

Executive summary


This year's *Whitehall Monitor* annual report tells three stories: what government looks like in the UK in 2014, how it has changed since 2010, and how transparent it is. These stories and the data underpinning them also give us a sense of the stresses Whitehall is likely to face under any government formed after the 2015 General Election.

In terms of what government looks like, the key word is variety. Although each government department is similar in being allocated a certain amount of resources, employing staff to deploy them, and answering to Parliament through a minister who sits in the Cabinet, they are defined by their differences. They differ in terms of their scale – their budgets, their staff numbers, the grade balance of their civil servants, the diversity of their staff and the functions their staff perform. In the aftermath of the Scottish referendum, it is worth noting the differences in the territorial extent of departments and where they employ their staff. Departments also differ in what they do with their resources – some directly manage much of their spend, others channel it through arm's-length bodies (ALBs), others through grants and system funding, and others through contracts with third parties. Some departments are responsible for more legislation than others; some receive a large volume of requests for information from parliamentarians and the public; some have more major projects; and some departments are performing better than others against their targets and in managing their major projects.

Whitehall has undergone significant changes since 2010. Departments have had their budgets reduced after the Government challenged itself to address the deficit, and many are spending even less than was planned in 2010. Nearly all have fewer staff with which to manage those budgets than pre-2010, and some have experienced considerable change in departmental leadership, with a high turnover of ministers and permanent secretaries. In spite of this, there has been little overall change in how civil servants feel about working in their organisations – although the engagement scores of some departments have fallen, and civil servants have become unhappier about their pay and benefits. Major reforms by the Coalition – notably at the Department for Education (DfE), Department of Health (DH) and Ministry of Defence (MoD) – have changed how those departments manage many of their resources, and therefore the skills and capabilities they need to employ. In terms of performance, there has been a slight improvement in how departments manage major projects and in the number of Business Plan actions under way (though some departments have got worse).

As for transparency, Government has improved the way it publishes and uses some of its data over the past year, including top-level financial data and objectives for permanent secretaries. Some welcome initiatives – notably the Major Projects Authority annual report – continue to be useful and largely realistic. However, concerns remain. A lack of financial transparency in some areas makes it difficult to explain changes between planned spending and actual outturn, and to present a comprehensive picture of government contracting; some datasets are missing a large amount of information (for example, on civil servants' individual professions); and the actions and impact indicators contained in Departmental Business Plans (which should allow the public to track the progress of actions and reforms, and their impact in the real world) are of limited use and not always taken seriously by departments.

Nonetheless, government transparency allows us to build up a better picture than ever before – and this includes identifying where stresses might emerge after the 2015 General Election.



What government looks like in 2014

When people think of government departments (if they think of them at all), it is probably what they have in common that stands out – the department of this or the ministry of that, based somewhere in London SW1, that receives money from the Treasury, employs people to work on behalf of the Government and has a politician representing it around the Cabinet table, in Parliament and through the media to the public. But government departments in 2014 vary hugely in what they are, what they do, and how they do it.

The resources that these departments have – the budgets, assets and staff that we call ‘inputs’ in this report – are the first point of difference. Some, such as the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) and the Department of Health (DH), are allocated more than £100bn a year; others, such as the Cabinet Office, with £500m (excluding the Secret Intelligence Service), considerably less. The control departments have over their spending also varies: more than 90% of DWP’s spending is Annually Managed Expenditure (AME) – demand-led spending that it is obliged to pay to any eligible claimant, like pensions and unemployment benefit. Spending in most other departments is mainly through DEL budgets (Departmental Expenditure Limits), where those in charge of the department have more control in allocating funds to achieve their departmental goals.

There is also a contrast between departments with mostly resource spending (on day-to-day operations, namely administration and policies) and those with mostly capital spending (adding to the assets of the public sector, through buildings and infrastructure). The Department for Transport (maintaining roads and railways) and Department of Energy and Climate Change (nuclear energy) are the only departments with more than 50% of spending going to capital.

Departments vary in the amount of assets and liabilities they hold, which seldom receive attention. The stake held by the Treasury in the banks following the financial crisis; by MoD in military estate, weapons and ammunition; and by the Department for Transport (DfT) in the transport infrastructure give them assets of more than £100bn (the majority of departments are under £10bn). Meanwhile, clinical negligence at DH and nuclear decommissioning at the Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC) are the largest departmental liabilities.

Devolution means that the territorial extent of departments’ spend and responsibility also varies. The Department for Education (DfE) is England-only while nearly all of the responsibilities of the Chancellor’s Departments (CxD) are UK-wide. The rapidly evolving, devolving constitutional settlement over the next few years is likely to have consequences not only for the nations and English regions but for how Whitehall operates.

As finances vary between department, so too does the workforce. DWP, HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC), the Ministry of Justice (MoJ) and MoD, with more than 50,000 employees each, dwarf the other departments. Most staff in the Department for International Development (DfID) are at the senior end of the civil service grades, compared to MoJ, which is dominated by staff at the lowest administration grades. All staff in the Department for Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) are based in London, while other departments and their arm’s-length bodies have a large percentage of staff in devolved nations (DfT in Wales, DfID in Scotland), which could become an issue with any further devolution. Civil servants in different departments also differ in what civil service professions they are part of – and therefore what they do on a day-to-day basis. ‘Operational delivery’ dominates HMRC, DWP, MoJ and the Home Office (HO), while policy is the largest professional grouping in DECC, the Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG), DH and DfID.

How departments manage their resources and what they do with them – the ‘outputs’ in this report – also differ. Some line-manage most of their resources directly (e.g. HMRC, DWP), others sponsor arm’s-length bodies (e.g. the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, DECC, DCMS), others still distribute grants and system funding (e.g. DfID, DCLG with its funding of local authorities) and some contract services out (e.g. MoJ). These vastly different ways of running a department require different sets of specialist skills and capabilities. But many departments use a mix of these management models. For example, according to the National Audit Office, MoD ultimately spends the most on contracts with third-party suppliers, but most of its resources are directly managed or channelled through arm’s-length bodies.

Government departments can implement their policies and achieve their goals through different routes, including legislation. The Treasury is responsible for the most bills (including finance bills which translate proposals made in the Budget into law); other departments have passed just a few pieces of legislation (if any). Departments come under different levels of pressure to answer enquiries and release information through parliamentary questions, correspondence and freedom of information

(Fol) requests, with DWP and DH bearing the most scrutiny. They also differ in how timely and how full their responses are. Departments are also responsible for varying numbers of major projects, MoD having the most, followed by DH.

Finally, various performance measures show us the different responsibilities and performance of departments. Looking at the actions and reforms they specify in their Business Plans, DfID missed the fewest deadlines and DCMS the most. On major projects, DfID, DH and HO saw delivery confidence decline in more projects across their portfolio than improve.

How government has changed since 2010

Whitehall departments have undergone significant changes since 2010, some more than others. Some departments have had a higher turnover of political leadership than others. Reshuffles mean that six departments are on their third secretary of state since May 2010 (MoD, Defra, the Wales Office, Scotland Office, DfT and DCMS), although six remain on their first (the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, the Cabinet Office, DCLG, DWP, the Treasury and HO). Reshuffles have also affected junior ministers, who do much of the heavy lifting in Parliament and on policy implementation: more than half of the ministers at BIS and DfE, and half of the ministers at MoD and DECC, were new to their post at the July 2014 reshuffle. In all, 19 out of 121 people remain in the same posts as when the Government was appointed in May 2010. On the civil service side, only one Permanent Secretary (Nicholas Macpherson) was in the same post prior to May 2010. This turnover of politicians and permanent secretaries is a perennial pressure on departments and likely to continue – it can hinder government effectiveness as leaders cannot see the job through to the end.

Turning to finances, the Government's commitment to reducing spending in order to address the deficit means that departments have been allocated reduced budgets. Many departments are spending even less than planned in the 2010 Spending Review, particularly DfID, DECC and the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra). Some of the changes can be explained through transfers of spend to other departments (for example, transport grants moving from DfT to DCLG) or policy changes (an extension of early-years childcare at DfE), but many do not appear to be explained in any documentation published by the departments concerned. In a time of sustained spending cuts, which are likely to continue after 2015, the lack of transparency can make it difficult to work out exactly how effective spending reductions are: are they sustainable, or are they simply storing up pressures for the future? Meanwhile, some liabilities have increased – particularly provisions for clinical negligence claims at DH (by 53%) and public sector pensions.

Civil service staff numbers have fallen from nearly 480,000 at the Spending Review in 2010 to under 410,000 in June 2014 (Full-time Equivalent). Again, different departments have different experiences – DCMS, DCLG and DWP have seen the largest percentage cuts, while DECC, DfID and the parts of the Cabinet Office (CO) line-managed by ministers and senior civil servants have more staff now than in 2010. For the first time, the current government is not on track to meet its objective in staff reductions. There may well be further reductions in the civil service workforce after May 2015. Whitehall will need to consider how it changes its ways of working, with a number of senior leaders publicly suggesting that more functions need to be shared across departments.

The composition of staff within departments has also changed slightly, with a number of departments (including DfID, DECC, CO, BIS, DfT, and DfE) becoming relatively more senior in terms of grade. The Civil Service as a whole is older than in 2010, slightly more female at senior level (though with women still making up only 38% of the Senior Civil Service), and slightly more diverse in terms of ethnicity and disability.

Despite the considerable challenges involved in budget and staff reductions, civil service engagement scores – how civil servants feel about working in their organisations – have held up or recovered after redundancy rounds. There are exceptions, however: DfE's engagement score has fallen from 63% in 2009 to 51% in 2013, and across the Civil Service, satisfaction with pay and benefits has continued to fall. One thing that hasn't changed is the much more positive attitude of the Senior Civil Service (SCS) compared with the rest of the Civil Service on every theme, including whether the results of the staff survey actually lead to change. Workforce morale, and the retention of key staff, could come under further pressure with further cuts and continuing pay restraint.

Major reforms have fundamentally changed the way some departments manage their resources. At DfE, grants to local authorities are increasingly being replaced by contracts with schools through the expansion of the academies programme; DH's relationship with the NHS and public health is now, formally at least, through two arm's-length bodies (NHS England and Public Health England, respectively); and at MoD, Defence Equipment and Support (and thus the procurement of defence materiel and support services) has moved from being part of the department to an ALB. These changes to how departments operate can create stresses – shifts to new ways of delivering services, for example through contracting, will require new skills and capabilities.

Another notable change is the decline in arm's-length bodies (ALBs). The Government's reform of public bodies since 2010 has led to a reduction in Non-Departmental Public Bodies (NDPBs), their staff numbers and funding, although it is part of a longer trend – there were over 2000 NDPBs in 1979 compared to under 450 in 2014. These numbers cannot fully express the complexity of the ALB landscape – with mergers, the creation of some new bodies, the transfer of functions between and within these bodies and the government department concerned – but again, these changes will require different relationships and skills. Reform of arm's-length bodies after the election should not be simply a numbers game, but rather be driven by changes that aim to make government more effective.

There have also been changes in how departments perform against some of their responsibilities. One performance measurement mechanism we analyse is the Major Projects Authority's RAG rating system: in the two years of published assessments of confidence in major project delivery, more projects have improved (32) than have declined (27), but the majority (64) stayed at the same rating. Large-scale infrastructure projects will continue to stretch departments, even with the oversight of the Major Projects Authority.

Another metric is the set of actions listed in each department's Structural Reform Plans. As of July 2014, 73% had been completed on time. This is consistent with previous years, where the on-time completion rate has hovered around 75%. Comparing 2013 and 2014 shows that there are some consistently strong performers (DfID, BIS, MoD) and some consistently weak ones (DCMS, DH). However, many departments' scores differ significantly between the two years.

How transparent government is

In *Whitehall Monitor 2013*, we published a list of recommendations that government could adopt to make data more accessible, more comparable and more useful. We made specific criticisms of Structural Reform Plans (Business Plans) and of Permanent Secretary Objectives. We also highlighted certain barriers to financial transparency, namely difficulty in accessing data, inadequate explanations of changes, and inconsistencies in how changes are reported and in organisational boundaries (what is classed as part of a department).¹ A year on, how have things changed?

There have been some definite improvements. Permanent Secretary Objectives are now more timely, being published earlier in the performance year (July not December); fewer in number (the average number is now nine, rather than the unfeasibly high 18 of 2013-14); and are more focused and accompanied by clear measures. These changes make objectives easier to analyse, and – hopefully – of greater use in assessing permanent secretary performance.

The continued publication of major projects data is also welcome, providing a comprehensive and realistic overview of the Government's portfolio even where the ratings are not unambiguously positive. One disappointment in the most recent report is the rating of Universal Credit as 'reset'. In evidence to the Public Accounts Committee, John Manzoni, then chief executive of the Major Projects Authority and now chief executive of the Civil Service, confirmed this decision was 'ultimately a ministerial and a government agreement'.² That said, some departments – notably the MoD in publishing its Equipment Plan and major projects information for the National Audit Office to analyse – continue to go further in transparency.

This *Whitehall Monitor* is the first to use data from the public bodies reports published by the Cabinet Office. Online archives go back to 1997 (with data back to 1979), but the most recent releases are much more detailed on the state of non-departmental public bodies and their situation as per the Government's reform plans.

The publication of the Whole of Government Accounts for a fourth year is also positive, giving us an overview of government finances over the past four financial years and enabling scrutiny of how departments manage them through their operational

and policy decisions. According to the Treasury, they have also been used to inform spending decisions.³ The continued drive to make the accounts timelier, more comprehensive and free of qualifications should make them even more useful.

However, there are still major improvements in transparency that can and should be made. Our attempt to explain the changes between spending plans and actual outturns for different departments shows that there is still work to be done on financial transparency. No department explains all of its changes in the financial documentation (Budget, annual reports, Public Expenditure Statistical Analyses) in which those changes appear. Some (DCMS, MoJ, DECC) explain all their changes somewhere, while others do not even publish figures that make it possible to compare resource spending between the budget documentation and their own annual reports. Departments are much better at explaining the impact of policy changes or transfers of funds across years than at explaining changes within financial years.

Our work with Spend Network on government contracting shows that the nature of the financial data available limits our analysis. Spending isn't linked to tenders or contracts; data is published in a way that makes it hard to determine which companies ultimately benefit from payments relating to PFI contracts and joint ventures; accuracy is limited because some datasets are not published; and central government transactions under £25,000 are rarely published. A great deal of information on supply chains, terms of the contracts themselves and performance data is not published at all, making it difficult to assess how well public service markets are operating.

In looking at the workforce, the large percentage of civil servants with 'unknown' professions in the Annual Civil Service Employment Survey is far from ideal. One would hope that departments have a better sense of what the people they employ actually do than is suggested by the data: professions are unknown for more than 15% of staff in MoD, the Foreign Office (FCO), DCMS, DfT and the Treasury (HMT). Since 2010, more data has become available for some departments, but in the case of DCMS, data availability has got worse – professions were unknown in under 10% of cases in 2010, but this figure has risen to more than 60% in 2013.

The data we have obtained from Departmental Business Plans or Structural Reform Plans – actions and reforms, and impact indicators – also gives cause for concern. The number of actions per department varies greatly, partly because the granularity of the actions varies (for example, the entire rail franchising programme, comprising multiple competitions, is entered as one action). The original concept – reporting progress against clear deadlines on things within the department's control – was good, but its implementation has several shortcomings – for example, it is difficult to track progress on key reforms such as Universal Credit.

The impact indicators are even more limited. Nearly half of departments prefer to use their own bespoke measures. And a member of the public wanting the latest information on a given department from the Number 10 Transparency website (transparency.number10.gov.uk) and even a department's annual report will run into difficulty, with some of the links directing users to out-of-date scores with little explanation.


Nevertheless, the commitment of this Government and the previous government to open data and transparency means we are in a better position than ever before to present a picture – specifically, more than 120 charts, maps and other graphics – of government in the UK. We hope that in presenting a snapshot of government in 2014, key changes since 2010 and the similarities and differences between departments, we can help departmental leaders understand and improve how departments operate, and help the public hold government to account. And, in highlighting areas where the lack of data hinders our analysis and limits our understanding, we hope further progress can be made in equipping all of us to improve government effectiveness.

Finally, one of the biggest pressures that will face any government after the 2015 election will be the relationship between public and government. One of the most difficult tasks taken on by this report is trying to measure the impact of government policies and reforms in the real world, and our conclusions are tentative as a result. But what is clear from our polling is that the British public want politicians who can implement their promises, and eschew party politics for long-term thinking and professional delivery. At the moment, however, they do not think they are up to the job. Whichever party or parties are in government after 2015 will certainly have their work cut out.

Inputs: government's resources

Very few ministers remain in the same posts they held in May 2010.


Figure 1: When ministers took up current post (as of October 2014)



Source: Institute for Government analysis of reshuffles, 2010-14.

Total Managed Expenditure (TME) was £720bn, with DWP spending the most...


Figure 2: TME by department, plans for 2013-14



Source: Institute for Government analysis of Annual Reports and Accounts, 2012-13.

...although most of this is Annually Managed Expenditure (AME) for meeting the department's obligations, which gives leaders less control over their spend.


Figure 3: Departmental Expenditure Limits (DEL) and AME, plans for 2013-14



Source: Institute for Government analysis of Annual Reports and Accounts, 2012-13.

Leaders of departments with high spending on capital – such as DfT and DECC – are also more constrained in their spending.


Figure 4: Departmental capital and resource spending, plans for 2013-14



Source: Institute for Government analysis of Annual Reports and Accounts, 2012-13.

Departments differ in the nature of their spending across the UK (from England-only departments to those covering the whole of the UK)...

Figure 5: Extent of devolved responsibility by department



Source: Institute for Government analysis of UK Government Statement of Funding Policy, 2010.

...and in how well they explain changes between their planned and actual spending.


Figure 6: Transparency of departmental spending plans

Department	2011-12	2012-13	2013-14	2014-15	Average rank
DECC	Green	Green	Green	Green	1
DCMS	Green	Yellow	Green	Green	2
MOJ	Green	Green	Green	Red	3
DH	Yellow	Yellow	Green	Yellow	4
DfE	Green	Red	Green	Yellow	5
DWP	Orange	Green	Yellow	Yellow	6
BIS	Green	Yellow	Red	Green	7
DfT	Yellow	Green	Yellow	Yellow	8=
DCLG	Green	Red	Red	Yellow	8=
FCO	Orange	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	9
DfID	Red	Orange	Yellow	Green	10
MoD	Orange	Red	Red	Green	11=
Defra	Yellow	Red	Yellow	Yellow	11=
HO	Red	Green	Yellow	Red	13
CO	Red	Red	Red	Red	15=
HMRC	Red	Red	Red	Red	15=
HMT	Red	Red	Red	Red	15=

Source: Institute for Government analysis of Budgets 2010-14, Spending Review 2010, Public Expenditure Statistical Analyses (Pesa) 2011-14, and departmental Annual Reports and Accounts 2011-12 to 2013-14.

The costs of actually running departments continue to be lower than planned.


Figure 7: Administration budgets – spending compared to plans, 2013 to 2014



Source: Institute for Government analysis of table 1.7 in Pesa 2013 (plans for 2013-14) and Pesa 2014 (outturn 2013-14).

As well as budgets, staff numbers continue to be reduced...


Figure 8: Civil service staff numbers, March 2009 – June 2014 ('000, Full-time Equivalents)



Source: Institute for Government analysis of Office for National Statistics (ONS) Public Sector Employment data (table 9), Q1 2009 to Q2 2014.

...with some departments taking more of a hit than others.


Figure 9: Change in staff in departmental groups since Spending Review 2010 (Full-time Equivalents)



Source: Institute for Government analysis of ONS Public Sector Employment data (table 9) to Q2 2014.

Despite the cuts, civil service engagement has held up overall but some departments have seen falls.

Figure 10: Civil Service Engagement Index changes, 2009-13 (falls, 2012-13, highlighted)




Source: Institute for Government analysis of Civil Service People Survey, 2009-13.

Outputs: what government does

Departments control their resources in different ways – some directly, others through intermediaries (such as ALBs and private companies).


Figure 11: Resource management model



Source: Institute for Government analysis of departmental accounts, National Audit Office (NAO) departmental overviews, relevant government publications, and the Online System for Central Accounting and Reporting (Oscar). Rough estimate of share of each department's resources managed through each model. Approximately 80% or more of each department's total net expenditure is included.

Some departments, such as BIS, channel a lot of funding through ALBs (though less than last year)...


Figure 12: Government funding of ALBs by department, 2012 and 2013



Source: Institute for Government analysis of public bodies reports, 2012 and 2013.

...with others, such as MoD, spending it with third-party suppliers of goods and services.


Figure 13: NAO estimate of annual spending with private sector providers



Source: Institute for Government analysis of NAO, *Managing Government Suppliers*.

There are different demands on different departments: for example, the Treasury passes the most legislation.

Figure 14: Government bills passed by department, 2010-12 to 2013-14



Source: Institute for Government analysis of parliament.uk legislation data.

Departments also differ in how effective they are at responding to requests for information (parliamentary questions, correspondence from MPs and peers, Fol requests) on time...

Figure 15: Overall rankings for responses to information requests

Department	Parl'y Questions	Rank	Correspondence	Rank	Freedom of Info	Rank	Overall Rank
Wal	99.64%	2	100%	1	100.00%	1	1
DH	98.92%	5	95%	3	99.59%	2	2=
DfT	99.79%	1	97%	2	95.99%	7	2=
DfID	99.39%	3	94%	5	98.20%	3	4
BIS	97.24%	6	93%	6	96.52%	4	5=
FCO	99.36%	4	95%	3	93.45%	9	5=
DWP	95.26%	7	89%	7	91.27%	13	7
DECC	86.67%	11	74%	11	92.16%	10	8=
Scot	85.77%	12	72%	12	94.87%	8	8=
HMT	76.92%	15	72%	12	96.21%	5	8=
NIO	90.91%	10	86%	8	87.93%	15	11
CO	92.59%	8	72%	12	90.27%	14	12
DfE	92.13%	9	66%	17	91.42%	12	13
DCMS	80.12%	14	51%	19	96.05%	6	14=
MoD	81.04%	13	82%	10	86.92%	16	14=
Defra	73.83%	16	71%	16	92.06%	11	16
MoJ	28.22%	19	83%	9	82.52%	18	17
DCLG	63.00%	17	72%	12	82.46%	19	18
HO	50.38%	18	61%	18	84.21%	17	19

Source: Institute for Government analysis of parliamentary questions, 2013-14; ministerial correspondence, 2013; Fol statistics, 2014 Q2.

...and in how many of their listed actions they complete on time.


Figure 16: Structural Reform Plan actions completed on time, 2013-14

Dept	% deadlines missed 12 months in		Rank		
	2012-13	2013-14	2012-13	2013-14	Change
DfID	4%	3%	1	1	=
HMT	39%	11%	17	2	+15
BIS	6%	12%	2	3	+1
HMRC	38%	14%	15	4	+11
MoD	9%	15%	3	5	-2
FCO	39%	18%	16	6	+10
DfE	23%	19%	9	7=	+2
DCLG	17%	19%	4	7=	-3
MoJ	35%	20%	13=	9	+4
HO	22%	22%	6=	10	-4
DfT	35%	24%	13=	11	+2
DWP	33%	26%	11	12	-1
CO	22%	27%	6=	13	-7
DECC	19%	31%	5	14	-9
Defra	23%	32%	8	15	-7
DH	30%	36%	10	16	-7
DCMS	34%	43%	12	17	-3

Source: Institute for Government analysis of Structural Reform Plans. Data API as of 29 May 2013 and 25 July 2014.

Some, such as MoD, are responsible for more major projects than others – and the confidence that they will be delivered varies.

Figure 17: Major project delivery – confidence by department, 2014




Source: Institute for Government analysis of Major Projects Authority annual report, 2014. Statuses as of September 2013.

Outcomes: the impact of what government does

The number of indicators for measuring impact varies between departments...

Figure 18: Number of impact indicators by department, 2014



Source: Institute for Government analysis of impact indicators, transparency.number10.gov.uk, 7-11 August 2014.

...as does the seriousness with which they take them and how easy it can be for the public to access them.


Figure 19: Usability of departments' impact indicators

Department	Current Score	Open Data	Presentation	Annual Report	Overall
DCLG	Green	Green	Green	Green	1=
DfT	Green	Green	Green	Green	1=
DWP	Green	Green	Green	Green	1=
CO	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Orange	4=
DCMS	Green	Green	Green	Red	4=
HMRC	Green	Green	Yellow	Green	6
DfE	Orange	Yellow	Green	Green	7
BIS	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	8
DfID	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	9
DECC	Green	Yellow	Yellow	Green	10=
DH	Green	Green	Yellow	Red	10=
FCO	Orange	Yellow	Yellow	Orange	12
MoJ	Orange	Yellow	Yellow	Orange	13
Defra	Red	Yellow	Yellow	Green	14=
MoD	Red	Yellow	Yellow	Green	14=
HO	Red	Yellow	Yellow	Orange	16
HMT	Red	Yellow	Yellow	Red	17

Source: Institute for Government analysis of impact indicators and departmental annual reports.

The British public does not believe politicians currently prioritise the right things...


Figure 20: 'Which three things do you think UK politicians prioritise at the moment?' and 'Which three things do you think UK politicians should prioritise?'



Source: Institute for Government/Populus polling, August 2014.

...and nearly 60% are dissatisfied with the way government does its job, more than some other northern European countries.

Figure 21: 'About the Government. How satisfied are you with the way it is doing its job?'



Source: Institute for Government analysis of European Social Survey, 2012.