David Cameron has repeatedly said he wants to leave ministers in place for a lengthy period. But the departure of Chris Huhne on Friday means that three members, one-seventh, of his original Cabinet have departed and this means five departments have seen changes. So how 'stable' is this coalition government proving, and what does it tell us about the management of reshuffling?
Cameron’s resistance to reshuffle is in part a reaction to the supposed shuffle-fever of Tony Blair – a reason for resistance in the resignation of Liam Fox. And indeed, the problem of ministerial churn is something that the Institute for Government has highlighted.
However, this does beg the question of whether Blair was as quick to reshuffle as legend would have, and whether Cameron is really managing to avoid it.
Cameron has had three major departures, but also a number of smaller ones (Baroness Pauline Neville-Jones from just outside the Cabinet being the most notable, but also a smattering of junior minister and Parliamentary Private Secretary departures). Of the major departures – the losses of Laws, Fox and Huhne – all have all been forced upon him by allegations of misbehaviour.
At the same point in his premiership (21 months) Blair had three incidences of having to make changes. Of these, one was down to the departure of Ron Davies in October 1998, and another to the first resignation of Peter Mandelson in December 1998. But of course Blair had had a major reshuffle in July 1998, moving 9 members of his Cabinet. Blair would also see relatively major shuffling in 1999 (partly down to devolution), following the 2001 and 2005 elections, and in May 2006 (following local election defeats). [To put it in context, Edward Heath had his first big change in April 1972, (22 months), Margaret Thatcher in January 1981 (19 months), and John Major, following the April 1992 Election (17 Months)].
So Cameron may well be ahead on overall churn, but not on the number of forced resignations – at least at this point in his government.
Perhaps, stability – if it be so – is down to the care with which the government was constructed in the first place. Partly because of coalition, Cameron saw relatively big changes between his (and Nick Clegg’s) shadow cabinet and the actual Cabinet in May 2010. Coalition, and issues of policy and party, brought great care about whom to appoint in the first place; the lack of such care helps explain Blair’s July 1998 reshuffle.
In addition to the shuffle-avoidance, many commentators consider coalition to be a reason why reshuffles are more complicated and less frequent since posts have to be balanced carefully between the parties. It might be better to view these changes in coalition terms – in which case perhaps it is a case of Cameron: 1, Clegg: 2. So what does it tell us about their respective options and preferences for making appointments?
Reshuffles – no matter how small – allow talent is to be brought on. For Cameron the issue is not only managing the ambitions of many backbenchers who expected to get on, but also getting to his one-third female Cabinet. In the changes thus far Cameron has managed to appoint three new female ministers, but he has lost two (Neville-Jones, and Baroness Browning, who came in to government after Neville-Jones’ departure but left again in September 2011), but he has had few chances to appoint new ministers except for a few new Parliamentary Private Secretaries.
Clegg, like Cameron, also has to face accusations of gender imbalance. He has managed to move up two women in the post-Huhne changes, one Parliamentary Private Secretary, and one Whip. But the PPS – his own, Jo Swinson – was previously PPS to Vince Cable, and the Whip, Jenny Willott, was formerly a PPS to Huhne, until she resigned over tuition fees in December 2010. And remember, for Clegg the issue is wider, only seven of his 57 MPs are female, and four of them are now in Government, yet none have made it in to Cabinet.
Backbenchers and the media understand forced reshuffles; a replacement has to be found, and the potential for change is limited. But at some point in the next few months Cameron and Clegg will likely face their first planned reshuffle. Expectations will be high; disappointments are inevitable among those dropped and those not appointed who expected to be.
Attempting to keep minsters in place for longer is commendable, but as the PM is learning, it’s not that easy. When the big shuffle does come, the pressure for managing it well will be all the greater.