Performance Tracker 2025: Children's social care

The cost of children’s social care is rising, with little evidence that outcomes are improving in step. Local authorities have increasingly relied on residential provision to house children in care, meaning care is more expensive. And because of gaps in other public services, most notably mental health services, a growing number of children with complex needs are entering care, with local authorities sometimes spending more than £1 million every year on individual care packages.

Yet shortages of foster carers and secure children’s homes mean some children end up in unsuitable settings and occasionally are even deprived of their liberty in accommodation that lacks appropriate safeguards.

However, there are some positive signs. Kinship care – where children are fostered by relatives or friends – is becoming more common. This is a sign of success for mounting central and local government efforts to keep children with their families. Furthermore, the core social care workforce appears to have stabilised after the turbulence of the Covid pandemic. And new statutory guidance, ¹ Department for Education, Agency Rules, GOV.UK, 2024, retrieved 25 September 2025, www.gov.uk/government/publications/child-and-family-social-workers-agency-rules  introduced by the Labour government in late 2024 – although developed under the Conservatives – appears to be curbing the excessive use of agency staff, historically a driver of churn and high cost.

The Labour government’s reform agenda, which has a particular focus on prevention, is promising. But a lack of data on the workforce in preventative services means the government cannot be certain that its plans in this area are achievable, and a lack of joined-up working across health, education, justice, immigration and social care may hinder progress. 

Nearly all local authorities overspend on children’s social care, putting pressure on their budgets

Spending on children’s social care^* has grown faster than economy-wide inflation every year since at least 2009/10. In 2023/24, local authorities in England spent £13.3 billion on children’s social care, nearly a quarter (23%) more in real terms than the £10.8bn spent on the eve of the Covid pandemic in 2019/20 and two thirds (68%) more than the £7.9bn spent in 2009/10. ² Department for Education, ‘LA and school expenditure 2023-24’, GOV.UK, 12 December 2024, retrieved 25 September 2025, https://explore-education-statistics.service.gov.uk/find-statistics/la-and-school-expenditure/2023-24

Local authority budgets shrank as a result of cuts in the early 2010s, and they have yet to fully recover. In 2024/25, local authority core spending power was 5.4% lower in real terms than it was in 2010/11.^{**, 4} Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, ‘Core spending power table: final local government finance settlement 2025 to 2026’, GOV.UK, 3 February 2025, retrieved 25 September 2025, www.gov.uk/government/publications/core-spending-power-table-final-local-government-finance-settlement-2025-to-2026  Children’s social care is therefore eating up a substantially bigger – and growing – share of available money. In 2011/12, spending on children’s social care accounted for 18% of local authority spending. ⁵ Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, ‘Local authority revenue expenditure and financing in England: 2011 to 2012 individual local authority data – outturn’, GOV.UK, 27 November 2012, www.gov.uk/government/statistics/local-authority-revenue-expenditure-and-financing-england-2011-to-2012-individual-local-authority-data--2  By 2024/25, it had reached 27%. ⁶ Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, ‘Local authority revenue expenditure and financing in England: 2024 to 2025 individual local authority data – outturn’, GOV.UK, 18 September 2025, https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/local-authority-revenue-expenditure-and-financing-england-2024-to-2025-individual-local-authority-data-outtu…  It is now the biggest financial pressure that most councils face, ⁷ Simpson F, ‘Most councils describe children’s services as biggest financial pressure’, Children & Young People Now, 22 October 2024, retrieved 15 September 2025, www.cypnow.co.uk/content/news/most-councils-describe-children-s-services-as-biggest-financial-pressure  putting some at risk of insolvency. ⁸ Samuel M, ‘Rising children’s social care costs deepening councils’ financial woes, finds study’, Community Care, 3 November 2023, retrieved 15 September 2025, www.communitycare.co.uk/2023/11/03/rising-childrens-social-care-costs-deepening-councils-financial-woes-finds-study

Budgets for children’s social care (set by each local authority) have not grown in  line with spending on it, resulting in mounting overspends. Of the £13.3bn spent on children’s social care in 2023/24, £2.3bn was not budgeted for, amounting to a 21% overspend. ⁹ Department for Education, ‘LA and school expenditure 2023-24’, GOV.UK, 12 December 2024, retrieved 25 September 2025, https://explore-education-statistics.service.gov.uk/find-statistics/la-and-school-expenditure/2023-24; Department for Education, ‘Planned LA and school expenditure 2023-24’, GOV.UK, 26 September 2024, retrieved 25 September 2025, https://explore-education-statistics.service.gov.uk/fi-statistics/planned-la-and-school-expenditure/2023-24  This rose from a 14% overspend in 2015/16. ²³⁸ Ibid.  Local authorities can cover these overspends using other day-to-day budgets, capital budgets,^*** increased revenue from sales, fees and charges, or reserves.

While budgetary pressures are not distributed evenly across England, more or less every local authority is struggling to stick to their spending plans.^**** Only three local authorities spent less on children’s social care than they had planned in 2023/24: Hampshire, North Lincolnshire and Nottingham. ²³⁹ Ibid.  At the other end of the spectrum, Bolton overspent its children’s social care budget by £32.6m in 2025/26 prices, or by 79%.^{*****, 240} Ibid.

Some interviewees cited the difficulties of predicting spending on unaccompanied asylum-seeking children and children with the most complex needs as factors in overspends ¹³ Institute for Government interviews.  – the former because it is driven by the UK’s immigration policy and the global refugee crisis; the latter because the numbers of children with the most complex needs are so small at a local authority level and these children appear to increasingly present to social care services only once at crisis point (more on this below). ¹⁴ Local Government Association, ‘High-cost children’s social care placements survey’, 29 November 2023, retrieved 25 September 2025, www.local.gov.uk/publications/high-cost-childrens-social-care-placements-survey

Overspends are not entirely outside of local authority control, however. If they were purely driven by unpredictable pressures, we would expect to see a high level of year-on-year variation in terms of which local authorities have the highest or lowest overspend. But as the chart below shows, councils with high overspends in 2022/23 tended to have high overspends in 2023/24, and vice versa.^******

Another factor driving overspends, then, is local authorities’ proficiency at forecasting demand and planning provision accordingly. This varies significantly from area to area, depending on factors such as leadership and capacity, ¹⁵ Institute for Government interview.  but appears to be relatively poor in most places. What Works for Children’s Social Care found in 2022 that “most [local authorities] employed a very basic analysis of less than five data points” and could not “reliably assess the statistical features of the forecasting estimates”. ¹⁶ Bach-Mortensen AM, Murray H, Goodair B, Carter E, Briggs E and O’Higgins A, Are Local Authorities Achieving Effective Market Stewardship for Children’s Social Care Services?, What Works for Children’s Social Care, 2022, p. 23, https://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ukgwa/20230308122151mp_/https://whatworks-csc.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/WWCSC_sufficiency_report_Final_Mar…  And almost half of local authorities did not have a publicly available or up-to-date sufficiency strategy,^{*******, 17} Bach-Mortensen AM, Murray H, Goodair B, Carter E, Briggs E and O’Higgins A, Are Local Authorities Achieving Effective Market Stewardship for Children’s Social Care Services?, What Works for Children’s Social Care, 2022, https://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ukgwa/20230308122151mp_/https://whatworks-csc.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/WWCSC_sufficiency_report_Final_Mar…  despite this being part of statutory guidance. ¹⁸ Department for Education, Sufficiency: Statutory guidance on securing sufficient accommodation for looked- after children, GOV.UK, 2010, retrieved 25 September 2025, www.gov.uk/government/publications/securing-sufficient-accommodation-for-looked-after-children

Poor forecasting appears to be compounded by a persistent optimism bias. If poor forecasting were the only issue, councils would sometimes overestimate, as well as underestimate, spending. But in practice, the errors almost always run in the same direction. Councils are legally required to set a balanced budget each year, which creates pressure to present a plausible savings plan for children’s social care that rarely materialises. One interviewee argued that this mostly reflects a genuine, if misplaced, belief that savings plans will deliver, rather than cynical attempts to balance budgets. ¹⁹ Institute for Government interview.

In late 2024, the Labour government committed itself to setting up regional care co- operatives as part of its suite of children’s social care reforms, discussed in more detail below. ²⁰ Department for Education, Keeping Children Safe, Helping Families Thrive, CP 1200, The Stationery Office, 2024, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/67375fe5ed0fc07b53499a42/Keeping_Children_Safe__Helping_Families_Thrive_.pdf  These co-operatives will plan and procure social care at a regional level and may help to address the volatile demand for care and poor forecasting capabilities that are driving overspends. A dedicated forecasting function, planned as part of the co-operatives, could build expertise in data analysis, while regional procurement may help improve the cost-efficiency of provision for those with the most complex needs (discussed further below), by enabling sufficiency planning across a wider area. But unless local authorities’ budgets are adequate to meet demand for statutory services, many are likely to continue relying on undeliverable savings plans, driving overspends on children’s social care.

_{* Defined as spending on children in care, safeguarding and family support services. Spending on other children’s services such as youth justice, early years and services for young people is excluded.}

_{** This figure, like other spending figures in this section, excludes the spending power of shire districts and ‘other’ authorities (combined authorities; police, fire and rescue authorities; waste authorities; and national park authorities), which are out of the scope of this chapter on children’s social care.}

_{***    Transfers from councils’ capital budgets to their day-to-day budgets are normally not allowed, but central government can grant them using a ‘capitalisation direction’.}

_{****    There are recognised data reporting issues with section 251 returns – the spending data used to calculate these figures. Local authority comparisons should therefore be treated with some caution; see Roma A, Section 251 Data: Testing accuracy and a proposed alternative, Government Social Research, 2017, retrieved 22 September 2025, www.gov.uk/government/publications/section-251-data-testing-accuracy-and-a-proposed-alternative}

_{*****    Bolton also had the fourth-highest overspend of any local authority in 2022/23 (excluding the City of London due to its small population).}

_{****** Regression LG 3.1 – see the Methodology for further details. Similar relationships hold between every consecutive pair of years for which we have data, back to 2015/16.}

_{******* A sufficiency strategy is a plan to ensure there is, as far as is ‘reasonably practicable’, enough accommodation within an area that meets the needs of children in the council’s care.}

Care has become more expensive

While the level of activity in children’s social care has grown, the rise in spending is largely because services – particularly care placements – have become more expensive. Children’s social care activity can be crudely divided into two tiers of acuity: children in need and children in care.^* ‘Children in need’ is an umbrella term that encompasses children who have been assessed and found to require services because of risks to their health or development, or because they are disabled. ²¹ Legislation.gov.uk, Children Act 1989 , c. 41, retrieved 15 September 2025, www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1989/41  A child in need is considered to be ‘in care’ if their local authority is responsible – or caring – for them, or has provided them with accommodation for more than 24 hours. ²⁴² Ibid.  This may mean living with relatives or friends under kinship care arrangements, with foster parents or in a children’s home.

Over the past decade, the number of children in need has risen modestly (by 6%), from 378,030 in 2012/13 to 399,460 in 2023/24. ²³ Department for Education, ‘Children in need’, GOV.UK, 31 October 2024, retrieved 25 September 2025, https://explore-education-statistics.service.gov.uk/find-statistics/children-in-need/2024  Once population growth is taken into account, the rate has remained almost unchanged – moving from 332 to 333 per 10,000 children. ²⁴ Ibid.  By contrast, the number of children in care has grown by 23%, from 68,060 to 83,630, with the rate rising from 59 to 69 per 10,000. ²⁵ Department for Education, ‘Children looked after in England including adoptions’, GOV.UK, 14 November 2024, retrieved 25 September 2025, https://explore-education-statistics.service.gov.uk/find-statistics/children-looked-after-in-england-including-adoptions/2024

Rising levels of activity should, naturally, mean more gets spent on children’s social care. But spending has risen twice as fast as the number of children in care since 2012/13, and nearly 10 times faster than the number of children in need. ²⁶ Department for Education, ‘LA and school expenditure’, GOV.UK, 12 December 2024, retrieved 25 September 2025, https://explore-education-statistics.service.gov.uk/find-statistics/la-and-school-expenditure/2023-24  More children need help – but this is not enough to explain ballooning spend.

Instead, much of the rise in spend is the result of care becoming more expensive. Local authorities spent an average of £97,689 – or £1,879 a week – on each child in care in 2023/24 (2025/26 prices).^{**, 27} Ibid. ; Department for Education, ‘Children looked after in England including adoptions’, GOV.UK, 14 November 2024, retrieved 25 September 2025, https://explore-education-statistics.service.gov.uk/fi-statistics/children-looked-after-in-england-including-adoptions/2024  This is a third higher in real terms than in 2015/16, when average spend was £73,339.

Part of this cost increase can be attributed to a small but growing cohort of children – those with the most complex needs. ²⁸ Association of Directors of Children’s Services, ADCS Safeguarding Pressures Research – Phase 9, 2025, www.adcs.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/ADCS_Safeguarding_Pressures_Phase9_FINALv1.pdf  These children often require specialist support and sometimes round-the-clock supervision by multiple members of staff, which by itself costs at least a few thousand pounds a week. ²⁹ Institute for Government interview.  Yet only a limited number of providers are equipped, or willing,^*** to accommodate these children, ³⁰ Local Government Association, ‘High-cost children’s social care placements survey’, 29 November 2023, retrieved 26 September 2025, www.local.gov.uk/publications/high-cost-childrens-social-care-placements-survey  giving local authorities little leverage to negotiate on cost. ³¹ Coady C and Karpf B, Costs and Complexity in Care: The real drivers of high-cost placements for children’s social care , Local Government Association, 2025, www.local.gov.uk/sites/default/files/documents/73.6%20High%20cost%20childcare_FINALAA.pdf  Moreover, the commissioning of these placements is often inefficient, relying on spot-purchasing rather than longer term strategic planning with providers. ³² Ibid.

A lack of supply and the acuity of demand combine to make the costs of placements for children with the most complex needs stratospheric. According to a Local Government Association survey, the number of placements costing more than £10,000 a week rose from 120 to 1,510 between 2018/19 and 2022/23. ³³ Local Government Association, ‘High-cost children’s social care placements survey’, 29 November 2023, retrieved 26 September 2025, www.local.gov.uk/publications/high-cost-childrens-social-care-placements-survey  These placements had a mean weekly cost of £23,746 (in 2025/26 prices) in 2022/23, nearly 13 times more than the typical weekly spend per child in care in 2023/24. ³⁴ Ibid. ; Department for Education, ‘Children looked after in England including adoptions’, GOV.UK, 14 November 2024, retrieved 26 September 2025, https://explore-education-statistics.service.gov.uk/fi-statistics/children-looked-after-in-england-including-adoptions/2024; Department for Education, ‘LA and school expenditure 2023-24’, GOV.UK, 12 December 2024, retrieved 26 September 2025, https://explore-education-statistics.service.gov.uk/find-statistics/la-and-school-expenditure/2023-24  The LGA wrote earlier this year that the increasing prevalence of high-cost placements “rarely reflects a proportionate improvement in outcomes for children”. ³⁵ Coady C and Karpf B, Costs and Complexity in Care: The real drivers of high-cost placements for children’s social care , Local Government Association, 2025, p. 7, www.local.gov.uk/sites/default/files/documents/73.6%20High%20cost%20childcare_FINALAA.pdf

The rising per-capita cost is also the result of a shift away from fostering and towards more expensive residential care.^**** Between 2016 and 2023,^***** the proportion of children in care who were fostered dropped from 74% to 68%, while those in residential settings rose from 11% to 17%. ³⁶ Department for Education, ‘Children looked after in England including adoptions’, GOV.UK, 16 November 2023, retrieved 26 September 2025, https://explore-education-statistics.service.gov.uk/find-statistics/children-looked-after-in-england-including-adoptions/2023  This shift reflects both a changing population of children in care – older children and unaccompanied asylum-seeking children, who are more likely to require residential care, make up an increasing share – and a decline in available foster carers (explored further below). ³⁷ Dellar A, Performance Tracker Local: Children’s Social Care , Institute for Government (forthcoming).

Further, the National Living Wage rose faster than inflation for much of the past decade, ³⁸ Francis-Devine B, National Minimum Wage Statistics , House of Commons Library, 2025, https://researchbriefis.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP-7735/CBP-7735.pdf  and in 2024 the Labour government raised it again, at the same time as it increased employers’ National Insurance contributions. ³⁹ HM Treasury, Autumn Budget 2024: Fixing the foundations to deliver change , HC 295, The Stationery Office, 2024, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/6722120210b0d582ee8c48c0/Autumn_Budget_2024__print_.pdf  This has exerted upward pressure on residential care prices and will continue to do so. ⁴⁰ Institute for Government interview.  The sector is marked by a reliance on low-paid and agency staff, both of which mean it is particularly vulnerable to rising labour costs.

Local authorities’ growing dependence on private provision may also be driving up costs. In 2010, 28% of children in care – around 18,000 – were placed with private providers. ⁴² Department for Education, ‘Children looked after in England including adoptions’, GOV.UK, 14 November 2024, retrieved 26 September 2025, https://explore-education-statistics.service.gov.uk/find-statistics/children-looked-after-in-england-including-adoptions/2024  By 2023,^****** that share had climbed to 40%, or 33,000 children. ⁴³ Ibid.  The government has accused some private providers of “profiteering” ⁴⁴ Department for Education, Keeping Children Safe, Helping Families Thrive , CP 1200, The Stationery Office, 2024, p.23, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/67375fe5ed0fc07b53499a42/Keeping_Children_Safe__Helping_Families_Thrive_.pdf  after the Competition and Markets Authority found in 2022 that the 15 largest private providers were making average annual operating profits of £45,000 per child in children’s homes and £8,100 per child in foster placements.^{*******, 45} Competition and Markets Authority, Children’s Social Care Market Study Final Report , GOV.UK, 2022, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/6228726cd3bf7f158c844f65/Final_report.pdf

As discussed below, we find that local authorities that rely more on private provision tend to spend more per child in care. And the sector’s attractiveness to investors is clear: private equity-backed firms now supply nearly a quarter (23%) of fostering places in England. ⁴⁶ Murray J and Mohdin A, ‘Nearly a quarter of foster places in England provided by private equity-backed firms’, The Guardian, 7 July 2025, retrieved 15 September 2025, www.theguardian.com/society/2025/jul/07/nearly-a-quarter-of-foster-places-in-england-provided-by-private-equity-backed-firms  The government is seeking to address this through new market management measures in the Children’s Wellbeing and Schools Bill, now progressing through parliament. These include steps to:

• encourage new providers into the market
• improve cost and price transparency
• introduce profit caps if necessary. ⁴⁷ Department for Education, Children’s Wellbeing and Schools Bill 2024: Policy summary notes (as amended in the House of Commons) , GOV.UK, 2025, retrieved 26 September 2025, www.gov.uk/government/publications/childrens-wellbeing-and-schools-bill-2024-policy-summary

However, evidence of profiteering does not prove that other providers could deliver services more cheaply. Cost data is often not directly comparable: for example, private providers’ prices will account for overheads, while the reported cost of local authority placements may not. ⁴⁸ Competition and Markets Authority, Children’s Social Care Market Study Final Report , GOV.UK, 2022, retrieved 26 September 2025, www.gov.uk/government/publications/childrens-social-care-market-study-final-report/final-report  Private providers also tend to take in children with more complex needs, which further distorts cost comparisons. ⁴⁹ Ibid.

_{* Most children in need are not considered at risk of significant harm and are on child in need plans. A third tier of acuity, those on child protection plans, is sometimes included. These children form a subgroup of children in need. They have been judged to be at risk of significant harm and often live at home.}

_{** Calculated by dividing inflation-adjusted net spending on children in care by the number of children in care as at 31 March in the relevant year. This is not quite a unit cost as it does not account for the number of days in care, data on which is not publicly available. Instead, we refer to it as ‘per-capita costs’.}

_{*** There are reports that providers have become increasingly selective over which children they are willing to support, especially out of fear of poor Ofsted ratings. More on this below.}

_{**** We use ‘residential care’ to encompass children’s homes, secure units and semi-independent living accommodation, in line with the Department for Education. While these placements are relatively diverse, data reporting practices make more granular analysis impossible in most cases.}

_{***** Data collection practices changed in 2016. In 2024, the ‘independent and semi-independent living arrangements/supported accommodation’ placement category included data that in previous years would have been put under ‘other placements in the community’. A longer time series is therefore not appropriate.}

_{****** 2023 is the most recent year for which data on residential care placements and private provision is comparable with previous years. The introduction of registration requirements for supported accommodation providers, which came into effect in October 2023, affected data in 2024. The numbers of placements recorded as private or residential dropped in many areas where providers missed the deadline for registration (these were instead recorded as ‘other’). But in many cases, that drop does not reflect a meaningful change in service provision.}

_{******* It is unclear which year’s prices these figures are in.}

Per-capita spending on care varies dramatically across England

In 2023/24, some local authorities were spending three and a half times more per child in care than others – for example, £198,808 in Richmond versus £56,318 in York (in 2025/26 prices). ⁵⁰ Department for Education, ‘Children looked after in England including adoptions’, GOV.UK, 14 November 2024, retrieved 26 September 2025, https://explore-education-statistics.service.gov.uk/find-statistics/children-looked-after-in-england-including-adoptions/2024; Department for Education, ‘LA and school expenditure 2023-24’, GOV.UK, 12 December 2024, retrieved 26 September 2025, https://explore-education-statistics.service.gov.uk/find-statistics/la-and-school-expenditure/2023-24  That gulf between the cheapest and most expensive care (£142,490 per child) has grown since 2015/16, driven by steep rises at the very top of the cost range.^* Yet the ranking of local authorities has not shifted much: those with the highest costs in 2015/16 still generally have the most expensive care, while those with the lowest costs have stayed relatively cheap.^**

Despite this stability – and the general trend of care becoming more expensive – there are a few exceptions. In nine local authorities, care has become cheaper in real terms since 2015/16.^*** The steepest drop has happened in Wiltshire, where care has become £6,416, or 6.5%, cheaper per child (in 2025/26 prices). Once among the most expensive local authorities in England, it now sits comfortably below the national average.

For the most part, though, the picture has remained relatively consistent, reflecting enduring local factors. One of the clearest of these factors is that differences in labour and property costs make care more expensive in some parts of England, particularly in London, than others. The government compensates for this through funding adjustments, giving more to local authorities with structurally higher costs. ⁵¹ Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, ‘Methodology note: 2024 Children’s Services Area Cost Adjustment’, GOV.UK, 18 December 2024, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/67615cf90345cd72db253435/Explanatory_note_on_2024_Children_s_Services_Area_Cost_Adjustment.pdf; Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government and Department for Education, ‘2021 Area Cost Adjustment methodology note’, GOV.UK, 29 March 2022, retrieved 26 September 2025, www.gov.uk/government/publications/2021-area-cost-adjustment/2021-area-cost-adjustment-methodology-note

While accounting for these cost differences^{****, 52} Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, ‘2024 Children’s Services Area Cost Adjustment values’, GOV.UK, 18 December 2024, retrieved 26 September 2025, www.gov.uk/government/publications/2024-childrens-services-area-cost-adjustment-values  narrows the spending gap slightly,^***** the gulf persists. Richmond still tops the list at £189,680 per child,^****** more than three times York’s adjusted figure of £57,532.  ⁵³ Department for Education, ‘Children looked after in England including adoptions’, GOV.UK, 14 November 2024, retrieved 26 September 2025, https://explore-education-statistics.service.gov.uk/find-statistics/children-looked-after-in-england-including-adoptions/2024; Department for Education, ‘LA and school expenditure 2023-24’, GOV.UK, 12 December 2024, retrieved 26 September 2025, https://explore-education-statistics.service.gov.uk/find-statistics/la-and-school-expenditure/2023-24

Three factors are likely driving remaining variation in spending. First, some local authorities may be supporting children with more complex needs, which naturally increases costs. Second, factors outside the local authority’s control can limit the local supply of different types of placement, some of which may be cheaper than others. For example, in more deprived areas, fewer households are likely to have a spare room suitable for fostering. Third, some councils may simply be delivering or commissioning services less efficiently – for instance, securing poorer deals from providers or placing more children in expensive residential care, even when this is not required.

While some of those explanations are difficult to test quantitatively, we controlled for those that we could.^******* We found that local authorities with higher per-capita costs of care tend to have a greater reliance on both private provision and residential care, but fewer children in care per 10,000 in their area. ⁵⁴ Dellar A, Performance Tracker Local: Children’s Social Care , Institute for Government (forthcoming).  The first two findings align with the cost pressures we have already discussed, although this still does not prove that private provision is more expensive on a like-for-like basis. It is unclear what is behind the third finding, but it may be because local authorities with higher rates of children in care are, on average, supporting children with less severe needs,^******** meaning lower per-child costs.

In 2023, Richmond had the greatest dependence on private provision (84% of placements), the third-highest use of residential settings (36% of placements) and the second-lowest rate of children in care (29 per 10,000) – all of which help to explain its excessively high per-capita costs.^*********

_{* There are recognised data reporting issues with section 251 returns – the spending data used to calculate these figures. Local authority comparisons should therefore be treated with some caution; see Roma A, Section 251 Data: Testing accuracy and a proposed alternative, Government Social Research, 2017, retrieved 22 September 2025, www.gov.uk/government/publications/section-251-data-testing-accuracy-and-a-proposed-alternative}

_{** Regression LG 3.2 – see Methodology for further details. R² = 0.37.}

_{*** Camden; Hammersmith and Fulham; Kensington and Chelsea; Lincolnshire; Milton Keynes; Rochdale; Waltham Forest; Wiltshire; and Windsor and Maidenhead.}

_{**** Using the 2024 Children’s Services Area Cost Adjustments. For more information, see the Methodology.}

_{***** The interquartile range is lower in every year except 2017/18, and often by £2,000 to £3,000 (in 2025/26 prices).}

_{****** These figures can be interpreted as the per-capita cost of care if the area had average (for England) labour and property costs.}

_{******* The proportion of placements that are private, the proportion of placements that are residential, the rate of children in care per 10,000, the proportion of episodes of need with mental health as a risk factor, the average number of risk factors per episode of need and the level of income deprivation among children.}

_{******** Other proxies for the complexity of cases – the proportion of episodes of need with mental health as a risk factor, the average number of risk factors per episode of need and the level of income deprivation among children – all had effects on per-capita care spending that were statistically indistinguishable from zero, once the aforementioned variables were controlled for.}

_{********* Excluding the City of London, the Isles of Scilly and Rutland.}

A shortage of foster carers is pushing some children into unsuitable placements, despite increases in kinship carers

Fostering plays a central role in the care system. In 2024, 56,390 children, or two thirds of those in care (67%), were fostered. ⁵⁵ Department for Education, ‘Children looked after in England including adoptions’, GOV.UK, 14 November 2024, retrieved 26 September 2025, https://explore-education-statistics.service.gov.uk/find-statistics/children-looked-after-in-england-including-adoptions/2024  Spending on fostering accounted for 17% of all children’s social care expenditure and more than a quarter (27%) of spending on children in care in 2023/24. ⁵⁶ Department for Education, ‘LA and school expenditure 2023-24’, GOV.UK, 12 December 2024, retrieved 26 September 2025, https://explore-education-statistics.service.gov.uk/find-statistics/la-and-school-expenditure/2023-24

But in 2024, the total number of fostering households in England was at its lowest point since at least 2014, standing at 42,615. ⁵⁷ Ofsted, ‘Fostering in England 1 April 2023 to 31 March 2024’, GOV.UK, 7 November 2024, retrieved 26 September 2025, www.gov.uk/government/statistics/fostering-in-england-1-april-2023-to-31-march-2024  Meanwhile, the number of children in care has continued to grow. There are now 14,840 more children in care than there were in 2014, ⁵⁸ Department for Education, ‘Children looked after in England including adoptions’, GOV.UK, 14 November 2024, retrieved 26 September 2025, https://explore-education-statistics.service.gov.uk/find-statistics/children-looked-after-in-england-including-adoptions/2024  but 2,165 fewer fostering households. ⁵⁹ Ofsted, ‘Fostering in England 1 April 2023 to 31 March 2024’, GOV.UK, 7 November 2024, retrieved 26 September 2025, www.gov.uk/government/statistics/fostering-in-england-1-april-2023-to-31-march-2024  The Fostering Network estimated this year that an additional 5,000 foster families were needed in England to meet demand. ⁶⁰ The Fostering Network, ‘Recruitment targets’, (no date), retrieved 15 September 2025, www.thefosteringnetwork.org.uk/about-fostering/for-fostering-services/recruitment-and-retention/fostering-recruitment-targets

The shortage of foster carers has pushed some children into unsuitable residential care placements. Ofsted looked at a small sample of 111 children living in residential homes in 2019 and found that a third of them originally had foster care on their care plan. ⁶¹ Ofsted, ‘Why do children go into children’s homes?’, GOV.UK, 13 April 2022, retrieved 26 September 2025, www.gov.uk/government/publications/why-do-children-go-into-childrens-homes/why-do-children-go-into-childrens-homes  In many cases, foster care would better meet these children’s needs and stop them from being sent far away from home, all while costing local authorities less. ⁶² MacAlister J, The Independent Review of Children’s Social Care , GOV.UK, 2022, https://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ukgwa/20230308122535mp_/https://childrenssocialcare.independent-review.uk/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/The-i…

The crux of the foster shortage lies in the mainstream system, and specifically in the falling number of local authority carers. Between 2016 and 2024, their numbers plummeted by 5,175, including a record fall of 1,010 in 2023 alone. ⁶³ Ofsted, ‘Fostering in England 1 April 2023 to 31 March 2024’, GOV.UK, 7 November 2024, retrieved 26 September 2025, www.gov.uk/government/statistics/fostering-in-england-1-april-2023-to-31-march-2024  Independent fostering agencies (IFAs) recorded a net gain of 480 carers over the same period, but since 2021 they too have been losing fostering households overall every year. ⁶⁴ Ibid.  The mainstream fostering system has been reshaped as a result. IFAs now account for 48% of all filled mainstream fostering places compared to 34% in 2016. ⁶⁵ Ibid. ; Ofsted, ‘Fostering in England 2015 to 2016: key findings’, GOV.UK, 28 February 2017, retrieved 26 September 2025, www.gov.uk/government/statistics/fostering-in-england-1-april-2015-to-31-march-2016/fostering-in-england-2015-to-2016-key-findings

Some fundamental pressures are likely contributing to a decline in mainstream fostering across both local authorities and IFAs. These include:

• many carers reaching retirement age
• carers finding that they cannot afford to foster a child
• rising house prices, which are pushing carers’ adult children to move back in with them, filling spare rooms. ⁶⁶ Association of Directors of Children’s Services, ADCS Safeguarding Pressures Research – Phase 9 , 2025, www.adcs.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/ADCS_Safeguarding_Pressures_Phase9_FINALv1.pdf

But there are also ways in which local authority fostering services are falling behind IFAs.

As the figure above shows, local authorities tend to be worse at both recruiting and retaining foster carers than IFAs, but the gap in retention is greater. Ofsted does not publish data on the reasons for deregistration, meaning that there is a limited understanding of why foster carers are leaving the system. But according to a 2024 survey of former foster carers, the most common reason for resigning was a lack of support from fostering services (43%), particularly from supervising social workers and approved support networks that can provide overnight care. ⁶⁷ The Fostering Network, State of the Nations’ Foster Care: Full report 2024 , 2025, retrieved 26 September 2025, www.thefosteringnetwork.org.uk/policy-and-campaigns/state-of-the-nations/state-of-the-nations-foster-care-2024  IFAs tend to make more generous and uniform offers of support than local authorities, which is likely contributing to their better retention. ⁶⁸ Institute for Government interview.  Some have also reportedly offered financial incentives to recruit local authority carers into the private sector, ⁶⁹ House of Commons Education Committee, Fostering: First report of session 2017–19 , HC 340, The Stationery Office, 2017, https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmeduc/340/340.pdf  although those reports have become less common in recent years. In late 2024, the government announced plans to “[improve] the support offer to both new and existing foster carers”. ⁷⁰ Department for Education, Keeping Children Safe, Helping Families Thrive , CP 1200, The Stationery Office, 2024, p. 26, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/67375fe5ed0fc07b53499a42/Keeping_Children_Safe__Helping_Families_Thrive_.pdf  If well targeted and sufficiently funded, this could ease some of the retention challenges.

On the recruitment side, there is a lack of co-ordination between local authorities. England does not have an active foster care recruitment plan, and many local authorities are competing with each other for foster carers. ⁷¹ Institute for Government interviews.  A couple of interviewees stated that improvements should be made to how well foster carer recruitment drives are communicated to the public. ⁷² Institute for Government interviews.  Current trials are under way for fostering hubs – regional schemes that aim to co-ordinate recruitment and communications campaigns. ⁷³ Mutual Ventures and Department for Education, Guide to Establishing Regional Fostering Recruitment Support Hubs: Version 2 – December 2024 , Mutual Ventures, 2024, www.mutualventures.co.uk/_files/ugd/661139_7fb419844cef4a148a6463f12705b7de.pdf  At the time of writing, it is unclear how much of the foster care funding announced in the Labour government’s autumn and spring budgets (discussed more below) will go towards these schemes. ⁷⁴ Samuel M, ‘£25m boost to foster care support and recruitment from 2026-28’, Community Care, 8 April 2025, retrieved 15 September 2025, www.communitycare.co.uk/2025/04/08/25m-boost-to-foster-care-support-and-recruitment-from-2026-28

In contrast to the decline in mainstream fostering, the number of family and friends fostering households rose from 5,835 in 2016 to 8,865 in 2024, an increase of 52%. ²⁴⁵ Ofsted, ‘Fostering in England 1 April 2023 to 31 March 2024’, GOV.UK, 7 November 2024, retrieved 26 September 2025, www.gov.uk/government/statistics/fostering-in-england-1-april-2023-to-31-march-2024  They now make up a fifth (21%) of all approved fostering households, compared to 13% in 2016. ⁷⁶ Ibid.  This growth is a sign of success for mounting central and local government efforts to, wherever possible, keep children with their families and out of acute forms of care (more on this below). ⁷⁷ For example, Department for Education, Keeping Children Safe, Helping Families Thrive , CP 1200, The Stationery Office, 2024, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/67375fe5ed0fc07b53499a42/Keeping_Children_Safe__Helping_Families_Thrive_.pdf  As the Department for Education (DfE) has set out: “This is likely to be influenced by an increased focus on kinship care, including family and friends fostering, following the independent review of children’s social care.” ²⁴⁶ Ofsted, ‘Fostering in England 1 April 2023 to 31 March 2024’, GOV.UK, 7 November 2024, retrieved 26 September 2025, www.gov.uk/government/statistics/fostering-in-england-1-april-2023-to-31-march-2024

_{* As of 31 March 2025, 84% of the 339 independent fostering providers in England were private providers; see Ofsted, ‘Children’s social care data in England 2025’, 16 July 2025, retrieved 22 September 2025, www.gov.uk/government/statistics/childrens-social-care-in-england-2025}

Entries into the system are relatively stable and prevention is gaining traction

Between 2013 and 2024, England’s child population grew by around 700,000. ⁷⁹ Office for National Statistics, ‘ONS mid-year population estimates’, 30 July 2025, retrieved 26 September 2025, www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationandmigration/populationestimates/datasets/estimatesofthepopulationforenglandandwales  Children’s social care entries kept pace, leaving the rate per 10,000 children broadly flat. ⁸⁰ Department for Education, ‘Children in need’, GOV.UK, 31 October 2024, retrieved 26 September 2025, https://explore-education-statistics.service.gov.uk/find-statistics/children-in-need/2024  That is bar a notable dip in 2020/21, when lockdowns due to the Covid pandemic disrupted the usual referral routes.

But not everything has held steady. In 2023/24, section 47 enquiries were two thirds (68%) more common among the child population than in 2012/13, with almost two for every 100 children. This surge has not translated into more child protection conferences or plans, suggesting that local authorities may be acting more cautiously and lowering the threshold for section 47 enquiries, perhaps under the shadow of recent high-profile child protection tragedies. ⁸¹ Institute for Government interview

The other major change is that the share of referrals resulting in no further action has more than halved since 2012/13. ⁸² Department for Education, ‘Children in need’, GOV.UK, 31 October 2024, retrieved 26 September 2025, https://explore-education-statistics.service.gov.uk/find-statistics/children-in-need/2024  This may be because more initial contacts are being triaged to early help instead of being referred to children’s social care, meaning that those who are referred are now more likely to meet the threshold for assessment.  ⁸³ Ibid.; Association of Directors of Children’s Services, ADCS Safeguarding Pressures Research – Phase 9 , 2025, www.adcs.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/ADCS_Safeguarding_Pressures_Phase9_FINALv1.pdf  Alternatively, it may reflect greater risk aversion, with more referrals now assessed under section 17 of the Children Act 1989. The DfE does not collect data on initial contacts, nor does it have an early help dataset that links to referrals data, so it cannot test these theories. ⁸⁴ Institute for Government interviews.  A recent Association of Directors of Children’s Services survey found that local authorities reporting a reduction in safeguarding activity often partly attribute this to having developed a more robust early help offer. ⁸⁵ Association of Directors of Children’s Services, ADCS Safeguarding Pressures Research – Phase 9 , 2025, www.adcs.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/ADCS_Safeguarding_Pressures_Phase9_FINALv1.pdf  But the rise in section 17 assessments resulting in no further action, from 19.0% to 30.3% since 2012/13, ⁸⁶ Department for Education, ‘Children in need’, GOV.UK, 31 October 2024, retrieved 26 September 2025, https://explore-education-statistics.service.gov.uk/find-statistics/children-in-need/2024  is more consistent with an increase in risk aversion.

There has been a broader shift towards prevention, which the independent review of children’s social care has accelerated in recent years. ⁸⁷ MacAlister J, The Independent Review of Children’s Social Care , GOV.UK, 2022, https://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ukgwa/20230308122535mp_/https://childrenssocialcare.independent-review.uk/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/The-i…  In a policy paper published in late 2024, the government outlined its vision that “wherever possible, children should remain with their families and be safely prevented from entering the care system”. ⁸⁸ Department for Education, Keeping Children Safe, Helping Families Thrive , CP 1200, The Stationery Office, 2024, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/67375fe5ed0fc07b53499a42/Keeping_Children_Safe__Helping_Families_Thrive_.pdf  It has since put money behind the ambition, which we discuss in a section on its reform plans below.

_{* The terms ‘early intervention’ and ‘early help’ tend to be used to refer specifically to preventative work with children. From there, some distinguish between early intervention and early help, with the former referring to more targeted and intensive programmes, and the latter covering universal services.}

_{** No official data is collected on initial contacts.}

Increasing numbers of children live in poverty, which could drive demand for children’s social care

In 2023/24, 26% of children in the UK were in absolute poverty,^* after deducting housing costs. ⁸⁹ Institute for Fiscal Studies, ‘Living standards, poverty and inequality in the UK’, (no date), retrieved 15 September 2025, https://ifs.org.uk/living-standards-poverty-and-inequality-uk  While that figure is not uniquely high by historic standards – it is roughly the same as in 2017/18, for example – the recent trend is very concerning. The 2.2 percentage-point rise in 2022/23 was the worst increase since 1981, and child poverty rates rose again by 1.4 percentage points in 2023/24. ⁹⁰ Ibid.  Approximately 600,000 children moved into absolute poverty across those two years. ⁹¹ Ibid.

There has also been an increase since 2021/22 in the share of children in relative poverty^** after deducting housing costs – a trend not seen in any other age group. ⁹² Ibid.  In 2023/24, 30.5% of children in the UK, and 30.8% in England,^*** were living in relative poverty. ⁹³ Ibid. ; Milne B, Matejic P and Stirling A, ‘Economic and employment growth alone will not be enough to reduce poverty levels’, Joseph Rowntree Foundation, 29 January 2025, retrieved 26 September 2025, www.jrf.org.uk/work/economic-and-employment-growth-alone-will-not-be-enough-to-reduce-poverty-levels  The Joseph Rowntree Foundation, a charity aiming to solve poverty in the UK, estimates that, under economic projections from the autumn budget last year, this will rise to 31.5% in England by 2028/29. ⁹⁴ Ibid.

There are clear ties between child poverty and families in crisis. For example, children who live in the most deprived 10% of neighbourhoods are 10 times more likely to be in care or on a child protection plan than those in the least deprived 10%. ⁹⁵ Bywaters P and the Child Welfare Inequalities Project Team, The Child Welfare Inequalities Project: Final report, University of Huddersfield , 2020, retrieved 26 September 2025, https://pure.hud.ac.uk/en/publications/the-child-welfare-inequalities-project-final-report  Indeed, a family’s housing or financial situation is one reason why a section 17 assessment can be triggered, and why the child may be deemed as in need. And a growing body of research points to deprivation as a contributing cause of child abuse and neglect. ⁹⁶ Bywaters P and Skinner G with Cooper A, Kennedy E and Malik A, The Relationship Between Poverty and Child Abuse and Neglect: New evidence , University of Huddersfield and Nuffield Foundation, 2022, www.nuffieldfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/Full-report-relationship-between-poverty-child-abuse-and-neglect.pdf; MacAlister J, The Independent Review of Children’s Social Care , GOV.UK, 2022, https://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ukgwa/20230308122535mp_/https://childrenssocialcare.independent-review.uk/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/The-i…

One interviewee expressed concerns that if child poverty continues to rise, many families may lack the stable foundations needed to function well, increasing demand for children’s social care. ⁹⁷ Institute for Government interview.  But it is notable that the recent period of rising child poverty has not been matched by a significant rise in demand – entries to children’s social care remain relatively stable, as discussed in the previous section.

The government is due to release a child poverty strategy in autumn 2025, which may go some distance towards tackling rising poverty rates. ⁹⁸ Nathoo L and Whannel K, ‘Government delays publication of child poverty strategy’, BBC News, 24 May 2025, retrieved 15 September 2025, www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/c62vn453ejjo  To date, the most substantial action it has taken is the expansion of free school meal eligibility to all children whose families receive Universal Credit. This is projected to bring 100,000 children out of poverty in the long run. ⁹⁹ Department for Education, ‘Over half a million more children to get free school meals’, press release, 4 June 2025, retrieved 26 September 2025, www.gov.uk/government/news/over-half-a-million-more-children-to-get-free-school-meals  But the Institute for Fiscal Studies estimates that the short-term impact will be more limited. ¹⁰⁰ Farquharson C and Waters T, ‘Benefits – and costs – of expanding access to free school meals will grow over time’, Institute for Fiscal Studies, 4 June 2025, retrieved 26 September 2025, https://ifs.org.uk/articles/benefits-and-costs-expanding-access-free-school-meals-will-grow-over-time  Campaigners are calling for the removal of the two-child limit on Child Tax Credit and Universal Credit, which the Conservative government introduced in 2017. Research suggests that this would be a quick and cost- effective way to enable many children to escape poverty. ¹⁰¹ Henry A and Wernham T, ‘Abolishing the two-child limit would be a cost-effective way of reducing child poverty but is no silver bullet’, Institute for Fiscal Studies, 3 October 2024, retrieved 26 September 2025, https://ifs.org.uk/news/abolishing-two-child-limit-would-be-cost-effective-way-reducing-child-poverty-no-silver-bullet

_{* ‘Absolute poverty’ refers to the share of people with household incomes below a time-invariant poverty line. Officially, that poverty line is 60% of the inflation-adjusted median income from 2010.}

_{** ‘Relative poverty’ refers to the share of people with household incomes below a time-variant poverty line. Officially, that poverty line is 60% of the contemporaneous median income.}

_{*** The UK figure is an average over 2023/24; the England figure captures one point in time in 2023/24. They are therefore not directly comparable. However, both are based on the same relative poverty line: 60% of median equivalised income after housing costs. The England figure is directly comparable to the estimate from the Joseph Rowntree Foundation cited in the following sentence.}

Some children have more complex needs, which can be difficult for social care services to address in advance

Many local authorities report that children in receipt of social care have increasingly complex needs. ¹⁰² Institute for Government interviews.  Ofsted defines complexity as describing “multiple, overlapping needs” that “require a collective response from multiple agencies”. ¹⁰³ Ofsted, ‘How local authorities and children’s homes can achieve stability and permanence for children with complex needs’, GOV.UK, 16 January 2024, retrieved 26 September 2025, www.gov.uk/government/publications/good-decisions-children-with-complex-needs-in-childrens-homes/how-local-authorities-and-childrens-homes-can-achiev…  While publicly available data lacks a good measure of complexity, one proxy – the average number of risk factors recorded per episode of need – rose modestly from 2.4 in 2014/15 to 2.7 in 2019/20, and has plateaued since then.^{*, 104} Department for Education, ‘Children in need’, GOV.UK, 31 October 2024, retrieved 26 September 2025, https://explore-education-statistics.service.gov.uk/find-statistics/children-in-need/2024  Whether that rise reflects an increase in complexity, changing practice among social workers in recording risk factors or heightened risk recognition remains unclear.

Directors of children’s services report that the rising complexity comes at least in part from children’s inability to access other services, particularly mental health services. ¹⁰⁵ Institute for Government interviews.  Children’s and young people’s demand for mental health services has exploded in recent years, with referrals rising by 11.7% per year, from roughly 40,000 a month in 2016 to nearly 120,000 a month in 2024. ¹⁰⁶ Lord Darzi A, Independent Investigation of the National Health Service in England , GOV.UK, 2024, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/66f42ae630536cb92748271f/Lord-Darzi-Independent-Investigation-of-the-National-Health-Service-in-Englan…  The capacity of mental health services has seriously lagged behind. Since 2016, the number of people in contact with child and adolescent mental health services has risen more than four times faster than growth in the child and adolescent psychiatry workforce. ¹⁰⁷ British Medical Association, ‘Mental health pressures in England’, (no date), retrieved 15 September 2025, www.bma.org.uk/advice-and-support/nhs-delivery-and-workforce/pressures/mental-health-pressures-data-analysis

Children therefore face inordinate waits for mental health services, often entirely without professional support. ¹⁰⁸ Care Quality Commission, The State of Health Care and Adult Social Care in England 2023/24 , HC 274, The Stationery Office, 2024, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/671b5ce3044f28e776c609dc/care-quality-commission-the-state-of-health-care-and-adult-social-care-in-eng…  Analysis from Mind shows that 609,000 under-18s are on mental health waiting lists across England. ¹⁰⁹ Hayward E, ‘Children wait years for mental health care’, The Times, 25 April 2025, retrieved 15 September 2025, www.thetimes.com/uk/healthcare/article/children-mental-health-care-rj5fndbmt  A quarter of them – 150,000 children and young people – have already been waiting for longer than two years. ¹¹⁰ Ibid.  Some of these children have nowhere to get support other than via social care.

In 2023/24, the child’s own mental health was recorded as a risk factor in 17% of episodes of need, up from 12% in 2017/18. ¹¹¹ Department for Education, ‘Children in need’, GOV.UK, 31 October 2024, retrieved 26 September 2025, https://explore-education-statistics.service.gov.uk/find-statistics/children-in-need/2024  Broader mental health concerns – including those relating to parents or other people – rose even more sharply. In 2021/22, that category overtook domestic abuse as the leading risk factor recorded in episodes of need. ¹¹² Ibid.  By 2023/24 it was recorded in 54% of cases, compared to only 33% in 2014/15.

Another factor reported to be behind the rise in complexity is the crisis in the special educational needs and disabilities (SEND) system. ¹¹³ Institute for Government interviews.  The proportion of children with education, health and care plans (or EHCPs, which are required for higher levels of SEND support) is increasing more rapidly among children in social care than in the general population. ¹¹⁴ Department for Education, ‘Children in need’, GOV.UK, 31 October 2024, retrieved 26 September 2025, https://explore-education-statistics.service.gov.uk/find-statistics/children-in-need/2024  Between 2017/18 and 2023/24, the share of children in need^** with an EHCP rose by 5.6 percentage points, compared to just 1.8 points in the wider population. ¹¹⁵ Ibid.  This suggests that children’s social care could be absorbing unmet need from the overstretched SEND system, although the trend may instead reflect a shift in which groups of children have an EHCP.^***

A couple of interviewees also attributed the rise in the complexity of children’s social care cases to growth in the immigration backlog and changes in the criminal justice system. ¹¹⁶ Institute for Government interviews.  The former leaves more families with children without recourse to public funds, and for longer, although children’s social care must step in if they are facing destitution as welfare or homelessness support would otherwise not be available to them. ¹¹⁷ Institute for Government interviews.  There have also been reports that efforts to reduce the number of children in custody ¹¹⁸ Redgrave H, Buckland G and Roberts M, Examining the Youth Justice Service: What drove the falls in first time entrants and custody? , Crest Advisory, 2019, retrieved 26 September 2025, www.crestadvisory.com/post/examining-the-yjs-what-drove-the-falls-in-first-time-entrants-and-custody  have pushed a small number of children with very complex needs into care. ¹¹⁹ Institute for Government interview.  Associated savings have reportedly remained in the justice system rather than following need. ¹²⁰ Institute for Government interview.

These system ‘spillovers’ may help to explain reports that growing numbers of children with complex needs only present to social care services once they hit crisis point ¹²¹ Association of Directors of Children’s Services, ADCS Safeguarding Pressures Research – Phase 9 , 2025, www.adcs.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/ADCS_Safeguarding_Pressures_Phase9_FINALv1.pdf  – the primary needs of these children lie in the remit of the health, education, welfare, immigration or justice system, so they may remain invisible to social care services until necessity dictates an intervention. If the spillovers are not addressed, children’s social care prevention initiatives, such as those that the Labour government announced last year, may be of limited use in stopping need from escalating.

The solution is better join-up across health, education, justice, immigration, welfare and social care services, as Ofsted recommended in 2022. ¹²² Ofsted, ‘How local authorities plan for sufficiency of accommodation that meets the needs of children in care and care leavers’, GOV.UK, 18 November 2022, retrieved 26 September 2025, www.gov.uk/government/publications/how-local-authorities-plan-for-sufficiency-children-in-care-and-care-leavers/how-local-authorities-plan-for-suffic…  One interviewee gave examples of how this can work in practice, citing their local authority’s use of a multidisciplinary team to regularly review a register of children with the most complex needs in the area. ¹²³ Institute for Government interview.  This has successfully kept more of these children living with their families. The council also has an integrated approach to commissioning, with a single officer responsible for the children’s budgets of both the local authority and the local NHS integrated care system, enabling improved partnership working in the area. ¹²⁴ Ibid.

Other examples can be found among the 10 local authorities participating in the Families First for Children pathfinder programme. ¹²⁵ Department for Education, ‘Families first for children (FCC) pathfinder programme and family networks pilot (FNP)’, GOV.UK, 10 April 2024, retrieved 26 September 2025, www.gov.uk/government/publications/families-first-for-children-ffc-pathfinder-programme/families-first-for-children-ffc-pathfinder-programme-and-fami…  This programme was set up under the previous government, and granted additional funding under the current government, ¹²⁶ Samuel M, ‘Munro: children’s social care reforms “very likely to fail” due to scale of change and lack of testing’, Community Care, 3 July 2025, retrieved 26 September 2025, www.communitycare.co.uk/2025/07/03/munro-childrens-social-care-reforms-very-likely-to-fail-due-to-scale-of-change-and-lack-of-testing  to trial a more integrated system with stronger multi-agency working. Although the trials are ongoing, in some areas, education, health, police and social care teams have begun sharing access to families’ cases through a single portal. ¹²⁷ Verian and National Children’s Bureau, Families First for Children Pathfinder: Implementation and process evaluation report , Department for Education, 2025, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/686e710310d550c668de3d02/Families_first_for_children_pathfinder_implementation_and_process_ evaluation_report.pdf  Stakeholders believe the programme as a whole will reduce caseloads, and is already helping families access support earlier. ¹²⁸ Ibid.

_{* This calculation excludes risk factors that were introduced as options between 2014/15 and 2023/24, to keep figures as comparable as possible over time. See the Methodology for more details.}

_{** Figures cover those who were in need (including children with a child protection plan and those in care) as at 31 March of each year.}

_{*** Children in social care may be more likely to have an EHCP because they tend to be, for example, more deprived than the average child, and it may be that more deprived children have seen disproportionate increases in EHCPs. This is difficult to rule out across all potential stratifications of the children’s social care population. But it at least does not seem to be true for one measure of deprivation: between 2017/18 and 2023/24, EHCPs only became one percentage point more prevalent among children who are eligible for free school meals, compared to two percentage points more prevalent in the general child population. One interviewee also mentioned the possibility that being in receipt of social care services comes with greater exposure to professionals, who are perhaps more likely to identify a special educational need in any given child than they used to.}

Insufficient placements for children with the most complex needs have prompted a sharp increase in Deprivation of Liberty orders

To be deprived of liberty is to be confined for a significant period of time by the state, without valid consent. ¹²⁹ Parker C, Deprivation of Liberty: Legal reflections and mechanisms , Nuffield Family Justice Observatory, 2022, www.nuffieldfjo.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/nfjo_briefing_DoL_final_20220203.pdf  For children in receipt of social care, this usually arises when they are judged at risk – of criminal or sexual exploitation, or of harming themselves or others. It is therefore often the most vulnerable children, and those with the most complex needs, who are subject to such restrictions.

England faces a chronic shortage of suitable placement options for children who have been deprived of their liberty – placements that both meet their needs and provide proper safeguards. ¹³⁰ Roe A and Ryan M, Children Deprived of their Liberty: An analysis of the first two months of applications to the national deprivation of liberty court , Nuffield Family Justice Observatory, February 2023, www.nuffieldfjo.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/nfjo_report_yp_deprivation_of_liberty-1.pdf  The number of secure children’s homes (specialist provision designed for restriction of liberty) has more than halved since 2002, falling from 31 to 13 in 2025. ¹³¹ Department for Education, personal communication to the author, 26 September 2025.  Providers’ frequent reluctance to accept referrals for children with the most complex needs is further squeezing capacity. ¹³² Ofsted, ‘How local authorities plan for sufficiency of accommodation that meets the needs of children in care and care leavers’, GOV.UK, 18 November 2022, retrieved 26 September 2025, www.gov.uk/government/publications/how-local-authorities-plan-for-sufficiency-children-in-care-and-care-leavers/how-local-authorities-plan-for-suffic…  In some instances, this is justifiable: homes may lack the staff or specialist facilities required, or worry about unsettling other children already living there. ¹³³ Ibid.  But in other cases, providers purportedly ‘cherry-pick’ the children they take into care, since they know other referrals will soon come along. ¹³⁴ Ibid.  Concerns among providers that taking on more challenging children may negatively affect their Ofsted ratings are partly driving this behaviour. ¹³⁵ Ibid.

As the number of children with complex needs grows, the most vulnerable increasingly have nowhere to go. In 2024, Ofsted reported that around 50 children were waiting for a secure children’s home place on any given day. ¹³⁶ Ibid.  There were only 235 approved places in England and Wales in March 2025. ¹³⁷ Department for Education, ‘Children accommodated in secure children’s homes’, GOV.UK, 15 May 2025, retrieved 26 September 2025, explore-education-statistics.service.gov.uk/find-statistics/children-accommodated-in-secure-childrens-homes/2025

In the face of this dangerous inadequacy, local authorities have turned to Deprivation of Liberty orders (DoLs) – intended as a last-resort measure ¹³⁸ Roe A and Ryan M, Children Deprived of their Liberty: An analysis of the first two months of applications to the national deprivation of liberty court , Nuffield Family Justice Observatory, February 2023, www.nuffieldfjo.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/nfjo_report_yp_deprivation_of_liberty-1.pdf  for authorising a deprivation of liberty when none of the statutory mechanisms, such as a secure accommodation order, applies. In practice, DoLs generally mean children are placed in unregistered settings, such as children’s homes and sometimes even holiday lets staffed with agency workers. ¹³⁹ Ibid.  These settings are unlawful, lack Ofsted oversight to ensure minimum standards and are frequently of poor quality. ¹⁴⁰ Ofsted, ‘Unregistered children’s homes’, GOV.UK, 27 November 2024, retrieved 26 September 2025, www.gov.uk/government/publications/unregistered-childrens-homes/unregistered-childrens-homes  Despite the lack of safeguards, they are authorised to impose severe constraints on children, including: constant supervision (sometimes up to a 4:1 ratio of staff to child); restrictions on access to belongings, money and the internet; and physical restraint. ¹⁴¹ Roe A, Children Subject to Deprivation of Liberty Orders , Nuffield Family Justice Observatory, 2023, www.nuffieldfjo.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/CHILDR1.1.pdf  Councils often rely on these settings because they have nowhere else to place a child.

Data from Cafcass, an advisory service for children involved in family court proceedings, shows a more than sixfold increase in DoL applications since 2018, reaching 1,230 applications in 2024.^{*, 142} Cafcass, ‘Our data: public law demand spreadsheet, August 2025’, (no date), retrieved 6 October 2025, www.cafcass.gov.uk/about-us/our-data  Although the trend has levelled off somewhat in recent years for reasons that are not well understood, ¹⁴³ Institute for Government interview.  DoL applications now significantly outnumber applications to place children in secure children’s homes. In April to June 2025, there were five times as many of the former than the latter. ¹⁴⁴ Ministry of Justice, ‘Family Court Statistics Quarterly: April to June 2025’, GOV.UK, 25 September 2025, retrieved 6 October 2025, www.gov.uk/government/statistics/family-court-statistics-quarterly-april-to-june-2025  The drop in secure accommodation applications likely does not reflect a change in demand for those places, rather that the length of the waiting list has deterred local authorities from making applications. ¹⁴⁵ Institute for Government interview.

The use of DoLs and their impact on children has drawn repeated concern from across the system, including from family court judges, directors of children’s services, Ofsted and family rights groups. ¹⁴⁶ Roe A, Children Subject to Deprivation of Liberty Orders , Nuffield Family Justice Observatory, 2023, www.nuffieldfjo.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/CHILDR1.1.pdf  Too often, children who need stable, specialist support are instead placed in unregistered provision as a stopgap, with the hope that something more suitable will emerge. ¹⁴⁷ Roe A and Ryan M, Children Deprived of their Liberty: An analysis of the first two months of applications to the national deprivation of liberty court , Nuffield Family Justice Observatory, 2023, www.nuffieldfjo.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/nfjo_report_yp_deprivation_of_liberty-1.pdf  The result is poor outcomes for the most vulnerable children and material pressure on the workload of family courts. This situation is far from inevitable. As Lady Arden wrote in a Supreme Court judgment in 2021:

“It is not entirely clear to me… why the Secretary of State cannot or cannot yet enable all children who need to do so to enjoy the security of a registered home. This problem is clearly not a new one… It is not satisfactory that the courts should be used to address not just a specific gap but a systemic gap in the provision of care for children.” ¹⁴⁸ Re T (A Child) [2021] UKSC 35 [185].

The Labour government intends to address this in part through the creation of regional care co-operatives. The independent review of children’s social care, published in 2022, highlighted that, because local authorities typically care for very small numbers of children with the most complex needs, they struggle to forecast demand for, and commission, specialist provision effectively. ¹⁴⁹ MacAlister J, The Independent Review of Children’s Social Care , GOV.UK, 2022, https://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ukgwa/20230308122535mp_/https://childrenssocialcare.independent-review.uk/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/The-i…  By commissioning at a larger scale, co-operatives should be able to pool demand and therefore bring greater strategic direction.

The Labour government also intends, through the Children’s Wellbeing and Schools Bill, to provide a statutory basis for authorising deprivations of liberty in registered children’s homes that do not qualify as secure accommodation. ¹⁵⁰ Department for Education, Children’s Wellbeing and Schools Bill 2024: Policy summary notes (as amended in the House of Commons) , GOV.UK, 2025, retrieved 26 September 2025, www.gov.uk/government/publications/childrens-wellbeing-and-schools-bill-2024-policy-summary  This is designed not only to address the shortage of suitable placements for children with the most complex needs, but also to create provision that can adapt to children’s changing circumstances and needs – reducing restrictions when safe, while ensuring access to therapeutic support and appropriate safeguards.

_{* Official statistics on DoL applications have only been published since July 2023, which makes it difficult to analyse trends. Cafcass records how many DoL applications it is involved with, and so its figures may not be representative of the true number.}

The number of child and family social workers is at an all-time high and vacancy and turnover rates are improving

In September 2024, there were more child and family social workers employed than at any point since comparable data collection started in 2013, with the level rising above 34,000 full-time equivalent (FTE) social workers for the first time. ¹⁵¹ Department for Education, ‘Children’s social work workforce’, GOV.UK, 27 February 2025, retrieved 26 September 2025, https://explore-education-statistics.service.gov.uk/find-statistics/children-s-social-work-workforce/2024  The  most recent year’s increase was due to an improvement in retention in 2024: the number of staff leaving the workforce fell for the second consecutive year, down 500, or 10%, on a year earlier. ¹⁵² Ibid.  As a result, in 2024, 14% of social workers left the workforce, compared to a peak of 17% in 2022. ¹⁵³ Ibid.  Vacancy rates show a similar pattern, dropping to 17% in 2024 from a peak of 20% in 2022. ¹⁵⁴ Ibid.

These improvements at least partly represent a correction from the disruption of the Covid pandemic. Covid created difficult working conditions while constraining job mobility, producing a wave of delayed exits from the workforce once restrictions eased. The resulting spikes in turnover and vacancies were likely behind the DfE’s decision to raise the national risk rating for insufficient social work capacity to ‘critical – very likely’ in March 2024, ¹⁵⁵ Department for Education, Department for Education Consolidated Annual Report and Accounts 2023 to 2024 , HC 59, The Stationery Office, 2024, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/66a78149a3c2a28abb50d885/DfE_consolidated_annual_report_and_accounts_2023_to_2024_-_print-ready_versio…  but this year the issue was dropped from the list of principal risks facing the department. ¹⁵⁶ Department for Education, Department for Education Consolidated Annual Report and Accounts 2024 to 2025 , HC 1129, The Stationery Office, 2025, retrieved 26 September 2025, www.gov.uk/government/publications/department-for-education-consolidated-annual-report-and-accounts-2024-to-2025

Two additional factors may be contributing to the recent improvements, beyond the easing of pandemic-related pressures. Most notably, new statutory guidance, which the Labour government introduced in late 2024 ¹⁵⁷ Department for Education, Agency Rules , GOV.UK, 2024, retrieved 26 September 2025, www.gov.uk/government/publications/child-and-family-social-workers-agency-rules  – although it was developed under the Conservatives – appears to be curbing the agency social work market, historically a key driver of churn (discussed further below). The proportion of permanent staff leaving public sector social care employment to join agency child and family social work has halved since its peak of 3.4% in 2022, falling to 1.7% in 2024. ¹⁵⁸ Department for Education, ‘Children’s social work workforce’, GOV.UK, 27 February 2025, retrieved 26 September 2025, https://explore-education-statistics.service.gov.uk/find-statistics/children-s-social-work-workforce/2024  This is the lowest level since this data started being collected in 2017. ¹⁵⁹ Ibid.

The second factor that may be behind recent improvements is falling caseloads, where a case is “any person allocated to a named social worker, where the work involves  child and family social work”. ¹⁶⁰ Ibid.  Being overworked remains the most commonly cited reason why social workers consider leaving their jobs. ¹⁶¹ Johnson C, Jouahri S and Earl S, Longitudinal Study of Child and Family Social Workers (Wave 4) , GOV.UK, 2022, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1121609/Long_CAFSW_Wave_4_Report.pdf  Average caseloads have been declining pretty steadily since 2017, and have now reached an all-time low of 15.4 cases per case holder, down from 17.7 in 2017. ¹⁶² Department for Education, ‘Children’s social work workforce’, GOV.UK, 27 February 2025, retrieved 26 September 2025, https://explore-education-statistics.service.gov.uk/find-statistics/children-s-social-work-workforce/2024  While this metric does not reflect the reported rise in the complexity of cases, it may nonetheless track a meaningful shift.

While the core social care workforce appears to be stabilising, the recruitment and retention of child and family social workers still remain among the most pressing workforce problems for local authorities. Four in five councils report difficulties in recruiting and retaining child and family social workers – more than do for any other role. ¹⁶³ Local Government Association, LG Workforce Strategy 2024: Survey of English councils , 2025, www.local.gov.uk/sites/default/files/documents/LG%20Workforce%20survey%20202425%20report%20-final%20 20250609.pdf  In particular, recruitment is still trending in the wrong direction. In 2024, the number of starters fell, down 400 (7%) on the previous year.  ¹⁶⁴ Department for Education, ‘Children’s social work workforce’, GOV.UK, 27 February 2025, retrieved 26 September 2025, https://explore-education-statistics.service.gov.uk/find-statistics/children-s-social-work-workforce/2024

One interviewee also highlighted concerns around a lesser-known part of the system: the workforce delivering preventative services, below the threshold of section 17 ‘child in need’ assessments. ¹⁶⁵ Institute for Government interview.  The Labour government’s focus on prevention will place greater demands on this group of staff, but little is known about their capacity, with no routinely published data on early help and family support staff. It is therefore unclear whether that part of the system needs support to deliver the government’s reforms, and if so, what that support should entail. Thanks in part to those roles’ generally lower wages, local authorities are reportedly confident they can afford^* to staff preventative services, ¹⁶⁶ Institute for Government interview.  but rising demand could put upward pressure on pay.

_{* Whether there is a sufficient supply of workers is a separate, and more difficult, question.}

Agency worker rates have started to fall, although remain higher in local authorities with more vacancies and worse Ofsted ratings

In 2024, 16.2% of child and family social workers, or 6,521 FTE members of staff were employed from agencies. ¹⁶⁷ Department for Education, ‘Children’s social work workforce’, GOV.UK, 27 February 2025, retrieved 26 September 2025, https://explore-education-statistics.service.gov.uk/find-statistics/children-s-social-work-workforce/2024  This was considerably higher than, for example, the 10% agency worker rate in adult social care. ¹⁶⁸ Skills for Care and Workforce Intelligence, Headline Social Worker Information , Skills for Care, 2025, www.skillsforcare.org.uk/Adult-Social-Care-Workforce-Data/Workforce-intelligence/documents/Headline-social-worker-information-February-2025.pdf

Concerns about the sector’s over-reliance on agency workers have intensified in recent years. The temporary nature of agency work drives higher churn, destabilising teams and making it harder to build the strong, trusting relationships with children that lead to good outcomes. And agency workers are particularly costly, using resources that could be better spent supporting children and families. Analysis conducted for the DfE in 2020 estimated that each agency worker cost councils around £28,000^* more per year than a permanent employee, a 53% premium. ¹⁶⁹ Kantar, National Assessment and Accreditation System (NAAS): Delivery evaluation of phases 1 and 2 , GOV. UK, 2020, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5fbe26598fa8f559e32b4cdd/NAAS_delivery_evaluation_of_phases_1_and_2.pdf

In response to these concerns, and as mentioned above, the previous government consulted on constraining the agency worker market, ¹⁷⁰ Department for Education, ‘Child and family social workers: agency rules statutory guidance’, GOV.UK, (no date), retrieved 15 September 2025, https://consult.education.gov.uk/social-work-reform-unit/statutory-guidance-child-and-family-social-worker  and statutory guidance was issued on the use of agency staff in local authorities in late 2024, after the Labour government had assumed power. ¹⁷¹ Department for Education, Agency Rules , GOV.UK, 2024, retrieved 26 September 2025, www.gov.uk/government/publications/child-and-family-social-workers-agency-rules  Under this guidance, local authorities are barred from employing agency staff that have recently left permanent roles in the same region, and must agree and observe regional pay caps, among other requirements. ¹⁷² Ibid.

In 2024, the number of agency social workers fell for the first time since data began being published, in 2017 – down 700 (9.2%) from the series peak of 7,179 in 2023. ²⁵¹ Department for Education, ‘Children’s social work workforce’, GOV.UK, 27 February 2025, retrieved 26 September 2025, https://explore-education-statistics.service.gov.uk/find-statistics/children-s-social-work-workforce/2024  The proportion of the workforce employed through agencies also declined, dropping from 17.9% to 16.2% – the first fall since 2020. ²⁵² Ibid.  While the government’s new guidance only took effect on 31 October 2024,^** one month after the date the latest statistics refer to, the DfE believes that earlier engagement with local authorities about these regulations may have contributed to these shifts in the market. ²⁵³ Ibid.  And an interviewee told us that the guidance is already reshaping agency supply. ²⁵⁴ Institute for Government interview.

Since agency workers are typically used as a stopgap for urgent staffing shortfalls, falling vacancy rates have also likely played a part in reducing councils’ reliance on them. Unsurprisingly, then, agency worker rates remain higher in the local authorities with higher vacancy rates.^*** Local authorities with median vacancy rates (17.3%) are expected to have agency rates of 16.7%; for those with
vacancy rates at the 75th percentile (24.2%), agency rates would typically be 5.9 percentage points higher, at 22.6%.^****

Local authorities that rely more heavily on agency social workers also tend to have worse Ofsted ratings.^***** In 2024, just 9% of child and family social workers were agency staff in areas judged as ‘outstanding’, compared to 29% in those rated ‘inadequate’.^{******, 256} Ofsted, ‘Local authority inspection outcomes as at 31 March 2024’, GOV.UK, 30 August 2024, retrieved 26 September 2025, www.gov.uk/government/statistics/local-authority-inspection-outcomes-as-at-31-march-2024; Department for Education, ‘Children’s social work workforce’, GOV.UK, 27 February 2025, retrieved 26 September 2025, https://explore-education-statistics.service.gov.uk/find-statistics/children-s-social-work-workforce/2024  Despite employing just over a quarter (28%) of the total workforce, top-rated services enlisted only 14% of agency staff. The worst-rated ones, by contrast, employed only 14% of child and family social workers, but 23% of agency staff.

Reliance on agency staff and worse service performance likely feed into each other. As our vacancy analysis above shows, when services are struggling and demand far exceeds workforce levels, agency staff are relied on more heavily. But this reliance can, in turn, lower service performance by destabilising social work teams and disrupting children’s lives with higher turnover rates. The cycle is deepened if the service receives a negative Ofsted judgment: directors of children’s services report that this heightens staff churn, and therefore reliance on agency social workers. ²⁶¹ Association of Directors of Children’s Services, ADCS Safeguarding Pressures Research – Phase 9 , 2025, www.adcs.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/ADCS_Safeguarding_Pressures_Phase9_FINALv1.pdf

_{* Adjusted to 2025/26 prices.}

_{** The guidance only applies to new contracts from this date; full implementation of the guidance across all contracts did not need to be achieved until 1 October 2025.}

_{*** Regression LG 3.4 – see Methodology for further details. R² = 0.76.}

_{**** See the Methodology for details of this calculation.}

_{***** The Isles of Scilly, City of London and Rutland were excluded from the analysis, as were local authorities that submit joint workforce census returns (Kingston upon Thames, Richmond upon Thames, North Northamptonshire and West Northamptonshire), as there is no equivalent combined inspection rating.}

_{****** Using local authorities’ most recent inspection outcome as at 31 March 2024.}

Ofsted grades for children’s services are improving and are highest in London

The share of children’s services that Ofsted has rated ‘good’ or ‘outstanding’ has risen in every year^* since 2015. ²⁶² Ofsted, ‘Local authority inspection outcomes as at 31 March 2024’, GOV.UK, 30 August 2024, retrieved 26 September 2025, www.gov.uk/government/statistics/local-authority-inspection-outcomes-as-at-31-march-2024  In 2025, 67% received one of those top ratings, up from just 24% in 2015. ²⁶³ Ibid.  Meanwhile, the share rated ‘inadequate’ halved, falling from 24% to 12%. ²⁶⁴ Ibid.

London led England in terms of Ofsted ratings in 2025, with 88% of its children’s services judged as ‘good’ or ‘outstanding’ – well above the national average. ²⁸⁷ Ibid.  Two interviewees suggested that this was, in part, because London does particularly well out of various government settlements relative to its need. ²⁸⁸ Institute for Government interviews.  Another suggested that London’s outperformance may reflect the boroughs’ strong track record of collaboration: meeting regularly, sharing good practice and investing as groups. ²⁸⁹ Institute for Government interview.

_{* It stayed flat between 2020 and 2021, but 2021 data is affected by Ofsted suspending all routine inspections of social care provision at the beginning of the pandemic.}

The Labour government has prioritised children’s social care reform

Throughout this parliament, the Labour government has allocated relatively large amounts of additional funding to children’s social care reform, signalling it as a priority. This was perhaps most noticeable in the 2025 spending review, where children’s social care received 17% (or £555m in cash terms) of the Transformation Fund, to spend on “reform of children’s social care through earlier intervention”. ²⁹⁰ HM Treasury, Spending Review 2025 , CP 1336, The Stationery Office, 2025, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/686270a608bf2f53761219fc/E03349913_HMT_Spending_Review_June_2025_TEXT_PRINT_CS.pdf

The government has also established a £270m a year (cash terms) ring-fenced grant for prevention in children’s services, with settlements agreed from 2025/26 to 2028/29. ²⁹¹ Ibid.  For comparison, local authorities spent roughly £897m on preventative children’s services^* in 2023/24 (in 2025/26 prices). ²⁹² Department for Education, ‘LA and school expenditure 2023-24’, GOV.UK, 12 December 2024, retrieved 25 September 2025, https://explore-education-statistics.service.gov.uk/find-statistics/la-and-school-expenditure/2023-24

It is welcome that the government is seeking to prioritise prevention, but this ring-fence is set out in vague terms, with the grant earmarked for “early help, Family Help, Family Networks and child protection”. ²⁹³ Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, ‘Children’s Social Care Prevention Grant Determination 2025-26: 31/7833’, GOV.UK, 4 May 2025, retrieved 15 September 2025, www.gov.uk/government/publications/childrens-social-care-prevention-grant-determination-2025-to-2026/childrens-social-care-prevention-grant-determina…  While it is important to ensure that local authorities have sufficient discretion in allocating this grant, there is a risk that it will be eaten up by acute demand if not properly specified. A more effective approach, as set out in the cross-service analysis, would be providing local authorities with a single prevention grant for all local services, protected by a clearly defined ring-fence. This would enable councils to focus on the causes of family breakdown, many of which lie outside of children’s services.

In total, the government has apportioned approximately £1.7bn (in 2025/26 prices) of funding to children’s social care reform, spread over five years. ²⁹⁴ Various sources – see the Methodology.  This rises to £2.2bn  if the £493m of repurposed funding – originally earmarked for the Supporting Families Programme – is included.

In his independent review of children’s social care, Josh MacAlister – now a Labour MP – called for an additional £2.6bn of investment over four years to transform the system. ²⁹⁵ MacAlister J, The Independent Review of Children’s Social Care, GOV.UK, 2022, https://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ukgwa/20230308122535mp_/https://Childrenssocialcare.independent-review.uk/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/The-i…  If we include repurposed and capital spending, the Labour government has met that overall target in cash terms by committing itself to £2.9bn between 2025/26 and 2028/29. ²⁹⁶ Various sources – see the Methodology.  Detailed negotiations over funding envelopes for individual programmes are to follow. But MacAlister intended most of the funding to go to family help, with the remainder allocated to the workforce, foster care recruitment, care placements, and support for family networks and care leavers. ²⁹⁷ MacAlister J, The Independent Review of Children’s Social Care, GOV.UK, 2022, https://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ukgwa/20230308122535mp_/https://childrenssocialcare.independent-review.uk/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/The-i…

The government’s vision for reform, set out in its policy paper from late 2024, closely follows the priorities that MacAlister outlined. One of its principles is that “wherever possible, children should remain with their families and be prevented from entering the care system”. ²⁹⁸ Department for Education, Keeping Children Safe, Helping Families Thrive , CP 1200, The Stationery Office, 2024, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/67375fe5ed0fc07b53499a42/Keeping_Children_Safe__Helping_Families_Thrive_.pdf  To support this, the proposed Children’s Wellbeing and Schools Bill would place a collective duty on safeguarding partners – local authorities, police and health – to set up and run multi-agency child protection teams in every local area. ²⁹⁹ Department for Education, Children’s Wellbeing and Schools Bill 2024: Policy summary notes (as amended in the House of Commons) , GOV.UK, 2025, retrieved 26 September 2025, www.gov.uk/government/publications/childrens-wellbeing-and-schools-bill-2024-policy-summary

Each team would include, at a minimum, a social worker, a police officer, a health care professional and someone with education experience. ³⁰⁰ Ibid.  It is hoped this will address the service spillovers discussed above, which appear to be a driver of acute demand for children’s social care. Early evidence from the Families First for Children pathfinder programme suggests the approach has potential. ³⁰¹ Verian and National Children’s Bureau, Families First for Children Pathfinder: Implementation and process evaluation report , Department for Education, 2025, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/686e710310d550c668de3d02/Families_first_for_children_pathfinder_implementation_and_process_evaluation_…

However, one interviewee raised a concern that these multi-agency teams would not tackle the root causes of the service spillovers. ³⁰² Institute for Government interview.  Integrated care boards and police forces have been safeguarding partners of local authorities since the implementation of the Children and Social Work Act in 2017, ³⁰³ Legislation.gov.uk, Children Act 2004 , c. 31, pt. 2, retrieved 26 September 2025, www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2004/31/part/2/crossheading/safeguarding-partners-for-local-authority-areas  yet the problem has worsened over that time period. Their incentives are not aligned with children’s social care, and in many cases they lack the capacity to meet their own targets.

Recent Institute for Government work recommended that the government should launch a revitalised version of the Total Place initiative, which was initially established under Gordon Brown’s premiership in 2009. This encouraged agencies in a local area to pool funding, identify duplication and gaps in provision, and redesign services around the needs of service users. It is therefore welcome that Angela Rayner, the former deputy prime minister, announced in July that the government would launch Total Place-style pilots “so councils and mayors can pool budgets and do joined-up services”. ³⁰⁴ Rayner A, ‘Local Government Association Conference 2025’, speech at the Local Government Conference, 3 July 2025, retrieved 26 September 2025, www.gov.uk/government/speeches/local-government-association-conference-2025

Another of the Labour government’s reform principles is to “support children to live with kinship carers or in fostering families, rather than in residential care”. ³⁰⁵ Department for Education, Keeping Children Safe, Helping Families Thrive, CP 1200, The Stationery Office, 2024, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/67375fe5ed0fc07b53499a42/Keeping_Children_Safe__Helping_Families_Thrive_.pdf  A major obstacle to this is the shortage of foster carers, driven by recruitment and retention challenges. The government plans to improve the support offer given to foster carers ³⁰⁶ Ibid., p.26.  and to co-ordinate recruitment efforts across local areas. ³⁰⁷ Mutual Ventures and Department for Education, Guide to Establishing Regional Fostering Recruitment Support Hubs: Version 2 – December 2024, Mutual Ventures, 2024, www.mutualventures.co.uk/_files/ugd/661139_7fb419844cef4a148a6463f12705b7de.pdf  To maximise the chances of success, these reforms should tackle the more fundamental causes of the shortage, by making fostering more affordable and attractive, particularly to working- age households.

The Labour government also hopes its reforms will “fix the broken care system”. ³⁰⁸ Department for Education, Keeping Children Safe, Helping Families Thrive, CP 1200, The Stationery Office, 2024, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/67375fe5ed0fc07b53499a42/Keeping_Children_Safe__Helping_Families_Thrive_.pdf  Upcoming Institute for Government work will be exploring these problems in greater detail. But a key element of its plans is the creation of regional care co-operatives, mentioned earlier, with the aim of bringing greater strategic oversight to the forecasting and commissioning of placements. To avoid replicating local authorities’ reactive approach, these bodies and their forecasting functions must be properly funded and prioritised. The government must also ensure that regional analysis does not come at the expense of granular insights, particularly in areas with diverse needs.

_{* In children’s social care, we classify spending on children’s centres, children under five and services for young people as preventative as these services reduce the likelihood or severity of acute demand.}