

Ministers Reflect Jeremy Hunt



10 June 2025

Biographical details

Parliamentary history

1997–2024: MP for South West Surrey

2020–22: chair of the Health and Social Care select committee

2024–present: MP for Godalming and Ash

Government career

2010–12: Secretary of state for culture, Olympics, media and sport

2012–18: Secretary of state for health

2018: Secretary of state for health and social care

2018–19: Secretary of state for foreign and commonwealth affairs

2022–24: Chancellor of the exchequer

Jeremy Hunt was interviewed by Gemma Tetlow and Sachin Savur on 10 June 2025 for the Institute for Government's Ministers Reflect project.

Jeremy Hunt discusses returning to government as chancellor of the exchequer in 2022. He talks about coming into the Treasury after the Truss-Kwarteng mini-budget, the power that chancellors hold, and trying to make long-term change in government.

GT: You were appointed chancellor in October 2022 in the aftermath of the Liz Truss-Kwasi Kwarteng mini-budget. In those early days, how did you choose your priorities?

JH: I think the number one priority was stabilising the markets – you know, they were crashing around our ears. I was appointed on the Friday night and over the weekend we spent a lot of time thinking what we needed to do to reassure the markets on Monday morning that we were taking the necessary measures to bring back fiscal and economic stability. So that kind of eclipsed everything.

There was a broader challenge that we had as well, which is that we knew that one of the reasons that the markets had taken umbrage was the lack of an OBR [Office for Budget Responsibility] costed autumn statement, and so we knew we had to do one – and we knew that that was going to require filling a £72 billion black hole, which was going to involve some very, very difficult decisions on both tax and spending. As soon as we realised – I guess by the end of Monday or Tuesday – that the markets were stable then our thinking started moving very quickly to that second challenge.

GT: More generally, what was it like coming into government at that moment?

JH: Well, I actually do write about this in my book, but I think it helped that I had been a minister before. I will never forget the first meeting I had in the chancellor's office in the Treasury, which was probably about six o'clock on the Friday evening. And you know, there's a big table in that office and there were probably about 14 of the top civil servants from the Treasury there, led by the permanent secretary James Bowler, and that was their first chance to size me up, really.

My default is that you trust people until they prove you wrong, and this proved to be a completely trustworthy group of people – very smart. And what I really liked about them was that they were not afraid to say what they really thought and so we could have very open discussions. I'd say what I thought, they would give me their instant reaction – it was a proper discussion.

I think that I probably had to earn that trust because prior to me, literally a week earlier, Tom Scholar [Treasury permanent secretary, 2016–22] had been sacked by Liz Truss. And I suspect, with the benefit of hindsight, that one of the reasons that the mini-budget went so badly wrong was because officials didn't want to tell Kwasi Kwarteng if they thought that elements of it were a bad idea, because their boss had just been sacked, and so, you know, there was a kind of nervousness there.

So I needed to establish a working relationship of trust, and the first thing I said to them was "we're going to do what's right for the country, even if it means that I'm a Ken Clark chancellor who bequeaths a healthy growing economy to his political opponents – we

have to do the right thing for the country”. And I hope that contributed to the trust that built between us.

GT: You emphasised there that they felt able to tell you what they thought and to be quite frank – was that different from what you found as a minister at other points in your career?

JH: I think this is an essential part of our constitution, because ministers are generalists, and civil servants are specialists and they have the institutional knowledge. I had never had an economics portfolio as a minister before – my only background in the area was having set up and run my own business before I went into politics. So the system depends on civil servants being able to talk really openly to ministers about things that they know have worked in the past and things that they know have failed in the past. And as a minister, you have to have the confidence to listen.

I found Treasury officials brilliant at that, but I would say it was equally important when I was foreign secretary and I was talking to people who were experts, for example on policy towards Iran. By the same merit you need to listen but also be able to challenge and have a good discussion, and then you generally get the right outcome.

GT: You stayed on as chancellor when Rishi Sunak became prime minister. What conversations did you have with him about how to get government back on track at that point?

JH: We had very similar instincts, and so we didn’t have very many conversations. I mean, he saw when he decided to appoint me as chancellor that I had successfully stabilised the markets, that I’d taken some very difficult decisions and I’d been able to restore confidence. And I think he felt it wasn’t time for another change.

But I think he chose to keep me because he broadly agreed with what I’d done and therefore was willing to be supportive, and I think he also knew that I would be a team player and that was very important for him.

I think when he became prime minister he was very interested in the decisions that we took with respect to the autumn statement, so that was put off for a month as one of the first decisions that we took. Initially, we thought we needed to present this to the country within a matter of days, but having restored confidence in the markets we were able to have a little bit of extra time, and I’m sure that made it a much better autumn statement. Of course, as a former chancellor he was very interested in some of the decisions that I was taking in that and we had, you know, very open discussions.

GT: You’ve sort of touched on this already, but how much agency did you feel you had as chancellor at that time given the constraints from financial markets?

JH: I had massive agency. Because, first of all, I didn’t have responsibility for the decisions that had got us into difficulty – so as far as everyone was concerned, I was identified as being part of the solution, not part of the problem. But because there was a proper crisis, that unlocked the opportunity to do many more radical things than it’s possible to do in normal times. Of course I had the prime minister, who I had to persuade – but in those early days I think our instincts were very, very similar.

So I think I had a lot of agency, actually. In fact, in the period that Liz Truss was still prime minister, in retrospect people said I was the most powerful man in the country and the most powerful chancellor that there had ever been for that short week – it's maybe true! I wasn't really thinking that way at the time – I was just trying to concentrate on the problems at hand.

I think, in a period when you're tackling a crisis you have, curiously, a much freer hand. No one's talking to you about the next election or opinion polls or interest groups who are making their case very strongly, and so I think I had quite a free hand.

GT: What would you point to as the more radical things you did at that point and why did you pick those?

JH: So the first thing that we had to do was make the decision as to whether to bridge the gap through tax or spend, and we did a combination of both. But I think probably on the spending side I introduced some pretty tight overall caps on government spending and they continue to this day. You know, it's quite interesting how that was much criticised by Labour at the time as a return to austerity, but actually we see Rachel Reeves [chancellor of the exchequer, 2024–] pursuing exactly the same path now. And I think we're having the wrong debate – we're defining austerity as whether there are cuts to unprotected departments, whereas I think the real definition of austerity is whether there are cuts to the services that the public value. And you can avoid those cuts if you have an ambitious productivity programme, and that was what I was in the process of putting in place – I put it in place for the NHS but not for the rest of the public sector. So I think that was a pretty big decision because prior to that, Boris Johnson and indeed Liz Truss, had planned very generous increases in public spending.

Obviously then, on the tax side the most difficult decision I took was to extend the freeze on income tax thresholds, which was much criticised as a back-door tax – in a way it was, but probably it was the most effective way of raising tax revenues in a way that broadly people could live with, although it was by no means popular.

GT: Liz Truss was obviously very critical of Treasury orthodoxy when she was prime minister. What was the mood of the department when you came in? And you talked a bit about rebuilding bridges with officials – could you expand on that?

JH: I think the Treasury had lost a lot of confidence – partly from its most senior, and a very respected, civil servant being fired, but also because the government had just announced a budget that had unravelled, and that's the Treasury's patch. You know, patently things weren't going well and we were having a market collapse, so I think there was a lot of nervousness in the Treasury about all those things going wrong in its territory. But it's full of very smart, very committed public servants. And you know, I found it was really easy to have very open discussions about radical changes that I wanted to make or was considering making.

I would say that the bit that I thought was missing at the Treasury is that – because it's responsible for these two fiscal events that by law we have to have every year – the beating heart of the Treasury is what you might call its accountancy function. There's a really big tax department and a really big spending team. And, basically, making sure that tax and spending balance within the chancellor's fiscal rules – that is the bread and butter

of the organisation. But I always felt there wasn't enough discussion about growth, about how you actually grow the size of the pie.

So I spent a lot of time on growth initiatives and, you know, there is a big team in the Treasury focused on that and they were excellent. And we did the Mansion House reforms [in July 2023], my plans to turn the UK into the world's next Silicon Valley. You know, we had a whole autumn statement in 2023 with 110 different growth measures. So there's a lot of willingness to do this, but it took the chancellor of the time to want to do it, and I always slightly felt the default would probably be to get back into the accountancy function with growth as something that's nice to do if you can.

GT: How much ability did you feel you had to really shift that focus within the Treasury, and how much effort were you having to put it into that?

JH: It was not a problem to make sure that growth got enough focus when I was chancellor, because I was the boss. And I would say this is how I'm going to spend my day, we're going to have meetings – as we did every week – on different aspects of the growth agenda. But what I didn't do was permanently change the institutional focus so that it remained that way after I left – it's still, I think, a matter for the priorities of individual chancellors. I think Rachel Reeves, in fairness, is very interested in growth and I'm sure they're carrying on having lots of discussions about things like planning reform. But I think it should be as much part of the DNA of the Treasury as the tax and spend side.

GT: Shifting focus a little bit, how did your previous experience as a spending minister affect your approach in the Treasury?

JH: A lot. Because, you know, I pushed through long-term workforce plan for the NHS, which the Treasury had been blocking. I pushed through an NHS productivity programme, which was a commitment from the NHS to 2% annual productivity growth in return for £3.4 billion to overhaul their IT systems. I think I was a lot more interested in public service reform than previous chancellors, having worked in a spending ministry, so it definitely really helped me.

GT: And you also chaired several cabinet committees, including the quite wide-reaching Home Affairs Committee. How would you describe your leadership role in government along with Rishi Sunak and Oliver Dowden as chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster?

JH: I don't think those committees are much more than rubber-stamping exercises. They're kind of a formality, but in practice, you know, certainly the person chairing had a very strong steer before the committee as to what No.10 wanted the outcome of the meeting to be. And so we did our best to deliver it.

I think in a different way, a chancellor who is interested in government policy across the piece can have huge influence because the Treasury has so many levers. You know, I've always been a big believer in the need to reform welfare, and so I made that a big feature in my fiscal events and had numerous discussions with Mel Stride [work and pensions secretary, 2022–24] about that. I obviously had a long-standing interest in the NHS. I had an interest in our economic infrastructure, so I took a big interest in all the decisions around nuclear power and rail and road infrastructure. So I think the chancellor is, after

the prime minister, the most powerful position in Whitehall and I think I used that to the maximum.

GT: There are obviously different hard powers that the Treasury has in ultimately having sign-off on where the money goes in one place or another. Were there also 'soft power' approaches that you took?

JH: I think most of your power does revolve around the decisions you can make over money and the chancellor is the only person in the government who, if there's a need for £50 million for XYZ project, can find it. So that puts you in a very different position to every other cabinet minister, including the prime minister – the prime minister can't just find £50 million, they have to go to the chancellor. So you do have a big influence, it's absolutely true, through that chequebook.

Although obviously I used that power to the max, I don't think it's an optimal system. I think that in other countries, once their budget is agreed with the finance ministry, providing they live within that budget, they have much more autonomy. They can roll over in-year underspends and I think we would get more long-term decision making through our spending departments, if they had more autonomy.

The level of financial control where the Treasury, for example, would sign off on a capital project for a new hospital, even if it was in the Department of Health budget, it would still sign it off. Or a new road scheme which was within the Department for Transport's budget, but it would still be signed off by the Treasury. That always felt to me like the kind of control that a finance department would have in a company that was in distress at risk of going bust, but not what you would do in a company that was prospering and going from strength to strength and planning for the long term. Obviously if you're in a situation where there's a crisis in public finances and the Treasury needs to show an interest in every penny that's spent, then in that situation it's understandable, but the Treasury has that power all the time in the UK. My worry about it is that, in the end, we don't make decisions strategically.

So I think what happens is that the Treasury's overwhelming interest in, for example, the spending review that's being discussed at the moment is to get to a number which is the envelope that the chancellor has put for public spending. The envelope's been set and the chancellor needs to deliver that number when she stands up in parliament on Wednesday. So if you're Yvette Cooper [home secretary, 2024–] arguing for the police budget, then in the end funding for the Police National Computer is something which no one's going to notice if it's cut – or in fact, more likely, delayed by two years. The Treasury gets its number, but the police continue to operate totally inefficiently. Now in the private sector, funding for that police IT system will be the top priority because the management is always ruthlessly focused on cost control, so they would want that funding in and then they would want to say 'and then we're going to employ fewer policemen at the end of the process'.

I didn't think that that kind of strategic cost reduction discussion happens as much as it should in Whitehall. And that is because I think the micromanagement by the Treasury of small amounts, to hit a number at a fiscal event, mitigates against the kind of long-term reforms that a lot of our public services need.

GT: Thinking about fiscal events, you announced cuts to National Insurance contributions in the autumn statement 2023 and the March budget in 2024. How did you come to those decisions?

JH: I very firmly believe that if you look around the world, there is a link between lower taxes and higher economic growth. There's a big debate in the economics community about whether it's correlation or causation, and maybe the reason that Switzerland has lower taxes than us is because it's grown faster than us. But I think that there is causation, for all sorts of reasons. And I felt that to get our growth rate up, we needed to bring down the tax burden – even though I was the person who put it up to pay down our Covid debt.

But because the economy was basically flat when I was making these decisions, I wanted to reduce tax in the way that was most beneficial to economic growth. And all the evidence was that the National Insurance cuts – well, the OBR said that the National Insurance cuts that I introduced would get the equivalent of 200,000 more people into work, because if you reduce the tax on work, people work more. And so I thought it was a good measure for labour supply, good for economic growth – that was recognised in the way the OBR scored those budgets.

If you're going to do that and you don't want public services to deteriorate, you have to accompany it with a very ambitious programme of public sector productivity and public sector reform. And that's the other side to the coin.

But I also think that employees' National Insurance is a pernicious tax. I mean, lots of taxes have problems, but that particular one is a very bad one, because one of the biggest cultural problems we have at the moment is too many people being signed onto welfare and being told they don't have to look for a job. And taxing people on low incomes through the payroll is one of the things that creates a very negative incentive for people not to engage in the world of work.

GT: Did the pre-election context affect your decisions about announcing tax cuts at that point?

JH: Well, obviously we hoped for as much electoral benefit as possible. And Conservative Party experts were very happy with the choice of National Insurance because they thought it would be popular in 'red wall' seats that we were defending. But my priority was economic growth – I thought it was good for economic growth, and that was backed up by the OBR that increased our GDP forecast for the end of the five-year period, as a result of those decisions. So there was a kind of agreement on the political side and the economic side that this was the right approach.

GT: How did the fiscal rules affect the fiscal announcements that you made or how you thought about those?

JH: I'd say two things. First of all, one of the things that I really regretted having to do, but I didn't have a choice in when I was filling that £72 billion black hole, was to freeze capital spending in cash terms, which is a real-terms reduction. And I really didn't want to do that because I think capital spending, particularly on economic infrastructure, is very important. In my own mind, I justified it because Rishi Sunak, at the start of the parliament, increased capital spending by 20% in real terms – so it was still higher than it

would otherwise have been, even after my freeze in cash terms. So I actually support Rachel Reeves's change to the fiscal rules that allows her to do more capital spending on economic infrastructure.

But there was one change that I made to the fiscal rules, which had a completely unanticipated benefit – in order to balance the books in 2022, I extended the fiscal period from three years to five years. This was widely welcomed by experts and independent economists because they recognised that, without that, I'd have been forced into much more savage cuts in public spending which could have got us into an economic doom loop, so no one criticised me for it at the time.

But it had a completely unanticipated benefit, because when a chancellor has a five-year fiscal period – I don't know if we've ever had a five-year fiscal period before that – that means that you can do things like welfare reform or planning reform and you have long enough for it to feed through into the growth that you see at the end of a five-year period. So if you're doing welfare reform, for example, you will have to pass an act through parliament, you then have to roll it out, you might have some pilots. And previously, none of the benefits of those difficult decisions would show through in a fiscal period, so there's quite a strong incentive not to do that because you get a lot of political grief – but with a longer fiscal period you do make policy making more long-term.

GT: As you say, there was quite a strong argument in 2022 for extending the time period, because you were starting in quite a difficult position and needed to take time to adjust. Did you ever think about then shortening the time horizon back again?

JH: No, because I could see this huge benefit. And this started with the childcare reforms I introduced in March '23 where the cost was about £6 billion a year but, after quite a lot of arm wrestling, I persuaded the OBR to score it, the economic impact of getting more mums and dads into work because of childcare reforms. And they concluded that the net cost to the exchequer was just £600 million a year. So they put that in their numbers and we were able to afford childcare reforms. We would literally not have been able to do that if there'd been a three-year fiscal period. So I think it's a really positive thing.

GT: The current government is aiming to take a 'mission-driven' approach to spending, trying to work across Whitehall to deliver on its priorities. What was the approach you took to cross-cutting issues when you were chancellor?

JH: I think what you have to do is embrace policies that are sufficiently radical, so that when they end up being watered down by the Whitehall machine – because this person doesn't like this element of them, or these people are sceptical at that element – that you still end up with something that represents meaningful change. And you have to be really focused on what those changes are, and then you have a chance of doing things that make a big difference.

I'm not really a fan of PR [public relations] constructs like 'mission-led government'. I think you need to have a tangible target that you can really hold ministers to account, and it's got to have the personal commitment of the prime minister and the chancellor – that's much more important.

I'm also a little bit sceptical of the use of government targets to get results. I understand why we do them a lot, but I think in practice after a year or two, people find a way to game a target. A very good example is the targets on child poverty – I mean, first of all, child poverty as it's commonly described is a relative measure. It's not about children in absolute poverty, as most people understand, it is actually about children whose level of income has fallen further behind everyone else. On the current definition of child poverty, if two thirds of the country has a fabulously successful year in terms of their personal finances, then child poverty increases. So if you chase a target, then that gives you an incentive to do things like top up a benefit here and there – whereas actually the real route out of poverty is opportunity and work and jobs that allow people to stand on their own two feet. And so you could sometimes hit the target and miss the point, as a former chief executive of the NHS used to say.

I think the real thing that matters is that the prime minister and the chancellor need to be very clear in their mind about the big long-term changes that they want to outlast them when they've left the job. And they need to make sure that they carve out enough of their time on a weekly basis and their brain space on those long-term changes, and not just on the short-term firefighting.

That's the opportunity that Keir Starmer has now, because he has four years of his mandate left, he has a large majority in parliament – he can really make some big long-term changes. And I think the risk is you forget that the window you have to really do those changes is your first year or two in a parliament. After that, people start worrying about, you know, local elections, catastrophes, the next general election coming over the horizon, and it just becomes much harder to make those long-term changes.

You know, when Gordon Brown made the Bank of England independent, when Margaret Thatcher got rid of exchange controls – these are big decisions, which if you make them properly at the start of a parliament, are totally transformative. When Tony Blair introduced tuition fees, for example, that led to a renaissance of our universities – very unpopular, difficult decision, but he took it early on, got on with it and it's worked.

To be successful, there's always firefighting, there's always the pressures to win elections, but how much of your time as a minister do you carve out on long-term change? That's the most important thing.

GT: You talked about the Whitehall machine. Who do you mean – who are the actors that you're talking about who might water down policies?

JH: Well, it's sometimes the civil servants who say 'oh, this policy is a bad idea because it's going to upset the Americans' or 'this policy is a bad idea because it's going to lead to an increase in regional disparity', or whatever.

But it's more often the politicians in the system, the No.10 spads [special advisers] who say 'oh, don't do this because it's going to upset this person' or 'don't do that because it's going to upset that person' – and that, I think, is one of the things that can lead to really bad policy making. We try so hard to avoid upsetting different groups of people that in the end the changes governments make become vanishingly small, and they think they're doing something really big. You know, 'the biggest investment in defence since the Cold War', or 'the biggest package of measures to tackle child poverty for 30 years' –

everyone loves those slogans. But actually when you look at the substance, it's often been really watered down, and you end up with a cycle of over-promising and under-delivering which leads to popular cynicism that elected politicians really aren't making the big changes they promised.

Sachin Savur (SS): Thinking across your time in government, how do you think that the way government worked changed, and also how did your ways of working as a minister change?

JH: Well, I had very specific ways of working, which I guess happens if you've been in the cabinet quite a long time. Because I think the most important thing is: what do you do that outlasts you? I found that the best way of carving out time for strategic long-term change was to have all my meetings on the Monday. And I became quite well-known for this – my civil servants all teased me about it!

Basically what I found was that the way politics works is that by the time parliament sits at 2:30 on a Monday afternoon, but then you have questions, so it really gets going at 3:30. So you could be summoned for an urgent question or have a statement. Then you've got the cabinet, you've got prime minister's questions. On Friday, you're back in your constituency. You need to have done the long-term thinking really early on.

I had lunch with Wes Streeting [health secretary, 2024–] just before Christmas and I said “look, my advice is have all your important meetings on the Monday”. And a month ago I met a Department of Health official who says “you'll never guess what's happened, but he started doing all his meetings on Mondays just like you!”. It sounds like an artificial device, but it's just you need to make sure there's space carved out for the big difficult strategic changes. And I found that in politics, there's just so much firefighting that that was my way of doing it.

I'm not saying it's the only way, of course. When I was culture secretary, I used to do arts on Monday, sport on Tuesday, technology on Wednesday. You know, for a relatively lower profile cabinet job, that's fine, but actually for the big ones you just have to focus on getting it all out of the way early. And then you know that whatever else goes wrong, the important long-term changes are protected.

SS: What achievement are you most proud of from your time as chancellor?

JH: I think probably from my time as chancellor, the two things that I'll most be remembered for is giving the economy a soft landing after inheriting a massive crisis – actually not really caused by the mini-budget, but by having to pay down our Covid debt and the energy shock [in 2022] – and you know, we had inflation at 11% and getting it down to 2% and getting the economy growing in some challenging circumstances. And then probably I would add to that, increasing defence spending to 2.5% of GDP, which is a global geostrategic necessity.

But often when I think about that question and I think about the challenge of long-term change versus short-term change, I actually normally point to an example of something that happened when I was health secretary. So my focus when I was health secretary was patient safety, reducing the number of avoidable deaths, of which we have about 13,500 every year in the NHS. And I think it's fair to say I was not a popular health secretary – I

mean, I had the junior doctors on strike for nearly a year when I was trying to get more doctors working on weekends. But after I'd stepped down as health secretary, someone showed me the figures on baby deaths, because I'd had a particular focus on maternity safety and the number of baby deaths actually fell – not just as a result of my efforts, but lots of people's efforts – by 15% over that period, which amounts to two fewer babies dying every single day. And no one will ever know that about what was a pretty challenging time as health secretary, but I will be proud of that until the day I die. And you know, Sachin, you and I were talking about Monday meetings – I had a meeting on patient safety every single Monday for pretty much my entire time as health secretary, and it did work.

So that's what I would say – you can make really profound long-term changes. I would really say to any minister today: focus on that, because one day it's all going to be gone. What you're going to think about is 'what did I do that stood the test of time?'. And you know, don't expect to get much public praise for it – of course, we're all human beings, we love to be lauded to the rooftops, but that's not the way British politics works. The press is set up to scrutinise politicians and ultimately it generally concludes that we're all failures.

But you can look back and you could see lots and lots of examples of politicians who made decisions that stood the test of time. John Gummer, when he was environment secretary [1993–97], bent the rules to give permission for the London Eye to be built in time for the millennium. And he knew it would never get through if he made it a permanent change, so they were given a temporary licence to put up the London Eye. But he knew once it was up, it would be permanent. And that's something he can be incredibly proud of – that is a London landmark that John Gummer created.

So it's possible to do amazing things and things that you really feel proud of, but you just have to know what those changes are that you're trying to do. And make sure you carve out enough of your time every single week to actually do those big changes and not get overwhelmed by the firefighting that's inevitably part of the job.

SS: More specifically, what advice would you give to future chancellors about how they can be most effective in office?

JH: I think the advice I would give to chancellors is that you have an incredible influence on not just the economy, but the social contract and the values that we have as a society. I think one of the greatest post-war chancellors was Nigel Lawson – his big tax cuts in 1988 actually caused a recession, and yet he's still thought of as a great chancellor, because the taxes that he cut turned us into a country that valued hard work and entrepreneurialism and made us one of the fastest growing economies for several decades afterwards.

So, don't underestimate the long-term changes that you can unlock as a chancellor. But to do that you've got to form a very clear idea in your mind of what those long-term changes are, and make sure you carve out enough time to deliver them through your budgets and fiscal events.

And as chancellor in particular, you have a privilege that no other cabinet minister has, which is that you do budgets. And budgets are moments where you can force through

decisions in Whitehall on any range of things – you know, on the way we teach English in schools, or a rail link between two northern towns, or welfare reform. You have that ability in a budget to concentrate minds and get a decision made quickly. And no one else has that.

I mean, when I was health secretary, I'd have died to have a moment equivalent to a budget every year where I was standing in parliament! Because it becomes a moment when everyone has to help you out to make it a good moment for the government, so it's really worth thinking how you're going to use those moments.

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