Whitehall Monitor: Deep Impact?

How government departments measured their impact, 2010-15

Gavin Freeguard, Robyn Munro, and Emily Andrews
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Any errors or omissions are, of course, our own.

Gavin Freeguard, Robyn Munro and Emily Andrews

March 2015
Executive summary

The British public thinks politicians should prioritise ‘fulfilling the promises they make before getting elected’, but currently don’t.

Figure 1: ‘Which three things do you think UK politicians prioritise at the moment?’ and ‘Which three things do you think UK politicians should prioritise?’

Source: Institute for Government/Populus polling, August 2014.

Polling conducted by Populus for the Institute for Government found that the British public values politicians fulfilling their election pledges, but believe parties currently prioritise party political goals (like getting re-elected, scoring political points and making big announcements).

Our polling also found that nearly two-thirds of the public said they would be more willing to vote for a party that showed how it could implement its policies. One way to show promises are being fulfilled would be to use a form of performance measurement (demonstrating what government was actually doing) or even performance management – using data to hold a department to account and drive further improvement.
Departmental Business Plans, introduced in 2010, are the latest cross-government way of measuring performance.

Figure 2: Cross-government performance initiatives since 1979

- **1982: Financial Management Initiative**
  Treasury initiative to get better and more consistent information from departments about managerial responsibility, financial accounting and control

- **1988: Next Steps Report**
  Aimed to move 75% of Civil Service into agencies, which would have objectives, performance targets and resources agreed with Treasury and Next Steps Unit

- **1991: Citizen’s Charter**
  Involved public in assessment of public services, through public bodies publishing clear contracts of service against which performance could be judged

- **1998: Public Service Agreements (PSAs)**
  A set of objectives with attached targets for government departments, initially 600 across 35 areas of government. Refined to 160 targets by 2000 and tied to spending review processes

- **2001: Prime Minister’s Delivery Unit (PMDU)**
  Established within the Cabinet Office to chase delivery of 17 high-priority PSAs relating to manifesto commitments (HO, DfT, DfE, DH)

- **2007: Evolution of PSAs**
  Shift in emphasis to 30 cross-cutting priorities across multiple departments, and away from targets (only a third of the 153 measures had targets)

- **2010: Business Plans**
  Set of actions and deadlines relating to coalition priorities for each department, with impact indicators to measure effects of policies and reforms

- **2012: Implementation Unit**
  Although bearing a passing resemblance to PMDU, focuses on ‘deep dives’ on difficult implementation issues

Source: Based on (and updated from) Whitehall Monitor 2013.

The Coalition introduced ‘Business Plans’ in 2010. These focus on actions or administrative steps departments could take – ‘outputs’ within their control – as part of a ‘Structural Reform Plan’. This was a reaction to Labour’s ‘Public Service Agreements’, which had set targets for the effects the government wanted to have in the real world – ‘outcomes’ or impact.
Each department’s Business Plan includes a series of ‘impact indicators’ which aim to measure the effect of their reforms.

Figure 3: Number of impact indicators by department

![Bar chart showing number of impact indicators by department.]

Source: Institute for Government analysis of impact indicators via transparency.number10.gov.uk.

Impact indicators ‘are designed to help the public to judge whether [departments’] policies and reforms are having the effect they want’. They include things like how many people are on particular types of benefit (in the Department for Work and Pensions), reoffending rates (Ministry of Justice), the proportion of trains running on time (Department for Transport) and net migration to the UK (Home Office).

According to the Number 10 Transparency website, which provides the public with a portal to all departmental Business Plans, the Department for Education (DfE) has the most indicators, with 28. This is eight more indicators than the next highest department, the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS), and more than four times as many as the Ministry of Defence (MoD), which has the fewest (six).

Very few of these 207 indicators have specific targets against them. So to work out how departments have performed, we looked at the scores for each indicator in 2010 and at the time of writing. We have assumed which direction the department wants it to move in. If it has moved in the right direction (for example, more people moving off Job Seeker’s Allowance) we have coloured it green. If it has moved in the wrong direction (such as more trains running late) we have scored it red. If it has stayed the same or the picture is mixed, we have scored it amber. Dark grey means the data is unavailable or incomparable.
Overall, more than half of all impact indicators have moved in the right direction compared to 2010.

Figure 4: Movement in impact indicators, 2010 to 2015


All of the Department of Energy and Climate Change’s (DECC’s) impact indicators – which range from lowering the number of households in fuel poverty to increasing the proportion of UK energy supply from low carbon sources – have headed in the right direction compared to 2010. The indicators for the Department for Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) also scored well (only the proportion of children playing competitive sport declined).

However, there were improvements across under 50% of the indicators for seven departments – the Department for Education (DfE), Department for Business, Innovation
and Skills (BIS), Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), Home Office (HO), the Treasury (HMT), the Ministry of Justice (MoJ) and the Ministry of Defence (MoD). At MoD and MoJ, more than 40% of their indicators had headed in the wrong direction since 2010 – including a falling percentage of deployable personnel and falling service personnel satisfaction at MoD, and rising reoffending rates at MoJ.

Some departments have not published comparable data for a significant percentage of their indicators, including Department for International Development (DfID, 50%); DfE (50%); Home Office (40%); the Treasury (40%); and Cabinet Office (nearly 40%).
However, scores, data and explanations for what the indicators mean can be difficult to find.

Figure 5: Transparency and usability of impact indicators by department

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Source: Institute for Government analysis of impact indicators and annual reports.

The Government intended that members of the public should be able to access the data from a central website. This would enable them to use the data themselves, understand what government reforms were achieving and hold departments to account.

However, using the Number 10 Transparency website (transparency.number10.gov.uk), we found that in many cases this was difficult, if not impossible.

When we then tried tracking down all of the indicator data ourselves, we found a huge variation in the quality, usability and accessibility of the data.

We also investigated whether there was a clear link between the steps and actions in the Structural Reform Plan part of the Business Plans, and the impact indicators. In other words, could we see the link between the actions departments were taking and what they were measuring in the real world?
The link between the actions departments committed to implementing, and the impact indicators they said they would use to measure the effects of their actions, is not always clear.

Figure 6: Strength of links between Business Plan actions and impact indicators

Source: Institute for Government analysis of impact indicators and Structural Reform Plan actions.

We found that for just over 40% of the indicators, there was a series of actions which would have a direct impact on the indicator (which we rated green). However, for just over 40% of indicators, there were either only a few actions with an indirect link to the indicator (amber), a single action with a tenuous link to the indicator (amber-red) or no relevant actions at all (red). Nearly 70% of DfE’s indicators fall into these categories, while Defra (over 50%) and HMRC (50%) have a large percentage in the red or amber-red categories.
The actions themselves say little about the quality of what has been implemented, or measures against which implementation should be judged. Without an idea of how to assess performance, beyond an increase or decrease, the same could be said for the impact indicators.
It is not clear that the impact indicators are being used by the public, by departments or by the centre of government.

Figure 7: The frameworks departments use to measure outcomes (2013)

Source: Adapted from Institute for Government, Whitehall Monitor 2013.

The Government intended that the public, departments and the centre of government would be able to use the impact indicators to judge progress.

But when we asked government departments how they measured outcomes in 2013, almost half said they used something other than just the Business Plans (two said they used something different altogether). The availability and accessibility of data makes it difficult for the public to use the indicators as intended. No army of armchair auditors appears to have enlisted. And the plans also appear to have lost any political link with the centre of government.

Implementation matters; demonstrating implementation matters; and performance measurement, or performance management, can help keep that on track. But the impact indicators which form part of the government’s performance measurement system are let down by problems with data, are not sufficiently well-explained to the public and do not appear to have been widely used by the public, departments themselves or by the centre of government.
Introduction

Charlie Elphicke MP: My one slight concern and question mark in my mind is if I went onto the doorsteps of Dover and said, "Look, we are replacing PSAs with Business Plans, we are replacing targets with milestones, this is a great cultural revolution," most likely they’d say, "Come again?" If not, they might say, "Well, isn’t that deckchair shuffling?" What would I say in response?

Rt Hon Oliver Letwin MP: Well if you were to say any such thing on the doorsteps of Dover you would be a much less canny local politician than I think you to be.. This is about running a Government, and most of the business of running a Government is, for most of our fellow citizens, very dull. It’s very important because it produces results that are not dull from their point of view. If they have a job and the economy is growing, grandma can get her hip replaced, the children are getting a decent school, police are preventing crime on the streets: that matters to people.²

Oral evidence to the Public Administration Select Committee, 12 January 2011

Performance measurement in government is, as the Elphicke/Letwin exchange suggests, unlikely to make the hearts of the electorate beat more quickly. However, it is a means to an important end: whether government achieves what it sets out to.

When, as part of our Programme for Effective Government, we polled members of the public to select three things that politicians should prioritise, more people selected ‘fulfilling the promises they made before getting elected’ than any other option.³

Figure 1.1: ‘Which three things do you think UK politicians prioritise at the moment?’ and ‘Which three things do you think UK politicians should prioritise?’

Source: Institute for Government/Populus polling, August 2014.
Another question in the poll also showed that nearly two-thirds of those polled said they agreed or strongly agreed that they would be more likely to vote for a political party that showed how it would implement its policies in government.

Figure 1.2: ‘To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements?’

Source: Institute for Government/Populus polling, August 2014.

Implementation matters; demonstrating implementation matters; and performance measurement, or performance management, can help keep that on track.

In 2010, the Coalition Government dropped New Labour’s Public Service Agreements – a series of cross-government priorities with targets attached – in favour of departmental Business Plans. These were designed to be ‘the definitive exposition’ of what 17 government departments were ‘meant to do… to make a reality of what is in the coalition programme for government’.

Within each of the 17 departmental Business Plans was a series of impact indicators, designed ‘to help the public to judge whether our policies and reforms are having the effect they want’, as the May 2011 versions of the Business Plans put it.

This report focuses on those impact indicators. We ask two broad but basic questions about them:

- what has happened to departments’ impact indicators over the course of this Parliament, i.e. have the department’s policies and reforms had the desired effect?
- how useful are the impact indicators in judging the impact of a department?

First, we give a brief overview of the history of cross-government performance initiatives since 1979 to understand the context. We then look at what was said about Business Plans and impact indicators in the first few months of the Coalition. We then introduce our analysis and assessment of the impact indicators. Finally, we provide analysis for each government department, with an overview of their indicators and a chart for each and every one.
Performance measurement before 2010

Performance measurement can be simply defined as measuring results in order to understand progress. Performance management is a way of using those results to drive an individual or organisation to meet objectives.

This is nothing new in British government: the Institute for Government’s Performance Art (2008) gives an example of payment by results in the school system dating back to 1863. Public services and organisations within and around government have collected and used measures in a variety of ways.

Since 1979 there has been more use of performance measurement by government, but little iterative learning from successive initiatives and inconsistency in measures collected and used. So it is worth considering how central government performance initiatives – designed to help departments monitor themselves and services, or used by ministers to show policy achievements – were viewed, and why the Coalition chose to develop a new system in 2010.

1979-1997

The Financial Management Initiative of 1982 was a Treasury initiative to get better and more consistent information from departments about managerial responsibility, financial accounting and control. It followed on from work by Michael Heseltine in the Department of the Environment to get more information that he, as a minister, could use to understand the department and make decisions about priorities.

In 1988, the Next Steps report recommended shifting 75%-95% of Whitehall staff into arm’s-length bodies. Part of this ‘agencification’ was ‘more accountable management with quantifiable targets, customer-focused services and better value from public expenditure’. The small Next Steps Unit (NSU) worked towards moving 75% of Civil Service staff into agencies and worked with the Treasury to create bespoke agreements with objectives, performance targets and resources for each agency. Each agency would have a chief executive, accountable to the relevant minister, who in turn would be accountable to parliament.

In 1991, Prime Minister John Major introduced the Citizen’s Charter. This was designed to directly involve the public in the assessment of public services and ‘define clear and appropriate mechanisms for enforcing standards across public service’. As Major said in a speech launching the initiative:

We will enforce publication of results by public services, make inspectorates truly independent, and make properly accountable those in control... We will also look to public bodies to publish clear contracts of service – contracts that mean something – against which performance can be judged.
Figure 1.3: Cross-government performance initiatives since 1979

1982: Financial Management Initiative
Treasury initiative to get better and more consistent information from departments about managerial responsibility, financial accounting and control

1991: Citizen’s Charter
Involved public in assessment of public services, through public bodies publishing clear contracts of service against which performance could be judged

1998: Public Service Agreements (PSAs)
A set of objectives with attached targets for government departments, initially 600 across 35 areas of government. Refined to 160 targets by 2000 and tied to spending review processes

2001: Prime Minister’s Delivery Unit (PMDU)
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2007: Evolution of PSAs
Shift in emphasis, to 30 cross-cutting priorities across multiple departments, and away from targets (only a third of the 153 measures had targets)

2010: Business Plans
Set of actions and deadlines relating to coalition priorities for each department, with impact indicators to measure effects of policies and reforms

2012: Implementation Unit
Although bearing a passing resemblance to PMDU, focuses on ‘deep dives’ on difficult implementation issues

Source: Based on (and updated from) Whitehall Monitor 2013.
A Citizen’s Charter Unit was established in the Cabinet Office, and – with Major’s attention focused on the Citizen’s Charter and ‘Competing for Quality’ – those in charge of the Next Steps programme tried to emphasise the links between them. Next Steps continued into a more consensual ‘business as usual’ phase in the 1990s, although many of the existing frameworks were not necessarily improving performance. Michael Heseltine (Deputy Prime Minister from July 1995) then attempted – and, against resistance from the Treasury, failed – to develop a major benchmarking project across the public sector.

1997-2010

New Labour abolished both the Citizen’s Charter Unit and the Next Steps Unit in their first term. Next Steps had served its purpose with 75% of the Civil Service working in agencies, and Labour having committed to the programme in Opposition and reiterating ‘delegation is here to stay’ when taking power.

Attention was turning to the accountability of central government. A framework to raise educational standards at the Department for Education and Employment was ‘seen by leading politicians as the lone example of progress on their key priorities’. Meanwhile, the Treasury was developing Output Performance Analyses (OPAs), which would require departments to report their successes against objectives, and connect budgeting and delivery. But the OPAs did not align with the five pledges the Government had been elected on, and had no targets against them.

Two days before the 1998 spending review, Ed Balls – then special adviser to Chancellor Gordon Brown – told Treasury officials to replace the OPAs with Public Service Agreements (PSAs), which soon encompassed 600 targets across 35 areas of government. Given the speed of introduction, the PSAs were highly variable and – given that spending allocations had already been decided – not tied to any financial levers. By the time of the 2000 Spending Review, however, the number of targets had been reduced (to around 160), their scope and definition improved, and they were tied to the spending review process.

PSAs entered a second phase in June 2001 following the creation of the Prime Minister’s Delivery Unit within the Cabinet Office. PMDU used 17 high-priority PSAs relating to manifesto commitments to chase delivery in four departments – Home Office, the Department for Transport, the Department for Education and the Department of Health. Prime ministerial support (and relationship building with an initially sceptical Treasury and reluctant departments) gave PMDU credibility and the resources to support and challenge departments. PMDU produced red/amber/green (RAG) ratings and league tables, rated departments against SMART (specific, measurable, achievable, relevant and timed) targets, and held stocktake meetings with the Prime Minister and relevant departments every few months.

PSAs went through another phase when Gordon Brown became Prime Minister in 2007 and PMDU moved into the Treasury. There was a shift in emphasis – to 30 cross-cutting priorities across multiple departments (with PMDU supporting the delivery of all 30 PSAs), and away from targets (only a third of the 153 measures had targets).
Alongside their use and development, critical views developed about PSAs that became synonymous with problems of targets and performance measurement. This had a big effect on the Conservative Party’s view of them. In 2003, the Public Administration Select Committee (PASC) published *On Target? Government By Measurement*. It recognised that much had been achieved by performance management:

> The increase in accountability and transparency which targets have brought with them has been valuable. Taxpayers and users of public services have a right to know how well their services are being delivered and who is accountable for them.\(^{17}\)

But PASC also focused on certain problems that then became firmly fixed in some minds. These included the tension between those at the centre and those responsible for delivering public services. But the impact of target-chasing became a particular theme, in terms of creating perverse consequences and giving rise to cheating. There were particular problems with targets in cross-cutting areas (e.g. the police putting more people in prison while the prison service tried to reduce overcrowding). PASC recommended fewer, more relevant targets focused on key outcomes; a wider consultation process including professionals and service users; and a move from a ‘hit and miss’ approach towards measures of progress which will enable better and more intelligent comparisons by managers and users alike.\(^{18}\)

David Cameron, leader of the Conservative Opposition, made his opposition to targets clear. For example, in 2007 he told the Police Federation that ‘[t]argets, directives, inspection and centralisation that take away your judgment and discretion’ were undermining ‘your morale and your vocation’ and ‘professional responsibility by placing too heavy a burden of central management and direction on the police’.\(^{19}\) The Conservatives also had ideological and practical objections to many of the outcomes measured by Labour. An example of this was a PSA target to make older people happier, which government could not control and therefore should not promise to deliver.\(^{20}\)

Cameron was also setting out a new philosophy for government: not just ‘the Big Society’\(^{21}\) but the post-bureaucratic state. This would be a state ‘properly focused on delivering its responsibilities, while trusting individuals, families, businesses and communities to get on with their lives’ instead of ‘the bureaucratic over-reach which sees the state trying to control everything in sight, while not running anything right’:

> In place of the bureaucratic age which sees wisdom, power and moral authority invested in the state and its growing army of agencies and quangos we see a new post-bureaucratic age where the information revolution and our new world of freedom makes it possible to put real power in people’s hands.\(^{22}\)

It was therefore no surprise when Cameron followed a different approach in government.
The introduction of Business Plans

The Coalition abolished both Public Service Agreements and Prime Minister’s Delivery Unit on entering government in 2010. The Implementation Unit, founded as part of the Cabinet Office in 2012, ‘bore more than a passing resemblance’ to PMDU, but PSAs were dead.23

In a speech in July 2010, ‘We will make government accountable to the people’, Cameron marked a clean break with the New Labour era. ‘Many of their intentions were right’, Cameron told an audience of civil servants, but they went wrong in using techniques that were ‘top-down’, ‘centralising’ and ‘above all, bureaucratic’:

In this system of bureaucratic accountability almost everything is measured or judged against a set of targets and performance indicators, monitored and inspected centrally. The evidence shows this hasn’t worked.24

The new Government would...

...replace the old system of bureaucratic accountability with a new system of democratic accountability – accountability to the people, not the government machine.25

People would be given ‘the power to improve our country and public services, through transparency, local democratic control, competition and choice’. For example, rather than impressing DfE, teachers should impress local parents who would have a choice over where to send their child.

This would require ‘radical reform’. Every Whitehall department would have a departmental Business Plan. Part of this would be a Structural Reform Plan – these differed from PSAs...

...because in these plans you will not find targets – but specific deadlines for specific action. Not what we hope to achieve – but the actions we will take.

They will show how each department plans to bring democratic accountability – how they will create the structures that put people in charge, not politicians.

The new performance regime then, would shift from measuring outcomes—what the Government wanted to see in the real world—against targets, to measuring whether actions were completed against deadlines. The people would judge success, rather than government.

Cameron reiterated many of these points on launching the Business Plans in November 2010. Public Service Agreements, targets and ‘the whole of the public sector constantly answering to Whitehall’ had created problems of bureaucracy, inefficiency and unintended consequences, low morale and short-term thinking and short-term wins ‘at the expense of long-term improvements’26 Business Plans would shine ‘a bright light of transparency on everything government does’ and allow the public to hold departments to account:

Because each of these Business Plans does not just specify the actions we will take. It also sets out the information we will publish so that people can hold us to account—plain-English details about the progress of the reforms and the results they are achieving...
But how could this be done without targets?

[I know some people will say] isn’t there a danger that without targets breathing down your neck, ministers will go native, the machine will slow down and nothing will actually happen?

But these plans won’t allow that to happen... With this you’ll be able to see month by month the progress being made – not what we’re promising will happen but what we’re actually doing to make sure it does happen...

And publishing information about the progress we’re making and the effect our reforms are having is not targets, it’s just the basic information that the public needs to hold government to account.27

Despite the shift in focus from outcomes to actions, there would still be information about the ‘effect’ of reforms, although they would not be target-driven.

Oliver Letwin, Minister for Government Policy, underlined this shift from measuring outcomes to measuring actions under a department’s control. He told the Public Accounts Committee that Business Plans ‘are the classical exposition, the definitive exposition, of what it is that departments are meant to do that is within their control... to make a reality of what is in the coalition programme for government.’28 This view of control was different to a target regime: Cameron had previously stated that the job of politicians and civil servants was merely ‘to create the conditions in which performance will improve’ (through ensuring 'professionals answer to the public').29 Letwin made a similar point to the Public Administration Select Committee:

The difference between a target regime and the Business Plans is that a target regime starts with the assumption that there are things out there in the world, the things I’ve described, policing streets, improving schools and so on, that you can specify in terms of a number. By next year the number of x’s that will do y in Britain will be suchandsuch, and then that you can drive the machine, somehow or other, and make this happen, and we think that produces a mess. We think what happens is you end up with lots of people going and trying to make things happen and discovering that there are all sorts of unintended consequences. We’re saying on the contrary, no. Let’s think about the structures within which people will get on with the job and do it well. Let’s try to work out how to put those structures in place where they aren’t.30

In front of the Public Accounts Committee, Letwin also emphasised that the Business Plans were focused on the Coalition’s reforms: ‘they are not plans for the operation of business as usual.’31 David Normington, soon to depart as permanent secretary of the Home Office, underlined that ‘they are not the whole story about what the Department does – and they are not intended to be’, but rather concentrated on ‘the reform programme and the changes the Government want to make.’32

Accountability to the public was vital, but the Business Plans had other uses and users. There was the centre of government: Letwin told PAC that, although it was ‘not a question of management, because [we] are not trying to manage each Department’, they were ‘a tool for accountability to the centre in the sense of No. 10, the Cabinet Office and the Treasury together, of each department for carrying out the Government’s programme’.33
Danny Alexander, Chief Secretary to the Treasury, added that they were also ‘for you and for other select committees, and for Parliament and for the public, to be kept abreast of how we are getting on with delivering those things – so it is a tool of accountability.  

Departments, too, should use the Business Plans: Oliver Letwin said he hoped ‘they will have the effect of enabling Departments to do what one hopes to do when one sets off in the morning with one’s little list, namely to complete the list on time’ and had the ‘impression’ that ‘Ministers have come to see this process of having regular reviews and having the documents, so they know what it is that they are trying to achieve, is actually quite a useful way of managing their departments.’
The place of impact indicators

The initial set of Business Plans published in November 2010 had five sections:

- Vision
- Coalition Priorities
- Structural Reform Plan
- Departmental Expenditure
- Transparency.

‘Vision’ disappeared in the second of three ‘refreshes’ to the Plans in May 2012 (the others came in May 2011 and June 2013).

Impact indicators form part of the transparency section, along with input indicators and occasionally ‘other data’. Typically, input indicators are the cost of providing public services – for example, at the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP), the ‘Unit cost of Jobcentre Plus labour market support per customer’ and ‘Cost of maintaining each existing claim for Basic State Pension’. Earlier versions of Business Plans described impact indicators thus:

> Our impact indicators are designed to help the public to judge whether our policies and reforms are having the effect they want.\(^{36}\)

Later refreshes – specifically, the June 2013 refresh for 2013-15 – introduced input and impact indicators and other key data as one:

> The Department has adopted the following input and impact indicators to help the public assess the effects of our policies and reforms on the cost and impact of public services. These indicators, and the other data specified here and in our Open Data Strategy, will be regularly published online.\(^{37}\)

Although there is little further discussion of the impact indicators in the Business Plans themselves, hearings held by the Public Accounts Committee and the Public Administration Select Committee in late 2010 and early 2011 give more detail.

According to Kris Murrin (director of Downing Street’s Policy and Implementation Unit), while still in draft, the indicators were ‘the best available data that Departments have suggested maps most accurately to the reforms and will give the greatest amount of clarity on what is happening out there across the system’ without putting ‘big and very costly new data requirements on the system’. She reiterated that they were not designed to cover the totality of a department’s business – ‘the business plan impact indicators are not in any way meant to be a summary of all the data that is going to be provided’ – but were supposed to reflect the structural reforms in the rest of the Business Plan.\(^{38}\)

This data should be readily useable by the public. As Oliver Letwin told the Public Accounts Committee that he had a ‘responsibility’ to ‘produce impact data and outcome data that is readily usable, readily comparable…[so that] you can see what outcomes there are, how they are moving, in a sensible way.’ And in ‘an internet age – and I am not sure we have collectively yet caught up sufficiently with this’, people...
...will do much better things with this data than we can do ourselves. And what Danny is saying is it is not peripheral, it is not an add-on; actually, when you look at what people are already beginning to do in just a few days with the crime maps, you discover the power of this. Once people have that power in their hands, they will start to use it and they will produce conclusions that are uncomfortable for us, and that is good for us.39

He was ‘really astonished by some of the assumptions’ in Whitehall as to ‘how complicated it is, not in 1920 or 1990 or 2000, but in 2011 to gather data virtually real-time and be able to interrogate it relatively easily’. The internet was ‘jolly nifty’ in allowing people with just ‘a quite simple PC’ to ‘mash it up extremely well’.40 Danny Alexander, too, hoped that transparency would mean the impact indicators and other data would ‘be comparable between Departments so that Committees and others can make comparisons’.41

Long-term, this data should also be available on a much more granular level: not just ‘how many schools are achieving what, how many hospitals are curing people of this or that, and also what money has gone in to achieving those results’, but actually to ‘be able to drill all the way down and actually find out right down to the level of the individual entity – school, hospital, police force, whatever it may be – how it’s performing in detail’.42

Many of the questions from both select committees focused on how the success of the government’s reform programme could be judged. For one MP, the Business Plans were ‘frankly... just how Government roll out their programme’ with ‘nothing distinctive’ to ‘give us a handle on whether or not the reforms have been successful’.43 How would the government judge success in lieu of targets? And ‘how [did] the milestones connect up with the impact or input or output indicators that you’ve got?’44

Letwin’s answer to PAC came in three parts. First, had the government ‘done the things we set out to do and translated them into legislative, administrative actions?’ Again, much of this hinged on what was in the department’s control. Letwin had told PASC that the ‘defect’ of the PSA ‘target regime’ was seeking ‘to establish a set of things in the external world that it was hoped Government would achieve’ and then pull levers to achieve them, only to find ‘the levers very often have nothing at the other end’.45 Business Plans, by contrast, ‘set out, in a very clear-minded, extremely acceptable way and very transparent way, the things that are under [departments’] control – the administrative changes, the legislative changes – and hold themselves to account for doing that’, setting out ‘very clearly the inputs and the outcomes that are achieved and then allows others to judge whether the mix is good, bad or indifferent’.46

Accordingly, when Letwin and Francis Maude ‘first sat down to think about all this’, they came to the conclusion that ‘it would be better to try to organise things so that the Government machine had as its immediate objectives the fulfilment of certain actions that are actually within the control of Government to fulfil’.47 This setting out, not only of a policy objective but ‘the steps administratively they are going to take in order to achieve that’, was a ‘novel’ approach, according to Danny Alexander.48

Second, ‘are the things that should flow from those changes, according to our view, happening on the ground?’ For example, ‘have the academies and free schools that we say will come about, come about?’49
Third was to look at the 'to look at the inputs and outcomes'.

You will be able to say, “Yes, you did what you said you were going to do in terms of legislation and administration. Yes, there were free schools and academies,” you might say, “But we don’t judge that you did enough good in terms of the outcomes.” We will enable you and the rest of the public to have that information very straightforwardly, so those judgments can be made.

The impact indicators thus meant that the Business Plans were not just ‘the checklist of actions, but also the measurement of the effects’. As Letwin put it in front of PASC:

It is not a success to have completed an administrative act; it is a necessity as part of a process, but the success at the end of the day, coming back to my previous remarks, is, five years from now, is there more social mobility than there was originally? And that comes back to the transparency issue. This is a very carefully thought through method of trying to help Government to achieve its goals, but in the end it will be judged by whether it achieves its goals, not by whether it has done things on a checklist.

In his evidence to PAC, Letwin distinguished between ‘the outcome in school x or school y’, which the government was not responsible for, and ‘the outcome of the school system as a whole’ where the government was ‘responsible for making sure that at the end of the period of these reforms, things are improving, more children are getting better results and more children are moving on to jobs and so on. Those sorts of things are the indicators that we described at the beginning.

‘In the end’, according to Letwin, ‘what we or each individual secretary of state hopes to be judged by is not whether they’ve taken certain administrative actions but whether they’ve achieved certain results for the country.

These ‘outcome measures’ were the ‘real test’. But they would not be targets – as the PSAs had shown, those ‘outcome targets’ lead to the ‘whole machine of the state’ being brought to bear if they were likely to be missed. This led to ‘short-termism and, ultimately, to poor longrun performance’. Instead, Business Plans were about ‘whether the long-run trends in all of these many areas are moving in the right direction’, ‘I would ask the Committee and, indeed, the public in general to recognise that that is the process we are going through and that this is a long-term approach. For ultimately, under the new system, it would be up to the public, and others including parliamentarians, to judge performance:

our judging it is not terribly interesting to anybody, because people do not take much notice of how I judge myself. You will be able to judge. The public will be able to judge. The public will be able to see what has been done, what the outcomes were, how much has been spent and then take a view. They will either re-elect us or not re-elect us. That is the pressure that we are under.

As a whole, the Business Plans would bridge the outputs and the outcomes, enabling select committees ‘and others to judge that and to haul us over the coals, if you think we are not doing that. And you could look at inputs and outcomes and say, “They do not seem to match”’. This was in spite of Letwin’s admission that...
...the secretaries of state and permanent secretaries who have a responsibility for one of these particular Business Plans will have set for themselves, in many cases, their ambition for what the outcomes that are measured look like. I suppose in a sense I’m saying what you were saying, but the difference is that we haven’t told them what those should be, and indeed, they don’t need to disclose to us what they will be.

Such an approach would require ‘robust self-evaluation’, but ultimately that would be ‘enforced… by transparency, so there’s nowhere to escape to’.

Impact indicators, then, were not the primary focus of Business Plans— the actions in the immediate control of the department were. Nonetheless, they were designed to allow the public to assess the effects of coalition policies and reforms— not against targets, but in general trends. In the next section, we attempt to analyse how departments have performed against them, and how useable and useful they are.
**Analysis**

**Movement in the indicators**

Figure 2.1: Number of impact indicators by department

Source: Institute for Government analysis of impact indicators via transparency.number10.gov.uk.

According to the Number 10 Transparency website, which provides the public with a portal to all departmental Business Plans, there are 207 impact indicators across government. The number varies across departments: the Department for Education (DfE) has the most with 28, which is eight more than the next highest department, the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS). DfE has more than four times as many as the Ministry of Defence (MoD), which has the fewest (six). We looked at what has happened to all 207 indicators since 2010.

**What we didn’t do**

Behind every one of those 207 impact indicators is its own extensive story – of the people, places and pounds sterling it reports, the quality of each measure and the caveats to each dataset. We have not been able to go into the detail of all of these.

As such, we do not engage in discussions about whether these are the right things departments should be measuring, or the accuracy or integrity of the datasets or measures, which we acknowledge may sometimes be controversial. Nor are we able to dive into intentions or results for each indicator in depth, which might give different results.
Nor are we able to give credit for the other data that departments may use and how well they publish and present it. This is an exercise in evaluating departments against the indicators explicitly set out by the government and the data through which they see the world, according to the cross-government performance management framework.

**What we did**

We took the most recent set of impact indicators published for each department on the Number 10 Transparency website. In some cases, departments may have published results for a slightly different set of indicators in annual reports or other publications. We do not count these.

We give two scores for each indicator:

- improvement since 2010
- improvement over the latest reported time period.

We tried to track down the underlying data for each impact indicator even where they could not be accessed from the Number 10 Transparency website, as of 27 March 2015. We encountered numerous problems:

- we could not find the underlying data for many indicators in annual reports or on the department’s website – and some were extremely difficult to find anywhere.
- in many cases, it wasn’t even clear what the underlying source data was – the data did not seem to exist outside a department’s annual report, and no further details were given.
- numbers for the same reporting year differed between different annual reports.
- data was not available in an open format even though it clearly existed.

In line with the Government’s stated intentions, very few specific targets for performance against impact indicators are given. As such, for all indicators, we simply look at whether scores have improved or declined from when the Coalition entered government in 2010 to date, and over the latest reported time period:

- **Green** indicates an improvement.
- **Amber** indicates no change, or where there is a mixed picture according to different aspects of an indicator.
- **Red** indicates a decline.
- **Dark grey** indicates a lack of comparable data. This includes:
  - for change since 2010 and change over period, where the desired direction of travel is not obvious
  - for change since 2010 and change over period, where we have only one data point
  - for change since 2010, where we have only two data points, both post 2010 (e.g. one 2012, one 2013) – where we have three or more data points, all since 2010 (e.g. 2012-14), we have counted change since the first data point.
In nearly all cases, we have made an assumption about which direction departments want the indicators to head in. Although (given the lack of targets), this is not always explicit, it is usually reasonably obvious.

These are crude measures. There may be indicators where a reasonably high score, ‘steady state’ or very small decreases are acceptable. For example, the Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG) says it ‘would not expect [accepted planning applications] to reach 100% as this would indicate all applications being accepted. A high and consistent approval rate would indicate good performance’. Conversely, in other areas, very small changes could bring larger real-world or political costs. However, in lieu of benchmarks, baselines or sensible counterfactuals in nearly all cases – and given the sheer volume of indicators – we believe this is the fairest and most consistent way of analysing the indicators.

We acknowledge that, in evidence to select committees, government ministers said that impact should properly be measured over a long-term period. However, they also make reference to the electorate being able to judge the government on their performance and these are the indicators against which departments report (or are supposed to).
What we found

Figure 2.2: Movement in impact indicators, 2010 to 2015


According to our analysis, more than half of all indicators across government have headed in the desired direction since 2010. All of DECC’s indicators – which include spare capacity of the UK’s gas and electricity networks, the number of households in fuel poverty in England, consumption of renewable energy across the UK and greenhouse gas emissions – have shown improvement. DCMS’s indicators showed improvement across the board (number of overseas visitors, number of people employed in the creative economy, charitable giving to DCMS-sponsored museums and galleries) with one exception – the proportion of children participating in competitive sport.
However, there were improvements across under 50% of the indicators for seven departments – MoJ, DfE, BIS, FCO, HO, the Treasury and MoD – saw improvements across fewer than 50% of their indicators. At MoD and MoJ, more than 40% of their indicators have headed in the wrong direction since 2010 – including a falling percentage of deployable personnel and falling service personnel satisfaction at MoD, and rising reoffending rates at MoJ. We could not find comparable data for a significant percentage of the indicators for some departments, including DfID (50%), DfE (50%), HO (40%), the Treasury (40%), and CO (nearly 40%).

Three departments had one indicator where we could not determine what the desired direction of travel was: the percentage of troops that had been deployed at MoD; nitrogen soil balance at the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra); and ‘departmental DEL [departmental expenditure limit] outturn v final plans’ at the Treasury which gives no indication of what is actually being measured or why.

Figure 2.3: Movement in impact indicators, latest reporting period

If we just look at movements over the latest reported period, we see the indicators for the same two departments at the top—DECC and DCMS—and a number of the same departments (MoD, the Treasury, HO and FCO) towards the bottom. The Department for Transport (DfT) indicators move up to third, as the number of urban trips under five miles taken by public transport increases and the reliability of motorway and A-road journeys improves. DWP indicators fall back as a number of indicators (such as disability and pensioner poverty) stabilise.

These charts will inevitably be used as a final scorecard for government departments from 2010 to 2015. However:

- **this is not the whole picture**—impact indicators show only the effects of coalition policies and reforms, rather than all the business of a department
- **there are other ways of judging performance**—many departments have their own performance indicators, and there may be other metrics (such as pledges in the *Programme for Government*)
- **there is a time lag on some of the data**—we do not have results for 2015 for many indicators
- **the effects of reforms may not be felt for some time**—as Oliver Letwin told PAC, ‘many of the things we are doing are likely to yield dividends in later years, rather than earlier ones— in some cases, alas, beyond the time of the parliament’
- **the Government has explicitly rejected a target-driven approach to performance measurement.**

In a number of cases, we could not find the data supposedly behind the indicators at all. In other cases, the data underpinning our analysis was more difficult to find than it should have been. We discuss some of these problems below.
Transparency and usability of the indicators

What we did

This exercise assesses how easy it would be for a member of the public looking to judge a department’s performance through the central Number 10 Transparency website.

We assessed each impact indicator against four measures, drawn from the Institute for Government’s *Performance Art* but also highly relevant in light of comments by government ministers:

- **Can we find the current score via the Number 10 Transparency website?**
  There’s a transparency machine in here, not totally developed – in the spring you will be able to see it in its full glory on the website – but basically what we’re doing is to make sure, and you can see the rough outline of this already on the website, that each Department establishes for itself the measures by which it thinks it’s fair to judge itself, both for internal and external purposes.
  
  *Oliver Letwin*

- **Is the data available in an open format?**
  We think we have a responsibility… to produce impact data and outcome data that is readily usable, readily comparable… people will do much better things with this data than we can do ourselves.
  
  *Oliver Letwin*

- **Is it presented in an easily-understandable form?**
  Each of these Business Plans... sets out the information we will publish so that people can hold us to account – plain-English details about the progress of the reforms and the results they are achieving.

  *David Cameron*

- **Can the score be found in the department’s annual report?**
  These business plans are a tool both for us... and also for you and for other select committees, and for Parliament and for the public, to be kept abreast of how we are getting on with delivering those things.

  *Danny Alexander*

For each indicator, we gave a mark of either 0 or 1 for each category. Once we had scored each indicator, we took an overall percentage score for each department in each category.

Where the indicators could not be accessed from the Number 10 Transparency site – or where the most recent update was more than a year old – we awarded a 0 across the Current Score, Open Data and Presentation categories. For Open Data, we awarded a point if it was available in anything other than PDF or HTML. For Presentation, we gave a mark if there was any explanation or visualisation of the data beyond a simple table.

Departments were ranked in each category. For the overall rank, we used the overall average score, rather than average category rankings.
What we found

Figure 2.4: Transparency and usability of impact indicators by department

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<th>Presentation</th>
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Source: Institute for Government analysis of impact indicators and annual reports.

Only five departments – DCLG, DfT, DWP, DCMS and MoD – allow members of the public using the central Number 10 Transparency website to access all of their indicator scores, in an open format and in a way that is clearly explained, as well as in the department’s annual report.

DCLG has a beta dashboard with graphs and full explanations. DfT has a page for each indicator with the data and an explanation. DWP has a single page with data, explanations and links. And DCMS has a spreadsheet with graphs. Most of these departments are rare in signposting what the indicator scores actually mean – for example, whether an increase in a particular metric is what the Government was aiming for. Many departments do not.

However, even this is flattering. DCMS provides graphs, but little information about what the scores represent. For DCLG, it is difficult to access the original source in many cases (for example, a few indicators give ‘live dates’ but older data is not obviously available). And we were unable to replicate the calculation that came up with the growth of business rate yield in Enterprise Zones.

But this is still better than most departments:

- The link to the Treasury’s impact indicators brings up a ‘page not found link’
- The link for Defra goes to a data.gov.uk page for Quarterly Data Summaries (which provided quarterly updates of Business Plan data) where the latest date covered is September 2012
• MoJ is a good example of best practice in publishing much of its underlying data, with consistent formats and long time series from well-ordered ‘collection’ pages on GOV.UK (e.g. for reoffending rates). Unfortunately, the link from the Number 10 Transparency website doesn’t link to any of these, but rather a set of PDFs with the results for the latest period and the previous one.

When we ran a version of this analysis for Whitehall Monitor 2014, a number of departments did update dead or out-of-date links (and a few more appear to have done so since). While this is welcome, it implies few people have been using the indicators.

Two departments do not report the results of the impact indicators in their annual reports at all, while others are patchy. Annual reports are presented to both houses of Parliament and often used by departmental select committees; given Danny Alexander’s hope that Business Plans would be a ‘tool’ not only for the Public Accounts Committee but ‘for other select committees, and for Parliament’, this is an obvious concern.⁶⁸
Link between actions and impact

What we did

Each Structural Reform Plan is arranged by a series of overarching themes drawn from the coalition agreement, with actions, and then sub-actions, below them.

This analysis takes each indicator and assesses whether there are actions listed in the Structural Reform Plan which link to, or seek to affect, it, since the indicators are 'designed to help the public to judge whether our policies and reforms are having the effect they want'.

We have not reversed the exercise and tried to link every action with an indicator, because—as was made clear in select committee evidence—the indicators are only 'the best available data that Departments have suggested maps most accurately to the reforms', and only a 'subset'.

For each indicator, we applied a RAG rating for the link between the actions outlined in the Structural Reform Plan (SRP) affecting it:

- **Green** indicates that there are several SRP actions with a direct link to this indicator, i.e. they will have a direct impact on this indicator.
- **Amber-green** indicates that there is one SRP action with a direct link to this indicator.
- **Amber** means several SRP actions have indirect links to this indicator, i.e. actions will affect the indicator, but not deliberately or specifically.
- **Amber-red** indicates there is one SRP action with an indirect or tenuous link to this indicator.
- **Red** means there are no actions corresponding to this indicator.

For example, looking at three impact indicators at HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC):

- **Green**: 'Cash collected from compliance—total amount of tax that HMRC collects from activity to tackle those individuals and businesses that have not paid the tax that is due.' The business plan includes four actions and several sub-actions which would directly impact this indicator, including:
  - 2.1) Invest c.£1bn to bring in £9bn in additional tax revenues per annum by 2014-15, by:
    - (a) tackling avoidance and evasion through targeted campaigns and interventions
    - (b) taking specific action to tackle off-shore avoidance and evasion
    - (c) preventing tax avoidance before it happens
    - (d) tackling organised criminals and fraud
    - (e) improving our debt collection capability.

- **Amber**: 'Payment on time—proportion of businesses and individuals (excluding employees who pay tax through [‘pay as you earn’] PAYE) who pay tax on time.' There is one action and a number of sub-actions in the plan that would have an
impact on this indicator – which involve moving to online notification and payment channels – but none that would explicitly, directly impact this problem.

- Red: ‘Percentage of post received by HMRC that has been cleared within 15 working days of receipt.’ There are no actions in the Structural Reform Plan that relate to improving the processes by which the department deals with correspondence, or to more general improvements in customer service for customers not online.

We acknowledge that some actions may have fallen off the Business Plans as they were completed. Therefore, although we have used the current actions as the basis for our analysis, we have also turned to older versions of the Business Plans to see if there were any actions relevant to the indicators.

**What we found**

**Figure 2.5: Strength of links between Business Plan actions and impact indicators**

Source: Institute for Government analysis of impact indicators and Structural Reform Plan actions.
Our analysis found that for just over 40% of the indicators, there was a series of actions which would have a direct impact on the indicator (green). However, for a similar number of indicators, there were either only several actions with indirect links (amber); a single action with a tenuous link to the indicator (amber-red); or no relevant actions at all (red).

More than 70% of DfE’s indicators fall into these categories. More than half of Defra’s are rated amber-red or red, including the farmland bird index which tracks population trends of certain species (red) and the condition of Sites of Special Scientific Interest (amber-red).

This – and indeed, the fact that any analysis was necessary – rather underlines the previous concerns of the Public Accounts Committee that while ‘the Business Plans align reform activities with priorities’ they ‘do not maintain that structure when setting out input and impact indicators’. PAC noted that ‘not all impact indicators align with the priorities’, which is also what we found here.’
Our assessment

In assessing the success – or otherwise – of the impact indicators, we consider subjects under three headings:

- **Data** – availability, quality and usability of published data, caveats and sourcing
- **Information** – explanations and presentation of data to make it meaningful and useful
- **Evidence** – whether the data has been used as evidence, for example in performance management.

**Data**

Open data is rightly seen as a success story for the UK government (indeed, spanning both the previous Labour Government and the current Coalition Government)\(^2\). The UK tops both the Open Knowledge Global Open Data Index and the World Wide Web Foundation’s Open Data Barometer.

However, we have encountered a number of problems with the impact indicator data.

The first was availability. In select committee evidence, it was clear that the Government hoped others would be able to access and ‘mash’ the data for themselves. However, in many cases, it was not obviously possible to access the underlying data in an open format, either from the Number 10 Transparency website or – even after extensive searching – from departments’ own websites. Even in cases where the data was ‘open’, it was literally a case of a few numbers that happened to be in a spreadsheet.

The second was quality. In its report on Business Plans, the Public Accounts noted:

> Parliament and the public need to understand the quality and limitations of data the Government makes available if they are to use it effectively to challenge and improve public services. Current Government policy is to make data available, regardless of its quality and there are no clear requirements for Departments in the Business plans to define key terms, assess and manage risks to data quality, disclose measurement approaches and limitations, or secure assurance that data standards have been met.\(^3\)

The Institute would rather data be published ‘regardless of its quality’ than not at all – the more people use published data, the more its quality is likely to improve.

However, PAC’s broader concerns are valid. In many cases, the data only exists within a department’s annual report. It is not clear that they have any sort of independent existence, where they are sourced from, how they are collected or how they are scrutinised. In some cases, the results for the same reporting period differ between different annual reports (e.g. DfID) without any explanation for the changes.

The National Audit Office (NAO) has previously raised concerns about the quality of data in departmental assessments.\(^4\) One concern was timeliness. For example, in its report on DCMS in 2012-13, the NAO recommended that DCMS use a more up-to-date measure to assess the strength of the tourism industry.\(^5\) In its annual report, DCMS acknowledged the
lag and has introduced the number of overseas visitors 'as a more timely performance indicator for tourism'. However, timeliness remains a problem elsewhere. For example, FCO's indicator for a stable Afghanistan has not been updated since 2010-11 owing to a change in World Bank methodology.

Information

Does the data published actually tell us anything? On the plus side, Business Plans give us detailed information on what departments are actually doing. As Danny Alexander told PAC, the 'Government set out not only whattheir policy objective is but the steps administratively they are going to take in order to achieve that'. Additionally, some departments – notably DCLG, DWP and DfT – are very good at explaining what their impact indicators mean, and the consequences of them going up or down.

However, these examples of best practice throw the problems with others into sharper relief. First, many departments are poor at providing any information to the public as to what their indicators show and why they matter. For example, we found that nine departments gave no explanation or even visualisation of any of their indicators, simply publishing numbers. The NAO has previously told BIS that they could give more explicit information on what each indicator was 'designed to express about the department’s performance'; what the current score shows (including whether it represents good performance, especially compared to other years); and 'how the department’s policies and activities have directly contributed to the performance expressed by the indicator', in addition to methodology.

Second, many indicators are not directly affected by the actions contained in the Structural Reform Plan whose impact they are supposed to measure. Our analysis found that 44% of indicators had either only a single action with a tenuous link to them or no relevant actions at all. Even where indicators do link back to actions, it has taken a great deal of analysis to show the linkages: as PAC noted in 2011, while 'Business Plans align reform activities with priorities' they 'do not maintain that structure when setting out input and impact indicators' with the result that 'not all impact indicators align with the priorities'.

This lack of alignment between inputs, outputs and outcomes can also create confusion. In the Institute’s See-Through Whitehall we considered aspects of the Business Plans to refer to more than just the coalition reforms. The ambiguous wording in the Business Plans themselves—that indicators show the effects of 'policies and reforms' (our italics) — and our conclusion that there are indicators without associated actions do not dispel this issue. As a result, we noted it was odd for one department to have no impact indicator for around 40% of its spend. PAC worried that 'lack of alignment means that reported progress will cover only a proportion of priorities and of expenditure, which will hinder comprehensive assessment of value for money'. The Institute has recommended that, in order to be understandable for the public, the Business Plans should have a clear scope and narrative with sections of the Plans clearly linked and fitting into a wider accountability framework.

Third, a focus on output actions rather than outcomes with targets brings its own problems. As PAC's report noted, most milestones in the Business Plans 'relate to the delivery of strategies, consultations or legislation' which are not 'of themselves evidence of action
implementing change’ or making ‘substantive progress’. Without baseline or benchmark measures, or sensible counterfactuals, it is difficult to understand performance. This absence is particularly odd given that political and Civil Service leaders are likely to have their own sense of what they want to achieve, and that even the Coalition has set outcome targets.

A good example of this was David Cameron’s pledge to reduce net migration to under 100,000 a year (net migration is one of the Home Office’s indicators, though there is no link with the target via the Business Plan). Outcome targets are also likely to be more politically and publicly salient. As the Institute has previously noted:

The problem is that, unlike the targets of the previous Public Sector Agreements, most of the public don’t care about actions on work done within Whitehall – they care about the end results. Yet we still cannot navigate easily from the work done by Whitehall through to the end results in the way Oliver Letwin described when explaining the plans to the Public Administration Select Committee.

Evidence

The final question is whether the impact indicators are actually being used. Here, we follow the Institute’s See-Through Whitehall which analysed Business Plans from the perspective of three different audiences: the public, the departments themselves, and the centre.

By the public

The Public Accounts Committee reported the following in 2011:

Ministers explained the role that local people will play in holding Government to account – in terms of making choices over the services they receive and challenging poor performance. Clearly if this is to work, the information needs to be relevant, accessible and easily understood – more work is required to achieve this.

As we have noted, the availability and quality of data poses a barrier to public use of the data in many cases – as does the quality of information around them and the links between the indicators and the actions completed by departments. It is possible that the ‘accountability to the people’ outlined by David Cameron is happening, with parents (for example) choosing schools based on their performance. But if it is, it will be using data not linked to from the impact indicators: granular data on individual school GCSE performances is provided by DfE, but you cannot, as Oliver Letwin hoped, ‘look down from’ the overall indicator to local authority or school level. In any case, there is limited evidence that the ‘army of armchair auditors’ has enlisted.

By departments

The Institute has previously recommended that the information within the Business Plans as a whole ‘should be fully integrated with the department’s own planning and reporting processes’ and involve each department’s board. Again, the quality of the data, the regularity of publication and (for some departments) the omission of the data from their annual reports suggests this has not happened – or if it has, that this is not being reflected publicly.
In *Whitehall Monitor 2013* (August 2013), we found that nearly half of the 17 government departments with Business Plans were using other performance measurement frameworks in addition to, or instead of, the Business Plans. Two were not using them at all.

**Figure 2.6: The frameworks departments use to measure outcomes (2013)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Department</th>
<th>Framework</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CO</td>
<td>DfID Results Framework</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCLG</td>
<td>NHS + Public Health + Adult Social Care Outcomes Frameworks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCMS</td>
<td>Business Plan + Internal Operations Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defra</td>
<td>Business Plan + Operational Business Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DfT</td>
<td>Business Plan + Delivery Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HMT</td>
<td>Business Plan + Delivery Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HMRC</td>
<td>Business Plan + FCO’s Priorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HO</td>
<td>Business Plan + Quarterly Performance and Risk Report + Decision and Support Template</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoJ</td>
<td>Other framework</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from Institute for Government, *Whitehall Monitor 2013*.

Some of these alternatives may be successful. DH has the advantage of an executive non-departmental public body dedicated to collating and publishing data relevant to its area of work. The Health and Social Care Information Centre (HSCIC) – formerly NHS Information Centre – publishes longitudinal data on indicators used by a range of different organisations on its indicator portal, in a consistent, clear and open format. Indeed, DH’s indicators are drawn from the frameworks published on the portal. There is also a growing movement in the United States around the ‘Stat’ model of performance management (see Box 1, page 40).

Oliver Letwin told PASC that the process was designed to create ‘a Business Plan that is in the ownership of, has been produced by, the particular Department’ rather than ‘an exercise of the centre... imposing a Business Plan on Departments’. Yet despite the business plans being crafted in consultation with departments, the evidence that they have been used by departments to keep on track is limited.

**By the centre**

As well as providing departmental accountability to the public, it was also hoped that Business Plans would be a means of ‘trying to hold them to account at the centre’ – which consisted of the Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Minister, Treasury and the Cabinet Office.⁹¹ We noted in 2011:

> The plans have lost their link to the political side of the centre of government. It appears that neither the Prime Minister nor any of the ‘quad’ are seriously using them to track the
progress of the reforms going on across government. They also aren’t designed to be used by the Head of the Civil Service Bob Kerslake or Cabinet Secretary Jeremy Heywood to hold the Whitehall’s Permanent Secretaries to account.92

It isn’t obvious what incentives and sanctions the centre would use, beyond conversations with the department in question and the hope that departments would be held to account by their boards.93 The lack of a ‘refresh’ of the plans since June 2013, and the approach of the Treasury to the whole exercise (it comes bottom out of all departments in making their impact indicators available online) does nothing to provide evidence to the contrary.

When compiling Whitehall Monitor 2014, we were also told by one department that they no longer updated the indicators on the Number 10 Transparency website. This was because they had been told by the Cabinet Office that there was no need to once the indicators had been removed from the Quarterly Data Summaries (quarterly releases of Business Plan data). Again, this does not suggest the centre uses the data for any sort of performance management. In a piece for Civil Service Quarterly, then-deputy director of the Implementation Unit referred to its ‘oversight’ role with Business Plans, with no reference to impact indicators and instead a focus on ‘deep-dives’. And the NAO has recently recommended that the centre ‘lead a more rigorous approach to business planning’ and ‘incentivise the right behaviour, including promoting collaboration, integration and innovation’.94

The point about collaboration is an important one. The centre is vital in ensuring cross-departmental co-operation. However, unlike PSAs at various stages, there is little cross-departmentalism in the Business Plans. The answer given to the Public Accounts Committee was that groups from different departments had been gathered together, actions supporting other departments’ actions had been included in various Business Plans, and there was a need for better working and overarching strategies. But there appears to be little driving collaboration through the Business Plans.95 Indeed, one indicator (‘progress toward a stable and secure Afghanistan’) appears in the Business Plans for both FCO and MoD, but the two departments measure it differently and therefore have different results.

Given Danny Alexander’s evidence to PAC, we could add a fourth audience for the impact indicators: parliament and its select committees.96 Without further research, we cannot confidently assess how extensively select committees have used the indicators. However, as more than half of departments do not include all their indicators in their annual reports, it has not been made easy for select committees to use them.
The Stat model: data-driven leadership

The ‘Stat’ movement is the story of how 12 words written on a napkin in New York changed the way people across the United States are governed.

Jack Maple was a transit officer in the New York City Police Department (NYPD). He had previously used maps to work out where crime was happening and concentrated police resources on them – ‘cops on dots’. One night in 1994, he scribbled down four tenets of what would become the NYPD’s ‘CompStat’ strategy:

1. accurate and timely intelligence
2. rapid deployment
3. effective tactics
4. relentless follow-up and assessment.

Commissioner Bill Bratton and Maple applied this to NYPD in the mid-90s, summoning district commanders to regular ‘CompStat’ meetings where they would examine their performance using data. Bratton had taken a deliberate decision to ‘own’ and take responsibility for the problem of crime in New York. Although causes of crime are complex, the new methods coincided with a huge drop in crime – particularly the homicide rate – in New York. Other police forces took notice.

In 1999, Martin O’Malley was elected as the Democratic mayor of Baltimore, Maryland on a pledge to reduce crime. A form of Compstat was promptly adopted by Baltimore City Police. But following a conversation with Maple, O’Malley went further and applied the Stat model to every city agency. Directors would be summoned to fortnightly CitiStat meetings at City Hall and grilled on their performance on service delivery. Baltimore later introduced a ‘311’ system – a single number for citizens to call to report problems – and customer satisfaction surveys, which dug behind the data. As Governor of Maryland from 2007, O’Malley used StateStat with a number of state agencies. But realising that the levers weren’t as close, or connected, as they had been at city level, he looked to the Prime Minister’s Delivery Unit in the UK as a way of driving 16 cross-cutting priorities. (Interestingly, both NYPD’s CompStat and Baltimore CitiStat appear in the UK Government’s 2004 report on refining its performance management, *Devolving Decision-Making*.)*97*

An interstate Stat was also introduced to improve the environmental conditions in Chesapeake Bay – ChesapeakeStat, encompassing Maryland, five other states, the District of Columbia and the federal government. And this is just how ‘Stat’ has developed in Maryland. Parts of the federal government (such as the Department of Housing and Urban Development and Federal Emergency Management Agency) have also deployed the technique. Other cities and counties have adopted and adapted their own versions, and there is a burgeoning ‘Moneyball for Government’ movement focusing on the use of data.

Our own visit to Maryland and the work of others – notably Robert Behn in his *The PerformanceStat Potential* – suggests that the Stat model is one of data-driven leadership, using the data and the routines around it to solve other organisational problems (such as cross-departmental working). The data should not be collected and presented merely as a ‘dog and pony show’ or ‘measurement for measurement’s sake’, but used for a purpose.

The use of the Stat model does not solve problems in and of itself. As Maple himself said, CompStat ‘is just a tool. In the hands of the mediocre, it’s useless. In the hands of a great leader, it can be Excalibur’.98 It requires political will, in spite of the risks of being judged publicly against performance. But, as O’Malley has said, ‘Effective leaders make themselves vulnerable – own the goals of the government you run and the people you lead, or no one else will’.99
Conclusion

The Coalition introduced Business Plans as a new form of accountability to the public in the internet age. Although the focus of these was on the actions – the steps taken to legislate and implement – that were in the immediate control of departments, impact indicators would allow the public to judge the effects of policies and reforms. Departments, too, would use them to measure their own effectiveness, and the centre of government would use them to hold departments to account. They would do away with the bureaucracy and the perverse consequences associated with the targets used by New Labour.

In reality, the quality and availability of the data does not allow the public to use the indicators as suggested. There is limited evidence that either the public or departments have used them to measure performance. The lack of benchmarks, baselines and sensible counterfactuals would make it difficult to understand performance. With some 207 impact indicators across government (and some 1,223 actions), it is not clear that the framework is any simpler. Although a focus on implementable (and implemented) actions is welcome, it is not always clear how these link into impact indicators, how they link with improvement or progress, or how they link to the public or to politics. If there are doubts about their utility in performance measurement, there must also – given the lack of evidence of use by departments and the centre of government – be doubts about their use in performance management to drive further improvement.

The formation of a new government after May 2015 – by whatever party or parties – is likely to prompt some discussion about the future of performance management. Drawing on our analysis here, and on previous Institute work (including Performance Art, See Through Whitehall and Reshaping Government), we offer the following tentative conclusions:

- **Performance management needs to be re-invigorated.** Our analysis suggests that Business Plans have not been fully utilised by any of their intended audiences. The scope and intention of any new regime should be clear. While setting out actions has its place, an incoming government must set clear priorities on what outcomes it wants to see. But any new government should be sensible around the transition of power: there is no point dismantling a system just because it was inherited from a predecessor, only to have to reconstruct it in time.

- **Performance management can be used to drive cross-departmental collaboration.** As PSAs and Martin O’Malley have shown, the performance management regime can be used to get the right people in the room together and provide the data to make important decisions. Any further reductions in the size of Whitehall departments should drive new, cross-departmental ways of working.

- **The link to politics, and the public, is vital.** Delivery of political promises – and being seen to deliver political promises – could bring electoral benefits, and expresses politics in a language that matters to people. As Oliver Letwin told Charlie Elphicke, it is the fact that ‘grandma can get her hip replaced, the children are getting a decent school, police are preventing crime on the streets’ that matters to people.
• **We need better quality data – and it should be public.** If performance management is to be successful, it needs good, real-time data. If it is worth doing, it is worth doing well. The data should be driven by the needs of the performance management system, not the other way round. While the needs of different users may vary,\textsuperscript{107} there are clear benefits – both practical and in terms of perception – to transparency.

• **It should be a performance management, not merely a performance measurement, regime – and there is more to it than ‘just’ the data.** Providing good-quality information is good, but data is much more powerful if used to drive improvement. That includes being able to properly assess what the data means – with proper comparison against benchmarks, baselines and counterfactuals. And the data can only ever take us so far: as Einstein once said, ’Not everything that is countable counts, not everything that counts is countable.’\textsuperscript{102}
Performance by department

There now follows a series of pages dedicated to the impact indicators of each department. The data behind all of the charts and analysis, and links to the sources for each, can be found on the Whitehall Monitor website: [http://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/publication/how-government-measures-its-impact](http://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/publication/how-government-measures-its-impact)

Each page begins with a summary, providing a table listing each of the department’s impact indicators. It contains three measures for each indicator, which form the analysis found earlier in this report. These are:

- **Change since 2010** – whether the indicator has moved in the desired direction compared to 2010 (e.g. more people off benefits, fewer late trains):
  - green for improvement
  - amber for no change or a mixed result
  - red for decline
  - dark grey for a lack of comparable data

- **Change in latest period** – whether the indicator has moved in the desired direction compared to the previous reporting period:
  - green for improvement
  - amber for no change or a mixed result
  - red for decline
  - dark grey for a lack of comparable data

- **Connection to SRP actions** – to what extent the actions in the Structural Reform Plan section of the Business Plan affect the indicator in question:
  - green for several SRP actions with a direct link to this indicator, i.e. will have a direct impact on this indicator
  - amber-green for one SRP action with a direct link to this indicator
  - amber for several SRP actions with indirect links to this indicator – i.e. actions will affect the indicator, but not deliberately or specifically
  - amber-red for one SRP action with an indirect or tenuous link to this indicator
  - red if there are no actions corresponding to this indicator.

The table is followed by three 100% stacked bars showing the overall scores across all the department’s indicators, and some further analysis of each department’s indicators.

For full methodological details, see page 27 for how we measured changes and page 36 for our work on connecting actions with impact indicators.

This summary section is followed by a graph for every indicator. We have tried to find the underlying data series for each indicator and to extend time series back, where possible, to give context to the most recent figures. Where we could not identify the underlying data, we used the figures as reported in the department’s annual reports. (In some cases, numbers differed for the same reporting period between reports. These are indicated by different colours.)

We have tried to balance accuracy and integrity with simplicity and clarity of information throughout. In some cases, we have truncated the y-axis to more clearly present the data. We have tried to keep this to 0%-50% or 50%-100%, but there are occasions where we have truncated it further to more clearly display the story.
For each department, we have a more extensive measurement annex indicating exactly where the data has come from and what we have done with it. Key details will be with the charts in the ‘Detail’ section, but the relevant annex provides a more comprehensive guide to sourcing.
### Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Change - 2010</th>
<th>Change - latest</th>
<th>SRP link</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The UK share of highly cited papers</td>
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<tr>
<td>Proportion of firms who are innovation active</td>
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<tr>
<td>Free-school meal recipients in higher education</td>
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<td>State school students at most selective HE institutions</td>
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<td>Rates of ‘graduate jobs’</td>
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<td>Qualification levels of the UK working age population</td>
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<td>Youth training and education</td>
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<td>Total achievements in full Level 2 or 3 Further Education</td>
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<td>Access to the Professions</td>
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<td>Regional Growth Fund contracts signed</td>
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<tr>
<td>Private Sector Employment</td>
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<td>Early-stage Entrepreneurial activity rate</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ease of doing business in the UK</td>
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<tr>
<td>Access to the Post Office network</td>
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<tr>
<td>Number of Businesses helped through internationalisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Number of FDI projects attracted to the UK</td>
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<tr>
<td>Openness to Trade</td>
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<tr>
<td>Net domestic regulatory burden</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Net domestic employment regulatory burden</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Benefits of the competition regime to consumers</td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Fewer than half of the department’s indicators have progressed since 2010: out of 20, just 9 have moved in the desired direction since 2010. For four of the indicators we were unable to chart their progress since the beginning of the parliament as the department has not published comparable data. Five indicators have moved in the wrong direction since 2010, and seven have fallen over the most recent reporting period.

We have graded two indicators as amber. ‘Youth education and training’ measures the proportion of young people in full-time education or training with a gap measure for those in
full-time education by background. While the gap between social groups has fallen, the overall proportion of 18-24 year olds in education or training has not improved since 2010. The gap between graduates of different backgrounds going on to secure a graduate job is the same now as in 2010, scoring the department an amber rating.

Interestingly, BIS shares two indicators with FCO (on internationalisation and Foreign Direct Investment), although BIS produces a longer times series of this data and has updated it more recently.

Just under half of the department’s impact indicators are directly related to an action in its Structural Reform Plan. However, the remaining indicators are only indirectly referred to in the Reform Plans, and four are not reflected at all.

1. The UK share of highly cited papers

![Graph showing the UK share of highly cited papers from 2006 to 2012.](Source: BIS impact indicator update, April 2014. Pre-2010 data is from annual report 2011-12)

2. Proportion of firms who are 'innovation active'

![Graph showing the proportion of firms who are innovation active from 2006-2013.](Source: BIS impact indicator update, October 2014. Pre-2010 data is from annual report 2011-12)
3. The gap between non-free school meal and free school meal 15 year olds going on to higher education

Source: BIS impact indicator update, October 2014.

4. The gap between young graduates from professional backgrounds who go on to a ‘graduate job’ six months after graduating and young graduates from non-professional backgrounds

Source: BIS Impact Indicator update, October 2014.
5. International comparison of the qualification levels of the working age population in the UK (rank out of OECD countries, c. 30)

Source: BIS impact indicator update, October 2014. Pre-2011 data is from annual reports 2012-13 and 2011-12

6. Proportion of 18-24 year olds who are participating in full- or part-time education or training activity, with a gap measure for participation in full-time education by social background using father’s occupational group

Source: BIS Impact Indicator update, May 2014
7. Total achievements in full Level 2 or 3 Further Education of people academic age 19 years and over

8. Access to the professions (% of 16-65 year olds in paid employment who are in managerial or professional positions)

9. Number of Regional Growth Fund contracts signed

10. Private Sector Employment share of total population

11. Early-stage entrepreneurial activity rate

Source: National Statistics, Further education and Skills: Statistical first release, Table 1.2: Adult (19+) FE and Skills Achievement by Level (2009/10 to 2013/14) – Learner Volumes

Source: BIS Impact Indicator update, June 2014

Source: BIS annual report 201213

Source: ONS Private Sector Employment indicator, Q3 2014

Source: Global Entrepreneurship Monitor 2013
12. Ease of doing business in the UK (ranking out of 189)


13. Meeting the commitment to maintaining fair access to the Post Office network – proximity of population

Source: BIS Impact Indicator update, October 2014
14. Number of UK businesses helped through internationalisation

15. Number of Foreign Direct Investment projects attracted to the UK with UK Trade & Investment (UKTI) involvement

16. Openness to trade: Exports plus imports as a share of GDP, ranked against major competitors

17. Change in the net domestic regulatory burden imposed on business by government

18. Change in net domestic employment regulatory burden imposed on business by government

Source: Annual reports 2011-12 and 2012-13

Source: Annual report 2011-12 and impact indicator update October 2014
19. The value of the consumer benefits of the competition regime

Source: BIS impact indicator update, December 2013
The Cabinet Office (CO)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Change - 2010</th>
<th>Change - latest</th>
<th>SRP link</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ERG savings figures</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The number of data sets published on data.gov.uk</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>External applications using data.gov.uk</td>
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<tr>
<td>Unique visitors to data.gov.uk: yearly increase</td>
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<tr>
<td>Overall level of volunteering</td>
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<tr>
<td>Participants in the National Citizen Service</td>
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<td>Number of senior community organisers trained</td>
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<tr>
<td>Growth of social investment market</td>
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In some respects, the charts above tell a positive story about the Cabinet Office’s impact indicators. For all of those where data could be found, the numbers have gone in the right direction since 2010.

However, for all but one of the indicators, there are no more than three data points. This is because they mostly refer to specific programmes of work – data.gov.uk, the National Citizen Service, Community Organisers – which were conceived and put into action after 2010. In this sense, they are more ‘output’ indicators: showing the rate of departmental activity rather than the effect that activity has had on the world.

There are only two data points showing the level of formal volunteering, beginning in 2012/13, so no change since 2010 could be established. Similarly, there are only two reporting points between showing the number of senior community organisers trained, both within 2013. One of the indicators – the growth of the social investment market in comparison to economic growth – has never been reported on.

The Cabinet Office has not released a new version of its impact indicators report since September 2013, although it has continued to update them in its annual report.
1. Efficiency and Reform Group savings (cumulative)

![Chart 1: Efficiency and Reform Group savings (cumulative)]

Source: CO input and impact indicators report September 2013, CO annual report 2013/14 and NAO

2. Number of datasets published on data.gov.uk

![Chart 2: Number of datasets published on data.gov.uk]

Source: CO input and impact indicators report September 2013, CO annual report 2013/14 and data.gov.uk (checked 13th March 2015)

3. External applications using data.gov.uk

![Chart 3: External applications using data.gov.uk]

Source: CO input and impact indicators report September 2013, CO annual report 2013/14 and data.gov.uk (checked 13th March 2015)

4. Unique visitors to data.gov.uk: yearly increase

![Chart 4: Unique visitors to data.gov.uk: yearly increase]

Source: CO input and impact indicators report September 2013
5. Overall level of volunteering (proportion of adults who volunteered in the last year)

Source: Community Life Survey Bulletin, 2013-14

6. Number of participants in the National Citizen Service

Source: CO input and impact indicators report September 2013 and NCS annual report 2013

7. Number of senior community organisers trained

Source: CO input and impact indicators report September 2013, CO annual report 2013-14
### Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG)

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<td>2. Planning authorities with Local Plan</td>
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<td>4.i. Affordable homes: starts</td>
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<tr>
<td>5.i. Total number of housing starts</td>
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<td>5.ii. Total number of housing completions</td>
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<td>6. Households in temporary accommodation</td>
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<td>8. Fire-related casualties</td>
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<td>9. Areas with Neighbourhood Plans</td>
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DCLG’s impact indicators have performed positively overall across this parliament, with eight of them heading in the right direction since 2010. The performance measurement of troubled families has been subject to recent controversy. The measure given in the department’s impact indicator is not straightforward: it gives the number of troubled families who have been identified by local authorities as ‘troubled’, as a percentage of the number of families the Prime Minister pledged to see ‘turned around’ by 2015.

The department has a performance ‘dashboard’ online (currently in beta) which gives the most recent figures on each of its indicators, some detail about each one, and a graph showing a time series. This move towards transparency is somewhat undermined by the difficulty we have had in reproducing some of these figures from the source data (for example, calculating business rate yield or finding time series beyond ‘live tables’).
1. **Business rates yield within Enterprise Zones**

![Graph showing business rates yield over time](image1)

Source: DCLG indicators dashboard, accessed 26 March 2015

2. **Percentage of local planning authorities with a local plan**

![Graph showing percentage over time](image2)

Source: DCLG indicators dashboard, accessed 26 March 2015

3. **The number of planning permissions granted as a percentage of all applications for major and minor schemes**

![Graph showing percentage over time](image3)

Source: DCLG indicators dashboard, accessed 26 March 2015

4. **Number of affordable housing starts and completions delivered through the programmes of the Homes and Communities Agency and the Greater London Authority**

![Graph showing housing starts and completions over time](image4)

Source: Housing and Communities Agency (HCA) housing statistics (November 2014) and Greater London Authority affordable housing statistics (January 2015)
5. Total number of housing starts and completions (seasonally adjusted)

6. Households in temporary accommodation (seasonally adjusted)

7. Percentage of Troubled Families local authorities have identified and are committed to working with

8. Fire-related casualties – per 100,000 population

9. Number of areas designated by the relevant local authority for Neighbourhood Plans

Source: DCLG house building 'live tables' (T775), February 2015

Source: DCLG homelessness 'live tables' (T775), December 2014

Source: DCLG Indicators dashboard, accessed 26 March 2015

Source: DCLG indicators dashboard, accessed 27 March 2015

Source: DCLG Indicators dashboard, accessed 26 March 2015
All but one of DCMS’s indicators have gone in the right direction since 2010 (the proportion of children participating in competitive sport), and more than half of them are reasonably clearly related to the actions set out in its structural reform plan. The department’s performance data is published in a clear and collated form on gov.uk.

We have given DCMS a green rating for change over the latest period on the European Broadband scorecard, which demonstrates the UK’s performance in coverage, speed, price and choice of internet services against the rest of the EU5 countries (France, Germany, Spain, Italy) against these metrics. The UK currently has the best coverage, take-up and choice of broadband in the EU5; the only measure the UK does not top is the percentage of the population who have interacted with public authorities online, which has declined over the last period.

DCMS is also home to the Government Equalities Office and so its publications also include an impact indicator on equality. This is a very specific measure of the percentage of people in organisations of 150 or more who report to be supportive of the Think, Act, Report campaign on gender equality, launched in 2011.
1. **Number of people directly employed in tourism**

2. **Number of overseas visitors to the UK**

3. **Broadband Delivery UK’s Best-in-Europe scorecard – UK ranking**

Source: Ofcom European Broadband Scorecard Research Document. This ranks the UK among other EU5 countries along different measures. The UK is also number one for choice in the market. The pink line shows the UK’s rank in 2014, the blue line in 2013 – the edge of the triangle is 1st place.
4. **Total amount of creative employment in the UK**

![Graph showing the total amount of creative employment in the UK from 1997 to 2013.](image)


5. **Charitable giving to DCMS-funded cultural institutions**

![Graph showing charitable giving to DCMS-funded cultural institutions from 2008/09 to 2012/13.](image)


6. **Visits to DCMS-sponsored museums and galleries**

![Graph showing visits to DCMS-sponsored museums and galleries from 2002/03 to 2013/14.](image)


7. **Children participating in competitive sport**

![Graph showing the percentage of children participating in competitive sport from 2011 to 2014.](image)


8. **Percentage of employees within medium and large organisations recognised as supporting Think, Act, Report on gender equality**

![Graph showing the percentage of employees recognised as supporting Think, Act, Report on gender equality from 2012 to 2014.](image)

The Department of Energy and Climate Change’s indicators have performed extremely well, with every indicator heading in the desired direction since 2010. All but one have moved in the right direction over the latest period, too. The exception is ‘the impact of other countries’ pledges to decrease their greenhouse gas emissions on predicted global emissions’. This has shown no movement since 2013.

DECC provides an updated list of indicators on the GOV.UK website each quarter, although this update only provides two data points and therefore makes long-term comparison difficult. There is a strong relationship between the way the DECC measures its impact and the actions it says it is taking in its Business Plans: each indicator has at least one corresponding action, and most have several.
1. The total number of energy efficiency installations in GB households

Source: DECC impact indicators at Q3 2014-15, and DECC annual report 2010-11

2. The number of households in fuel poverty in England

Source: DECC impact indicators at Q3 2014-15 and Q1 2012-13

3. Percentage of energy consumed in the UK generated from renewable sources

Source: DECC impact indicators at Q3 2014-15 and Q1 2012-13

4. The spare capacity of the UK’s gas network

Source: DECC impact indicators at Q3 2014-15, Q2 2012-13 and Q1 2012-13

5. The spare capacity of the UK’s electricity network

Source: DECC impact indicators at Q3 2014-15, Q2 2012-13 and Q1 2012-13

6. The proportion of all UK energy supply from low carbon sources

Source: DECC impact indicators at Q3 2014-15 and Q1 2012-13
7. The impact of other countries' pledges to decrease their greenhouse gas emissions on predicted global emissions (gigatonnes)

Source: DECC impact indicators at Q3 2014-15, Q2 2014-15 and Q1 2012-13 – emissions are measured in Gigatonnes of carbon dioxide

8. Total emissions of greenhouse gases from the UK (MtCO2)

Source: DECC impact indicators at Q3 2014-15 and Q1 2012-13 – emissions are measured in metric tons of carbon dioxide equivalent

9. Reduction in the nuclear provision through decommissioning and clean-up

Source: DECC impact indicators at Q3 2014-15, Q2 2013-14 and Q1 2012-13
Four of Defra’s indicators have moved in the wrong direction since their previous update, and two of these have fallen consistently across this period:

- The productivity of the agricultural industry has fallen by 1.1% since 2010, and fell from 2011-2013
- The percentage of cattle herds that are TB-free has fallen consistently since 2010.

For one indicator, ‘the balance of nitrogen in agricultural soil’, it was not clear what the available data represented, or whether the number should increase or decrease. We have excluded this from our ranking, although we have charted it below.

There is only a partial link between the actions in Defra’s Structural Reform Plan and the measures it uses to chart its impact. Less than half of Defra’s indicators have a direct relationship to an action in the Structural Reform Plan.
1. Productivity of the UK agricultural industry (2010 = 100)

Source: Agriculture in the United Kingdom, 2012

2. Access to broadband (premises in hard-to-reach areas)

Source: Rural Community Broadband Fund output indicator, August 2014

3. Agricultural soils nitrogen balance (England)

4. Net change in surface water quality

Source: Defra annual reports and accounts

5. Farmland birds index (England)


6. Condition of Sites of Special Scientific Interest (England)

Source: Defra annual report and accounts 2013-14

7. Household recycling rates (England)

Source: ENV18 Local authority collected waste: annual results tables, November 2014
8. Number of households where the risk of damage from flooding and coastal erosion has been markedly reduced

Source: Defra annual reports and accounts 2010-11 to 2013-14

9. Cattle herds that are officially TB free (OTF) (England)

Source: Latest statistics on the incidence of tuberculosis (TB) in cattle in Great Britain, March 2015
Nearly all of DfE’s indicators for which data is available have performed well across the current parliament. Only one indicator shows a negative performance since 2010: ‘attainment at level 2 by age 19’ (‘the percentage of young people who have not attained a
level 2 qualification in English and mathematics at age 16, who go on to attain level 2 or a higher qualification in both by the end of the academic year in which they turn 19).

In several cases, no comparable data – or indeed any data at all – had been published to allow us to measure the department’s progress against its indicators. Six indicators (a quarter of the total) could not be measured since 2010 because we could not find comparable data. Others had to be excluded from our ‘Change since 2010’ score because the department only provides two data points for comparison, so we were only able to score them on their most recent performance.

A further four indicators were excluded because no data is available to measure them. ‘Attainment beyond the basics at 19’ is described as a new indicator for which data is not yet available. A new measurement framework is under development for ‘absence in looked-after children’. Data on pupils in alternative provision is no longer provided through the department’s impact indicator website – we assume these are no longer included as indicators in actual reporting.

Despite performing well against its impact indicators, there are few direct links between the department’s Structural Reform Plan and how it measures its impact.

1. Percentage of pupils achieving Level 4 or above in reading, writing and mathematics at 11

2. Percentage of pupils achieving A*-C GCSE in English and mathematics at 16

Source: Department for Education impact indicator update, March 2015

3. Percentage of young people attaining a full level 3 qualification by age 19

Source: Department for Education impact indicator update, April 2014

4. Percentage of young people who go on to attain level 2 or a higher qualification by age 19

Source: Department for Education impact indicator update, April 2014

5. Percentage of pupils achieving the English Baccalaureate at age 16

Source: Department for Education impact indicator update, March 2015
6. Attainment gap at age 11 between FSM pupils and the rest

Source: Department for Education impact indicator update, February 2015

7. Attainment gap at age 16 between FSM pupils and the rest

Source: Department for Education impact indicator update, February 2015

8. Attainment gap at age 19 between FSM pupils and the rest

Source: Department for Education impact indicator update, February 2015

9. Attainment gap at age 11 – looked-after children

Source: Department for Education impact indicator update, April 2014

10. Attainment gap at age 16 – looked-after children (children looked after by local authorities)

Source: Department for Education impact indicator update, April 2014

11. Percentage of FSM pupils progressing to Oxbridge

Source: Department for Education impact indicator update, August 2014
12. Percentage of FSM pupils progressing to a Russell Group university

Source: Department for Education impact indicator update, August 2014

13. Percentage of FSM pupils progressing to any university

Source: Department for Education impact indicator update, August 2014

14. Participation in education and work based training at age 16 to 17

Source: Department for Education impact indicator update, July 2014

15. Number of primary schools below the floor standard

Source: Department for Education impact indicator update, March 2015

16. Number of secondary schools below the floor standard

Source: Department for Education impact indicator update, March 2015

17. Attainment gap – schools with the greatest and the least proportions of disadvantaged pupils

Source: Department for Education impact indicator update, February 2015
18. Teaching (of English, mathematics and science) by teachers with qualifications in a relevant subject

Source: Department for Education impact indicator update, May 2014

19. The percentage of overall absence in primary, secondary and special schools

Source: Department for Education impact indicator update, July 2014

20. Number of academies opened nationally

21. Number of free schools opened nationally

Source: Department for Education impact indicator update, February 2013
22. Academies and free schools opened nationally as a percentage of all mainstream schools

23. Percentage of children achieving 'good level of development' in the early years foundation stage by FSM eligibility

Source: Department for Education impact indicator update, February 2013
Source: Department for Education impact indicator update, February 2015

24. Percentage of Year 1 children meeting the expected standard in the phonics screening check by free school meal eligibility

Source: Department for Education impact indicator update, February 2015
On those DfID indicators for which we have comparable data back to 2010, there has been good progress. Every indicator has moved in the right direction since the beginning of this parliament. Two indicators have slipped back since the previous update. The ‘number of insecticide-treated bed nets’ has fallen, as has the ‘number of assisted births’.

The final indicator is included in the list of indicators published on the Number 10 transparency website, but it does not appear in the latest refresh of impact indicator data. We assume it is no longer counted as an indicator.

The key difficulty in assessing DfID’s progress against its own indicators is the lack of comparable data from previous years. Nearly half of the indicators have been revised since 2010, making it difficult in the majority of cases to compare current data even with data from last year. In addition, the majority of the data charted below is taken from DfID’s annual reports and appears to have no existence outside it. Details of how the data was collected and by whom are not given.

Of DfID’s impact indicators, 75% have at least one directly-related action in the departments Structural Reform Plan, even though DfID is one of two departments to use a different performance measurement system (according to our research in Whitehall Monitor 2013).
1. Number of people with access to financial services as a result of DFID support

![Graph showing the number of people with access to financial services over time.]

Source: Department for International Development annual reports 2011-12 to 2013-14, and DfID’s Business Plan update, October 2014

2. Number of insecticide-treated bed-nets distributed with DFID support

![Graph showing the number of insecticide-treated bed-nets distributed over time.]

Source: Department for International Development annual reports 2011-12 to 2013-14

3. Access to an improved sanitation facility

![Graph showing the number of people with access to improved sanitation facilities over time.]

Source: Department for International Development annual reports 2011-12 to 2013-14

4. Number of people who vote in elections supported by DFID

![Graph showing the number of people who vote in elections over time.]

Source: Department for International Development annual reports 2011-12 to 2013-14
5. Number of children supported by DFID in primary education

Source: Department for International Development annual reports 2013-14

6. Number of assisted births with DFID support

Source: Department for International Development annual reports 2011-12 to 2013-14

7. Number of people supported by DFID programmes to cope with the effects of climate change

Source: Department for International Development annual reports 2012-13 and 2013-14
Just over half of the Department for Transport’s indicators have gone in the right direction since 2010, rising to 75% in the last reporting period. Two indicators did not improve in the last reporting period, but the change in both cases was marginal: the proportion of trains running on time fell by less than one percentage point, from 90.8% in 2010-11 to 89.9% in 2013-14, while the proportion of urban trips under five miles taken by public transport fell from 38.3% in 2012 to 36.3% in 2013.

The changes among the improved indicators are also fairly small. The proportion of buses running on time rose from 83.1% to 83.4% in the most recent reporting period; the number of road fatalities fell by 41 from 1,754 in 2012 to 1,713 in 2013 contrasting with the significant reductions in the previous decade. The rise in the number of ultra-low-emission vehicles registered in the UK has been more dramatic, from less than 2,000 in Q1 2014, to more than 6,000 were registered in the last quarter of the same year.

DfT’s indicators are largely drawn from data collections which pre-date the current parliament, so long time series are available for comparison. They are updated regularly, easily accessible from the DfT Indicators website, and are clearly linked to the department’s Structural Reform Plan actions.
1. Total greenhouse gas emissions from transport

![Graph showing total greenhouse gas emissions from transport, with data points from 1990 to 2010.](image)

Source: DfT Transparency data, March 2015

2. Proportion of trains running on time

![Graph showing proportion of trains running on time, with data points from 10/11 to 13/14.](image)

Source: DfT annual reports

3. Proportion of urban trips under 5 miles taken by (i) walking or cycling or (ii) public transport

![Graph showing proportion of urban trips under 5 miles taken by walking or cycling and public transport, with data points from 2002 to 2012.](image)

Source: DfT Transparency data, July 2014

4. Proportion of bus services running on time

![Graph showing proportion of bus services running on time, with data points from 07/08 to 13/14.](image)

Source: DfT Transparency data, September 2014

5. Reliability of journeys on the Highways Agency’s motorway and A road network

![Graph showing reliability of journeys on the Highways Agency’s motorway and A road network, with data points from April 2010 to April 2014.](image)

Source: DfT Transparency data, March 2015
6. **Annual road fatalities**

![Graph showing annual road fatalities from 2000 to 2013.](image)

Source: DfT Transparency data, September 2014

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7. **Number of newly registered Ultra Low Emission Vehicles**

![Graph showing the number of newly registered Ultra Low Emission Vehicles from 2010 Q1 to 2014 Q1.](image)

Source: DfT Vehicle LICencing statistics, February 2015

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8. **Households with good transport access to key services or work**

![Bar chart showing households with good transport access from 2007 to 2013.](image)

Source: DfT Transparency data, November 2014
There has been improvement against half of DH’s impact indicators since 2010, including life expectancy and infant mortality. It has seen declines in others: the number of safety incidents reported by NHS/healthcare providers has been rising steadily since 2010, although the number of incidents leading to severe harm or death has declined since 2012.

Since April 2013, all of the impact data used by the Department of Health has been collated and published by a new non-departmental public body, the Health and Social Care Information Centre (HSCIC), on its Indicator Portal. This brings together health indicators from a range of health and social care measurement frameworks, publishing the data in an open, frequently-updated format. It is an example of excellent practice in indicator reporting.
Less than 50% of impact indicators were directly linked to actions in DH’s Structural Reform Plan – the department’s structural reform plan actions were largely focused on structural change in the healthcare system.

1. Potential Years of Life Lost (PYLL) from causes considered amenable to healthcare

![Graph showing PYLL from 2003 to 2013 for males and females.]

Source: HSCIC, NHS outcomes framework indicator 1a

2. Life expectancy at 75

![Graph showing life expectancy at 75 for males and females from 2003 to 2013.]

Source: HSCIC, NHS outcomes framework indicator 1b

3. Infant mortality – per 1,000 live births

![Graph showing infant mortality from 2003 to 2013.]

Source: HSCIC, NHS outcomes framework indicator 1.6.i

4.i. Differences in life expectancy between communities (by deprivation)

![Graph showing differences in life expectancy for males and females between 2009-11 and 2010-12.]

Source: DH transparency data, December 2014

4.ii. Differences in healthy life expectancy between communities (by deprivation)

![Graph showing differences in healthy life expectancy for males and females between 2009-11 and 2010-12.]

Source: DH transparency data, December 2014
5.i. Low birth weight of term live births

Source: DH transparency data, December 2014

5.ii and iii. Low birth weight, by father’s occupation

Source: DH Transparency data, December 2014
Chart shows change in method, 2011-12

6. Mortality rate from causes considered preventable, per 100,000 population

Source: ONS avoidable mortality in England and Wales, 2011

7. Health-related quality of life for people with long-term conditions – EQ-5D™ health status score

Source: HSCIC, NHS outcomes framework indicator 2
8. Emergency admissions for conditions not usually requiring hospital admission

Source: HSCIC, NHS outcomes framework indicator 3a

9. Emergency re-admissions within 30 days of leaving hospital

Source: HSCIC, NHS outcomes framework indicator 3b

10. Patient experience of primary care - % 'good' or 'very good'

Source: HSCIC, NHS outcomes framework indicator 4a.i

11. Patient experience of hospital care – score out of 100

Source: CQC inpatient adult survey, collated by DH

12. Quality of life for adults receiving social care – score out of 24

Source: HSCIC adult social care outcomes framework 1a

13. Satisfaction with adult social care services - % 'very' or 'extremely' satisfied

Source: HSCIC adult social care outcomes framework 3a
14. Safety incidents reported by NHS/healthcare providers that lead to severe harm or death

Source: HSCIC, NHS outcomes framework indicator 5b

15. Safety incidents reported by NHS/healthcare providers

Source: HSCIC, NHS outcomes framework indicator 5b
### Department for Work and Pensions (DWP)

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<tr>
<td>1.i. People moving off JSA</td>
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<td>1.ii. People moving off ESA</td>
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<td>2. People on key out-of-work benefits</td>
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<td>3. Young people not in education or employment</td>
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<td>4. Wage progression low earning 25-30 year-olds</td>
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<td>5. Disability poverty</td>
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<td>6. Employment rates of disabled people</td>
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<td>7. Pensioner poverty</td>
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<td>8. Employees in employer-sponsored pension scheme</td>
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<td>9.i. Age people stop working - men</td>
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<td>9.ii. Age people stop working - women</td>
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<td>10. Children living in workless households</td>
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<td>11. Fraud and error in the benefit system</td>
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<td>12. Departmental service levels</td>
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Overall, DWP’s indicators have performed well, with 11 out of 14 going in the right direction since 2010. The number of employees enrolled in pensions schemes led by their employers appears to have gone down in this parliamentary term, but – due to reporting lags – this is based only on data from 2010 and 2011. Half of the evidence used to assess the wage progression of low-earning 25-30 year olds was reported as ‘indeterminate’, so the reality of this indicator might be better than the figures suggest – although there is a question over how appropriate this apparently ‘indeterminate’ measure is.

DWP regularly publishes updates to each indicator on a dedicated page on GOV.UK, in an open format, with a full explanation of where the numbers come from. There is a strong relationship between the way the DWP measures its impact, and the actions it says it is taking in its Business Plans.
1. Rates of people moving from key out of work benefits (Job Seeker’s Allowance – JSA, Employment and Support Allowance – ESA)

Source: DWP transparency data, March 2015

2. Number of people on key out of work benefits

Source: DWP transparency data, March 2015

3. Proportion of young people not in full time education who are not in employment

Source: ONS labour market statistics table AO6, February 2015

4. Proportion of the lowest earning 25-30 year olds that experience wage progression ten years later

Source: DWP transparency data, March 2015
5. Rate of disability poverty

Source: Households Below Average Income report, July 2014. 2012-13 saw a change in the disability questions in the Family Resources Survey, so data should be compared with caution.

6. Gap between the employment rates of disabled people and the overall population

Source: DWP transparency data, March 2015. Methodological changes in 2010 and 2013 make the data incomparable with earlier years.

7. Rate of pensioner poverty

Source: DWP transparency data, July 2014

8. Number of employees in a pension scheme sponsored by their employer

Source: DWP transparency data, May 2014

9. Average age people stop working

Source: DWP transparency data, January 2015

10. Proportion of children living in workless households

Source: ONS Working and Workless Households report, October 2014
11. Fraud and error in the benefit system, as a percentage of benefit expenditure

Source: DWP 'Fraud and Error in the Benefit System, 2013-14, November 2014

12. Customer and claimant opinion of departmental service levels

Source: DWP transparency data, February 2014
Of FCO’s seven indicators, only three have shown improvement since 2010. Two indicators are in a worse position now than in 2010, and one has fallen again since its previous update: customer satisfaction with British consular service abroad is at its lowest since 2010.

The first in the list of FCO indicators published on the Number 10 Transparency website is ‘The FCO has developed a system of metrics for Diplomatic Excellence to help assess progress towards its vision of being the best diplomatic service in the world by 2015’. However, the indicator does not appear in the most recent indicator data update, nor could we find data for it in previous annual reports. We have excluded it from the charts below.

The ‘conflict prevention and capacity building in fragile states’ indicator is under development and no data has been collected, although the FCO has been saying this in its annual report since 2011-12. Moreover, ‘progress towards a stable and secure Afghanistan’ is measured using a score calculated by the World Bank. The World Bank has stopped producing this score, yet the department has not removed or revised this indicator.

FCO shares two indicators with BIS (on internationalisation and Foreign Direct Investment), although BIS produces a longer times series of this data. FCO and MoD share an indicator— ‘progress toward a stable and secure Afghanistan’— but measure it differently.

The department did significantly better when we looked for links between impact indicators and structural reform plan actions: five indicators have actions that are directly linked, and every impact indicator has at least a few indirect actions that relate to it.
1. Progress toward a stable and secure Afghanistan


3. Number of UK Businesses helped to improve their performance through internationalisation

Source: Foreign and Commonwealth Office impact indicators, 2014-15 and 2011-12

5. Better consular service to British nationals abroad as indicated by customer satisfaction

Source: Foreign and Commonwealth Office impact indicators, 2014-15 and 2011-12

2. Number of Foreign Direct Investment projects attracted to the UK with UKTI involvement

Source: Foreign and Commonwealth Office impact indicators, 2014-15 and 2011-12

4. Trend in gap between currently anticipated low-carbon investment, and the low-carbon investment required to meet the 2°C target

More than half of HMRC's impact indicators have gone in the right direction since 2010. This includes most of the indicators which focus on the core business of the department: collecting tax from people who owe it, on time.

The indicators which have gone in the wrong direction mostly relate to customer service: answering calls and clearing post on time. Meanwhile, the proportion of transactions carried out online reached 97.3% in the last reporting period (2014-15 Q2).

These indicators do not fully represent the way HMRC measures its impact: its reporting documents contain several indicators which were not included in the original list.
1. Cash collected from compliance

2. Revenue loss prevented – the value of our activities where we have prevented revenue from being lost to the Exchequer

3. Tax gap – difference between all the tax theoretically due and tax actually collected

4. Amount of tax credits money claimed by people who are not entitled to it

5. Payment on time using VAT as lead indicator

6. Proportion of tax debt – corporation tax (CT), self-assessment (SA), employers’ pay as you earn (PAYE) that has been cleared within 90 calendar days

Source: HMRC Business Plan indicators performance report, December 2014
7. Percentage of post received by HMRC that has been cleared within 15 and 40 working days of receipt

Source: HMRC Business Plan indicators performance report, December 2014

8. Percentage of post cleared within 15 and 40 working days of receipt that has passed HMRC quality standards

Source: HMRC Business Plan indicators performance report, December 2014

9. Percentage of call attempts handled by HMRC Contact Centres

Source: HMRC Business Plan indicators performance report, December 2014
10. Percentage of transactions carried out online

11. Increase/decrease (-) in cost for our customers when they deal with us

Source: HMRC Business Plan indicators performance report, December 2014

12. Customers find us straightforward to deal with

Source: HMRC Business Plan indicators performance report, December 2014
We had to exclude a large percentage of the Treasury’s indicators owing to lack of data. Of 10 indicators, we have excluded four:

- ‘Cyclically adjusted current deficit as a percentage of GDP’ is no longer listed as an indicator in annual reports, but remains on the list of indicators published on the Number 10 Transparency website.
- While we found data for ‘departmental DEL outturn vs Final Plans’, there was nothing to indicate the direction of this indicator. In different years the data is published as a percentage and as a full number, so we are unclear what this indicator actually measures.
- The charts provided to explain ‘overall impact of tax, tax credit, and benefit changes on households’ do not provide comparable data. So we have excluded them.
- We could find no data in any annual report on ‘banks’ capital ratios: average bank capital as a proportion of risk-weighted assets’. However, it is on the published list of impact indicators available on the Number 10 Transparency site.

Of the indicators that were measurable, two have moved in the wrong direction since 2010: public sector debt as a percentage of GDP has risen year-on-year, and business investment as a share of GDP has fallen since 2010 and fell again between 2012-13.

The Treasury also performs poorly in using indicators that reflect the actions in its Structural Reform Plan: only half have a directly-related action in the Structural Reform Plan.
1. Public sector net debt as a percentage of GDP

Source: ONS Public Sector Finances, July 2013 and update at January 2015

2. Departmental DEL outturn v final plans

Source: Treasury annual reports and accounts 2012-13 and 2013-14

3. GDP – latest quarter growth on corresponding quarter of previous year

Source: ONS Gross Domestic Product Preliminary Estimate, Q4 2014, Summary Table 1
4. GDP per capita

Source: ONS Statistical Bulletin: Economic wellbeing, Q3 2014, Figure 1

5. Business investment as a share of GDP

Source: Treasury annual report and accounts 2012-13 and 2013-14

6. UK employment rate

Source: ONS Labour Market Statistics, February 2015, Summary table A01

7. Government shareholdings in banks: RBS, Lloyds Banking Group

Source: Treasury annual report and accounts 2012-13 and 2013-14
There are a number of indicators for which data going back to 2010 is not available. Two indicators relating to organised crime – ‘actions against organised crime groups’, and ‘number of disruptions to organised crime groups’ – have no data collected against them.

On indicators where data is available, the Home Office’s indicators perform well, with improvement against all indicators since 2010 except two: the amount of revenue protected through detecting goods where excise duty has not been declared is lower than 2010 (and lower than 2012-13), and the proportion of passport applications processed within target also dropped in 2013-14 for the first time since 2010.

Other indicators have shown improvement since 2010 but have fallen in the last year: the percentage of asylum applications completed within a year fell from 2012-13 to 2013-14, and net migration rose in the same period.
1. Crime rates – violent and property crime reported to the police

Source: Home Office annual reports and accounts 2010-11 to 2013-14

2. Number of known organised criminals

Source: Home Office annual reports and accounts 2010-11 to 2013-14

3. Number of organised crime groups

Source: Home Office annual reports and accounts 2010-11 to 2013-14

4. Estimated scale and costs of organised crime to the UK

Source: Home Office annual reports and accounts 2010-11 to 2013-14

5. Net migration to the UK

Source: Home Office annual reports and accounts 2010-11 to 2013-14

6. Tax revenue protected through duty fraud detection

Source: Home Office annual reports and accounts 2010-11 to 2013-14

Some reports give different figures for same year.
7. Clearance of passengers at the border within target

Source: Home Office Annual Reports and Accounts 2010-11 to 2013-14

8. Migration applications within target

Source: Home Office Annual Reports and Accounts 2010-11 to 2013-14

9. Asylum applications concluded in one year

Source: Home Office annual reports and accounts 2010-11 to 2013-14

10. Passport applications processed within target

Source: Home Office annual reports and accounts 2010-11 to 2013-14
The Ministry of Defence has the fewest indicators of any major department. Its set of indicators is also one of the lowest-ranking in terms of movement since 2010. Of six, only two have moved in the right direction since 2010, with three moving in the wrong direction. Two indicators – the ‘percentage of personnel that are deployable’ and ‘service personnel satisfaction’ – have been falling consistently since 2010.

For one indicator – ‘number of personnel deployed’ – it is not clear which direction is desired, so we have excluded this from our ranking.

FCO and MoD share an indicator – ‘progress toward a stable and secure Afghanistan’ – but they measure it differently and therefore have different results.

Half of all MoD’s impact indicators are supported by a directly-related action in the plan, and only one – the ‘public favourability of the armed forces’ – is not related to any of the department’s actions.
1. Progress toward a stable and secure Afghanistan

Source: Ministry of Defence impact indicators

Data shows size of Afghan Defence force against NATO target

2. Number of Service and MOD civilian personnel deployed on all operations in a year

Source: Ministry of Defence impact indicators

3. Percentage of service personnel that are deployable

Source: Ministry of Defence impact indicators

4. Number of force elements showing critical/serious weakness

Source: Ministry of Defence impact indicators

5. Percentage of service personnel who are satisfied with service life in general

Source: Ministry of Defence impact indicators

6. Overall public favourability of the UK armed forces

Source: Ministry of Defence impact indicators
Five of MoJ’s indicators have more than one measure included in them (for example, timeliness of different types of court case, or juvenile and adult offenders), which we have split apart and counted as separate measures.

MoJ’s indicators show a mixed picture since 2010, with seven heading in the right direction (particularly around reoffending after custody) and seven heading in the wrong direction (including all of the other reoffending measures). However, as the charts below show, some of these increases have been marginal: reoffending among adults has gone up by less than 0.2 percentage points since 2010.

MoJ has largely chosen to measure things for which there were already long-standing data collection practices in place, so we can judge the changes over a much longer period than just this parliament. Much of the data is helpfully published as a collection on GOV.UK. The
impact indicators currently being reported on are clearly related to the actions in the department’s structural reform plan.

We think 'Average annual cost per place in youth secure estate' may be an input indicator, but it is listed as an impact indicator on the Number 10 Transparency website and we have therefore included it in our analysis.

1. **Reoffending rates: percentage**

![Graph showing reoffending rates: percentage](image)

Source: MoJ Reoffending statistics

2. **Reoffending rates: frequency**

![Graph showing reoffending rates: frequency](image)

Source: MoJ Reoffending statistics

3. **Reoffending rates after custody: percentage**

![Graph showing reoffending rates after custody: percentage](image)

Source: MoJ Reoffending statistics

4. **Reoffending rates after custody: frequency**

![Graph showing reoffending rates after custody: frequency](image)

Source: MoJ Reoffending statistics

5. **Number of young people on secure remand**

![Graph showing number of young people on secure remand](image)

Source: MoJ Youth Justice statistics
6. Court and tribunal timeliness – average length in days

Source: MoJ Court Statistics

7. Number of new criminal offences (across all government departments)

Source: MoJ Criminal Offence statistics
Measurement annex

BIS

1. The data is taken from a BIS publication, *International Comparative Performance of the UK Research Base*, published in 2013. We matched the figures to the original publication, but were unable to find the underlying dataset.

2. An enterprise is defined as 'innovation active' if during the three-year period 2010-2012 it engaged in any of the following:
   a. introduction of a new or significantly-improved product (good or service) or process
   b. engagement in innovation projects not yet complete or abandoned
   c. new and significantly improved forms of organisation, business structures or practices and marketing concepts or strategies.

   This data is taken from the *UK Innovation Survey*. We matched the figures to the original publication, but were unable to find the underlying dataset.

3. The source of this data is given as the department’s *Widening Participation* report, but the original source of the data is not given.

4. This indicator measures the gap between young graduates from professional backgrounds who go on to a ‘graduate job’ six months after graduating, and young graduates from non-professional backgrounds. Data is taken from the Higher Education Statistics Agency (HESA) Student Record, and the Destination of Leavers from Higher Education (DLHE) survey, but it is not clear how they were combined and we could not find corresponding data in these sources.

5. This indicator shows the UK’s international ranking against other OECD countries (30 before 2010, now 34). The data source is the OECD *Education at a Glance* report, Table A1.2a, ‘Percentage of adults who have attained at least upper secondary education, by age group (2012)’ and Table A1.3a, ‘Percentage of adults who have attained tertiary education, by type of programme and age group (2012)’.

6. Data source is *Understanding Society*, the UK Household Longitudinal Study (UKHLS). Data not accessible.

7. This data is unusually well-referenced. Not only does the impact indicator update contain a link to the National Statistics site which hosts the original data, but it also references a specific table within the National Statistics release (Table 1.2 of the November 2014 Further Education and Skills Statistical First Release or SFR).

8. ‘Access to the professions’ is measured as the percentage of 16 to 65 year olds who are in paid employment in managerial or professional positions by social background, using fathers’ occupational group. Data source is *Understanding Society*, the UK Household Longitudinal Study (UKHLS). Data not accessible.

9. At May 2013, 289 out of a possible 370 Regional Growth Contracts had been signed.
10. This data is taken from the ONS Private Sector Employment Indicator published in October 2014. The data refers to England only.

11. This data is based on a survey of UK households which asks questions about entrepreneurial activity. Results are weighted to be representative of the population.

12. The most recent World Bank ‘Doing Business’ report is available here:
http://www.doingbusiness.org/

13. ‘Fair access to the Post Office network’ is measured using five ‘accessibility performance target criteria’. Performance against the government access criteria is measured by splitting the national population according to census output areas. Accessibility is calculated by measuring the distance of the population weighted centre of the output area to its nearest Post Office access point.

14. This indicator measures the impact of UK Trade and Investment, which has set targets to increase UK exports through a number of methods, including investing in small to medium enterprises (SMEs) and supporting large companies to secure opportunities overseas. This data is based on a survey of UK businesses – about the difference UKTI has made to their work – and the Performance and Impact Monitoring System (PIMS). This data was updated in March 2015; figures were revised upwards so they may not match those published in Annual Report 2013-14, or those previously published on the Impact Indicator website.

15. As with the previous indicator, this measures the impact of UKTI in encouraging inward investment in the UK. The impact indicator update gives details of what constitutes a successful ‘Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) project’, with data from UKTI’s Inward Investment Report. This data was updated in March 2015; figures were revised upwards so they may not match those published in Annual Report 2013-14, or those previously published on the Impact Indicator website.

16. This data is taken from OECD Macro Trade Indicators and OECD National Accounts database.

17. Data on this indicator is no longer published through the Number 10 Transparency website, so we used data from previous annual reports to build a time series.

18. Not clear how figures in annual report 2011-12 (which show positive numbers indicating change in burden) relate to figures published in October 2014 (which give details of increases and decreases, but not net change). We have calculated net change by adding decreases and increases together.

19. The source of this data is the Office of Fair Trading (now the Competition and Markets Authority) report, Positive Impact. We could not find a copy of this report on GOV.UK. Nor could we find an explanation of how this figure is calculated.
The Cabinet Office

1. Shows the amount of savings (£bn) estimated to have been influenced by the Efficiency and Reform Group (ERG), verified by the National Audit Office (NAO). These figures are cumulative: as we noted in previous work, the figures combine savings that are ‘one-off’ (saving government money only in that particular year) with savings that are ‘recurring’ which permanently alter the cost base of government. The latter count in the year when they are first made, but also continue to be included in subsequent years’ savings figures. Source data is from ERG reporting.

2. The most recent figures are taken from the data.gov.uk search page, with previous numbers from the CO input and impact indicators report September 2013 and the CO annual report 2013-14.

3. The number of external applications using government data published on data.gov.uk. The most recent figures are taken from the data.gov.uk apps page, with previous numbers from the CO input and impact indicators report September 2013 and the CO annual report 2013-14.

4. The number of unique visitors to data.gov.uk increases yearly. It is unclear whether this measure shows the number of visitors to data.gov.uk in the year given, or the increase in the number of visitors over the reporting period. The data.gov.uk site analytics page does not appear to provide data on unique visitors, so this cannot be verified.

5. This shows the percentage of adults formally volunteering at least once in the last year. This shows the number of people interviewed in the Community Life Survey who said that they had volunteered formally at least once in the previous year. Source data from the Community Life Survey, conducted by TNS-BMRB and analysed by CO.

6. 2011 and 2012 were both pilot years for the National Citizens Service programme, so the substantial year-on-year increase in participants reflects the expansion of the programme.

7. Growth of the social investment market is higher than UK economic growth. In September 2013, the Cabinet Office impact indicators report stated that measurement against this indicator would begin in October 2013. This does not appear to have taken happened. The measure does not appear in the Social Impact Market annual report.
DCLG

1. This shows the value of business rates relief plus the value of business rate yield, minus the baseline level of business rates yield, across all enterprise zones in England. Source data is from the department’s national non-domestic rates statistical returns, and are forecasts as reported by local authorities for the financial year 2013-14.

2. This shows the percentage of local planning authorities that have adopted a local plan prepared under the 2004 Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act (England). Source data is from the Planning Inspectorate, collated by DCLG.

3. This shows the number of planning permissions granted as a percentage of all applications for major and minor development schemes (England). Source data is from planning authority PSF (Planning Statistics Form) returns, collated by DCLG.

4. This shows the number of affordable house building starts and completions delivered through the Homes and Communities Agency (HCA) and the Greater London Authority (GLA). Source data is from HCA and GLA investment management systems and other programme information, collated by DCLG.

5. This shows the seasonally-adjusted figures for house building starts and completions in England. Source data is from P2 house building returns by local authorities, the National House-Building Council, and a quarterly survey of building control companies, collated by DCLG.

6. This shows the total number of households in temporary accommodation for all housing authorities in England, seasonally-adjusted. Source data is from P1E returns from housing authorities.

7. This shows the number of troubled families identified, as a percentage of the number of troubled families the Prime Minister pledged to ‘turn around’ by 2015 (usually referred to as 120,000 but rounded up from 117,910). This shows only families which have been identified as ‘troubled’, not those which have been declared ‘turned around’. Source data is from local authority returns, collated by DCLG’s Troubled Families Team.

8. This shows the number of fire-related casualties including fatalities and ‘first aid’ cases but excluding precautionary checks (where there’s no obvious injury, but a check-up is recommended). Data is expressed per 100,000 resident population.

9. This shows a count of communities that have applied and been designated by their local authorities as neighbourhood planning areas – the first legal step in the production of a neighbourhood plan. Source data is collected by DCLG from automatic reporting of updates to local authority websites.
DCMS

1. Source data is from ONS Tourism Satellite Accounts.

2. Source data is from the ONS 'Travel Trends' travel and tourism statistics.

3. Broadband Delivery UK’s Best-in-Europe scorecard (measuring coverage, speed, price and choice of broadband service) – the European Broadband Scorecard was developed by Broadband UK (within DCMS).

   The data is identified, collated and published by Ofcom, with results published so far in 2013 and 2014. The scorecard ranks the UK among EU5 countries (France, Germany, Spain, Italy) for the coverage, take-up, usage, speed, price and choice of the broadband available. However, Ofcom has thus far not found sufficient evidence to make reliable comparative assessments on speed.

4. This data includes people deemed to be working in creative employment who are not directly employed in one of the ‘creative industries’. The data is collated by DCMS, based on ONS employment statistics.

5. Total amount of charitable giving (donations and sponsorship) to cultural institutions funded by DCMS. The source data comes from submissions made by the relevant institutions, collated by DCMS.

6. Total visits to DCMS-sponsored museums and galleries. The source data comes from submissions made by the relevant institutions, collated by DCMS.

7. Proportion of children participating in competitive sport. This shows the proportion of children surveyed by the Taking Part survey who had participated in competitive sport at least once in the last 12 months. The source data comes from the Taking Part survey, a household survey administered on behalf of DCMS by TNS-BMRB.

8. Percentage of employees within medium and large organisations (over 150 in size) recognised as supporting ‘Think, Act, Report’ on gender equality. This measures the total number of employees in organisations larger than 150 people which have signed up to the ‘Think, Act, Report’ campaign, as a percentage of the total number of employees in organisations of that size in the UK. The source data comes from the reporting of organisations signed up to the report, collated by DCMS.
DECC

1. This indicator tracks progress on the number of homes with adequate loft (at least 125mm) and cavity wall insulation in Great Britain. 2014 data taken from DECC Impact Indicators at Q3 2014-15; previous data is from DECC annual report 2010-11.

2. Data is taken from DECC’s annual fuel poverty statistics report. A household is considered to be in fuel poverty if:
   - they have required fuel costs that are above average (the national median level)
   - were they to spend that amount they would be left with a residual income below the official poverty line.

3. This indicator uses the data that report the UK’s progress against the Renewable Energy Directive and records the energy consumed from renewable technologies, such as wind (onshore and offshore), hydro, solar, bio-energy and transport bio-fuels.

4. This data is taken from the datasets that accompany DECC’s own publication, UK Energy in Brief 2014, Table 13: Reliability – gas and electricity capacity margins – maximum supply and maximum demand 1993-94 to 2013-14.

5. This data is taken from the datasets that accompany DECC’s own publication, UK Energy in Brief 2014, Table 13: Reliability – gas and electricity capacity margins – maximum supply and maximum demand 1993-94 to 2013-14.

6. This data is taken from DECC’s own publication Energy Trends (2013), Table 1.3a: Supply and Use of Fuels.

7. This indicator measures the estimated impact of other countries’ pledges to decrease their greenhouse gas emissions on predicted global emissions, in terms of gigatonnes of carbon dioxide. A high and low estimate is provided. Data is taken from the United Nations Environment Programme Emission Gap Report.

8. The indicator refers to UK emissions of the Kyoto Protocol basket of greenhouse gases as reported to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), measured in metric tonnes of carbon dioxide. Source is given as ‘DECC’ in annual report 2012-13. It is unclear where these figures are calculated.

9. The Nuclear Provision represents the total estimated cost of the rolled-up plans for carrying out the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority’s core mission of decommissioning and cleaning up its 19 sites. It includes waste management, maintaining safety and security at the sites and the NDA’s share of the costs of the Geological Disposal Facility. It does not include the costs of commercial operations and the associated income.
Defra

1. This data is from a 2012 National Statistics publication, *Agriculture in the United Kingdom*, and uses 2010 as its baseline. The most recent dataset (published in 2014) rebased the data to 2010 (earlier releases used 2005=100), giving different data for each year. Figures report in Defra’s annual report do not match figures found in the source dataset.

2. This indicator reports on the number of domestic, business and other premises in hard-to-reach rural areas that have the potential to receive superfast broadband as a result of Rural Community Broadband Fund investment (England). The indicator reports on a key impact of the Rural Communities Broadband Fund, that is the number of domestic, business and other premises in hard-to-reach areas that have the potential to receive a superfast broadband service, that would otherwise only have the potential to receive standard broadband. This data is cumulative: 2014-15 data includes previous years.

3. The Agricultural Soil Nitrogen balance is measured in kilograms of nitrogen per hectare, and calculated by deducting total inputs from total outputs. It is unclear what the ideal balance of nitrogen should be.

4. Source for this data is departmental annual reports. Improvement or decline in water quality is judged against the 2009 baseline. We could not identify what factors are involved in assessing water quality.

5. This dataset uses 1970 as the base year. The data used to generate the Farmland Birds Index is collected every five years by an external agency – the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds. Trends should be observed over a five-year period, rather than annually. The RSPB provides a chart with a longer time series, but we could not find the underlying data.

6. Figures in the source do not match figures reported in annual reports. We have used older datasets to produce a times series back to 1996.

7. Household recycling rates are surveyed quarterly and compared annually. We could find no further detail on how this data is compiled.

8. This data measures the number of households where the risk of damage from flooding and coastal erosion has been markedly reduced (England).

9. This data is taken from latest statistics on the incidence of tuberculosis (TB) in cattle in Great Britain, March 2015.
1. Additional data is from National Statistics publication, *National Curriculum Assessments at Key Stage 2 in England: Academic year 2011 to 2012*, Table 2, ‘Percentage of pupils achieving Level 4 or above and Level 5 or above in Key Stage 2 tests and teacher assessments by gender’, published December 2012.

2. This data is taken from National Statistics publication *Revised GCSE and Equivalent Results in England: 2013 to 2014*, Table 1a, ‘Time series of GCSE and equivalent entries and achievements’. Publication date unknown.

3. The indicator is the percentage of young people in England who have attained a full Level 3 qualification by the end of the academic year in which they turn 19. A full Level 3 equates to two or more A-levels or an equivalent qualification. Data is taken from National Statistics publication *Level 2 and 3 attainment by young people aged 19 in 2013*, Table 3, ‘Percentage of 19 year olds qualified to Level 3, by qualification type and cohort’, published March 2015.

4. The indicator measures the proportion of young people who have not attained a Level 2 qualification in English and Maths at age 16, who go on to attain Level 2 or higher qualification in both by the end of the academic year in which they turn 19. The source of this data is unclear.

5. This indicator measures the percentage of all pupils at the end of Key Stage 4 (typically age 16) who achieved grades A* to C in the core academic subjects – English, mathematics, sciences, a foreign language and history or geography. From 2014, sciences includes Computer Science. This data is taken from National Statistics publication, *Revised GCSE and Equivalent Results in England: 2013 to 2014*, Table 1b: The English Baccalaureate, published March 2015.

6. The attainment gap is calculated from the percentage of all other pupils (those known not to be eligible for free school meals or with an unclassified status) achieving Level 4 or above in reading, writing and mathematics minus the percentage of pupils known to be eligible for free school meals achieving Level 4 or above in reading, writing and mathematics. Source data is from National Statistics publication *National Curriculum Assessments at Key Stage 2, 2014 (revised)*, December 2014.

7. As data is only available from 2012 and 2013, we have excluded this indicator from the ‘since 2010’ measure and graded it only under progress since previous update.

The attainment gap is calculated from the percentage of all other pupils (those known not to be eligible for free school meals or with an unclassified status) achieving an A* to C grade in English and mathematics GCSEs, minus the percentage of pupils known to be eligible for free school meals achieving an A* to C grade in English and mathematics GCSEs.

8. Comparisons are based on the percentage of young people who attain a Level 3 qualification by the end of the academic year in which they turn 19. Data is taken from National Statistics publication *Level 2 and 3 Attainment by Young People aged 19 in 2013*, published March 2015.

9. As data is only available from 2012 and 2013, we have excluded this indicator from the 'since 2010' measure and graded it only under progress since previous update.

The impact indicator for Key stage 2 (age 11) is the attainment gap between looked-after children (looked-after by local authorities) and non-looked-after children achieving Level 4 in reading, writing and mathematics.

The source data is taken from National Statistics publication *Outcomes for Children looked after by Local Authorities*, Table 2, Key Stage 2 eligibility and performance of children who have been looked after continuously for at least 12 months, by gender, April 2014.

10. The impact indicator for Key Stage 4 (age 16) is the attainment gap between looked-after children and non-looked-after children achieving grade A* to C in GCSE English and mathematics.

The source data is taken from National Statistics publication *Outcomes for Children Looked After by Local Authorities*, Table 3: 'Key Stage 4, eligibility and performance of children who have been looked after continuously for at least 12 months, by gender, April 2014.

11. The link to this data is given as the DfE publication, *Destinations of Key Stage 4 and Key Stage 5 Pupils: 2012 to 2013*, but we could not locate the relevant data.

12. The link to this data is given as DfE publication, *Destinations of Key Stage 4 and Key Stage 5 Pupils: 2012 to 2013*, but we could not locate the relevant data.

13. The link to this data is given as DfE publication *Destinations of Key Stage 4 and Key Stage 5 Pupils: 2012 to 2013*, but we could not locate the relevant data.

14. The indicator measures the proportion of young people in England of academic age 16/17 who are participating in education or work based learning. The data is taken from National Statistics publication, *Participation in Education, Training and Employment, Age 16 to 18*, but we could not identify which data sheet contained the relevant figures.

15. The criteria for a below-standard school are given in the department’s impact indicator update. The source data is taken from *National Curriculum Assessments at Key Stage 2, 2014 (revised)*, December 2014.

16. As data is only available from 2012 and 2013, we have excluded this indicator from the 'since 2010' measure and graded it only under progress since previous update.
The criteria for a below-standard school are given in the department’s impact indicator update. Source data is from National Statistics publication *GCSE and Equivalent Attainment by Pupil Characteristics: 2014*, February 2015.

17. As data is only available from 2012 and 2013, we have excluded this indicator from the ‘since 2010’ measure and graded it only under progress since previous update. This indicator is a measure of the attainment gap between the 10% of schools with the highest proportion of disadvantaged pupils and the 10% with the lowest proportion.

Source data is from National Statistics publication *GCSE and Equivalent Attainment by Pupil Characteristics: 2014*, February 2015. We found the impact indicator data as it appears in the impact indicator publication, but could not identify how it had been calculated.

18. This indicator shows the percentage of hours taught in secondary schools in a typical week (in November each year) to pupils in years 7 to 13 by teachers with a relevant post-A Level qualification in each subject. This data is taken from the National Statistics publication *School Workforce in England: November 2013*, Table 11: ‘Headcount of teachers and number of hours taught by subject and key stage to year groups 7 to 13 in all publicly-funded secondary schools, 2013’. However, this source only provided data for 2013. We could not find a time series of earlier data.

19. The overall absence rate is defined as the total number of absences (authorised and unauthorised) as the percentage of the total number of possible sessions. The data is taken from National Statistics publication *Pupil Absence in Schools in England, Including Pupil Characteristics*.

20. The data source given for number of academies and fee schools gives the total number in 2013 with no time series. It is unclear where the time series data has come from.

21. The data source given for number of academies and fee schools gives the total number in 2013 with no time series. It is unclear where the time series data has come from.

22. The data source given for number of academies and fee schools gives the total number in 2013 with no time series. It is unclear where the time series data has come from.

23. This indicator measures the percentage of children achieving a ‘good level of development’ in the early years foundation stage by eligibility for free school meals. A new framework for this indicator was introduced in 2012 so previous data is not comparable.

As data is only available from 2012 and 2013, we have excluded this indicator from the 'since 2010' measure and graded it only under progress since previous update.

24. This indicator measures the percentage of Year 1 children meeting the expected standard in the phonics screening check by eligibility for free school meals. The threshold for this indicator was revised in 2012 so earlier data is not comparable. The data is taken from National Statistics publication *Phonics Screening Check and Key Stage 1 Assessments England 2014*, December 2014.

DfID

1. Number of people with access to financial services as a result of DfID support—through DfID’s bilateral programme. The source of this data is not given. We assume it is collected by DfID directly.

2. We have combined data from three consecutive annual reports to show where there is inconsistency in the data. This data is collated by DfID from various sources, including UNICEF, the US President’s Malaria Initiative, the subset of Global Fund procurements realised through the Voluntary Pooled Procurement mechanism, and direct DfID procurement for the calendar year 2013.

3. This is the number of people with sustainable access to an improved sanitation facility through DfID support. We have combined data from three consecutive annual reports to show where there is inconsistency in the data. The source of this data is not given. We assume it is collected by DfID directly.

4. The definition of this indicator was revised in the annual report 2012-13—strengthening of ‘free/fair’ criteria. This explains the sharp fall in numbers after 2010. The source of this data is not given. We assume it is collected by DfID directly.

5. The figure of 8.7 million represents the total number of children supported in primary education up to 2013-14 inclusive, so includes results achieved in earlier years. It is not appropriate to present data for individual years for this indicator as the data is drawn from national systems and governments’ enrolment data may be subject to a time lag of a year or more. The source of this data is not given. We assume it is collected by DfID directly.

6. This is the number of births delivered with the help of nurses, midwives or doctors through DfID support. We have combined data from three consecutive annual reports to show where there is inconsistency in the data. The source of this data is not given. We assume it is collected by DfID directly.

7. Annual report 2012-13 contained a note explaining that previous results for this indicator included figures for all people receiving support to cope with the effects of climate change. From 2012-13, data will only refer to those receiving direct support. The figure for 2011-12 was therefore revised down from 2.5 million to 20,000. We have used the revised figure. The source of this data is not given. We assume it is collected by DfID directly.
1. This is the total greenhouse gas emissions from transport in the UK (but includes international transport) in million tonnes of CO₂ equivalent. Source data is collected and compiled by DECC.

2. Percentage of trains which ran on time (GB) – a train is considered to be on time if it arrives at its destination within five minutes (i.e. four minutes 59 seconds or less) of the planned arrival time for London and South East and regional operators; or ten minutes (i.e. nine minutes 59 seconds or less) for long-distance operators. Source data is from Office of Rail Regulation.

3. Percentage of trips of five miles or less travelled by walking, cycling or taking public transport, undertaken by residents of urban areas (connected built-up areas that have resident populations above 10,000 people based on the 2011 Census) (England). Source data is from National Travel Survey, collected by NatCen (commissioned by DfT).

4. Proportion of non-frequent bus services running on time (England). ‘Non-frequent’ bus services are used, because frequent bus journeys do not operate in all areas. DfT Transparency site also shows average waiting times for frequent services. Source data is from local authorities, collated by DfT.

5. Proportion of journeys on Highways Agency roads that are ‘on time’ (England). This is based on a set norm for travel times between adjacent junctions, drawn from historical data. Source data is from the Highways Agency Traffic Information System (HATRIS) Database.

6. Number of fatalities per year resulting from road accidents in Great Britain. Source data is from police reported accident statistics, collated by DfT.

7. Number of ultra-low emission vehicles registered for the first time in Great Britain (millions). Source data is from DVLA/DfT Vehicle Licensing statistics.

8. This indicator relates the car ownership rate to the average public transport time to seven key services. The indicator is indexed (as a score of 100) to the England average for 2011.
All data for England

1. Potential Years of Life Lost (PYLL) from causes considered amenable to healthcare – European age-standardised rate per 100,000 population. Source data is from ONS Mortality statistics.

2. Life expectancy at 75 by gender, in number of years left to live. Source data is from ONS life expectancy statistics.

3. Rate of infant mortality per 1,000 live births. Source data is from ONS Child Mortality Statistics: Childhood, Infant and Perinatal.

4. Differences in life expectancy and healthy life expectancy between communities (for males and females separately). Difference in life expectancy in years by deprivation deciles, as measured by the Slope Index of Inequality. Note that the reporting periods overlap, so any comparison should be made with caution. Source data is from ONS Inequality in Healthy Life Expectancy statistics.

5. i. Percentage of all live births that are of low weight. Source data is from ONS Gestation-Specific Infant Mortality Statistics. ONS published data is for England and Wales. DH obtained separate figures for England.

   ii and iii. Percentage of all live births that are of low weight, by parents’ National Statistics socio-economic classification (NS-SEC). NS-SEC 1, 2, 3, 4 = managerial, professional or intermediate; NS-SEC 5, 6, 7, 8 = routine and manual occupations, never worked or long-term unemployed.

   Data is not directly comparable due to reporting changes by ONS. For 2010-11, father’s NS-SEC classification is used, whereas for 2011-12, the most advantaged parent by NS-SEC classification is used. Source data is from ONS Gestation-Specific Infant Mortality Statistics. ONS published data is for England and Wales. DH obtained separate figures for England.

6. Mortality rate from causes considered preventable, per 100,000 population. Source data is from ONS Avoidable Mortality in England and Wales, 2011.

7. Case-mix adjusted average health status (EQ-5D™) score for individuals aged 18 and over reporting that they have a long-term condition. This gives an average self-reported score measuring health status, with 1 representing perfect health. EQ-5D™ is a standardised health questionnaire and a registered trademark of EuroQol. Source data is from Ipsos-Mori GP patient survey, commissioned by NHS England.

8. Emergency admissions for conditions not usually requiring hospital admission, per 100,000 population. Source data is from hospital episode statistics and ONS population statistics.
9. Percentage of emergency admissions occurring within 30 days of the last, previous discharge after admission. Source data is from hospital episode statistics.

10. Percentage of people reporting a 'very good' or 'fairly good' experience of their GP surgery, GP out-of-hours services and NHS dental services. Source data is from Ipsos-Mori GP patient survey, commissioned by NHS England.

11. Overall patient experience of hospital score from 1 to 100. Source data is from CQC Inpatient Adult Survey, collated by DH.

12. Quality of life for adults receiving social care based on Adult Social Care Survey – score out of 24. Source data is from Health and Social Care Adult Social Care Survey, collated by HSCIC.

13. Percentage of respondents to Adult Social Care Survey Question 1 who were ‘very’ or ‘extremely’ satisfied. Source data is from Health and Social Care Adult Social Care Survey, collated by HSCIC.

14. Safety incidents reported by NHS/healthcare providers that lead to severe harm or death, per 100,000 population. Source data is from National Learning and Reporting System (NLRS), collated by NHS England.

15. Safety incidents reported by NHS/healthcare providers, per 100,000 population. Source data is from NLRS, collated by NHS England.

DWP

1. This shows the percentage of claimants moving off Job Seeker's Allowance and Employment Support Allowance within 52 and 65 weeks. Source data is from the Job Seeker's Allowance Payment Database (not publicly accessible) collated by DWP.

2. This shows the number of people between 16 and state pension age claiming Job Seeker's Allowance, Employment Support Allowance, Incapacity benefit, Severe Disablement Allowance, Income Support, Pensions credit (non-seasonally adjusted). Figures are for the month, not year ending. Source data is from ONS JSA claimant count, and the DWP Work and Pensions Longitudinal Study, collated by DWP.

3. This shows the percentage of people aged 18 to 24 in the UK who are not in education or in employment. Source data is from ONS Labour Market Statistics.

4. This shows the percentage of individuals in the bottom fifth of earners at age 25 to 30 that are 20 or more percentiles higher in the earnings distribution 10 years later. Figures from ONS Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings.

5. This shows the percentage of individuals in families with at least one disabled member with a household income which is below 60% of contemporary equivalised median income. Source data is from ONS and NatCen Family Resource Survey. The FRS definition of disability in 2012-13 – not applied retrospectively.
6. This shows the employment rate of disabled people, relative to employment rate of total working population. Source data is from ONS Labour Force Survey, collated by DWP. Changes to the survey method in 2010 and 2013 make the data not directly comparable.

7. This shows the percentage of pensioners in the UK with incomes below 60% of median income in a particular year, adjusted for family size and composition, and after deducting housing costs. Source data is from ONS and NatCen Family Resource Survey.

8. This shows this number of employee jobs (i.e. excluding the self-employed) where the individual is aged at least 22 years of age, and under state pension age, and earning above the earnings threshold for automatic enrolment (£10,000 in 2014-15 earnings terms) and is participating in a pension scheme sponsored by their employer. Source data is from ONS Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings with bespoke analysis for DWP.

9. This shows the ages at which older people withdraw from the labour market and become inactive, based on multiplying each age by the probability of exiting the labour market at that age. Source data is from ONS Labour Force Survey.

10. This shows the proportion of children (under 16) who live in workless households (which contain at least one person aged 16 to 64, none of whom are in employment). Source data is from ONS Labour Force Survey.

11. This shows estimates of the levels of overpayment and underpayment, as a percentage of benefit expenditure, due to fraud and error across the benefit system. Source data is from fraud and benefit statistics, collected by DWP.

12. This shows the percentage of Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA), Employment and Support Allowance (ESA), Income Support (IS), Disability Living Allowance (DLA), Attendance Allowance (AA), Carer’s Allowance (CA), State Pension (SP) or Pension Credit (PC) claimants who had meaningful contact with the department in the six months prior to fieldwork, and are either fairly or very satisfied. Source data is from a survey conducted by third party (TNS-BMRB), contracted by DWP.

FCO

1. The Ministry of Defence has the same impact indicator, but measures it differently. This data is taken from the FCO’s impact indicator document from September 2012. The data has not been updated since then. In 2014, the FCO gave the following explanation: ‘The World Bank has changed its methodology, so no longer produces a single figure for government effectiveness on its Worldwide Governance Indicator.’

2. The Department for Business, Innovation and Skills has the same indicator. To create a longer time series, we have combined FCO data with data from BIS indicators.
3. The Department for Business, Innovation and Skills has the same indicator. To create a longer time series, we have combined FCO data with data from BIS indicators.

4. To create a longer time series we have combined data from 2014-15 and 2011-12. The data from this source is given as *Bloomberg New Energy Finance/World Economic Outlook*. We could not locate this data.

5. To create a longer time series we have combined data from impact indicator updates published in 2014-15 and 2011-12.

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**HMRC**

1. Cash collected from compliance – this is the total amount of tax that HMRC collects from activity to tackle those individuals and businesses that have not paid the tax that is due, such as cash collected as a result of tax enquiries identifying evasion. A discount rate is applied to reflect the fact that some of the amounts identified will not be collected, due to insolvency for example. Source data is from HMRC.

2. According to the list on the Number 10 Transparency website, the title of this indicator is ‘revenue protected – tax receipts that are protected through HMRC activity, such as legislative action or guidance, that prevents non-compliance’.

   In HMRC’s reporting documents, this indicator is called ‘revenue loss prevented – the value of our activities where we have prevented revenue from being lost to the Exchequer, e.g. stopping a fraudulent repayment claim’.

   We consider this a renaming and clarification of the indicator, and so include it in our analysis. This indicator shows the value of activities undertaken which do not result in the collection of cash but do prevent revenue from being lost to the Exchequer. Source data is from HMRC.

3. HMRC publishes a detailed methodological annex describing the calculation of this indicator.

4. Tax credits error and fraud – this is the amount of tax credits money claimed by people who are not entitled to it. This is an estimate of the tax credits incorrectly paid made after the awards have been finalised. It is shown as a percentage of overall tax credit entitlement.

5. Payment on time – this is the proportion of businesses and individuals (excluding employees who pay tax through PAYE) who pay tax on time – using VAT as a lead indicator.

6. Debt roll rate – this is the proportion of tax debt (CT, SA, Employers’ PAYE) arising in the year that has been cleared within 90 calendar days. This measure covers PAYE, corporation tax, and self-assessment.
7. & 8. Post ‘cleared’ is post which required an HMRC employee to do something or an HMRC action that has an actual or a potential impact on the customer.

10. Percentage of self-assessment, PAYE, VAT, corporation tax, the Construction Industry Scheme and stamp duty land tax returns received online.

11. This measure assesses the effect of changes to HMRC’s products and processes on the costs to individuals and businesses in complying with them. It is shown as a comparison between the end of quarter position and March 2011.

12. This data comes from the quarterly HMRC Customer Survey, and shows an average score of three different questions:

- How easy was it to complete the processes?
- How easy was it to get in touch?
- How easy was it to understand what you had to do? (or ‘How good were HMRC at getting things right?’ for agents).

It includes responses from personal tax customers, benefits and credits customers, small and medium enterprises (SME) and agents, but not from large organisations.

**The Treasury**


2. We cannot provide data back to 2010 as the data was reported in 2010-11 as £billion, not as a percentage.

3. We have used data from the fourth quarter of each year.

4. Data is taken from ONS *Statistical Bulletin: Economic Wellbeing, Q3 2014*, Figure 1: ‘GDP per head and NNDI per head (Q1 2008 - Q3 2014)’. This dataset uses 2008 Q1 as a baseline. We have charted the data for Q3 each year, to show latest quarter growth on corresponding quarter of previous year.

5. We cannot find data for this indicator prior to 2012-13. It was not included in the list of indicators in annual report 2011-12.


7. These figures indicate the value of the government’s shareholdings in each bank.
1. This indicator is defined in the Home Office impact indicator measurement annex as ‘crimes against an identified victim (including organisations) involving personal harm or loss/damage to property, which are brought to the attention of the police and constitute a notifiable offence’. Data is collected from national police forces and divided by resident population data, from the ONS. There is a slight discrepancy in the data for 2012-13. The annual report 2012-13 reports 3.159 million, whereas the annual report for 2013-14 reports 3.211 million.

2. This is the number of organised criminals and groups identified by law enforcement and included on the organised crime group mapping database. This data is collected by the Serious Organised Crime Agency and is not publicly available. Data for 2012-13 is not available.

3. This data is collected by the Serious Organised Crime Agency and is not publicly available.

4. The ‘scale’ of organised crime is the number of known organised criminals and the number of known organised crime groups as identified by law enforcement agencies and recorded on the Organised Crime Group Mapping database. No data is available for earlier years.

5. Net migration is defined as those coming into the UK to stay for 12 months minus those leaving for more than 12 months. This data is taken from the Migration Statistics Quarterly Report. We have indicated where there are discrepancies between provisional estimates and final estimates for each year.

6. The value of the excise tax payable on tobacco goods (cigarettes and hand-rolling tobacco) seized and alcohol products seized at the border or referred to HMRC. Data is collected by Border Force and HMRC.

7. ‘Within target’ indicates within published standards. These are:
   a. 95% of European Economic Area (EEA) passengers within 25 minutes
   b. 95% non-EEA passengers within 45 minutes.

8. ‘Within target’ indicates within published standards. Service standards vary depending on the type of application being processed (e.g. family, individual). Data is collected by the Home Office.

9. The indicator tracks the progress of asylum claims received in each calendar month. The number of conclusions achieved within one year is then divided by the number of asylum applications received for the same period, and multiplied by 100 to give a percentage. Data is collected by the Home Office.
10. ‘Within target’ indicates within published standards – in this case, three weeks. Data is collected by the IPS Passport Application Support System Management Information team.

MoD

1. This is the percentage of Afghan National Security Forces against the NATO target. The time series is constructed from the impact indicator data report in the Ministry of Defence annual report and accounts 2010-11; impact indicators corporate report September 2014; and MoD mid-year report to Parliament September 2014.

2. This is the total number of personnel deployed on operations both in the UK and overseas. The time series is constructed from impact indicator data report in Ministry of Defence annual report and accounts 2010-11; impact indicators corporate report September 2014; and MoD mid-year report to Parliament, September 2014.

3. This is the total percentage of personnel medically fully deployable and medically limited deployable on operations both in the UK and overseas. The time series is constructed from impact indicator data report in the Ministry of Defence annual report and accounts 2010-11; impact indicators corporate report September 2014; and MoD mid-year report to Parliament, September 2014.

4. Number of force elements (FE) (typically ships, ground force sub-units and aircraft) showing critical or serious weakness against the total number of FE for Strategy for Defence (SfD) priorities. As of September 2014 this indicator can no longer be calculated as a consequence of changes under the delegated operating model. The time series is constructed from impact indicator data report in Ministry of Defence annual report and accounts 2010-11; impact indicators corporate report, September 2014; and MoD mid-year report to Parliament, September 2014.

5. The time series is constructed from impact indicator data report in Ministry of Defence annual report and accounts 2010-11; impact indicators corporate report, September 2014; and MoD mid-year report to Parliament, September 2014. Data is taken from the Armed Forces Continuous Attitude Survey.

MoJ

1. & 2. Adult and juvenile reoffending – 'percentage of adult and juvenile offenders reoffending' and 'frequency of reoffending per 100 offenders'. This shows the proportion of offenders who commit at least one further offence within a 12-month period which is proven by either a caution, reprimand or warning, or court conviction within that 12-month period.

The statistical releases do not show the frequency of reoffences per 100 offenders, but per offender. Chart 2 therefore shows frequency of reoffending per offender. Source data is from Police National Computer, prison data, probation data, Home Office data on drug misusing offenders and priority and prolific offenders, collated by MoJ.

3. & 4. Full title: Reoffending and juvenile reoffending – percentage of adults and juveniles released from custody reoffending and frequency of reoffending per 100 offenders.

This shows the proportion of offenders who commit at least one further offence within a 12-month period of release from custody which is proven by either a caution, reprimand or warning, or court conviction within that 12-month period. The statistical releases do not show the frequency of reoffences per 100 offenders, but per offender. Chart 4 therefore shows frequency of reoffending per offender.

Source data is from Police National Computer, prison data, probation data, Home Office data on Drug Misusing Offenders and Priority and Prolific Offenders, collated by MoJ.

5. Source data is from the Youth Justice Board (YJB). Since April 2012, the data has been collected from the eAsset database – the booking system that the Youth Justice Board's Placement Service uses to book young people into custody. Prior to April 2012 the data comes from the YJB's Secure Accommodation Clearing House System (SACHS) database.

6. Court and tribunal timeliness in hearing cases and related processes: criminal court; civil proceedings – fast-track; civil proceedings – small claims; care proceedings; tribunals.

The criminal court figures give the average (mean) number of days from offence to completion for criminal cases. They have been divided by seven to represent weeks on the chart.

For small claims hearings, the figures show the average number of weeks from issue to hearing.

For fast-track civil proceedings, the figures show the average number of weeks from issue to trial.
The care proceedings figures show the average (mean) duration of ‘disposals’ in weeks.

The tribunal figures show the average (mean) age of cases when they are cleared.

Data for the crown court comes from the CREST-MIS administrative system; magistrates’ courts from the Libra administrative system; civil proceedings from CaseMan administrative system; care proceedings primarily from FamilyMan administrative system, plus summary returns from some family proceedings courts; tribunals comes from tribunals case-management system.

These are collated by MoJ, via HM Courts and Tribunals Service.

7. This shows the number of new offences created across all government departments since 2010. The results given for 2010 are described as a ‘one-off retrospective historical count of published legislation’. Without further explanation of what this means, we have not included the 2010 score in our ‘change since 2010’ ranking, but instead used the 2011 results.


18 Ibid.


25 Ibid.


27 Ibid.


57 Letwin, O., Q733, Corrected Evidence to the Public Accounts Committee published as HC 650-ii, Parliament UK website, 9 February 2011, retrieved 27 March 2015, [http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmselect/cmmpubacc/c650-ii/c65001.htm]


60 Letwin, O., Q20-21, Corrected Evidence to the Public Administration Select Committee published as HC 693-I, Parliament UK website, 12 January 2011, retrieved 27 March 2015, [http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmselect/cmmpubadm/c693-i/c69301.htm]

61 Portes, J., 'A troubling attitude to statistics', NIESR blog, 15 March 2015, retrieved 27 March 2015, [http://www.niesr.ac.uk/blog/troubling-attitude-statistics#VRlqw_mSVPw]


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66 Cameron, D., Speech on Business Plans, 8 November 2010


68 Ibid.


70 Murrin, K., Q47, Corrected Evidence to the Public Accounts Committee published as HC 650-i, Parliament UK website, 30 November 2010, retrieved 27 March 2015, [http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmselect/cmmpubacc/c650-i/c65001.htm]


97 Her Majesty’s Treasury and Cabinet Office, *Devolving Decision Making: 1-Delivering better public services:*
refining targets and performance management, March 2004, retrieved 27 March 2015,