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Revolution in a teacup?

Why ministers should choose permanent secretaries.

Underpinning all we have to say about senior appointments in the Civil Service, and explicitly, is the principle of appointment entirely on merit. Why then the fuss in some quarters about some great principle having been breached if ministers, as we recommend, are given the choice from a shortlist, in a competition run entirely by the regulator, the Civil Service Commission (CSC), there to ensure fair play?

Our proposals, which are based on analysis of all the literature, including that available to the CSC; extensive interviews with those involved including current and past Chairs of the CSC; the available quantitative evidence; and experience from other countries, are well thought through, and have the benefit of an evidence base. Ministers of all parties to whom we spoke are clear that their influence needs to be strengthened. However, although the CSC has used its statutory power to block ministerial choice, this does not reflect what the promoters of the most recent legislation, the 2010 Constitutional Reform and Governance Act, intended to achieve. Jack Straw, the former Justice Secretary who sponsored the legislation, made clear to us that he ‘wouldn’t have been party to it’ had he known it would be used to block ministers from choosing their officials from a shortlist of appointable candidates. We are very clear that this cannot mean descent into undue influence, still less “cronyism”. Minsters past and present, across parties, agree strongly on that. Yet the CSC, resting largely it appears on the fact that our recommendations “would be a significant change from current long-standing practice”, appear trenchantly opposed to any suggestion of movement, however rational, towards elected politicians’ expressed wishes. There was an interesting exchange of views at our seminar on this issue between a Secretary of State who claimed that she had minimal input to the replacement of her Permanent Secretary, and a former Cabinet Secretary who, having overseen many such appointments, claimed that could not possibly be the case. Yet both could well have been right: the current system lacks transparency and takes no account of ministers’ sometimes significant and unspoken influence. And there is no transparency at all about managed moves, with no competition, across the permanent secretary grade. Merit is key to successful appointment. This is our strong view; and it is shared by all with whom we spoke. If the CSC does its job properly and with due rigour this would remain the case under our proposals. Indeed, the Commissioner for Public Appointments - a role held by the same person as the First Civil Service Commissioner - produces a short list of appointable candidates (the “merit” criterion) for important and independent public appointments now. The Chair of the UK Statistics Authority and of the BBC Trust, among many others, are posts which offer ministers choices now. It seems to us really hard to argue that independent permanent secretary appointments should somehow be subject to a separate regime. I have been involved in many senior appointments, including those just below permanent secretary level, considering both internal and external candidates. The critical question, always, becomes the first hurdle – could she or he do the job as advertised? If the answer is yes, candidates are placed “above the line”. There is then a separate discussion about ranking the candidates who have passed that first test. Sometimes there is a truly outstanding candidate, clearly ranked first. On other occasions, a degree of subjective judgement is applied, including an assumption as to how candidate x or y might work effectively with ministers. We are arguing that ministers are best placed to make that judgement, taking all the evidence, including the CSC ranking, into account. But they would only have the power to make that judgement based on a list of candidates who have passed a duly rigorous merit test overseen as now by the independent Commission. This is hardly revolutionary.
Publisher
Institute for Government

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