

# Institute for Government National Minimum Wage policy reunion

## Seminar report, 1 February 2011

### Introduction

As part of the Institute for Government's "better policy-making" project, we are reuniting groups of people involved in successful policies of the last thirty years. The reunions allow participants to talk through the process, choices and decisions that shaped the outcomes. The aim is to produce an in-depth understanding both of the policy itself but also of the wider system within which it was shaped. In doing so, we wish to shed light on the role of Ministers, civil servants and external players. The Institute will use the "reunions" to inform our better policy making project, as well as producing individual case studies.

On 1st February 2011, we invited the key players from inside and outside government involved in the formulation and implementation of the National Minimum Wage by the new Labour government in 1997. A list of those who attended is at Annex B and a timeline of the key events is at Annex C.

The objective of the reunion was to understand both how policy was developed and implemented, and to understand the factors that contributed to the success of the policy such that the principle of the National Minimum Wage is now widely accepted and the Low Pay Commission has survived the change of government.

As preparation, we asked all participants to fill out a "policy typology" to allow us to understand how far people agreed on the key characteristics of the policy. Full responses are summarised in Annex D, but the key features to emerge from that typology were:

- Disagreement over who was the originating actor of the policy and its main UK government 'owner', but agreement that there was a strong and long-term commitment to the policy.
- Agreement that the policy was a new response to an existing policy goal and involved multiple Whitehall departments and a complex 'delivery chain'.
- Agreement that the evidence base for this policy was contested.
- General agreement that both the anticipated media reaction and the level of public salience surrounding this policy were significant and controversial.
- Agreement that there were significant and major points of conflict between the political parties, but disagreement about the degree of controversy within the governing party.

This formed the starting point for the discussion.

## Method

We conducted the reunion as a discursive process, designed to bring out differences and success factors at different stages. What follows are the key points to emerge in the session. This is not intended to be a comprehensive historic account, but to shed light on how events played out and what this tells us about the policy making process in Whitehall.

## The reunion

### Stage 1: the context

*(In this section we wanted to explore what brought this issue onto the agenda? How did different players see the problem? Where were the politics? The media? How was the timeframe for action perceived?)*

A national minimum wage had featured in four Labour manifestoes in history. It had featured in writings by the Webbs, Philip Snowden in the 1920s and had been advocated by Winston Churchill at one stage. But in 1982 and 1987 it was impossible to get agreement to put it in the Labour manifesto. There had been some reports and reviews in the 1960s. During the 1970s and 1980s, many in the broader labour movement were opposed: many trade unions saw a national minimum wage as undermining collective bargaining and hence their rationale for existence; as posing a threat to their members' differentials if pay scales were squeezed; and, more generally, they feared that a national minimum wage would cost jobs. There were a few lone campaigners – Rodney Bickerstaffe from the National Union of Public Employees, following the earlier NUPE leadership, and Chris Pond from the Low Pay Unit – but they both recalled attending events where the panel outnumbered the audience, such was the lack of interest in the topic. But one of the strengths of these campaigns was the robustness of the information on which they were based.

Attitudes started to change in the mid-1980s. The first resolution for a national minimum wage passed in the Scottish TUC conference in 1984; a year later the Labour Party conference endorsed a minimum wage of 2/3 male median earnings. In 1986 the TUC came on board, although though it was still opposed by the Transport and General Workers' Union, who continued to be concerned with the impact on differentials.

The issue then was to get political agreement to put a national minimum wage commitment into a Labour manifesto – and for Labour to form a government again. At a meeting with John Smith and Tony Blair in 1991, they ruled out a 2/3rd male median earnings minimum wage for the 1992 election and were prepared only to see 50% rising over time to 2/3rds. Tony Blair moved away from the formula when he became leader in 1994.

While the attitudes of the labour movement to a National Minimum wage were changing, the other change was in academic thinking, where labour market research was increasingly demolishing the argument that an NMW would destroy jobs. Whereas academic work before 1992 had all focussed on the potential for job destruction, work by Gregg, Manning and Machin showed more positive labour market impacts and that start to affect the views of the commentariat.

## Stage 2: the initiation

*(In this section we explore how the issue was specified. Who decided on the process and what were the choices that determined that? How were people brought into the process? What handling issues were identified and how was it proposed to resolve them? How was the team assembled? Were there resource issues and how were they decided? What else needed to be resolved before “work” could get going?)*

The detailed preparation for the introduction of the NMW started when the Labour Party was in opposition, to ensure they would have clear proposals ready for enactment when the party came to power. Two groups were established to work up the proposals between 1994-6, headed by Sir Ian McCartney: an implementation group which met weekly to deconstruct all issues (including details such as the treatment of babysitters and au pairs); and a second group which looked at mechanics – coverage and how to ensure compliance. At the same time, the Labour party started to build the political case, starting with the business case, that low pay would not undermine the ability of companies to compete and that high turnover brought high costs in training and recruitment. They also started to reposition the NMW from being about the state taking over wage negotiation to put it in the wider economic context of welfare reform and making work pay. In parallel, the “fat cats” campaign ran week after week to highlight the unfairness of the treatment of people at the bottom end of the pay scale, in contrast to Board Room excess. This was a way of getting round disagreements within the party.

The result of all this preparatory work was that by 1997 some of the participants considered the NMW to be relatively non-controversial. Its passage was helped by the size of the Labour majority, the detailed work done by Ian McCartney and the acquiescence of the CBI.

## Stage 3: the options

*(In this section we look at the process for surfacing options? What evidence was available and how was it used? What unexpected issues came to light? Who was involved and at what stage? Were there “unthinkable” options and how were they kept on or off the table? How were Ministers/ external stakeholders/implementers/ citizens involved? Other departments/ centre? How did the key choices emerge?)*

By the time of the 1997 election, the decision had been made that the route to a national minimum wage was through the establishment of a Low Pay Commission rather than a set formula. That was important for getting consensus within the Labour party. The only dissent came from the Treasury, as the Chancellor wanted to be in charge of setting the wage level.

The preparations in opposition meant that the civil service could be primed to enable the President of the Board of Trade to get the NMW legislation in the first Queen’s speech. Business made clear it wanted to be part of the Low Pay Commission, with the CBI supportive and 76% of the Federation of Small Businesses in favour. The key argument with business was that NMW would prevent good employers being undercut by bad employers and bad employers by the worst.

The decision was made to have a Low Pay Commission with three employer representatives, three labour representatives and three independents. The appointment of George Bain as Chair was crucial

to the success of the Commission, though there were big debates within government over whom to appoint. The independents were able to influence internal deliberations by being able to threaten to side with the other grouping if either one were unreasonable, but the chair was absolutely clear that unanimity was crucial to the Commission's success. The underlying threat that failure to agree would put the decision back in the hands of the Treasury was a powerful incentive to the Commission to agree. Such unanimity was in marked contrast to the Bullock Commission in the 1970s, where the social partners had split, producing minority reports, as had the left and right of the Labour party. Equally, Margaret Beckett, as President of the Board of Trade, fought hard and quite successfully to ensure that the Commission's recommendations were adopted as a whole, rather than taken separately. She and Geoffrey Norris at No.10 were critical to achieving political agreement for the Commission's proposals.

The Low Pay Commission based its recommendations on significant analysis and research, and it was supported by an extremely effective secretariat. The Commission was 'bounced' by Peter Hain into incorporating a strong regional visits element into its work programme, visiting more than 200 places – but this proved hugely beneficial both in terms of getting buy-in and bringing the Commission together. The Commission uncovered a lot of real abuse. For instance, one member recounted seeing an advertisement for a night-watchman at £1 an hour for a 100 hour week, where the employee had to bring their own dog.

In the final analysis, the decisions came back to an old-fashioned negotiation between Bill Callaghan for the TUC and John Cridland for the CBI. Both were highly pragmatic, skilled negotiators. And again, unlike the Bullock Review, it was much easier to negotiate money than power.

One of the big successes was that despite a lot of journalists looking for stories about tensions, people did not talk to the press.

#### Stage 4: The decision

*(in this section we explore the process around making the final decision. How were conflicting departmental positions/ HMT/ No.10 handled? Were there significant compromises? How were Parliament and the media handled? How was implementation set up? Who played what role in the process?)*

There were two critical decisions from the first set of recommendations from the LPC. The LPC was not asked to address the question of whether there should be a minimum wage or whether it should be national – but to recommend the level. The first issue was whether the trade unions settled too low for the first NMW. The decision was partly affected by the poor data; the decision to go for £3.60 was assumed to impact 2m people but later data showed only 1.5m were affected. But the trade unions made a deliberate decision that it was better to get an agreed system on a durable basis than to bid high straight away. Over time, the minimum wage was ratcheted up significantly in real terms, so this proved in retrospect a very effective approach.

The second and most controversial issue was the youth rate. This was an area where evidence suggested that there could be employment impacts, and anything showing that the minimum wage was destroying jobs for young people would be politically disastrous. The intervention of Peter

Mandelson that people were “not old” until they were 25 brought the Commission together in order to assert their independence. Nevertheless, the youth rate proved to be the one area where concessions had to be made to the Treasury.

The third issue was whether the LPC was to be a one-off, making the first recommendation but then disappearing (which was the preference of the Treasury team), or whether it was to be a standing commission. The fact that the battle was won for it to be a standing commission, and the high quality of subsequent chairs, meant that the LPC was able to pick up unfinished business from the first report and adapt proposals over time.

The amount of preparation meant that the proposals could be implemented by April 1999 – less than two years after the general election.

### Stage 5: The hindsight

*(in this section we ask what worked and what didn't? What could/ should have been done differently? What were the big surprises? )*

There was general agreement that the approach worked well, in particular establishing a permanent commission with a powerful reputation. The NMW made a significant immediate difference to people at the bottom end of the pay scale – 70% of those who benefited were women and many were not covered by traditional collective bargaining arrangements.

Summing up, Professor Martin Lodge said that the NMW was both a policy and institutional success. This could be attributed to five factors:

- Creating the context – through the fat cats campaign and changing the attitude of the unions
- Ability to change the definition of the issue – about abuse in monopsonistic markets
- Institutional design – which enabled the issue to be depoliticised, involved the social partners and developed reputational credibility
- Fitting into existing frames of mediation
- Importance of gradualism and muddling through and using “ordinary knowledge”.

When asked about what could have been done better, participants identified the following issues:

- The treatment of London – the minimum wage was irrelevant to workers in London
- Although the NMW put a “plimsoll line” floor under the labour market (and was a critical enabler of the attack on poverty and of the introduction of tax credits), it did nothing to tackle the issue of people stuck in low productivity companies – one effect of the NMW was to remove the possibility of progression
- More resources for enforcement and potential joining up with enforcement in other areas, e.g. Health and Safety – bad employers tend to be bad employers across the board, and collaboration between HMRC and local authorities may enabled higher enforcement
- Some issues, e.g. gratuities, were still not solved
- The quality of statistics on which the decisions were based
- Use of the social partner model on other issues such as the working time directive

- Real concerns about the risk that the NMW may be eroded in coming years, despite apparent consensus, through pressure for regionalisation or exemption of small businesses, or a reduction in enforcement.

## Conclusions: the critical success factors

The key success factors behind the introduction of the national minimum wage seem to be:

- The extended **public campaign** by the Low Pay Unit, NUPE and others, based on good evidence, to gain acceptance to the principle of the NMW
- The **extensive preparation** done in Opposition by the Labour front bench team, which meant they could: prepare the detail of the proposals; capitalise on the political momentum of the Labour victory; prepare the political ground, which paved the way for business support, including the reframing of the issue into a wider economic and social justice context;
- The creation of an **independent Commission**, with a high quality Chair, commissioners and secretariat, a strong incentive for internal unanimity, and the ability to bond effectively despite coming from very different perspectives
- The involvement of **outstanding people**: the LPC Chair (and subsequent chairs) played a key role, with an ability both to think strategically but also tactically, and the TUC and CBI leads (concern that the impact of Nolan might make it harder to choose the right people in the same way in the future).
- The **strong analytical and research base** for the proposals both in the campaign for the NMW and the Commissions' proposals;
- The fact that the proposals were **simple** and that the remit of the LPC was focussed;
- **Political leadership** within the government to protect the integrity of the Commission's proposals and the **passion and persistence** of those involved to ensure that the policy was implemented;
- The **complementary roles** played by the President of the Board of Trade in providing political cover and the Minister of State in driving the legislation through;
- The decision to establish the Commission as a standing commission, which enabled it to evolve an **incremental and adaptive** approach. This meant it could solve issues over time and start with relatively modest proposals, see the impact and then adjust.

*Jill Rutter, Michael Hallsworth and Tori Harris  
Institute for Government, February 2011*

## Annex A: Lessons for policy making

Barrier	Manifestation	Significance	Resolution
Relationships between civil servants and Ministers	Not an issue – Ministers and the Low Pay Commission both pay tribute to the support they received from the civil service	L	NA
Innovation	This was a new policy for the UK – but not a new idea. Key issue was the large number of detailed implementation issues involved	L	See design below
Adversarial political culture	Potentially hugely controversial both between parties and within Labour movement	H	Internal LP campaign over a number of years. Conservative opposition muted by scale of Labour election victory. Media coverage impacted by loss of specialist industrial correspondents.
Evidence	Data quite poor	H	LPC secretariat developed analytic capacity – but also gained real understanding of operation of labour markets at bottom end
Evaluation	Impacts on labour market important	M	LPC as standing commission able to monitor labour market impacts
Policy design	Very important – large number of detailed issues needed to be resolved	H	Extensive preparatory work in Opposition. LPC able to address emerging issues over time.
Policy as a profession and a career	NA		NA
Europe			NA – but could model have been used to reach agreement on working time directive? but made difficult by European legislative timetable

## Annex B – Participants

Participant	Role at the time
Andrew Adonis, Chair	
Rt Hon Margaret Beckett MP	President of the Board of Trade 1997-1998
Sir George Bain	First Chair of the Low Pay Commission, (1997-2002)
Sir Ian McCartney	Shadow Employment Minister (1994-1997), Minister at Department for Trade and Industry (1997-1999)
Rodney Bickerstaffe	President of TUC (1992), General Secretary of UNISON (1995-2000)
Dan Corry	Senior Economist IPPR 1992-1997, Special Adviser DTI and DTLR (1997-2002)
Geoffrey Norris	Special Adviser (Business), Number 10 Policy Unit (1997-2008)
Sir Bill Callaghan	Chief Economist and Head of the Economic and Social Affairs Department at the Trade Union Congress, Commissioner, Low Pay Commissioner (1997-2000)
John Rhodes	First Secretary of the Low Pay Commission
Chris Pond	Director of the Low Pay Unit (1980-1997), Chair, Low Pay Unit (1997-1999)
Dr Martin Lodge	Academic Discussant, Department of Government LSE



## Annex C –National Minimum Wage Commission timeline

1909

### **Trades Board Act**

Created four Trades Boards to set minimum wages

1986

### **National Minimum Wage (NMW) received formal support from the TUC**

This occurred when the TGWU and other major unions modified their stance. The unions had previously been concerned that such a stance would with undermine collective bargaining, however this was already being eroded by Mrs Thatcher’s government.<sup>1</sup>

### **25 July – Wages Act received Royal Assent**

This Act reformed the Wages Councils (of which there were 26 councils covering two million employees at the time), reducing their scope and preventing new ones being formed. The Act “removed workers under 21 from regulation and restricted the Councils to setting a single minimum hourly rate, a single overtime rate and a limit for accommodation charges. In order to introduce the changes made by the Wages Act 1986 the government notified the ILO of its intention to withdraw from Convention No 26, which requires the creation and maintenance of wage fixing machinery.”<sup>2</sup>

1992

### **Labour fought the 1992 election on a policy of a NMW fixed at ‘half male median earnings’**

This policy was widely criticised for its ambiguity and the dubious formula on which it was based (male median weekly earnings divided by average weekly hours worked by men and women, then divided by two, was an inconsistent formula). Another criticism was that it would “it would take the UK from having no national minimum wage at all to having the highest minimum wage in the developed world” which would “inevitably create a major labour market shock”.<sup>3</sup>

1993

### **1 July – Trade Union Reform and Employment Rights Act received Royal Assent**

This Act led to the abolition of the Wage Councils, and as a consequence from 1993 to 1999 the UK was in the as unusual position of where there were no wage controls except the Agricultural Wages Board.

1997

### **May – Labour Election Manifesto promised to introduce NMW**

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<sup>1</sup> [http://www.theworkfoundation.com/assets/docs/publications/57\\_National%20minimum%20wage.pdf](http://www.theworkfoundation.com/assets/docs/publications/57_National%20minimum%20wage.pdf)

<sup>2</sup> <http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/emire/UNITED%20KINGDOM/WAGESCOUNCILS-EN.htm>

<sup>3</sup> [http://www.theworkfoundation.com/assets/docs/publications/57\\_National%20minimum%20wage.pdf](http://www.theworkfoundation.com/assets/docs/publications/57_National%20minimum%20wage.pdf)  
[www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk](http://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk)

The manifesto claimed that the NMW should be “decided not on the basis of a rigid formula but according to the economic circumstances of the time and with the advice of an independent low pay commission, whose membership will include representatives of employers, including small business, and employees.”<sup>4</sup>

#### **14 May – Government announces plans for NMW in Queen’s Speech**

#### **August – Main members of the Low Pay Commission (LPC) Appointed<sup>5</sup>**

These members included Professor George Bain, and the LPC was further composed of three members from the business community, three from the trade unions and two independent academics. These appointments came less than three months after the election, indicating how much of a priority the NMW was for the new government.

**October** – Emerges that the NMW set might not be a definite one, and that it may take two or three years for a figure acceptable to all parties to be found<sup>6</sup>

**October** – Joseph Rowntree Foundation issued a report arguing that the NMW established must take social security into account, and that a minimum wage of GBP 3.75 would enable 300,000 low-paid workers to escape family poverty, whilst at the same time saving the taxpayer GBP 1.2 billion. While “another piece of research by the London School of Economics finds that a rate of GBP 3.85 would be equivalent to the all industry average set by the Wages Councils before their abolition in 1993 (it was then GBP 3.07) and therefore probably have few longer-term detrimental effects.”<sup>7</sup>

#### **26 November – National Minimum Wage Bill Introduced**

This bill provided for an hourly rate that most UK workers over the age of 22 (separate levels were set for most 16 and 17, and 18-21 year olds) could not be paid less than. Failure to pay the NMW became a criminal offence, as was not keeping records that prove the company was complying with the legislation.

### **1998**

#### **18 June – LPC presented its First Report to the PM**

This report detailed the process by which they had come to their recommendations, the patterns of working pay and current wage levels, the importance of training and development, and finally the method of choosing and potential impact of the NMW. The Report also began by establishing the Commission’s objectives of making a difference to low paid workers and making recommendations that business could afford and that were enforceable with no exploitable loopholes.

#### **31 July – National Minimum Wage Act received Royal Assent**

“Trade unions, who in 1979 had represented 55% of the workforce, had been capable of negotiating wages through collective bargaining. But by 1999 less than one in four workers were unionised, and a

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<sup>4</sup> <http://www.labour-party.org.uk/manifestos/1997/1997-labour-manifesto.shtml>

<sup>5</sup> <http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/1997/11/feature/uk9711177f.htm>

<sup>6</sup> <http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/1997/11/feature/uk9711177f.htm>

<sup>7</sup> <http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/1997/11/feature/uk9711177f.htm>

national solution was proposed. The policy is opposed by Conservatives, who vote against its introduction.”<sup>8</sup>

## **Sept-Nov – Public Consultation on the draft NMW regulations**

### **1999**

#### **March – NMW regulations received Parliamentary approval**

##### **1 April – NMW legislation came into force**

£3.60 for those over the age of 22, £3 for those under 22. Firms faced a fine of up to £5,000 if they failed to comply and the move was expected to benefit nearly 2 million people.<sup>9</sup>

### **2000**

#### **February – Government announced increase in NMW**

##### **February – LPC published their Second Report<sup>10</sup>**

This report had been commissioned the report as an evaluation of the introduction of the NMW in its response to the LPC’s First Report, and asked that it be submitted by December of 2000. This Second report concluded that the smooth introduction of the NMW was due to “the prudent nature of our initial recommendations”, the hard work of all the stakeholders involved, and adaption to the new system by individuals and businesses. It also noted the early indications that the introduction of the NMW had closed some of the gender pay gap.

As part of this report the LPC “commissioned twenty-three research projects, undertook large-scale surveys of companies in low-paying sectors, considered all available data and held two seminars... took written and oral evidence and visited all parts of the UK”.

### **2001**

#### **March – Volume One of LPC’s Third Report published<sup>11</sup>**

The Third Report was published in two volumes, with the first dealing with recommendations for the new rate and the second dealing with other issues, in order to allow business at least six months to prepare for any changes which the Government wished to implement by October 2001.

This report began with the same conclusions as the Second Report that the NMW had been introduced successfully “without any significant impact on employment or the economy”. It also noted that “This major intervention in the labour market, which many considered controversial even a couple of years ago, is now widely accepted throughout the UK”. It went on to recommend an increase in the NMW to £4.10 in October 2001 and a further increase in October 2002 to £4.20.

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<sup>8</sup> <http://www.totalpolitics.com/blogs/index.php/2010/10/01/history-of-the-uk-s-minimum-wage>

<sup>9</sup> [http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/april/1/newsid\\_2465000/2465397.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/april/1/newsid_2465000/2465397.stm)

<sup>10</sup> <http://www.lowpay.gov.uk/lowpay/report/pdf/complete.pdf>

<sup>11</sup> <http://www.lowpay.gov.uk/lowpay/report/pdf/report3.pdf>

### **June – Volume Two of the LPC’s Third Report published<sup>12</sup>**

The second volume of the Third Report dealt with the remaining issues beyond the question of the increase to the NMW which was covered by the first volume. This included issues surrounding young people and training, the impact of the NMW on incomes, as well as issues of compliance, enforcement, and implementation. It also recommended that future reviews of the NMW should take place biennially, with the Commission reporting in February “to allow sufficient notice of implementation the following October”.

### **August – Second Annual Report on the NMW published**

“This shows, among other things, that despite a fall in the number of complaints of underpayments received, the amount of arrears recovered for workers actually increased quite dramatically from £1.2m in 1999/2000 to £3m in 2000/2001. This was achieved as a result of improved case selection and with enhancements to staff training, investigation officers were able to achieve better results.”<sup>13</sup>

### **October – Government confirmed the permanent status of the LPC**

## **2003**

### **March – Fourth Report of the LPC published<sup>14</sup>**

This was the first report to be published under the new Chair, who paid tribute to Sir George’s leadership in the Foreword arguing that he “helped to establish the way in which the Commission operates: an approach based on openness, consultation and partnership, underpinned by rigorous analysis”.

It recommended further increases of the NMW to £4.50 in October 2003 and £4.85 in October 2004 (subject to confirmation by the Commission in early 2004).

## **2010**

**1 October – Minimum wage raised to £5.93 (most recent annual uprate) and the age threshold to qualify for main rate lowered to 21.**

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<sup>12</sup> <http://www.lowpay.gov.uk/lowpay/report/rep01.shtml>

<sup>13</sup> <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+http://www.dti.gov.uk/er/nmw/nmwhist.htm>

<sup>14</sup> <http://www.lowpay.gov.uk/lowpay/report/pdf/lowpay-nmw.pdf>

## Annex D – Typology Questionnaire Summary

1) Who was the originating actor of this policy?	Other - was in manifesto but vague on details	Prime Minister	Other (non-media) stakeholder	Labour Party	Other, Labour Party (NEC?)
2) Who was the main UK government 'owner' of this policy?	Single Secretary of State; Single Junior Minister	Prime Minister	Single 'Junior' Minister	Prime Minister; Single Secretary of State	Single 'Junior' Minister
3) How strong was the commitment of this main 'owner' to the policy?	Strong, long term	Strong, long term	Strong, long-term	Strong, long-term	Strong, long term
4) How well defined were the goals and objectives of this policy?	well-defined	Well-defined	Well-defined	Well-defined, contested	Contested
5) What degree of change to existing policy did this policy represent?	New response to an existing policy goal	New response to a perceived new policy goal	New response to an existing policy goal	New response to a perceived new policy goal, Other (long held Labour Movement priority)	New response to a perceived new policy goal; Other (Equally an old response to an old policy goal dependent upon Labour being in Government)
6) What was the perceived urgency of this policy?	urgent	Urgent	Long-term issue	Urgent	Urgent; long-term issue

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7) What evidential foundation was there for this policy?	Uncertain, other - could not be definitive, depended on rate set, youth rate etc	Contested	Contested	Contested	Contested
8) What type of internal dependencies were involved with this policy?	Multiple Whitehall departments, complex 'delivery chain'	Multiple Whitehall departments, complex 'delivery chain'	Multiple Whitehall departments, complex 'delivery chain'	Multiple Whitehall departments, complex 'delivery chain'	Multiple Whitehall departments, complex 'delivery chain'
9) What level of non-government stakeholder power surrounded this policy?	High power and varying goals	High power and varying goals	High power and varying goals	High power and varying goals	High power and varying goals
10a) Were there other dependencies surrounding this policy?			Yes	No	No
10b) If 'Yes' please give details			Differences of views and interests among and within key stakeholder groups - employers and trade unions	Benefit improvement and changes. Knowledge of difficult sector of economy i.e. homeworking, agency work, proposed new policies in tax credits and training	
11) What kind of legislation was required for this policy?	Primary legislation	Primary legislation	Primary legislation	Primary and secondary legislation	Primary legislation

12) What level of party political controversy surrounded this policy?	Significant - major point of conflict between parties	Significant - major point of conflict between parties	Significant, major point of conflict between parties	Significant - major point of conflict between parties	Significant - major point of conflict between parties
13) Was there a significant degree of controversy within the governing party?	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Other (I would call it 'rumbling')
14) What level of public salience surrounded this policy?	Significant and controversial	Significant and controversial	Significant and controversial	Significant but non-controversial	Limited but controversial
15) What was the anticipated media reaction to this policy?	Significant and contested	Significant and contested	Significant and contested	Significant and contested	Limited and contested