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Armitt’s National Infrastructure Commission.

Moving towards a more sensible debate.

Ed Miliband announced last week that Labour intends to establish an independent National Infrastructure Commission if it returns to power.

The Commission was a key recommendation of Sir John Armitt’s infrastructure review published in 2013. It would be responsible for identifying the UK's long-term infrastructure needs and for reviewing government policy plans laid before government, commenting on their (in)consistency with the needs identified by the Commission. It is seen by its proponents as a critical part of a system of long-term infrastructure planning, designed to curb the short-termism that has plagued policy-making in areas such as power generation, transport, water, waste, telecommunications, and strategic flood defences. According to the announcement, every 10 years the Commission would identify UK infrastructure needs over the next 25-30 years, spell out the consequences of doing nothing, and make suitable recommendations. The expectation is that by giving politicians and the public a clearer idea of the challenges the nation faces in the long-run, the debate around infrastructure investment could take place on a more informed basis, making it easier to establish political consensus on major schemes. There is some merit in these arguments, but some important problems too. First, there is no shortage of information about the infrastructure challenges the UK faces and the dangers of failing to meet them. For example, there is plenty of credible evidence suggesting that our energy security is increasingly at risk. The need for investment in power generation is uncontentious. The controversies are about how those challenges should be met, how the required investment should be delivered and paid for, and what sectors or specific projects should be prioritised. With the exception of the prioritisation of needs, these questions would sit outside the Commission’s proposed remit. Second, the politically controversial nature of decisions is often because of the contestable nature of the information that is available, as well as disagreement on policy goals. The evidence-base for strategic infrastructure decisions can be, by its own nature, extremely contentious. Assumptions and methods are debatable as in any other areas, but crucially, in the case of infrastructure, the results of analyses are often subject to unavoidable uncertainties. These stem from the long-term nature of these decisions, the way they are influenced by technological change, their complex interactions with decisions in other sectors and with the evolving pattern of economic development. Also, the policy alternatives involve trade-offs between high-level goals (e.g. between growth and environmental impacts) and on the interests of specific groups, making these decisions politically sensitive. Perhaps unsurprisingly, debates around these issues often degenerate into spats about the quality of information where contradictory “studies” and “business cases” are used as weapons in a battlefield of private and political interests. It would be a mistake if the Commission underplayed the importance of these issues. It would risk becoming yet another source of competing analysis, fuelling controversies rather than helping resolve them. Instead, the UK needs a forum where independent experts and interest groups may come together to:
  • discuss the nature of the evidence-base that ought to inform strategic infrastructure decisions
  • to debate the trade-offs implicit in policy alternatives with a view to reaching a compromise.
Our research has identified examples of international best practice in these areas. One such example is the work of the Australian Productivity Commission, which has been successful in fostering informed public and political debates about strategic policy decisions, through an interesting mixture of solid research and public input and scrutiny. The Commission’s public inquiries usually tackle complex, contentious issues that often have significant impacts on different groups in society. The French and Dutch experience, on the other hand, offer useful examples of ways of facilitating discussions between key interested parties, with a view to reaching agreement on the delivery and operation of specific infrastructure projects. In the Netherlands, the so-called “Alders-table” (a consultative body responsible specifically designed to formulate advice to government on plans for Schiphol airport) seems to have been successful at creating an ‘arena’ where national and municipal governments, representatives of the local communities, and the parties involved in aviation were drawn together to discuss mutually advantageous solutions. That success inspired the creation of other similar consultative bodies across the country. In France, the “National Commission of Public Debate”, a state-funded, independent body, has been playing an important role in ensuring the public participates effectively in the decision-making processes about projects that have major effects on the environment and/or on land use. This has given citizens from all walks of life an opportunity to investigate whether a project is worthwhile, to reflect on its objectives and main features, and to express their opinions in ways that can influence the design and implementation of those projects. These examples highlight the benefits of approaches that seek to build consensus by facilitating informed dialogue between experts, interest groups, and the wider public. The Commission announced last week offers an opportunity to create an institution in the UK that might effectively play these roles.
Political party
Labour
Publisher
Institute for Government

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