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	<title>Blog &#187; Arm&#8217;s length bodies</title>
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	<description>Institute for Government Blog</description>
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		<title>Acceptance of NHS reform could hinge on accountability</title>
		<link>http://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/blog/2781/acceptance-of-nhs-reform-could-hinge-on-accountability/?source=rss</link>
		<comments>http://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/blog/2781/acceptance-of-nhs-reform-could-hinge-on-accountability/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Fri, 03 Jun 2011 13:25:00 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Bill Moyes</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[New models of governance and public services]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Accountability]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Arm's length bodies]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Devolution]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Localism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Select committees]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/blog/?p=2781</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[If the Government&#8217;s listening exercise can encourage ministers to clarify the lines of accountability, the decentralisation introduced in the Health and Social Care Bill may be more widely accepted. The Institute&#8217;s recent report, Nothing to do with me? put forward guiding principles on ministerial accountability within decentralised services. The report argues for a new consensus about the accountability of ministers, as well as officials, as services are devolved. Greater clarity is needed on two fundamental points: what a minister should properly be held accountable for, and how Parliament can best play its role in holding ministers and others to account. Guiding principles The report suggests two guiding principles: the use of public money should always be subject to ultimate scrutiny and oversight by elected public representatives, acting on behalf of taxpayers accountability should be aligned with effective responsibility, with scrutiny and oversight focused first on the person or body with the most appropriate remit and powers (see page 9 of the report). Putting these principles into practice implies an end to top down accountability by default. But changing perceptions of who is accountable takes: time clarity about who is responsible for what actions within decentralised services political skill and discipline [...]]]></description>
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		<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
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		<title>One rule for social mobility, another for sustainability</title>
		<link>http://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/blog/2326/one-rule-for-social-mobility-another-for-sustainability/?source=rss</link>
		<comments>http://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/blog/2326/one-rule-for-social-mobility-another-for-sustainability/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Wed, 06 Apr 2011 16:43:55 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Jill Rutter</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Better policy making]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[New models of governance and public services]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Arm's length bodies]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/blog/?p=2326</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[In July 2010, Environment Secretary announced the abolition of the government funded watchdog on sustainability, the Sustainable Development Commission. The rationale was that sustainability was too important to be left to an outside body – it had to be brought in house and &#8220;mainstreamed&#8221; within government with an oversight role for Parliament’s Environment Audit Committee. &#8220;On sustainability &#8211; together with my right hon. friend the Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change &#8211; we are determined to play the lead role across the whole of Government. We will mainstream sustainability, strengthen the Government&#8217;s performance in this area and put processes in place to join up activity across Government much more effectively. &#8220;I am not willing simply to delegate this responsibility to an external body. I have accordingly decided that I will withdraw DEFRA funding from the Sustainable Development Commission (SDC) at the end of the current financial year, and instead take a personal lead, with an enhanced departmental capability and presence.&#8221; (Caroline Spelman, July 2010) So far, so coherent. Except the government’s new social mobility strategy (PDF, 2.82MB) takes exactly the opposite tack. It echos uncannily the original rationale for handing scrutiny of the government’s sustainable development performance to an [...]]]></description>
		<wfw:commentRss>http://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/blog/2326/one-rule-for-social-mobility-another-for-sustainability/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
		<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
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		<title>Where next for arm&#8217;s length bodies?</title>
		<link>http://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/blog/1562/where-next-for-arms-length-bodies/?source=rss</link>
		<comments>http://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/blog/1562/where-next-for-arms-length-bodies/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Fri, 07 Jan 2011 17:41:37 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Ian Magee</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[New models of governance and public services]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Arm's length bodies]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Public Services]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Quangos]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Select committees]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/blog/?p=1562</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[We’ve produced our report, Read Before Burning. We had in the autumn the results of the Government review. Today, we heard coruscating criticism from the Public Administration Select Committee (PASC) of the way the government carried out its review. There seems to be a deal of unhelpful emotion creeping into this debate – words like &#8220;absurd&#8221; (a Cabinet Office spokesman, responding to the Select Committee’s claim, in its turn, that the Government’s review was &#8220;botched&#8221;). Even some of the commentators are affected, occasionally allowing personal agendas to skew their normal objectivity. So  where next? Well, let&#8217;s hope that the government takes notice of what we and the PASC have in our different ways said: there is much work still to be done with arm&#8217;s length bodies (or quangos, if you must) a simpler structure needs to be introduced the government has made a frank admission that the savings once trailed simply aren’t there and above all &#8211; a positive look forward is needed to help those organisations which are for the chop manage their demise effectively. Why this matters should be obvious. All these organisations are there to serve the public. They are staffed by public servants who deserve better than [...]]]></description>
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		<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
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		<title>Henry VIII or Henry II? Ministers need to rethink powers in the Public Bodies Bill</title>
		<link>http://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/blog/1009/henry-viii-or-henry-ii-ministers-need-to-rethink-powers-in-the-public-bodies-bill/?source=rss</link>
		<comments>http://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/blog/1009/henry-viii-or-henry-ii-ministers-need-to-rethink-powers-in-the-public-bodies-bill/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Mon, 08 Nov 2010 12:07:59 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Andrew Adonis</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[A more effective Whitehall]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Accountability]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Arm's length bodies]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Quangos]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/blog/?p=1009</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[There is often Parliamentary controversy when the government seeks to give itself &#8216;Henry VIII powers&#8217; &#8211; extensive powers through secondary legislation. The last government&#8217;s Legislative and Regulatory Reform Act (2006) had a torrid time in Parliament for that reason. The House of Lords Constitution Committee has flagged similar concerns about the Public Bodies Bill due for second reading in the Lords on Tuesday and the Institute for Government has produced a briefing note (PDF, 68KB). In normal circumstances, it would be controversial enough to propose one bill to take powers to implement the outcome of a review of the entire quangos landscape through secondary legislation. The key feature is that, as the House of Lords points out, secondary legislation does not allow debate – yet many of these bodies were the subject of extensive parliamentary debate when they were set up. A sword of Damocles over public bodies Equally, if not more concerning yet, is clause 11. This gives Ministers the power to add, at any time, any body listed in Schedule 7 of the bill to earlier lists of bodies to be abolished, merged or have its functions modified. The sword of Damocles thus hangs over bodies which have been [...]]]></description>
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		<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
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		<title>The fate of quangos</title>
		<link>http://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/blog/820/the-fate-of-quangos/?source=rss</link>
		<comments>http://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/blog/820/the-fate-of-quangos/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Fri, 15 Oct 2010 16:50:45 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Jill Rutter</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[A more effective Whitehall]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Arm's length bodies]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Quangos]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/blog/?p=820</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Early on in my civil service career, I worked on the abolition of the Greater London Council (GLC). One of the Thatcher government&#8217;s charges against the GLC was that it wasted ratepayers’ money on a plethora of loony left causes. But Ministers wanted to be sure that the few worthy causes &#8216;Red Ken&#8217; might have also funded were not left stranded as the GLC rug was pulled out from under them. The then officials in charge of abolition in the department of the environment summoned officials from across government to go through the list of GLC grants, searching for ones that could be cut. One by one, departments resisted. Finally the chair read out &#8220;Sexual Relations for the Disabled &#8211; surely we don&#8217;t need to fund that&#8221;. But the DHSS representative piped up that not only did the GLC fund it, but so did they. Analysing the fates of  public bodies A rather similar sense pervades the list of quangos being lined up for the bonfire (PDF, 432KB). A quick analysis of the fate of types of public body below shows that the government has found very few arm&#8217;s length body functions (we have counted as one the same function performed [...]]]></description>
		<wfw:commentRss>http://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/blog/820/the-fate-of-quangos/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
		<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
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		<item>
		<title>Reining in the quango state: our four key findings</title>
		<link>http://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/blog/627/reining-back-the-quango-state-our-four-key-findings/?source=rss</link>
		<comments>http://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/blog/627/reining-back-the-quango-state-our-four-key-findings/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Fri, 24 Sep 2010 15:42:11 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Ian Magee</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[A more effective Whitehall]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Arm's length bodies]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Cuts]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/blog/?p=627</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Ministers have already said that the list does not represent current policy. But the desire to rein back the quango state was already clear in the coalition agreement and earlier announcements. Since arm’s length bodies account for some 13% of all government spending, a large scale rationalisation was always on the cards with the government seeking to achieve large scale fiscal consolidation. But this comes back to some of the key findings in our July report, Read Before Burning. First, over half of all quangos are small advisory bodies of experts with no independent budget or staff. Abolishing them may make sense if their advice is no longer needed – but it won’t save significant sums of money. In Read Before Burning we argued that since they advise, not execute, they should not be regarded as part of the arm’s length landscape at all. In addition, some of the bodies on the list are trading funds which raise fees to cover their costs. That is not reason to keep them if they no longer serve a purpose – but abolishing them won’t save money. Second, the really big money is tied up in relatively few bodies. In 2007-8 just 15 [...]]]></description>
		<wfw:commentRss>http://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/blog/627/reining-back-the-quango-state-our-four-key-findings/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
		<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
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		<item>
		<title>Select Committee report demonstrates need for reform</title>
		<link>http://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/blog/586/select-committee-report-demonstrates-need-for-reform/?source=rss</link>
		<comments>http://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/blog/586/select-committee-report-demonstrates-need-for-reform/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Tue, 21 Sep 2010 16:34:25 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Jill Rutter</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[A more effective Whitehall]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Arm's length bodies]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Parliamentary reform]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/blog/?p=586</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Everyone agrees the Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR) needs not only to be independent, but also be seen to be independent of government. Otherwise it fails the credibility test. The Treasury Select Committee has therefore concluded the only way of giving it that degree of independence is to make it a non-Ministerial department. The problem with non-Ministerial departments Our report Read Before Burning makes clear the real lack of transparency associated with non-Ministerial departments. Many departments treat them more like Executive Agencies. As one non-Ministerial department head memorably said, &#8220;the first thing you need to know about being a non-Ministerial department is that you have a minister and you are not a proper department&#8221;. The factor behind the Committee&#8217;s recommendation to make the OBR a non-ministerial department was the need for it to have its own Estimate – rather than get its money direct from the Treasury. However, as non-Ministerial departments agree their funding with the Treasury through their parent department (in the OBR&#8217;s case, the Treasury!) all this does is blur the picture. The need for a clearer system The answer, as recommended in our report and our evidence to the Treasury Select Committee (PDF, 98KB) is a new, clearer system for determining [...]]]></description>
		<wfw:commentRss>http://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/blog/586/select-committee-report-demonstrates-need-for-reform/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
		<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		</item>
		<item>
		<title>Closing quangos: lessons from Ofcom and the Hearing Aid Council</title>
		<link>http://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/blog/390/closing-quangos-lessons-from-ofcom-and-the-hearing-aid-council/?source=rss</link>
		<comments>http://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/blog/390/closing-quangos-lessons-from-ofcom-and-the-hearing-aid-council/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Thu, 19 Aug 2010 10:31:40 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Ian Moss</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[New models of governance and public services]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Arm's length bodies]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/blog/?p=390</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[The latest government cull of Arm&#8217;s length bodies (ALBs)  may be different in scale and speed from anything we have seen in the recent past – but there are many useful lessons out there on how to navigate through the minefield.  In particular it pays to learn from those who have already been through it. Bodies may close but the functions they undertake may remain crucial. Government has to guard against the inevitable blight that hits condemned organisations so essential services do not suffer as a consequence of rationalisation and change. The work of the Financial Services Authority going to the Bank of England might come into the category of issues where high risks are attached if staff turnover leads them to take their eye off the ball on financial regulation. Elsewhere the Government has given commitments that changes in structures will not affect the outcome the body supports. For instance, that the abolition of the UK Film Council will not lead to a loss of support for filmmaking in the UK. Interested parties will be watching closely to ensure this promise is kept. Learning from experience Most Departments will be grappling with the same set of issues, many of which [...]]]></description>
		<wfw:commentRss>http://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/blog/390/closing-quangos-lessons-from-ofcom-and-the-hearing-aid-council/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
		<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
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		<item>
		<title>Q. When is an agency not an agency?</title>
		<link>http://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/blog/130/when-is-an-agency-not-an-agency/?source=rss</link>
		<comments>http://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/blog/130/when-is-an-agency-not-an-agency/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Wed, 14 Jul 2010 00:01:41 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Jill Rutter</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[New models of governance and public services]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Arm's length bodies]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://dev1.silverworks.com/blog/?p=130</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Welcome to the confused subject of arm’s length government. At the launch of the Institute last year, Cabinet Secretary Sir Gus O&#8217;Donnell singled out the tangled landscape of arm’s length government as a suitable case for &#8216;IFG treatment&#8217;. One year’s research, seminars and discussions on, we have published Read before Burning, our recommendations for sorting out this confused landscape. A key recommendation is to untangle the current confused designation of public bodies – and relate form and governance much more closely to function and the freedom the body needs to perform that function. Although ALBs in total account for about 14% of government spending, the big money is tied up in just a few organisations – and even then 75% of NDPB spending is passed on to third parties.  If we are to get real efficiencies and better governance, we need remove the temptation to treat arm&#8217;s length government as a numbers game. Half ALBs are small advisory bodies with no independent budget or staff. They advise, not execute. We think they should simply be treated as what they are &#8211; departmental advisory committees and no longer be regarded as part of arm&#8217;s length government. For the rest, we would get [...]]]></description>
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		<slash:comments>4</slash:comments>
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