Government must integrate different forms of advice to inform coronavirus response

Departmental fiefdoms are part of Whitehall’s DNA. A lack of joined-up thinking often undermines policies even in normal times. But in the current crisis – one which affected everyone’s lives and every sector of the economy, and required carefully coordinated interventions – it has been especially damaging.

Public health and economic policies – notably around the exit from the first lockdown – were made not only separately but on the basis of different analysis and expectations about the spread of the virus. As panellists at a recent Institute for Government event argued, the government needs to integrate different forms of analysis much better if it is to have a coherent strategy for the winter ahead.

The government’s approach has been marked by a lack of joined-up thinking

In the spring, the prime minister and ministers repeated their mantra that they were “following the science”. They relied heavily on a fairly narrow group of medical scientists and modellers on the Scientific Advisory Group on Emergencies (SAGE) to inform the March lockdown.

But by the end of the summer, it was the economists who appeared in control. The Treasury launched a host of policies designed to boost the economy and encourage people to venture out and consume, while the government encouraged them to return to the office and even travel abroad. This reflected changing political priorities. But the advice underpinning the shift was not consistent with SAGE’s thinking. 

Rishi Sunak said in the Commons on Thursday that the Treasury’s approach was based on an optimistic assessment that “we could stay ahead of the virus”. Yet senior SAGE members thought the policies were epidemiologically illiterate – incentivising people to take unnecessary risks and re-seed the virus returning from their holidays. 

While the exact effect is still debated, a recent study from the University of Warwick suggested the Eat Out to Help Out scheme caused a “significant” rise in infections ^[1]. John Edmunds, a core SAGE member, said at our event that the policy was made without consulting the leading epidemiologists advising the government.

Cabinet committees are failing to bring different forms of advice together 

There have been various calls – including from Theresa May – for economics and business expertise to be better represented on SAGE. But this will not solve the bigger problem of departments in Whitehall not talking to one another – and producing policies that do not work together.  

In June, the government set up two Covid-19 cabinet committees – one on strategy and one on operations. These – rather than an external advisory committee – are where scientific, economic and other analysis should be brought together into a unified view that informs the government’s strategy. 

But our panellists – as well as interviewees for an upcoming IfG report – agreed that this is not happening. Of course, some disagreements come down to politics. But political differences are exacerbated if ministers are briefed with conflicting advice. Ministers cannot be expected to reconcile these differences themselves; they need analysis to be brought together to inform their discussions and help them discuss trade-offs.

Scientific advisers and civil servants have done a bit of this already. At the Science and Technology Committee on Monday, chief medical officer Chris Whitty insisted that he has regular conversations with economic advisers in “other settings” – outside of SAGE. But it needs to happen much more systematically.

The government needs to develop a framework to inform decision making

There have been various suggestions for better models. Gus O’Donnell, a former cabinet secretary, has called for the government to set out a clear framework to integrate different forms of analysis – not just science and economics, but also a broader view of wellbeing and population health. Nick MacPherson, former Treasury permanent secretary, argued at our event that the Cabinet Office should draw on the success of the National Security Council, where a wide range of advice is distilled into a coherent view.

The Cabinet Office may also need extra analytical expertise and support to do this well – particularly if it is to bring together economic and epidemiological modelling, which are currently done separately. Tony Yates, a former Bank of England official, has suggested that a new Centre for Economics and Epidemiology, with a large budget, could perform this role.

With critical decisions coming down the track, a more coherent approach is essential. The Treasury’s decision to extend the furlough scheme until March suggests it may not share the prime minister’s confidence that the second lockdown will end in a month, with the regional tiered approach seeing us through the rest of winter. Edmunds indicated that a more realistic time frame for the country “to come out of the nightmare of this epidemic” would be Easter.

Whatever the timescale for easing restrictions, it is vital that the government has a clear unified view informing its decisions. A lack of joined-up thinking contributed to it squandering the gains of the first lockdown. It cannot afford to repeat the mistake.