The Chilcot report: a system under strain

In addition to criticising several decisions by the Prime Minister, the report makes systematic criticism of the processes of government. For example:

• The Joint Intelligence Committee should have made clear to the Prime Minister that “the assessed intelligence had not established beyond doubt either that Saddam Hussein had continued to produce chemical and biological weapons or that efforts to develop nuclear weapons continued.” (para 807)
• The Inquiry found that eleven decisions should have been subject to collective decision making taken by a Cabinet Committee or group of ministers (para 409). This is partly a matter of ministers being able to challenge decisions, and partly because it provides departments with an opportunity to feed advice to their ministers. The report notes that it is “the responsibility of the Cabinet Secretary to ensure that members of the Cabinet are fully engaged in ways that allow them to accept collective responsibility and to meet their departmental obligations nevertheless remains” (para 430).
• Cabinet should have been “aware of the legal uncertainties” when discussing Iraq on 17 March 2003 (para 492).
• “UK planning and preparation for the post-conflict phase of operations, which rested on the assumption that the UK would be able quickly to reduce its military presence in Iraq and deploy only a minimal number of civilians, were wholly inadequate” despite the fact that “the information available to the Government before the invasion provided a clear indication of the potential scale of the post-conflict task and the significant risks associated with the UK’s proposed approach” (para 814).
• The Inquiry identified several foreseeable risks after the invasion, but because the Government “lacked both clear Ministerial oversight of post-conflict strategy, planning and preparation, and effective coordination between government departments”, it “failed to analyse or manage those risks adequately” (para 814).
• The Ministry of Defence (MOD) was slow in responding to gaps in capability in Iraq (para 821).
• It is striking that the Inquiry found that a lack of financial resources was not the reason for problems in Iraq (para 820) – while the Inquiry identified problems in the MOD, it will be interesting to see if longer-term resource questions for the military are highlighted in the debate in the coming days.
• Successive governments have taken steps to address issues identified by previous Iraq inquiries:
  • After the Butler review, Tony Blair said that in future he would use cabinet committee meetings, and his successors have stuck to that.
  • Also after the Butler review, the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS – formerly known as MI6) reinstated internal checks on the quality of intelligence that had been removed in the 90s.
  • Gordon Brown created a National Security Committee, which the Coalition renamed and revamped as the National Security Council. While Institute for Government research has found that these built upon previous committees and to some extent represented “old wine in new bottles”, they were nonetheless a step towards more formal decision making.
  • The Coalition government published its position on the legality of military action against Syria, providing some of the legal reasoning.
  • The Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) assessment of chemical weapons in Syria was published under the Coalition without a Prime Ministerial foreword.

This Inquiry’s broader remit than previous inquiries means that it reaches into new territory, and makes recommendations about how potential military engagements should be considered and planned in the future. It is important that the Government considers these recommendations, where action has not already been taken. For example, two MOD reviews have addressed some of the issues which the Inquiry identifies: Levene (on defence reform) or Gray (on procurement). It is also notable that David Cameron’s response makes a point that seems absent from Sir John’s report: “we should not be naïve to think that just because we have the best prepared plans, in the real world things can’t go wrong.” In the end, the best machinery can’t substitute for political judgements taken in uncertain environments.