Making the Games: Delivering London 2012

Speakers:

• Sir John Armitt; Chair, Olympic Delivery Authority (2007-present day)
• Paul Deighton (Baron Deighton of Carshalton); Chief Executive, London Organising Committee of the Olympic and Paralympic Games (2006-present day)
• Jonathan Stephens; Permanent Secretary, Department of Culture, Media & Sport (2006-present day)

Chair: Evan Davis; BBC journalist and presenter of Built in Britain

Introducing the event, Evan Davis presented three main themes for the speakers to consider – whether there was a trade-off on major projects between acting decisively and being accountable, whether the government had acted more decisively than usual in delivering the Olympics, and what the ideal relationship between a public buyer and private provider would be.

Sir John Armitt outlined that while the Olympics were unique, elements of it were replicable for future major projects. The willingness to review the initial, insufficient budget was rare but necessary because it was impossible for the UK to decide not to proceed with the Olympics once the bid had been won. The generosity of the revised budget was crucial as better decisions get made, especially in construction projects, when excessive cost-cutting is not taking place. Government committing both itself and future governments guaranteed cross-party support as the opposition did not want to damage a project that they may end up running. He argued that effective incentives were at the heart of the success of the project – CLM, the ODA’s delivery partner who appointed individual contractors, were incentivised within a target price contract to deliver elements of the project on-time and on-budget. Likewise the use of NEC-3 contracts reinforced the obligations of contractors to tell the client about problems, and enforced the obligations of the client to respond to problems.

Paul Deighton began by referring to July 2005 and the vision of the Olympics as inspiring change. This vision had remained as LOCOG’s compass throughout the seven year journey towards the Games. He saw the competitive bidding process as being crucial for the thought and preparation it required – this put LOCOG in a strong position once the bid was won. The fact that no-one in the UK had experience of delivering an Olympics meant that close working with the International Olympic Committee was essential; that and LOCOG’s back-ended spending model was unnerving for government as they had little concrete to show for 7 years prior to the Games themselves.

There were three major variables on any project: time, cost and design; the immovable deadline of the Olympic opening ceremony meant that all the volatility within this project had to be absorbed within the latter two. LOCOG had approached their task in four main segments – the primary objective of delivering an outstanding Games had been planned for from the outcome backwards. A great experience had been planned for athletes, journalists and spectators, with the necessary measures being put in place. His second area of focus was building an organisation – he had applied for the CEO role as it involved building a company that would ultimately be the size of Shell from scratch, with the ability to hire whoever he chose. The third segment was telling people what was happening and breaking the project up into clear stages communicated through the media. The final area was enabling a legacy; while LOCOG did not deliver the legacy, the promise from the bid was about inspiring future generations, which was intrinsically linked to legacy.

Jonathan Stephens explained that DCMS, while a small Department, was an excellent host Department for the Games as it was used to working through arms-length bodies. He focused on what the role of government was (and equally importantly, was not) around the Games. The five major roles for government included, firstly, ensuring that political support for the Games continued across political transitions such as changes of minister and elections. The second was contributing to the clarity of purpose as to why London was hosting the Games. The third core government function was providing the £9.3 billion public funding package and accounting for it; 75-80% of all funding for the Games had come from the public sector. The fourth role for government was having an oversight of risk as all risk would ultimately be laid at the government’s door. The final area involved contributing to effective delivery, in areas including public transport, security and border operations. In achieving these objectives the transparency around the project, emphasis on effective working relationships and a willingness to change intra-governmental structures were all crucial.

Questions focused on how best to align incentives between the public and private sector, what lessons could be drawn for transforming public services from the success of major projects, and what lessons had been drawn from individual elements of the project not going as well as had been hoped for.

Jonny Medland

We are grateful to CH2M HILL for supporting this event