 22 May 2013, the Institute for Government hosted Andrew Adonis in conversation with David Laws, MP. To mark the release of Lord Adonis’ new book, 5 Days in May, the speakers discussed their perspectives on the 2010 coalition negotiation process. The event was chaired by Peter Riddell, Director of the Institute for Government

• Andrew Adonis is currently the chair of Progress and IPPR, formerly Labour’s Secretary of State for Transport
• David Laws is Minister of State for Schools and the Cabinet Office and Liberal Democrat MP for Yeovil
• Peter Riddell (chair) is Director of the Institute for Government

Lord Adonis began the proceedings with a humorous take on what could have been in May 2010. He read from his fabricated text of David Laws’ 2017 memoirs, The Origins of the Progressive Coalition. This account saw Gordon Brown offering his resignation immediately and creating decisive plans for succession. Taken alongside the Liberal Democrats’ rejection of the Osborne approach to the economy, the stage was set for a Lib/Lab coalition. The resultant scenario saw Alan Johnson as Labour Leader, and the Progressive Coalition ushering in a period of prosperity – with growth up, the deficit down and euroscepticism reversed.

David Laws’ critique of ‘5 Days in May’

• The Arithmetic of the hung Parliament - Contrary to the assertions of 5 Days in May (pp. 23-5), it would have been nothing short of a “nightmare” to organise a Lib/Lab coalition that ultimately relied on minority party votes. The resultant coalition would have been “shambolic” and unable to take any tough decisions in a time that demanded them urgently. Ultimately, he felt, the arrangement would surely have collapsed, bringing about another general election in which the Conservatives may have won outright.

Lord Adonis took the view that this arrangement would have survived for at least long enough that the Progressive coalition might have been able to prove its worth, such that another general election could have brought victory.

• The Clegg/Laws ‘plot’ – Laws also took issue with the accusation that the Liberal Democrats wanted a coalition with the Conservatives from the outset. He defended their actions, citing Nick Clegg’s commitment to talk first to the party with the largest number of seats. To pursue parallel negotiations would have betrayed this stated intent. Thus, there was not any “reticence” in talking to Labour in particular, but rather a conscious commitment to how the negotiations were going to be approached.

• Labour’s side of the negotiations – Laws identified the fundamental problem as being the lack of engagement with the negotiations by the Labour party, and the absence of key figures such as Alistair Darling from the negotiation table. This came alongside Ed Balls’ admission that Labour couldn’t even be certain of delivering its own party’s votes on certain issues, such as AV. Ultimately Laws felt that Labour didn’t offer the same concessions as the Conservatives, in areas such as increasing the tax allowance and delivering the pupil premium.

Was a Labour based coalition ever a viable option?

Internal divisions

Speaking from the Chair, Peter Riddell asked Lord Adonis whether the problem at the time was that Labour was too divided. Significant persuasion was required to bring Gordon Brown round to the decision to resign, whilst deep divisions existed in the Cabinet. Was it therefore the case that Labour weren’t ever realistically in a position to form a coalition?

Lord Adonis pointed out that in the Cabinet meeting immediately following Brown’s resignation; nobody spoke out against the idea of a coalition – even its most ardent opponents. He felt this to be a sign of the formation of solid majority views.

His view was that a Lib/Lab coalition could have been realised, if all of the following assumptions were satisfied:

• The coalition had been under new leadership
• The transition to new leadership was timely and well planned
• The Liberal Democrats had negotiation criteria beyond the numbers. The only way in which a Liberal/Conservative coalition was not going to be the most likely outcome was if the Liberal Democrats had taken the stance that the Conservative economic policy was entirely incompatible with their own.

As it was, “only some kind of really dramatic change in the weather on the part of the Labour party – which, let’s be frank, we weren’t capable of – could have externally changed things”.

David Laws disputed this conclusion – and suggested that if the policy offer from the Labour party had been better, and the Gordon Brown problem had been resolved in a timely manner, then there would have been some more serious debate amongst the Liberal Democrats on the best choice for coalition.

The problem of incumbency

Both the speakers felt that coming from position of Government significantly impacted Labour’s position. In particular, David Laws felt that this “baggage” made Labour somewhat protective over their policies, and therefore less flexible in their negotiations. He also felt that Labour didn’t approach the negotiations on equal terms, with Alistair Darling approaching the negotiations very much in the mind-set of the Chancellor, often bypassing the negotiations table in favour of bilateral discussions with senior party figures.

What could have been done better?

Key figures needed to talk more in the run up to the election

Lord Adonis saw lack of communication as a key hindrance to the proceedings in May 2010. As the standing government, however, contingency planning for the possibility of a hung Parliament would have been a dangerous sign of weakness, particularly in the atmosphere of Brown’s administration.

David Laws felt that, nonetheless, Gordon Brown did not reach out as he should have done. He asked whether it was perhaps a sense within Labour that they were in competition with the Liberal Democrats, who had been eroding their support base on a number of issue areas.

The Liberal Democrats’ preparation on policy

Peter Riddell asked whether the Liberal democrats had failed to sufficiently prepare their policy stance for coalition – in particular with regard to Tuition Fees.

David Laws suggested that Tuition Fees were the exception rather than the rule on this point. All other flagship policies were well prepared for and subsequently delivered. He took the point, though, that more preparation on Tuition Fees would have been desirable. Pre-election revisions, such as a retreat from total abolition, had been a start, but had not been thought out in adequate detail.

Were the negotiations too short?

A strong current of opinion that was evident amongst audience members was that the negotiations were remarkably short – particularly in relation to examples from Belgium and the Netherlands.

Both the speakers felt that the media were a key constraint in this regard. In particular David Laws proclaimed himself to be a “go faster man” at the time of negotiations. This was on the basis that protracted negotiations would lead to an exponential growth in the complexity of the eventual agreement, alongside diminishing media faith in the competency of the parties involved.

A trade-off with internal party support

Peter Riddell pointed to the fact that beyond the negotiations of the first 5 days, neither party had the full support and consent of its members for a coalition.

David Laws saw this to be a key lesson from the Scottish coalition negotiations of 1999. He felt that having potentially long, and somewhat ponderous, discussions with the party was a necessary evil. Ultimately, endorsement and buy-in is crucial at the outset to stave off fracture later down the line.

The desirability of coalition

With reference to Lord Adonis’ stated preferences for single majority government, Peter Riddell asked whether this was something of a moot point, given the unavoidable reality of the need for coalition.

On this point Lord Adonis conceded that a majority Labour government was an ideal, but desirable nonetheless. In the absence of such an outcome, he felt coalition to be much more preferable than minority government. He pointed to the experience of Callaghan in the 1970s as fair warning to any pursuit of such arrangements.

Is this Coalition undemocratic?

Questions from the audience touched on the idea of the Conservative/Liberal Democrat coalition as a betrayal of the progressive agenda – for which the public had shown a preference in 2010.

On this point David Laws was of the opinion that the public simply did not provide a sufficient mandate. As such, though the Liberal Democrats have made some progress in the Progressive agenda, with policies such as childcare and the pupil premium, this has been somewhat muted by the politics of austerity.

Lord Adonis countered that, in 2010, the second preferences of Liberal Democrat voters was 60/40 in the favour of the Labour party. This was somewhat unusual and made the possibility of a Lib/Lab coalition realistic. The big issue in 2010 was the economy, and he was of the view that the public had decidedly marked their preference for the ‘Darling plan’ over the ‘Osborne plan’.

The role of the Civil Service

David Laws was asked whether he would wish to see the involvement of the Civil Service in any future coalition negotiations. His feeling was, based on the evidence of Civil Service involvement in Scottish negotiations, that this may act as a hindrance to proceedings. In this instance his view was that the Civil Service had shown a preference towards the stronger party, and that their presence stifled more frank and open discussion.

Peter Riddell brought the discussions to a close by thanking the speakers and acknowledging the valuable insights that the discussion had given when looking forward to the coming years. This will be a key element of the Institute for Government’s future research and an area that will greatly benefit from this kind of open and honest discussion.