IPPR report addresses important issues of accountability

The IPPR report offers the chance for a more reasoned debate by setting out in detail experience from overseas and allaying some of the fears over politicization. Its aim is explicitly ‘to make the Civil Service more accountable, more effective and more responsive, while at the same time preserving its political neutrality…. and a merit-based, non-partisan Civil Service’. The proposed reforms are intended to improve ministerial confidence in the Civil Service, to go with the grain of current Whitehall practice and to be easily implemented. The Institute for Government has been carrying out its own accountability project for the past nine months, run by Akash Paun and Joshua Harris, and we have already published papers on: •the lessons from Australia and New Zealand •strengthening ministerial offices •appointment of permanent secretaries. We have shared our thinking throughout with IPPR and our analysis and conclusions are in many, though not all, areas similar. In particular, there is considerable overlap on three proposals: 1.‘Giving the Prime Minister the power to appoint permanent secretaries, choosing from a list of appointable candidates’. The Civil Service Commission would draw up the list to ensure appointments are made on merit. (IPPR) This is similar to the IfG proposal of June 3rd except that we have proposed that the decision should be made by a Secretary of State not the Prime Minister. Ensuring that a permanent secretary has the explicit backing of their Secretary of State should bolster their authority in the role. Under our proposals, the Prime Minister would retain their existing statutory veto, though, in a coalition, this power should be carried out after consultation with the Deputy Prime Minister. 2.‘Provide Secretaries of State with an extended office of ministerial staff working directly on their behalf in the department’. (IPPR) This is very similar to the recent IfG proposal and would involve recruiting more outside experts in ministerial offices, but not necessarily many more political advisers, certainly many fewer than in Australia and Canada. Like the IfG, the IPPR rejects a ‘cabinet’ of political appointees on the EU/Continental model because of fears of isolating ministers from their departments. 3.‘Introducing fixed-term contracts for new permanent secretaries of four years, renewable depending on performance’. (IPPR) The IfG has floated a similar option of fixed-term appointments (after which permanent secretaries would move on to another position) rather than fixed-term contracts (after which you are out of a job). There needs to be clarity on the nature of any fixed term since it affects pay levels (higher for a fixed-term contract to offset uncertainty over tenure) and increases doubts about the currently rather battered ideas over succession planning for the most senior civil servants. Four years is, however, longer than recent average tenure. Some of the other proposals are part of wider debates: 4. ‘Strengthening the role of the Head of the Civil Service in managing and holding permanent secretaries accountable by making the post full-time and taking a similar role in this respect to the New Zealand State Service Commissioner.’ (IPPR) The IfG’s work has highlighted the importance of an effective system for holding permanent secretaries and their top teams to account. We agree with IPPR that the role of the Head of the Civil Service should be strengthened to create scope for better performance management, and this requires clear political backing. The IfG believes that the key is strengthening the corporate leadership of the Civil Service, which we will be addressing in a separate report shortly. 5. ‘Strengthening the external accountability of senior civil servants in key operational roles: the 200 odd senior responsible owners (SROs) – senior officials running big projects and implementation tasks should be made directly accountable to the relevant select committees for their performance (as permanent secretaries are and as accounting officers are before the Public Accounts Committee).’ (IPPR) There have been many proposals for improving the implementation of major projects, notably our own work on the lessons of the Olympics, Making the Games, and Lord Browne’s recent report Getting a Grip. On SROs, the key is limiting the past big turnover. Any changes will help if they ensure that SROs are accountable for the whole life of a project, or a specific stage of the project cycle. However, this could create confusion with the role of accounting officers who are responsible for feasibility of departmental spending and, under the Civil Service Reform Plan, must explicitly sign off implementation plans. There also needs to be a clear distinction between SROs and other civil servants explaining what is happening, and ministerial accountability. Unless this is clear, officials could be put in an awkward position by committees. One answer on major projects like the Olympics, is to give responsibility for execution/implementation to a special arm’s-length body. 6.‘Enabling the Civil Service to provide better support to Opposition parties to allow civil servants to be seconded into the offices of opposition parties to help with policy development’. (IPPR) As the IfG has highlighted in its reports on Transitions, there is a real problem of preparing Opposition parties for government and for understanding the problems of translating policy ideas into implementation. Secondments are only one solution. Other alternatives which we have backed include broadening and deepening the access talks between Opposition parties and the Civil Service in the 12 months before the election. This question is further complicated by the desire of the two coalition parties for separate policy advice. The IfG will produce a report on these issues later in the year.