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Chilcot: what should we expect?

Five and a half years after its last public evidence session, the Chilcot Report will be published on Wednesday. Daniel Thornton looks at what it will cover.

Intelligence The intelligence failures that supported the decision to invade Iraq have been well explored, including by the Butler Review, which Sir John Chilcot participated in. Iraq was a fabricator’s paradise: there was a high demand for intelligence, but a short supply. Although the intelligence failures were shared with the UK’s main allies, it is possible that Chilcot will explore how the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) ‘overpromised’. After the Butler Review, SIS reinstated internal checks on the quality of intelligence that had been removed in the 1990s – Chilcot may consider whether these changes were sufficient. On the publication of intelligence, it is hard to believe that Chilcot will be able to add anything to previous exhaustive examinations, and action has also already been taken here: the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) assessment of chemical weapons in Syria was published under the Coalition without a Prime Minister foreword. Assessment While hindsight is a wonderful thing, it is striking that some of the key risks – instability in Iraq and the role of Iran – were not considered in decisions about whether to support the US-led invasion. The famous (in some circles) options paper of 8 March 2002 only includes passing reference to Iran’s neutrality in the event of invasion. This turned out to be insufficient, given regime change in Iraq meant deposing a Sunni dictator in a Shia majority country, next to Shia Iran. Advice to the Foreign Secretary did refer to the risks of instability, but this was not taken into account in decision making at the centre of government. This should be a central part of the report. Timing of commitment to war One of the questions facing the inquiry is when a commitment was made to join a US invasion. Having worked in No 10 while Tony Blair was Prime Minister, I would judge that the most authoritative account is a memo from Jonathan Powell, then-Chief of Staff, to the PM on 19 July 2002. This private communication by a trusted adviser stated that ‘we will be there when the US takes the decision to act, but…’ and lists a serious of steps that were required. Tony Blair wrote on the memo: ‘I agree with this entirely.’ It confirms the UK assessment of the US position – ‘when’ they decided to act, not ‘if’ – and that the UK was preparing to support the US, but only if various actions were taken. Decision making process Chilcot will look at the decision making process that led the Government to reach this position and whether planning at official level was properly organised. The evidence provided to Chilcot suggests that the departments which needed to be involved in planning were involved, and meetings were minuted (with at least one notable exception) and distributed to the right people. One of the issues Chilcot has explored is whether holding Cabinet committee meetings rather than meetings in No 10 would have been preferable. But it seems unlikely that Cabinet Office civil servants rather than No 10 civil servants minuting meetings would have made much difference to the UK’s decision to join the US-led invasion.  In any event, after the Butler Review, Tony Blair said that in future he would use Cabinet committee meetings ‘where a small group is brought together to work on operational military planning and developing the diplomatic strategy’, and his successors have emphasised their attachment to Cabinet government. Gordon Brown created a National Security Committee, which David Cameron renamed and revamped as the National Security Council. While the IfG found that these built upon previous committees and, to some extent, represented ‘old wine in new bottles’, they were nonetheless a return to more structured decision making. The Cabinet might have had a more informed debate if papers had been provided to committees, or to the whole Cabinet, but it is not clear what this would have changed. The big decisions on the invasion and its aftermath were taken in Washington DC, and the big decisions about UK involvement were made by a Prime Minister at the height of his power. These fundamental things would have applied regardless of who received which papers. A possible exception relates to the Attorney General’s advice on the legality of the invasion. The facts that his advice evolved and that Sir Michael Wood, who was the FCO’s senior lawyer, considered ‘the use of force against Iraq in March 2003 was contrary to international law’ seem important for Cabinet, Parliament and the public to have been aware of. Chilcot is likely to explore this question. It is notable that the Coalition Government published its position on the legality of military action against Syria, providing some of the legal reasoning. Reconstruction Chilcot will explore the UK’s role post-invasion in the four southern provinces of Iraq. The UN Security Council Resolution recognised the US and the UK as occupying powers, imposing responsibilities on both. The thrust of the evidence to Chilcot is that the UK did not meet its responsibilities effectively. Several witnesses point to mistakes by the US administration as contributing to this – primarily de-Ba’athification and disbanding the Iraqi army – and a lack of traction with the US-led civilian administration. On the reconstruction side, it seems that the UK was unprepared to take on the role it was required to play given the UN’s limited role, and UK efforts were unco-ordinated. Much has been made of the problems of post-war planning and reconstruction, with a link being drawn to then- Secretary of State for the Department for International Development (DfID), Clare Short’s absence from some key meetings. This is not the reason reconstruction was flawed. A letter sent by Clare Short shows that she was aware of the invasion plans (which is not the same as saying that she supported them) and DfID officials anticipated hunger and mass movement after the invasion. The real problem for reconstruction, as for the administration of Iraq as a whole, was a lack of security, which was not DfID’s responsibility. It is encouraging that governments since the Butler Review appear to have addressed some of the issues that have been raised. On 6 July we will see which further issues need to be addressed.

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