Westminster over the water?

Like Westminster, Canada’s House of Commons has retained the first-past-the-post electoral system. But as in the UK, the old certainties of two-party dominance have given way to a more fluid multi-party dynamic. As polling day (19 October) approaches, three parties have a plausible chance of taking power: the ruling Conservatives of Prime Minister Stephen Harper, the leftist New Democratic Party (NDP) – Official Opposition for the past four years – and the once-dominant Liberals of Justin Trudeau (son of a former Prime Minister). In such a tight race, a hung parliament is the most likely outcome, though this was also the case four years ago when Harper pre-empted Cameron in winning an unexpected majority. But if the polls are right, Ottawa may face a period of post-election uncertainty similar to that anticipated at Westminster in May. Canada has more recent experience of hung parliaments than the UK – nine since 1945. The norm is for the largest party to form a minority administration, as Harper did for five years until 2011. A common view in Canada is that minority parliaments produce unstable governments characterised by brinkmanship rather than statesmanship. As a minority PM, Harper regularly pushed through contentious bills by daring opposition parties to bring him down and trigger an early poll. This experience means there would be little enthusiasm for a return to non-majoritarian rule. If the centre-left Liberals or NDP come out ahead in this election, they will have the advantage of a more natural ally with whom to build a stable governing arrangement. It would be more contentious if the Conservatives remain the largest party, but the Liberals and NDP seek to squeeze Harper out of office using their combined majority. As in the UK, the rules around government formation are somewhat cloudy. In 2008, when the Liberals and NDP sought to form a coalition to push Harper out of office, he controversially requested a temporary suspension of Parliament, during which he challenged the legitimacy of the proposed coalition. By the time Parliament returned, the momentum had shifted and Harper retained his position as PM. Partly as a result of this previous failure – but also informed by the UK Liberal Democrats’ electoral disaster this year – a full coalition between the non-Conservative parties is considered unlikely this time. The big difference in 2015, however, is that the separatist Bloc Québécois (BQ) is no longer a significant force. In 2008 the proposed coalition (which went so far as to publish a short co-operation agreement), was to have relied upon the support of the Bloc on confidence votes. In another parallel with the Westminster 2015 election, the idea of a national government dependent on a party that was committed to breaking apart the country was a powerful rhetorical weapon wielded to scupper the plan. At that point, the separatists dominated Quebec politics nearly as fully as does the SNP in Scotland today. From 1993 until 2011, the BQ held a majority of seats in its home province (see chart), and failed by a mere one percent to win an independence referendum in 1995. Since Quebec represents around a quarter of seats in the national parliament (compared to under 10% for Scotland), this made the nationalists a serious force in Ottawa. In 2011 however, the party collapsed, taking just four seats as the NDP won an unprecedented triumph in francophone Canada. Its provincial ally the Parti Québécois also lost power in 2014 in provincial elections and the Bloc is not expected to recover significant ground next month.

Lessons for the UK Does the decline of the ‘sovereigntist’ challenge hold lessons for the UK? That is a big question worthy of further research, but it is notable that as Canadian federalism has evolved, Quebec has been granted significant scope to develop a distinctive social policy agenda to reflect what is seen as a more social democratic culture. Quebec has its own pension plan (with portability to the rest of Canada), and more generous parental leave and childcare provision. It also has a more extensive form of income tax devolution than that being devolved to Scotland, including the right to define taxable income and to set allowances and exemptions. Also unlike Scotland, where HM Revenue and Customs will continue to administer income tax, Quebec has a separate tax agency, thereby requiring les Québécois to file separate tax returns to the governments in Ottawa and Quebec City. Quebec also has important powers over immigration policy, which it uses to attract French speakers from elsewhere in the world. This extensive level of autonomy, combined with continuing financial ‘equalisation’ transfers from richer and faster-growing parts of Canada (such as the oil-producing West), seems to have helped quell the desire to secede. Consequently, the ‘national question’ is not currently at the forefront of political debate. But that is not to say that the Canadian federal system is a finished article: all territorial constitutions are constantly renegotiated and redesigned over time. In the present electoral campaign, Trudeau is promising to improve joint working between federal and provincial governments (for instance around healthcare) after a period of poor intergovernmental relations. Canada’s election will have no direct impact on the UK. But another victory for Harper will bring cheer to our own Conservatives, while a centre-left alliance will be watched with interest from the opposition benches. A second successive wipe-out for the Bloc, meanwhile, will illustrate that nationalist fortunes can fall as well as rise, and that well-designed constitutional arrangements can provide a stable (though never static) balance between national unity and sub-national autonomy.